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COMMAND HISTORY 1980

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PREFACE

(U) This first time supplement to the 1980 USREDCOM Command History is a record of the activities and accomplishments of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). It is therefore appropriate for the Commander to preface our first year of existence.

(U) The following excerpt was extracted from Lieutenant General P.X. Kelley's statement made before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Force Projection, 9 March 1981. It reflects not only the status of the command, but his own personal views and philosophy about the many important issues that affect the RDJTF.

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(U) "On 1 March 1980, Headquarters, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, or RDJTF, was activated as a subordinate command of the U.S. Readiness Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

(U) Roughly a year ago, if you had visited our headquarters you would have been greeted by a constant stream of carpenters, electricians, telephone installation men, and Air Force construction personnel. To add to this confusion, you would have also met our uniformed men and women, who were individually selected by their parent service, as they reported for duty. You might say, then, that one year ago headquarters, RDJTF, started with a "clean piece of paper", and undertook one of the most difficult, demanding, and complex military tasks ever addressed in peacetime.

(U) Today, 56 officers and 42 enlisted from the Army, 42 officers and 42 enlisted from the Air Force, 29 officers and 15 enlisted from the Navy, and 18 officers and 17 enlisted from the Marine Corps, all of whom are assigned to the RDJTF Headquarters, are a National asset. This group, which represents a carefully orchestrated and in-depth balance of combat, combat support, and combat service support skills from all four services, is, to the best of my knowledge, the only group in this country whose current, fulltime activities focus on joint and combined combat operations. At last, we have recognized the essentiality of such a peacetime organization, and obviated the confusion and risks associated with pulling together an "AD ROC" headquarters at the "11th Hour" when a crisis erupts. Teamwork, cooperation, and daily interface between all four services are absolute requirements to successfully accomplish the missions assigned to the RDJTF. Anything less is courting defeat. The RDJTF Headquarters is the amalgam which accomplished this!

(U) In my view, one of the most significant decisions ever made by the National Command Authorities relative to effective crisis management was the establishment of a functional Washington Liaison Officer for the RDJTF. The Director, RDJTF/WLO is Army Brigadier General Dale A. Vesser, and he has 15 officers and three enlisted from the four services. In their one year of existence, the RDJTF/WLO has become the focal point for the myriad of activities in Washington associated with the RDJTF, not to mention the critical political-military interface they have provided for the RDJTF with all agencies of government. I can state, unequivocally, that the success of the RDJTF thus far is directly related to the superb efforts of General Vesser and our WLO. Without the WLO, the RDJTF's ability to accomplish assigned missions would be highly speculative. It is my right arm!

(U) I should emphasize that what I say today is fully supported by each and every member of our Headquarters: Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine. I do not stand alone in my opinions. I am backed-up by 261 of the most talented and dedicated individuals I have ever known, and no group can speak with more authority on the RDJTF. We have worked daily, weekly, and monthly, with only one purpose: the successful accomplishment of the RDJTF's many and complex tasks. If we don't do it, I'm in a quandary as to who will! I have yet to hear a reasonable alternative.

(U) It is important to note that the RDJTF Headquarters is charged with the primary responsibility for the planning associated with contingency operations in Southwest Asia. In terms of land mass, Southwest Asia encompasses an area which approximates the size of the United States. This includes a wide diversity

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of terrain and climatic conditions, ranging from the formidable mountain ranges of Iran to the barren desert wastelands of the Arabian Peninsula; from sub-zero temperatures to +140F in the shade. Moreover, it should come as no surprise to note that the Persian Gulf is some 7,000 air miles from the east coast of the United States. To the best of my knowledge, we have never, in 205 years of our history, attempted to rapidly project and sustain a force as sizable as the RDJTF over such vast distances. In contrast, Vietnam involved a relatively slow, incremental build-up over years — not days or weeks.

(U) Since the United States imports roughly 13% of its oil requirements from the Persian Gulf States, there is little doubt that if forced to do so we could find alternatives. It is highly unlikely, however, that Germany, which imports some 45% of its oil requirements from the gulf, or Japan and France, who import approximately 75% of theirs, could find reasonable alternatives should this source be denied. In my personal opinion, then, without Persian Gulf oil, western Europe and Japan could be in economic chaos in a matter of months. I need not remind you of the potential consequences to the United States and the rest of the Free World.

(U) When deployed, the RDJTF would start with zero combat power and support structure on the land masses of Southwest Asia. Our difficult task is to deploy combat power — and I describe combat power as personnel, equipment, and necessary logistics support — in an orderly, balanced, and sequential manner — as rapidly as strategic airlift, strategic sealift, and amphibious shipping will permit.

(U) Let me now tell you about the RDJTF itself — particularly its uniqueness.

(U) First, I would emphasize that in peacetime, or prior to deployment, I do not command forces of the RDJTF. My day-to-day command is limited to the 261 officers and enlisted of our headquarters. Our headquarters, in turn, is under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Readiness Command.

(U) RDJTF forces from the four services are assigned on a daily basis to a unified or specified commander, and there is no intent to assign these forces to the RDJTF until directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; such assignment is to be determined by requirements existing at the time.

(U) When the RDJTF deploys to Southwest Asia, it would normally report to the National Command Authorities in Washington through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or as otherwise directed by the JCS.

(U) It should be noted that no new forces have been added to the overall military force structure specifically for the RDJTF. The RDJTF's job is to amalgamate the broad range of diverse combat capabilities currently extant in all four services into an effective combat force.

(U) Among the Army organizations designated for planning, we have many of the finest available, and, when these deploy as part of the RDJTF, they will be commanded by Lieutenant General Thomas H. Tackaberry, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps.

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(U) The Air Force has made an extraordinary effort to provide the RDJTF with their best units from Tactical Air Command, Strategic Air Command, and the Military Airlift Command. Our Air Force Commander is Lieutenant General Arnold W. Braswell, Commander, 9th Air Force.

(U) Our planning interface with the Navy is CINCPACFLT, Admiral Donald C. Davis, who, of course, is the ultimate Navy senior of Naval Forces in the Indian Ocean. When we deploy to Southwest Asia, naval force in the Indian Ocean will be significantly augmented to conduct maritime operations in support of the RDJTF.

(U) Regarding the Marine Corps, we plan on a daily basis with Major General Kenneth L. Robinson, the Commanding General, I Marine Amphibious Force, Camp Pendleton, California. In his planning, General Robinson can draw on forces from the entire Marine Corps, including I Marine Amphibious Force; the II Marine Amphibious Force on the east coast; and the III Marine Amphibious Force on Okinawa.

(U) Our final planning component is the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, commanded by Brigadier General Joseph C. Lutz, USA, who also commands the J.F.R. Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. I consider unconventional warfare to be a significant force multiplier, — and General Lutz has specialized units available to him for planning from the Army, Navy and Air Force.

(U) My main reason for mentioning these individuals and organizations is to provide a counter-point to those who have criticized the RDJTF from positions of ignorance. As evidenced, no responsible person could logically call the RDJTF a "paper tiger". The RDJTF Headquarters plans, on a daily basis, with a force which exceeds 200,000 young, hard-charging, professional Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines. In terms of deterrent capability and combat power, the forces available to the RDJTF represent some of the best our nation can currently muster —and, as it matures, the RDJTF gains increased recognition and respect from friends and foes, alike.

(U) I have consistently maintained, the permanent establishment of a four-service headquarters to plan, train, jointly exercise, deploy and employ a joint force is one of the most important decisions I have known. Never before, to the best of my knowledge, has this been done on such a scale in peacetime.

(U) Perhaps it is appropriate to discuss why our nation requires such a force. To do this, it may be best to first highlight the RDJTF's role in the security of Southwest Asia.

(U) While there are a number of threats to the security of Southwest Asia, the most serious is the military power of the Soviet Union —and the will the Soviets have shown to use it.

(U) During the last decade and a half, we have seen the Russians developing a more global perspective to their military capabilities, especially in Africa and Southwest Asia.

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(U) Soviet intervention through proxies in Angola and Ethiopia, or directly as we have seen in Afghanistan, has become a real and disturbing threat. We can no longer ignore new Soviet overseas bases, or the proximity of their forces to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

(U) The best counter to Soviet adventurism in Southwest Asia is a network of strong, independent, and stable nations — in simple words — collective security. While this must be at the initiative of the nations in the region, the United States must be prepared to assist diplomatically, economically, and, if necessary, militarily.

(U) It should be obvious that the RDJTF is currently the only meaningful counterbalance to Soviet adventurism in Southwest Asia. It is a deterrent force, designed to promote stability in this region. If deterrence fails, however, it must have the capability to counter Soviet aggression with military force. Aside from the RDJTF, I know of no reasonable alternative for responsive and effective military action in Southwest Asia. I must emphasize that the RDJTF is not an invasion force to intrude on the sovereign rights of any nation. Quite to the contrary, our purpose is to insure that these fundamental rights are protected.

(U) Two key words basic to the RDJTF's ability to establish a credible deterrence in Southwest Asia are "rapid" and "deployment". Not only do these encourage questions such as, "How rapid is rapid?" and "How do you deploy?" — but they mean different things to different people. I do not have simple answers — for specifics are scenario dependent. If we merely had to deploy people, and didn't have to worry about equipment and supplies, we have enough seats on our strategic airlift — together with the highest number of aircraft, in our civil reserve airlift fleet — to move the entire RDJTF in several days. But people alone do not constitute combat power. It takes equipment and logistics to build an effective combat team.

(U) The challenge facing the RDJTF is to ensure that we optimize and fully integrate the capabilities of airlift, sealift, and amphibious lift. And, in our planning, we must deal with today's numbers of aircraft and ships to perform this task. We cannot make non-real-world assumptions — nor can we conjecture as to what will or will not be available in 1985 or 1990. Our mission is here and our mission is now! Parenthetically, I must be the first to emphasize that without sufficient strategic airlift, strategic sealift, and amphibious lift, there is no way to put a capital "R" in rapid, and all of the finest trained troops and most sophisticated weapons systems in the world are totally useless sitting at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; or Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, South Carolina.

(U) We are undertaking incredibly detailed planning to insure we optimize the use of these limited resources. We are demanding, through command channels, that every item of supply or equipment which goes aboard an aircraft in the early days of deployment will be something which is an essential enhancement to RDJTF combat capabilities — we will not tolerate creature comforts at the expense of combat power!

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(U) Also, we are undertaking increased efforts to preposition supplies and equipment in the region — either aboard ship or on land. The airlift savings associated with prepositioning are significant. As an example, one ammunition ship at Diego Garcia, as part of the NTPS, carries as much ammunition as could be lifted by roughly 500 C-141 sorties from the east coast to the Middle East. This, obviously, would allow us to reduce force closure times and simultaneously enhance staying power.

(U) On the strategic sealift side, we are looking for faster ways to get ships on-berth and loaded in U.S. ports, on their way to the Middle East, and off-loaded in Persian Gulf ports or over the beach. Our ultimate objective is to get a specific item of supply or equipment from where it is today in the U.S. — to the actual user in Southwest Asia — in the shortest period of time.

(U) Concerning readiness of RDJTF units, it is important to note that the Army has undertaken extraordinary efforts to upgrade those organizations which are available to the RDJTF for planning.

(U) The Air Force has filled all of the key billets in RDJTF wings, and re-allocated war reserve spare kits to these units to insure that they are ready to deploy and fight — now!

(U) The Marine Corps, with traditional readiness emphasis, is relatively sound across the board. In fact, the 7th MAB's equipment aboard the NTPS ships is in an exceptionally high state of readiness.

(U) Since the bulk of the Navy forces which will support the RDJTF will be those which are forward deployed on a daily basis in the Indian Ocean, and forward deployed forces are normally given priority for readiness, I have every confidence that our partners on the sea will be ready when the circumstances so dictate.

(U) To enhance operational readiness, we have established a realistic training and exercise program. In one year we have participated in eight separate exercises — two of which were conducted overseas — Exercise BRIGHT STAR in Egypt last November — and Exercise ACCURATE TEST, a communications exercise, in Oman during February. Both of these far exceeded our initial expectations.

(U) One of our most important tasks is to constantly look for more and better ways to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities — and there are many. Press reports from Moscow highlight the fact that the RDJTF has added a new dimension to Soviet concerns over U.S. combat capabilities.

(U) If you give us the same amount of time to deploy the RDJTF as it would take the Soviets to mobilize category II and III divisions and move them into position, we can deploy a credible force — one which, at the very least, changes the fundamental calculus of Soviet decision-making.

(U) While I am quick to recognize the RDJTF's shortcomings, I am impatient with those "gloom and doom" experts who picture every Soviet soldier leaning forward in the attack position — and who portray every U.S. serviceman or woman

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sitting back wringing their hands in desperation. This is an unwarranted indictment of the hundreds of thousands of superb young Americans in uniform today who still have the patriotism, guts, determination and professionalism to do the job. As the RDJTF, I can't afford the luxury of spending the bulk of my time discussing what we need for the future — even though I applaud those who do. I have been given a specific mission, and must do with what we have available — here and now!

(U) We cannot afford to put our head in the sand, and, as long as I am associated with the RDJTF, I will continue to move forward in providing this country with something it requires — a fully combat capable and deployable force. Don't think me naive in this regard, for I doubt if there is anyone who has a better understanding of RDJTF capabilities and limitations — but we must make this concept work. I have neither heard of nor do I know a reasonable or responsible alternative which takes into consideration the enormity and complexity of our missions — particularly as they relate to peace and stability in Southwest Asia.

(U) In closing, let me say that as the Commander I see the RDJTF as an essential element of a viable national military strategy.

(U) I see it as a strong and powerful signal of our commitment to our friends in Southwest Asia and elsewhere in this troubled world.

(U) To the Soviets, it says that we will not tolerate military adventurism. It says that threats to our friends and allies could constitute an assault on our vital interests, and, when they do, we have a credible military capability to respond.

(U) To our friends and allies, it says that we are a nation to be reckoned with. We are not a "Paper Tiger".

(U) And, to the American public, it says that we, as a nation, have not forgotten our obligations to friends and allies — and that we recognize the importance of the developing regions to the free world."

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I. (U) GENERAL

~~U (S)~~ The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force concept grew out of a study conducted in 1977 which highlighted the need for a four service force which could deploy for contingencies outside NATO and Korea. Presidential Review Memorandum 10 culminated in Presidential Decision 18 (PD-18) which discussed the establishment of a force to project U.S. power rapidly. The Iranian revolution, the seizure of the American hostages in Tehran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan hastened the formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

(U) Public interest in the Rapid Deployment Force predated establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force by nearly a year. Among the first senior government officials to mention publicly what eventually would become the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was the outgoing Army Chief of Staff in the summer of 1979, General Bernard W. Rogers. He held a farewell news conference at the Pentagon on June 21, 1979, and, in response to questions, told reporters, "We are designing what will be known as the unilateral corps", a force which could be deployed for "a non-NATO contingency such as the Persian Gulf or the Middle East or Northeast Asia".¹

(U) After the Rogers news conference, news media carried a variety of reports on the proposed force. Press releases by the White House and OSD provided an additional catalyst for the creation of an RDJTF.

(U) On 29 November 1979, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) Headquarters, located at MacDill AFB, Florida. The HQ RDJTF was to be a moderately sized, full-time military staff with a balanced service representation and sized to enable the Commander, RDJTF to exercise operational control of the identified forces of the RDJTF or a force of comparable size using rapid deployment forces.

(U) On December 5, 1979, Major General Paul X. Kelley stepped forward for the U.S. Marine Corps to talk with the Pentagon press corps about the Corps' new maritime prepositioning concept. Under this concept, the Marine Corps would preposition heavy equipment and supplies aboard "maritime prepositioning ships", which could then be placed in strategically located ports around the world. When trouble flared, he said, a force of up to 45,000 Marines could be flown to the area by Air Force transports and civilian aircraft from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Once there, they would meet the prepositioning ships, draw their equipment and up to 30 days supplies from the ships, and proceed to the objective area. General Kelley, then responsible for requirements and programs at Marine Corps Headquarters, pointed out that while the maritime prepositioning ships did not have a forcible entry capability, they would, nonetheless, enhance the Marine Corps' role in the proposed Rapid Deployment Force. At the time, Kelley was not aware that he would be named the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force's first commander.

(U) The Kelley briefing received considerable coverage in national news media. Official Washington took note, and a background briefing for Pentagon reporters was scheduled late the following afternoon. Under the ground rules for the briefing the "senior Defense official" who conducted the briefing could not be identified, nor could the "senior Marine Corps officer" who joined him.

1. Transcript of news conference by General Bernard W. Rogers, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, June 21, 1979, Washington D.C.

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The senior Defense official told those present that the Carter Administration was prepared to spend \$9 billion over the next five years to create a Rapid Deployment Force which could send Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps units into areas such as the Persian Gulf. He said that the plans included purchase of at least 50 new CX transport aircraft and 15 new multi-purpose prepositioning ships. Although the plan did not have White House approval, it had been proposed by the Secretary of Defense because it would fill a major gap in the nation's defense readiness, i.e., insufficient airlift and sealift. The division of labor within the proposed Rapid Deployment Force, he told reporters, would have the Army using the new CX aircraft while the Marine Corps would use chiefly the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and the new maritime prepositioning ships. The senior Defense official also discussed at some length the kind of force which could be projected into the Southwest Asia region.

(U) National news media reported what the senior Defense official had said at the background briefing, and the idea of a Rapid Deployment Force began to gather additional steam. However, there was an information vacuum on the Rapid Deployment Force, and speculation began to fill the vacuum.

(U) Secretary of Defense Harold Brown scheduled a news conference on Friday afternoon, December 14, 1979, to lay to rest some of the speculation about the RDF. As he put it in his opening statement, "I understand there have been some questions about the organization of Rapid Deployment Forces and what the command organization might be. I should soon be establishing that organization formally, but I can tell you what is planned". He went on to tell reporters:

-- A joint task force will be established to do the planning for various contingency uses of the Rapid Deployment Forces, and these forces could range from a battalion to an Army corps in size.

-- The force could involve elements from all the services.

-- The Joint Task Force will be headed by a lieutenant general and will be part of the Readiness Command.

-- The Joint Task Force will do the planning for deployment and operation of whatever parts of the rapid deployment forces are to be used for a given contingency and will examine various contingencies.

-- If these contingencies actually occurred and an operation had to be mounted, the commander of the Joint Task Force would become the operational commander. His headquarters would be subordinate to the unified commander in the area or would report directly to the National Command Authorities.

-- The establishment of the joint task force will take place very soon, within weeks or months.

-- The Rapid Deployment Force will be composed of essentially all units not already committed to NATO or Korea. Forces will be selected from a very broad spectrum of units, including the 82nd Airborne, the 101st Airborne, a number of other Army units, the bulk of the Marine Corps, and Air Force and Navy units.

-- Over the next five years, we would expect to be able to cut the deployment time for the first substantial elements to be deployed to distant places by at least a factor of two.

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— Something on the order of \$10 billion will be spent to improve our ability to deploy rapidly.²

(U) Less than two weeks later, on December 27, 1979, Dr. Brown flew to Tampa's MacDill Air Force Base where he held a news conference about the Rapid Deployment Force. He reiterated much of what he had said on December 14th, but he added:

— The new organization will be called the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

— The task force headquarters will be part of the Readiness Command and will be subordinate to the Readiness Command.

— Major General Paul X. Kelley will be assigned as the commander of the new unit. General Kelley will be given a third star and will take command very soon.

— The RDTF Headquarters will become operational in early March 1980 and will have a staff of about 250 personnel.³

(U) Although no one had been specific about the size of the new force since General Rogers' news conference the previous summer, the consensus was that the force would number around 100,000 to 110,000 and those were the most frequently mentioned figures.

(U) Senior Defense officials who discussed the Rapid Deployment Force always talked in terms of employing it in the Southwest Asia region. It was clear that the focus of the new force was to be Southwest Asia. This was underscored by President Carter, in his State of the Union address, of January 23, 1980, which set forth what came to be known as the Carter Doctrine:

(U) "Any attempt by outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

President Carter went on in the same address to say:

"We are systematically enhancing our ability to respond rapidly to non-NATO contingencies wherever required by our commitments or when our vital interests are threatened. The Rapid Deployment Forces we are assembling will be extraordinarily flexible: They could range in size from a few ships or air squadrons to formations as large as 100,000 men, together with their support. Our forces will be prepared for rapid deployment to any region of strategic significance. Among the specific initiatives we are taking to help us respond to crises outside of Europe are: — the cargo aircraft with inter continental range; (and) — the design and procurement of a force of maritime prepositioning ships that will carry heavy equipment and supplies for three Marine Corps brigades."

2. Transcript of news conference by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, December 14, 1979, Washington, D.C.

3. Transcript of news conference by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, December 27, 1979, MacDill AFB, Florida

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(U) When the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was formally established on March 1, 1980, there was little fanfare. As other sections of this history will show, few of the new command's 258 authorized personnel were actually at MacDill Air Force Base, the headquarters building was still under renovation, guidance to the new headquarters from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Readiness command was still being formulated, and the commander of the new force was still needed in Washington.

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II. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

U ~~(S)~~ The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was not developed as an "invasion force". Rather, it was structured chiefly as a force to deter aggression from outside the Persian Gulf region and to assist nations in the region in resisting aggression from outside the region. Upon invitation from a friendly nation (or nations) in the region and when directed by the National Command Authorities, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force would have the capacity to rapidly deploy a significant force to the Middle East/Persian Gulf region. The presence of such a force would be intended as a signal to potential adversaries that movement of their armed forces into the area could result in direct confrontation with the United States. If deterrence failed, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force would be prepared to conduct sustained combat operations in the region. To prepare for any contingencies, COMRDJTF was assigned the responsibilities for all aspects of employment planning for RDJTF operations; to be capable of deploying on a no-notice basis and in a bare-base environment to meet Southwest Asia (SWA) contingencies; and to be prepared to conduct combat operations on order. Under the operational command of USCINCRD, COMRDJTF was to undertake predeployment planning for Southwest Asia (SWA) region contingencies and related CONUS training and exercises. Through USCINCRD, COMRDJTF would coordinate outside CONUS exercises with commanders of appropriate unified commands and employ forces as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

U ~~(S)~~ JCSM-318-79 dated 15 Nov 79 delineated the force composition for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and identified notional forces which were regularly assigned to a unified command and capable of rapid deployment to meet the requirements of global contingencies. In this reference, certain of those forces were also tentatively identified for designation as joint task force rapid deployment forces and were also tentatively identified for use in initial contingencies/planning for the Middle East and Africa. As a result of lessons learned in RDJTF exercises and continuing coordinated action between HQ USREDCOM, USREDCOM Service Component Headquarters, the RDJTF HQ, the services, and the headquarters of the unified and specified commands, specific forces were identified to better define the notional structure provided in JCSM-318-79. Action to further identify specific units continues.

U ~~(S)~~ With regard to deployments, the RDJTF is directed to be capable of deploying forces that were varied in their size and composition. In all cases the force selection was to be predicated on mission requirements and could be structured through modified existing OPLANS, pre-identified packages, or in some cases a no-plan situation. The deployment concept is based on the following factors:

U a. ~~(S)~~ Except for small contingencies, forces will utilize both air and sealift.

U b. ~~(S)~~ Intermediate Staging Bases (ISBs) may or may not be available.

U c. ~~(S)~~ Forces would normally be deployed by air and land, however, they must be capable of airdrop operations.

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d. U ~~(S)~~ Naval forces would normally begin closure during the crisis buildup.

U ~~(S)~~ Force deployment packages would provide a balanced capability to command and control forces from all services at various levels of conflict. If the actual force deployed for the operation was not balanced, command, control and communications (C3) would be adjusted or tailored to reflect the composition of the force.

(U) The following force packages were structured based on the above guidance:

U a. ~~(S)~~ Reinforced battalion/squadron(s)/MAU/naval combatant(s) force(s) are introduced primarily for "presence" operations and would rely heavily on local subsistence, security, billeting and transportation support. C3 would be established with the appropriate CINC and COMRDJTF via secure TTY by entry into the AUTOSEVOCOM System, and communications would be established with any other US combat forces located in or near the operational area.

U b. ~~(S)~~ A brigade/wing/MAB/CVBG force capable of short-term medium intensity combat operations and requiring subsistence, security, billeting and transportation support. C3 would be established with the supporting NCA, CINC, and RDJTF.

U c. ~~(S)~~ A division/multi-wing/MAB/multi-CVBG force capable of medium intensity combat operations for an indefinite period or capable of conducting high intensity operations until approximately C+15. Operations may be from a bare base and full subsistence, security, billeting, communications and transportation support would be required.

U d. ~~(S)~~ The entire RDJTF force list capable of sustained operations and requiring maximum logistical and communications support. In any given scenario, the deployment of the RDJTF headquarters should be viewed as a buildup by increments rather than as separate packages. These increments build from a small liaison staff to a full capability for command and control of the entire force list. Augmentation would be required as the force size and conflict intensity increases.

U ~~(S)~~ In most situations the RDJTF would attempt to deploy a headquarters liaison increment to the objective area prior to deploying forces, or possibly, even prior to a decision by the National Command Authority.

(U) An incremental buildup was planned as follows:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

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(b)(1)1.4a

a. (U) Phase I. Crisis Development.

(b)(1)1.4a

(2) (U) Priority for strategic airlift would be established by
COMRJTF.

(b)(1)1.4a

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(b)(1)1.4a

U ~~(S)~~ Specific instruction for command, control and communications counter-measures (C3CM) operations (to include electronic warfare (EW) operations); psychological operations (PSYOPS); unconventional warfare (UW) operations; search and rescue (SAR) operations; deception; rules of engagement (ROE); and reconnaissance are being developed and will be contained in appropriate annexes to specific operations orders and SOPs.

(U) In the logistics area, the following concept applies:

a. (U) COMRDTF exercises overall directive authority within the area of operation in order to insure effectiveness and economy in operations to prevent or eliminate unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the service components.

b. (u) The respective services would continue to have responsibility, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, for the logistics support of their own forces, except where such support is otherwise provided for by agreements or assignments as to common-servicing, joint-servicing, or cross-servicing at force, area or Department of Defense (DOD) level. Component commanders would deal directly through their service channels on logistics matters.

c. (U) Commanders of component forces and the naval force command would comply with the instructions of their respective department regarding the internal management of logistics within their respective commands. Additionally, they will be responsible for logistics support to their respective forces deployed in support of operations set forth in supporting plans, using established service methods, except where the logistics support is otherwise provided for by prearranged agreements or predirected assignments.

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U d. ~~(S)~~ Deploying forces would be fully equipped and provided with sufficient accompanying supplies to sustain themselves until resupply can be effected. The initial resupply lines of communication (LOC) will be programmed to be established to the area of operations not later (b)(1)1.4a by sealift. While resupply will ultimately be from CONUS, resupply prior to closure of the RDJTF elements will be subject to strategic movement tradeoffs. Prior to closure of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC), some resupply may be from Unified Command (e.g. EUCOM) stocks with automatic replenishment established from CONUS.

e. (U) Initial units, supplies and equipment are scheduled to be deployed by airlift to the area of operations except for Naval/Marine forces afloat. Maximum use would be made of existing facilities at each staging base/operating base, both in CONUS and overseas and every effort will be made to keep combat service support requirements to a minimum commensurate with the tactical situation. In preparing logistics and movement plans, service component commanders would evaluate and consider throughput capabilities, adjusting required stockage levels to meet mission requirements.

U f. ~~(S)~~ The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) Commander plans to coordinate common-user logistics facilities in the area of operations, and to control and coordinate the establishment of interior LOCs as will be required to accomplish the mission. Maximum utilization will be made of local logistics support resources.

g. (U) The services, in coordination with appropriate component commanders, would compare logistics requirements in support of various sized force packages against assets available. Supporting plans would be developed; logistical shortfalls would be identified, and alternative support methods would be determined. The services would also identify specific host nation support requirements as a potential alternative logistics source.

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III. (U) MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

(U) MISSION

(U) The mission of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is to plan, jointly train, exercise, and be prepared to deploy and employ designated forces in response to contingencies threatening U.S. vital interests. More precisely and as defined by the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, the mission includes:

U a. ~~(S)~~ Being under the operational command (OPCOM) of USCINCRD to undertake predeployment planning for Southwest Asia (SWA) region contingencies and related CONUS training and exercises. The SWA region is defined as all states on the Arabian Peninsula south of the northern borders of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; the countries of Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan on the Middle East landmass; Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya on the Horn of Africa; and the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and adjacent waters.

U b. ~~(S)~~ Coordinating through USCINCRD, all outside CONUS exercises with commanders of appropriate unified commands.

U c. ~~(S)~~ Employing forces as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

(U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

U ~~(S)~~ The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Headquarters is a subordinate command of the U.S. Readiness Command. As such, the Commander, RDJTF is under the OPCON of USCINCRD for planning, joint training and exercising, and during all preparation phases for the employment of assigned forces.

U ~~(S)~~ For the employment/deployment of assigned force, the RDJTF will be employed under the direction of the National Command Authority (NCA) through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or as otherwise directed by the JCS. Furthermore, all command arrangements, agreements and memorandums of understanding between USCINCRD and commanders of other unified and specified commands will be submitted to the JCS for approval.

U ~~(S)~~ USREDCOM components (i.e., United States Army Forces, Readiness Command (USARRED) and United States Air Force Forces Readiness Command (USAFRED) will designate Army and Air Force headquarters to support RDJTF requirements for planning in exercises and contingencies. USARRED, USAFRED, and CINCPAC will further designate deployable headquarters to conduct detailed execution planning with HQ RDJTF. Once the deployable headquarters are identified for a specific exercise or contingency, they will serve as HQ RDJTF's component headquarters through which the specific contingency response will be planned in detail and executed.

U ~~(S)~~ When deployed in an exercise or contingency response, operational control (OPCON) of Army and Air Force forces will pass to COMRDJTF, Naval forces will operate in support of COMRDJTF, and Marine forces will pass OPCON to COMRDJTF upon termination of amphibious operations.

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(U) ORGANIZATION

(U) The RDJTF was slated to have an initial fill of 117 officers and 114 enlisted (total 231) to be responsible for all aspects of planning in coordination with appropriate unified commanders for rapid deployment force operations in the Middle East and for planning and conducting rapid deployment force operations in other regions of the world as directed by the JCS. Duties and responsibilities include:

a. (U) Maintain a permanent in-place, ready, trained, and exercised joint staff.

b. (U) When deployed, exercise operational control, or maintain operational relationship, as directed, over the designated forces of the RDJTF.

c. (U) Conduct mission analysis and develop staff estimates to include force tailoring.

d. (U) Review and develop OPLANS, CONPLANS and coordinate joint deployment requirements with USREDCOM and JDA.

e. (U) Monitor, through USCINCRCD, RDF readiness to include unit readiness, force deployability, force sustainability, and joint procedures and systems effectiveness.

f. (U) Coordinate, in conjunction with USREDCOM, inter-service logistics requirements.

(U) The following flag officers are assigned to the RDJTF:

(U) The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was officially established on 1 March 1980. Lieutenant General Paul X. Kelley, USMC, was the first commander. General Kelley, native of Boston, Massachusetts, was born 11 November 1928 and commissioned in 1950. He has served at least one tour with each of the four services, including service as commanding officer of the Marine Detachment of a navy ship, a tour as the senior Marine Corps officer at the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, GA., and graduated with distinction from the U.S. Air Force's Air War College at Maxwell AFB, AL. As the commander, General Kelley commands a joint task force capable of responding to strategic deployments world-wide. He is directly responsible to the Commander in Chief of United States Readiness Command (USCINCRCD) for the daily performance of the prescribed command mission and functions, and to a Unified CINC or the NCA upon employment of the RDJTF.

a. (U) The Deputy Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is Major General Robert C. Taylor, USAF. General Taylor, a native of Danforth, Illinois, was born on July 2, 1932 and commissioned in 1953. He is a command pilot and has flown over 4,300 hours, primarily in fighter aircraft such as the F-4. General Taylor has served as military assistant to three Secretaries of Defense (Melvin Laird, Elliott Richardson and James Schlesinger). In addition, he has served as commander of the 314th Air Division and U.S. Air Forces in Korea. The Deputy Commander is the principal advisor and assistant to the Commander, RDJTF discharging the mission and functional responsibilities of the Commander in his absence.

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b. (U) The Chief of Staff of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is Brigadier General Carl W. Stiner, USA, a native of LaFollette, Tennessee. General Stiner was born in 1936 and commissioned in 1958. An airborne officer, General Stiner has spent most of his career in airborne and infantry positions, including command of the 1st Infantry Training Brigade at Fort Benning, GA. For two years in the mid-seventies, General Stiner served as assistant project manager of the Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program, with headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The Chief of Staff directs and coordinates the activities of the RDJTF Staff in accomplishing its mission and functional responsibilities, and the policies and instructions of the Commander.


c. (U) Concurrent with establishment of the Headquarters at MacDill AFB, was a 19 man Washington based liaison office (WLO). The Director of the Washington D.C. Liaison Office is Brigadier General Dale A. Vesser, USA, a native of Pocatello, Idaho. General Vesser was born in 1932 and graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1954. An Airborne/Ranger qualified officer, General Vesser commanded the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry in Vietnam, 1970-71, and the 1st Brigade 3d Armored Division, Europe, 1976-77. Before assuming his current assignment, General Vesser was the Deputy Director (J5) for Force Development and Strategic Plans, Officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This unique extension of the RDJTF is located in the Pentagon and provides the RDJTF Headquarters with the requisite politico-military/contingency planning interface and serves as a sounding board for ideas/plans and concepts with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, individual service headquarters and other Washington-based agencies. The WLO also maintains cognizance of ongoing actions that may effect the RDJTF planning for contingencies anywhere in the world.

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JOINT KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

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IV. (U) GENERAL AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

A. (U) HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT (RDHC)

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The RDJTF Headquarters Joint Manpower Program¹(JMP) dated 1 March 1980 as authorized by JCS on 23 January 1980² provided a single support element for support of USREDCOM and RDJTF. As shown in paragraph 11, page 40 of the JTD¹, the combined support element in support of HQ RDJTF was made up of 5 officers and 54 enlisted. Two officers and 20 enlisted are RDJTF billets and the MOS's required by the USREDCOM support element to support the additional requirements created by HQ RDJTF. The other billets (3 officers, 34 enlisted) are shown on the JTD as USREDCOM augmentees to support HQ RDJTF upon deployment.

(U) The garrison support arrangements that evolved from the original JTD was that 3 officers and 2 enlisted would work full time for HQ RDJTF and the remainder of the combined support element would be utilized as required through RCTI-B.

(U) Upon activation, HQ RDJTF shared facilities in Bldg 501 with USREDCOM. On 24 March 1980 the HQ RDJTF moved to Bldg 1105 which was being remodeled by USAF "RED HORSE" units. Small elements of some directorates remained in Bldg 501. Construction on the RDJTF Headquarters began on 9 February 1980 with a \$300k approval for the renovation of building 1105, the former Strategic Air Command (SAC) alert facility bunker at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Paperwork to designate Bldg. 1105 as a restricted area had been submitted to the base on 5 Feb 80.

(U) On 15 August 1981 six rental trailer units were leased for use by HQ RDJTF to allow for the expanded administrative space requirements of the headquarters.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

~~U~~ ~~+~~ Field Support for HQ RDJTF. The current arrangements for providing field support to HQ RDJTF would require, upon notification of deployment, USREDCOM and RDJTF components to provide pre-planned individual, unit and equipment augmentation as required to Headquarters Commandant, RDJTF (RDHC).

(U) RDHC personnel augmentation, as tasked, below:

(a) (U) RDHC (JMP)	22
(b) (U) USREDCOM AUGMENTEES (JMP)	37
(c) (U) Component Individual Augmentees	38
(d) (U) Unit augmentees	

1. RDJTF JMP FY80/81 DTD 1 Mar 80
2. JCS MSG 2968, DTG 231754Z Jan 80.

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<u>1</u>	(U)	MP/SP (Army/AF)	180
<u>2</u>	(U)	Water Purification TM (Army)	3
<u>3</u>	(U)	Water Transportation TM (Army)	5
<u>4</u>	(U)	Bath Det (Army)	3
<u>5</u>	(U)	POL Storage/Issue TM (Army)	9
<u>6</u>	(U)	POL Bulk Dist TM (Army)	18
<u>7</u>	(U)	Medical Det (AF)	10
<u>8</u>	(U)	Laundry SVC TM (Army)	7
<u>9</u>	(U)	Combat Engr Plat (USMC)	<u>37</u>
TOTAL			369

(U) ~~(S)~~ On 20 November 1980³, CJCS designated CSAF as executive agent for the JCS for coordinating field support of the HQ RDJTF. On 26 Jan 81⁴ HQ USAF requested HQ RDJTF to provide the envisioned concept for field support⁵, current/proposed arrangements with all services, and requirements to support the field support concept.

(U) On 24 March 1981 equipment requirements which would provide the capability for "standing alone" as a separate headquarters, were⁶ submitted to USREDCOM.

(U) On 28 January 1981⁷ a personnel requirements package was submitted to USREDCOM which would provide COMRDJTF with a Headquarters Commandant stand alone capability.

B. (U) DATA AUTOMATION

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) During 1980, the data automation effort was directed toward establishment of the foundation for a viable, deployed automatic data processing (ADP) system, the first such computer system in the Worldwide Military Command and Control System community. Initial tasks centered around procurement of data processing equipment as a prerequisite to development of system applications.

3. JCSM 675-80, 20 Nov 80.4. HQ USAF MSG DTG 262215Z Jan 81..
5. COMRDJTF MSG DTG 092021Z Apr 81.
6. RDEC FORM 14, SUBJ: RDJTF EQUIPMENT, DTD 24 March 1981.
7. RDEC LTR SUBJ: MANPOWER STUDY DOCUMENT, DTD 28 Jan 1981.

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(U) Prior to the creation of the RDJTF, USREDCOM organized an RDJTF ad hoc Working Group to study the projected requirements of the new organization. The Working Group concluded, among other things, that the RDJTF required a deployable ADP system to support staff decision-making and command and control functions. This led to submission by USREDCOM in February 1980, of a Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) System Development Notification (SDN) for a commercial test-bed as well as a deployable system.⁸

(U) Although the RDJTF was officially established on 1 March 1980, the Office of Data Automation did not reach full staffing until 26 March 1980. One week later, the new office learned that OJCS had validated the USREDCOM SDN, but had returned it to the Air Staff without action because the desired deployable ADP equipment was not available on the current WWMCCS ADP contract. OJCS recommended that the requirement for a deployable ADP system be present in the form of a Required Operational Capability (ROC). In addition, OJCS recommended submission of a restructured SDN for acquisition of the test-bed (a Honeywell Level 6 Minicomputer).⁹

(U) The ROC and revised SDN were completed and placed in channels in early June. ^{10/11}OJCS validated the SDN on 9 September 1980,¹² and personnel training and site preparation were completed in anticipation of delivery of the test-bed computer system in January 1981. The ROC is still undergoing staffing at the OJCS/Service level.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) Data automation support was provided to the RDJTF for the first time under field conditions during Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 81 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in October 1980. Visual Information Projection (VIP) terminals and printers were tactically deployed in support of the RDJTF, AFFOR, MARFOR and JWTF. This exposure provided the staff a greater appreciation of how ADP might support the accomplishment of their functional responsibilities.

(U) As the staff continued to gain experience with ADP, more potential applications emerged. The coming year should see the marriage of deployable equipment obtained through the ROC with a growing inventory of application systems which will enhance the productivity and effectiveness of the RDJTF.

8. Letter, HQ USREDCOM (RDCA), 20 Feb 80, Subject: WWMCCS System Development Notification (SDN) RED-057.

9. Memorandum, JCS (SC3S), ADP-030-80, 2 Apr 80, Subject: WWMCCS System Development Notification (SDN) RED-057.

10. Letter, HQ USREDCOM (RCCS), 4 Jun 80, Subject: WWMCCS ADP Required Operational Capability.

11. Letter, HQ USREDCOM (RCCS), 6 Jun 80, Subject: Revised WWMCCS System Development Notification (SDN) RED-057.

12. Memorandum, JCS (SC3S), ADP-M-100-80, 9 Sep 80, Subject: Acknowledgment Memorandum (SDN F80032).

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C. (U) LEGAL ADVISOR

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The COMRDJTF Legal Advisor, an Army Lieutenant Colonel, reports directly to the Chief of Staff. Duties include developing a system that would permit the RDJTF to take care of its own military justice matters. Under the system, COMRDJTF has Article 15, UCMJ punishment authority for all Navy and Marine Corps officer personnel. With respect to enlisted naval service personnel, a Naval Service Detachment Enlisted (NSDE) was activated and a Marine Corps officer was designated as its commander. The senior Air Force officer, Deputy Commander, RDJTF was delegated Article 15, UCMJ punishment authority for all USAF officer and enlisted members. The senior Army officer, Chief of Staff, RDJTF was given the same authority over assigned Army personnel. Also, the Legal Advisor was instrumental in obtaining the authority for the COMRDJTF to convene General Courts-Martial. This gives him the authority to prefer for trial by courts-martial the cases of any armed forces members who are assigned or attached to RDJTF. This authority is published in DOD Directive 5510.3.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) This office published RDJTF Directive 27-1, Reporting Violations of the Law of War, in July 1980. The purpose is to implement DOD Directive 5100.77 and insure that the law of war and the obligations of the United States Government under the law are met and that a program is designed to prevent any violations of the law of war by US personnel. This directive applies to all RDJTF personnel, component commands, subordinate elements and all personnel assigned, attached or serving as a part of the RDJTF upon deployment of the RDJTF as the supported Joint Commander.

(U) Claims responsibility for the RDJTF rests with the Department of the Air Force. The Legal Advisor was responsible for assisting in the formulation of the claims procedure that will be used. All claims involving or generated by the RDJTF or units assigned or attached thereto except when they arise in countries for which single service responsibility is already assigned in accordance with DOD Directive 5515.8, will be handled in accordance with the procedure proposed by the Legal Advisor, RDJTF and approved by the Dept. of the Air Force.

(U) All OPLANS and OPORDS issued by RDJTF have been reviewed to assure their compliance with the law of war.

(U) Lastly, in the area of administrative law, the Office of the Legal Advisor has assisted the Commander and Staff with answers to a myriad of thorny legal questions.

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D. (U) PROVOST MARSHAL

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The Provost Marshal, an Army Lieutenant Colonel, has staff responsibility for discipline and law and order aspects of the RDJTF.

(U) In a deployed status, suspected criminal activity of HQ RDJTF members will be investigated by qualified personnel of the supporting MP unit under supervision of the RDJTF Provost Marshal. Criminal investigative support will be requested from the appropriate component as required. Confinement of US personnel will be done in accordance with service directives with the confinement facility operated by the ARFOR Commander.

(U) Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) and Civilian Internees (CI) are transferred as soon as possible to the ARFOR operated facility.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) During exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 81 a "Task Force Pistol" was formed to assist the RDJ3 ground operations section by developing a plan to provide Rear Area Security (RAS) for the area of RDJTF and other facilities located in the littoral of Saudi Arabia.

U (S) This task force, made up of members of the HHD 519th MP BN produced by ENDEX a viable RAS plan briefing the Chief of Ground Operations. The plan determined force requirements, logistical and other shortfalls of the 19-76 MP BN HHD. This data was provided to the PM FORSCOM in Nov 1980 for use by that office in further coordinations with TRADOC.

(U) Investigative support for a deployed HQ RDJTF continues to require specific resolution. Visits to HQ OSI and NIS in Oct 80 by PM RDJTF, resulted in commitments of support from the nearest permanent location OSI Turkey, NIS from the nearest ship or direct from the Washington area. During Nov 80, a representative of the USACIDC visited the RDJTF Provost Marshal to discuss the viability of collocating a CID detachment with HQ RDJTF to provide direct support to HQ RDJTF. This represents the best solution to the requirement and does not create a support problem. USACIDC held a conference in Dec 80 to determine the best configuration for this support element. This issue continues with resolution expected by the middle of next year.

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E. (U) COMPTROLLER

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The current organization of the Comptroller, RDJTP, consists of two Army officers, a Lieutenant Colonel and First Lieutenant.

(U) The mission of the Comptroller, RDJTP is to advise the commander and the staff on resource management, fiscal and budgetary matters and resource structure; the creation and maintenance of a financial management system; and administering the execution of the approved Operations Operating Budget (OOB) and Joint Readiness Exercise (JRX) Budget. He is also responsible for maintaining liaison and coordination with component forces and higher headquarters regarding budget and fiscal matters. Other duties and responsibilities include:

a. (U) Providing comptroller support planning for the headquarters, to include financial planning for joint training and JRX's;

b. (U) Performing staff supervision of command TDY travel policies and procedures;

c. (U) Preparing the financial management section of the Personnel Annex of all headquarters OPLANS/CONPLANS to include: budget, accounting and reports, financial services, logistics (interface with the finance system), local procurement of foreign currency, and use of military payment certificates (MPC);

d. (U) Evaluating contract administration for the RDJTP;

e. (U) Controlling local contract funding procurement actions made by the imprest fund cashier.

(U) When deployed the Comptroller will, in addition to the duties noted above, provide staff supervision and act as advisor to the commander regarding finance services in the area of operations to include: disbursing operations, related cash requirements and banking services and military accounting.

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STATUS OF FY80 OPERATING PROGRAM

AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1980 (U)

(U) PROGRAM BY DIRECTORATE/OFFICE:

	FY80 <u>PROGRAM</u>	FY80 <u>OBLIGATIONS</u>
Command Section	\$ 46,100	\$ 63,366
Comptroller	8,800	365
Legal Advisor	2,600	3,279
Public Affairs	3,000	1,806
Adjutant General	65,400	59,821
Data Automation	5,000	3,523
J-1	5,600	7,952
Headquarters Commandant	588,872	614,276
J-2	54,000	47,800
J-3	47,500	23,997
J-4	17,300	18,972
Surgeon	1,500	313
J-5	25,300	30,650
J-6	<u>14,400</u>	<u>9,252</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$885,372</u>	<u>\$885,372</u>

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(U) FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

(U) Since the year 1980 was the first year of existence for the RDJTF, one time set-up costs were incurred by the JCS designated executive agent, the United States Air Force. Significant among these costs are those associated with the minor construction project necessary to refurbish the headquarters building and the dollars required to procure the items of supply and equipment necessary to make the RDJTF headquarters operational. The obligations incurred in these areas as of 31 December 1980 were as follows:

Minor Construction (AF EEIC 529)	\$282,000
Supplies (AF EEIC 605,609,618 & 619)	\$554,365
Equipment (AF EEIC 628)	\$208,055

(1) (U) FY80 OOB. Depicted below is the final status of the FY80 OOB as of 30 September 1980 (end of fiscal year):

(U) PROGRAM BY ELEMENT OF EXPENSE:

	FY80 <u>PROGRAM</u>	FY80 <u>OBLIGATIONS</u>
Transportation Costs	\$ 96,600	\$100,756
Per Diem	83,400	46,697
Equipment Rental	27,800	19,455
Other Commo Svcs	1,000	1,002
Other Purchased Services	11,200	3,996
Supplies - SSD	2,600	2,537
Supplies - GSD	448,172	503,936
Other Supplies	7,800	8,501
Equipment	<u>206,800</u>	<u>198,492</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$885,372</u>	<u>\$885,372</u>

(2) (U) FY81 OOB: The FY81 OOB is shown below as of 31 Dec 1980 (end of calendar year):

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STATUS OF FY81 OPERATING PROGRAM

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1980 (U)

(U) PROGRAM BY DIRECTORATE/OFFICE:

	FY81 <u>PROGRAM</u>	OBLIGATIONS <u>TO DATE</u>
Command Section	\$ 93,600	\$ 27,209
Comptroller	154,200	0
Legal Advisor	4,500	0
Washington Liaison Office	69,000	13,562
Public Affairs	23,400	7,063
Adjutant General	209,300	150,320
Data Automation	50,000	522
CCAG	10,900	6,023
J-1 & PM	42,500	2,637
Headquarters Commandant	189,200	37,766
J-2	126,200	35,567
J-3	186,500	24,344
J-4 & Med Svcs	73,900	16,755
J-5	110,300	8,589
J-6	<u>139,500</u>	<u>5,840</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$1,483,000</u>	<u>\$336,197.</u>

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(U) PROGRAM BY ELEMENT OF EXPENSE:

Transportation Costs	\$489,400	\$ 86,219
Per Diem	245,400	40,482
Equipment Rental	153,550	154,702
Other ~~Commo~~ Support	5,650	5,650
Printing & Reproduction	4,000	0
Facilities Projects	58,000	0
Other Purchased Services	51,600	190
Medical Supplies	1,000	0
Supplies - GSD	218,400	37,656
Other Supplies	6,000	1,735
Equipment	<u>250,000</u>	<u>9,563</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$1,483,000</u>	<u>\$336,197</u>

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2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) In addition to the OOB, the Comptroller, RDJTF also administers a Joint Readiness Exercise (JRX) budget for the RDJTF. In 1980, the RDJTF prepared for and/or participated in seven exercises. Listed below are the exercises with the associated costs by fiscal year and total obligations as of 31 December 1980:

<u>EXERCISE</u>	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>TOTAL 1980</u>
POSITIVE LEAP	\$ 4,467	\$ 2,964	\$ 7,431
BRAVE SHIELD	338	-	338
GALLANT KNIGHT	4,548	-	4,548
ACCURATE TEST	20,391	13,083	33,474
BRIGHT STAR	17,563	51,216	68,779
BORDER STAR	-	1,324	1,324
BOLD STAR	-	900	900
TOTAL	\$47,307	\$69,487	\$116,794

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3. (U) Significant Activities

(U) FY82 OOB: The FY 82 OOB was submitted to HQ USAF in February 1980 and reflected a projected requirement of \$10,590,000. A significant portion of this estimate was programmed to cover military airlift cost associated with the developing RDJTF exercise program - \$6,717,000. HQ USAF was advised that as the RDJTF exercise program was approved and integrated into the JCS directed or coordinated exercise program, the \$6,717,000 should likewise be removed from the OOB and redistributed in the exercise budget. Final funding for FY82 anticipates such redistribution. Set forth below is the FY82 OOB as submitted:

FY82 OPERATIONS OPERATING BUDGET (U)

(U) PROGRAM BY ELEMENT OF EXPENSE:

<u>EEIC</u>	<u>FY82 ESTIMATE</u>
Travel	\$ 803,000
Transportation	6,717,000
Rental	102,000
Communications	34,000
Printing	3,000
Purchased Maintenance	27,000
Misc Contracts	2,757,000
Supplies	134,000
Equipment	<u>13,000</u>
TOTAL	\$10,590,000

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F. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) COMRDJTF is responsible for public affairs matters within the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and will serve as the principal public spokesman for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. His principal assistant in such matters is the RDJTF Public Affairs Officer (PAO).

(U) During normal in-CONUS exercises, significant RDJTF public affairs activities shall be coordinated with USCINCPAC, normally through the USREDCOM Public Affairs Officer.

(U) During normal OCONUS exercises, significant RDJTF public affairs activities shall be coordinated with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), unless COMRDJTF is under the operational command of another commander in which case the coordination shall be with that commander. Significant public affairs activities overseas shall also be coordinated with the country team PAO.

(U) Public Affairs Officer, RDJTF:

a. (U) Serves as Joint Public Affairs Officer for RDJTF exercises and operations.

b. (U) Serves as RDJTF command spokesman.

c. (U) Conducts public affairs/liaison with OASD/PA, CINCs, and commands assigned/designated for assignment to COMRDJTF.

d. (U) As required, establishes Press Center and Joint Public Affairs Office (JPAO) in connection with RDJTF exercises and operations and is responsible for operation of press center/JPAO.

e. (U) Obtains feedback on news coverage of RDJTF operations and exercises.

f. (U) As feasible (depending upon news sources), publishes a daily news sheet during RDJTF exercises and operations.

g. (U) As appropriate and as feasible, initiates action to commence delivery of Stars and Stripes newspapers and obtain American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) during RDJTF operations.

h. (U) Is releasing authority for RDJTF news and photographs during exercises and operations.

(U) National news media took notice in early April when the fledgling RDJTF began its first exercise. The exercise came only five weeks after the force was formally established. It was called Positive Leap, and media reports noted that it was a command post exercise conducted entirely on paper and that it had a Middle East scenario. Other than local news media in the area where the exercise

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was held (Ft Bragg, N.C.), there was no interest on the part of news media representatives in actually visiting the exercise site. Because the exercise was classified throughout, no effort was made to generate news media interest.

(U) When the initial planning for creation of the RDJTF was being done, Readiness Command public affairs personnel correctly fore saw great news media interest in the new command. Early REDCOM drafts of the proposed RDJTF Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) allocated 13 of the original 258 manpower spaces to public affairs. These included a public affairs officer and an enlisted public affairs specialist from each of the four services plus two photojournalists and a broadcast journalist. The public affairs section of the proposed JTD was cut by 10 billets to provide additional manning for the operations directorate and other RDJTF staff sections, leaving billets for two public affairs officers and an administrative assistant. When it became necessary to create the Washington Liaison Office, however, one more billet was taken, leaving RDJTF with two public affairs billets: a Navy Lieutenant Commander (O-4) public affairs officer and an Air Force Staff Sergeant (E-5) administrative specialist. The public affairs officer billet was filled by Commander (b)(6) who reported to the new command on March 31, 1980. For a command sometimes accused of being nothing more than a public relations gimmick, the new force began its life with a very small public affairs staff. The staff was not enlarged during the first year.

(U) When Lt. Gen. Kelley reported to MacDill, he and his deputy commander, Air Force Major General Taylor, sat down with Commander Baker on 30 April 1980 to discuss public affairs for the new command. Basically, the following emerged from that meeting:

a. (U) The first priority in public affairs would be devoted to explaining what the RDJTF was, what it needed, and, in general terms, what its capabilities were.

b. (U) The principal target audience for RDJTF public affairs initiatives would be the Washington arena.

c. (U) General Kelley said "he felt that the RDJTF should have a moderately aggressive" public affairs program and that sustaining the momentum was important.

d. (U) It should be emphasized that the RDJTF was a joint service enterprise and was highly dependent for success on the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

e. (U) Because General Kelley was already perceived by news media as the personification of the Rapid Deployment Force, he would serve as the principle spokesman for the RDJTF. He noted that he wanted his deputy and chief of staff also to meet with news media representatives from time to time and for his PAO to take care of day-to-day dealings with news media representatives as required, keeping the Readiness Command PAO informed.

(U) News media reports about the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force during the force's first few months were numerous, but most of the coverage simply re-hashed previously available information. But the demand for new information grew, and arrangements were made for General Kelley to meet with a small group of Pentagon reporters on one of his regular trips to Washington.

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(U) When word got out that General Kelley would meet with reporters, the list began to grow rapidly. What was originally intended as a briefing for a handful of Pentagon reporters became a full-blown Pentagon news conference on June 18, 1980, with reporters from all major media present. Television cameras were not permitted.

(U) In his meeting with the press, General Kelley provided an update on the RDJTF's progress during its first three and a half months. He noted that his staff was a good one, that he had done a great deal of traveling since the first of March, that the RDJTF was making significant progress, but that the force also had some significant problems, mainly interoperability and a shortage of sealift and airlift.¹³

(U) Media coverage of the briefing focused on two points, however: .plans to increase from 50,000 to 100,000 the number of reservists the President could call up without declaring a national emergency, and a concept General Kelley called "pre-emptive strategy", the idea that the RDJTF would get forces, irrespective of size, into an area rapidly because, as he pointed out, "once you get a force into an area that is not occupied by the other guy, then you have changed the whole calculus of the crisis and he must react to you, not you to him."

(U) Because of the particularly painful connotation of the word "pre-emptive" in the Persian Gulf region (based on Israel's "pre-emptive strikes" against Arab targets), General Kelley changed the name of his concept. The concept, he felt, remained a viable cornerstone of the RDJTF's capabilities.

(U) The month of June also brought the first of a steady stream of news media representatives who wanted to visit the home of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Between June 2nd and the end of October, the RDJTF played host to news media representatives on 15 separate occasions, not counting eight additional interviews or other meetings with the press by General Kelley. Between early June and late October, the command told its story to representatives from the New York Times (on several occasions), the Washington Post, Time magazine, U.S. News and World Report, Newsweek, Newhouse News Service, Fortune magazine, the New York Daily News, the London Observer, and many other news organizations.

(U) General Kelley also spent a great deal of his time on the road giving speeches. In all, he spoke to 21 different audiences ranging from the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations in New York City (December 2, 1980) to the Sarasota Council of the Navy League of the United States (December 4, 1980) to the National Security Council of the American Legion during the Legion's annual convention at Boston (August 16th). Among the groups he spoke to were the Joint Civilian Orientation Committee, the Armed Forces Staff College, the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Chicago Committee of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the Reserve Officer Association, the Iron Gate Chapter of the Air Force Association in New York, the Naval War College, the Air War College, and the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association.

13. Transcript of news briefing by Lieutenant General Paul X. Kelley, USMC, Commander Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, June 18, 1980, Washington, D.C.

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(U) In addition, other members of the RDJTF staff spoke to local community groups as well. Particularly active in speaking were the deputy commander, Maj Gen Taylor, and the director of plans (RDJ5), Navy Captain (b)(6) both of whom spoke to community groups on numerous occasions.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) As the operations portion of this history covers in considerable detail, the RDJTF Headquarters had a particularly heavy exercise schedule during its first year. The majority of the exercises were classified, and news media representatives were unable to cover them. One exercise, however, was essentially unclassified and received a great deal of news coverage. It was the first overseas deployment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

(U) Exercise Bright Star 81 was a combined field training exercise conducted at Cairo West Airfield, Egypt, November 7 through 27, 1980, involving approximately 1,400 U.S. military personnel and a number of Egyptian personnel. Americans on the exercise came from RDJTF Headquarters, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the 150th Tactical Fighter Group, Air National Guard, with a smaller number of personnel from other commands.

(U) In spite of some last-minute surprises, public affairs activities for the exercise were straightforward and there were no significant public affairs problems which had an effect on coverage. Initial public affairs guidance, based on consultations between U.S. Government and Egyptian Government, provided for keeping news media involvement at a low level throughout the exercise. No media visits were anticipated, but U.S. public affairs personnel associated with the exercise would be accessible to news media representatives, and selected print, still photo and video tape releases on exercise activities were planned.

(U) The crash of a C-141 transport (with the loss of all 13 U.S. military personnel aboard) heightened media interest near the beginning of the exercise.

(U) Midway through the exercise, the Government of Egypt decided unilaterally and without warning to invite news media representatives to cover a portion of the exercise which was especially photogenic: a combined live fire exercise and a combined air assault exercise. Approximately 35 news media representatives from major U.S. media based in Cairo and a small contingent of Egyptian media covered the exercise, with significant coverage resulting on U.S. television networks, in major U.S. newspapers, and on wire services around the world. Interest in the exercise by the resident U.S. press corps in Cairo remained high throughout, peaking with the on-scene coverage. The ready accessibility of Bright Star public affairs personnel and the frequent release of photography and video tape coverage throughout the exercise contributed significantly to the straightforward media coverage of the exercise.

(U) If the public affairs goal for Bright Star 81 was to demonstrate the capability of the RDJTF to deploy a small joint force to the Middle East, the goal was achieved. Given that the exercise was a first, however, there were many lessons learned not the least of which was that more than three full time public affairs officers should be on hand for similar exercises in the future. The three--Commander Baker of the RDJTF Headquarters, LTCOL (b)(6) from the RDJTF Washington Liaison Office, and MAJ (b)(6) PAO for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)--had their hands full throughout the exercise.

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(U) Because the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force began its life as a high visibility organization, it was imperative that the commander and his key staff have quick access to newspapers and other media accounts of activities in Southwest Asia and Washington.

(U) After a number of false starts in trying to obtain subscriptions to The New York Times, the Washington Post and other national newspapers for delivery on the day of publication, it was learned that Tampa, Florida, just could not provide such service unless the papers were flown in especially for RDJTF at tremendous cost. The best alternatives were:

- a. (U) Subscribe to the newspapers by mail and receive them two to four days after the date of publication.
- b. (U) Make arrangements to receive Current News, a press clipping service published by the Department of Defense, in a timely fashion; and,
- c. (U) Install wire service printers at the RDJTF Headquarters.

(U) In the end, all three alternatives were used. RDJTF Headquarters subscribed to a number of national newspapers by mail; arrangements were made to receive the Early Bird edition of Current News each morning by facsimile, with the main edition arriving a few days later by mail; and teletype printers for the Associated Press "A" Wire and the Reuters International "RNA" (Reuters North America) wire were installed. The Early Bird was reproduced for distribution to the staff each morning, and an afternoon news summary called "Today's News" was taken from the wire services and other clippings for distribution each weekday to the staff. It was one of the best informed staffs outside the Washington area, at least if access to news media reporting is used as yardstick.

(U) As with any new concept, the Rapid Deployment Force received criticism from many sources. Among the most notable criticism appearing in the media were:

a. (U) A Washington Post column which appeared on March 3, 1980, a mere two days after the force was established officially. The piece was written by Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record and it told readers that a rapid deployment force should be based on a restructured and reequipped Marine Corps. (General Kelley responded by saying he felt the success of the Rapid Deployment Force would depend on the integration of all four service components of the RDF into an effective war-fighting machine.)

b. (U) Various articles quoting (b)(6) a retired Army Colonel who was senior national defense specialist for the Library of Congress. In a sentence, (b)(6) said there were only two things wrong with the Rapid Deployment Force; it was not rapid and it had little to deploy.

c. (U) An article which appeared in the Baltimore Sun (and other media) on July 6, 1980. This one was written by (b)(6) a freelance writer, who summarized many of the arguments advanced against a Rapid Deployment Force: no bases in the Southwest Asia area, a confused chain of command, no troops permanently assigned to the RDF, etc.

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d. (U) Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, in an article by the Washington Post on September 14, 1980, told readers that like the Holy Roman Empire—which was said to be neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire—in his opinion the Rapid Deployment Force was not rapid, it was not much of a force, and its potential for deployment remained to be demonstrated.

(U) General Kelley responded to the criticism in typical fashion. He took an upbeat, positive approach, emphasizing what was right about the new force. And he used many platforms to carry his message: speeches to private groups, public speeches, classified speeches to military audiences, interviews, and Congressional testimony. One of his principal points was this:

(U) The only alternative I see to a positive, yet realistic approach is for me to hunker down and say that the job is impossible. Well, the job isn't impossible — not when you've got well over 200,000 people behind you who are willing, eager and capable.

(U) Those words came from his speech to the American Legion's National Security Council on August 16, 1980. But they were echoed over and over again.¹⁴

(U) Testifying before the House Budget Committee on October 1, 1980, General Kelley told those present that the Rapid Deployment Force "contrary to some speculation, is not a paper tiger." He added: "But that is not to say that the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is without problems." Among the problems he listed:

a. (U) No new combat troops were created for the RDF, though he could call on more than 200,000 troops from all branches of the service.

b. (U) The bulk of the heavy equipment needed in Southwest Asia would have to go by ship, which might take three or four weeks.

c. (U) The United States was deficient in strategic airlift, with only 70 C-5s and 234 C-141s.

d. (U) Staff for the RDJTF Headquarters was "woefully inadequate in terms of our planning," according to Kelley.

(U) After Ronald Reagan defeated President Jimmy Carter in November, attention was focused on what the Reagan team would do with the Rapid Deployment Force. During the campaign, the RDF had not been an issue which led many observers to believe that the new Administration would leave the force substantially as it was.

(U) As the end of 1980 approached, the "command relationships" of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force began to receive increasing visibility in the press. News media also reported the Army and Marine Corps to be locked in a bitter dispute over which would command the Rapid Deployment Force. Another dimension

14. Remarks prepared for delivery by Lieutenant General Paul X. Kelley, Commander Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, before the National Security Commission, the American Legion, August 16, 1980, Boston, Massachusetts.

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was added to the reports with indications in the media of a rift between Lieutenant General Kelley and his boss, Army General Volney F. Warner, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Readiness Command.

(U) General Kelley cut back on the number of interviews being granted as the year ended. He reasoned that the question of command relationships was "above my paygrade" for resolution, and he had no desire to comment on the matter in public.

(U) When the year ended, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force's profile was slightly lower than it was the year before. That notwithstanding, it probably still was the highest profile military organization the United States had at the time.

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G. (U) COMBAT CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS GROUP (CCAG)

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The Combat Capabilities Analysis Group (RD/CCAG) was not included in the original organization of the Headquarters RDJTF. It was established by the commander effective July 1, 1980, at the request of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its purpose was to provide COMRDJTF and subordinate component commanders with an inherent, deployable research and analytical resource.

(U) The CCAG was constituted as a special staff section administratively subordinate to the Chief of Staff. It was staffed by excess and overage personnel with combat, intelligence, foreign area, analytical, war-gaming and administrative skills.

(U) With a small complement of 4 officers and 1 enlisted, directed by an Air Force Colonel, the CCAG set out to respond to a number of specific tasks already levied by the Commander, the Deputy Commander, the Chief of Staff, and the Staff Directorate. It was CCAG's mission to directly support these senior officials with studies, briefings, discussions and other product forms.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) ~~(S)~~ The dominant focus and major CCAG effort during 1980 centered on two over-riding postulates:

(U) a. ~~(S)~~ Conceptualization and articulation of RDJTF interdiction operations, and

(b)(1)1.4a

(U) The bulk of this concentrated, specialized research and analytical effort materially assisted the Intelligence, Operations and the Plans and Policy directorates in support of the production, exercise and potential execution of COMRDJTF OPORD 1003. In this initial period, a modus operandi was developed to the effect that any armed force performs only four functions, attack, defense, withdrawal and reinforcement. All armed forces function during wartime in accordance with their peacetime training, organization and equipment, plans, and precedents. Military analysis is not a magical process; an understanding of the foregoing principals permits the analyst to project backward or forward in time, starting at any point. Throughout CCAG's first half-year, the emphasis was always on joint plans and operations imbued by a strong sense of immediacy.

U ~~(S)~~ Products produced by CCAG during the last half of 1980 included the following printed (hard copy) studies, by title:

- Soviet Logistics: A Concept for Interdiction
- Three Hundred Years of Strategic Warning: An Overview of Soviet Interests in Iran

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- Soviet Policy for the Middle East
- The Problem of Water in a Soviet Invasion of Iran

U (S) Other products included:

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- RDJTF Basing Options in the Middle East and Southwest Asia—a briefing
- U.S. defense strategy for military operations in Southwest Asia—written commentary and verbal discussion
- Analysis of RDJTF simulated combat operations during JCS-sponsored CPX GALLANT KNIGHT-81 (October 1980) deployed to Fort Bragg, N.C.—comments and discussion
- Interdiction in Southwest Asia—conference coordination of and participation in a Pentagon conference in January 1981.

3. (U) Significant Activities

(U) The CCAG also was tasked to establish contact and to maintain liaison with selected research and analysis agencies throughout the U.S. Department of Defense, including contract companies. Several temporary additional duty (TDY) trips were made in this connection, buttressed by written and electrical communications.

(U) Agencies contacted and visited included:

- Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), St. Louis, MO
- Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), Washington, DC
- Center for Advanced Research of the Naval War College (CAR/NWC), Newport, RI
- Combined Arms Combat Development Activity (CACDA), Fort Leavenworth, KS
- Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA
- Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), Washington, DC
- PROJECT CHECKMATE (The Air Staff, Pentagon)
- Strategic Analysis and Gaming Agency (SAGA), JCS, Pentagon

(U) The purpose of this liaison was to consult on projects of mutual interest and utility with a view to expanding CCAG's effectiveness through access to pertinent and complementary research and analysis.

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(U) Several other tasked or initiated projects could not be completed or undertaken because of limited manpower, lack of specific expertise and demands of competing priorities. Staff-wide administrative requirements also had a negative impact on the Group's effectiveness because of limited staffing against a building workload. The most critical limitation was noted as one of an insufficient number of appropriately skilled personnel. This shortage was most evident in CCAG's lack of a ground warfare specialist within the joint section and in the insufficiency of administrative skills and man-hours.

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H. (U) LIAISON

1. (U) Washington Liaison Office

a. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The WLO was established at the direction of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to improve contingency planning. The Memorandum from Secretary Brown on 26 January 1980 stated,

(U) "Establish a JTF liaison office in Washington (headed by a general or flag officer) to support JTF responsibilities, especially those for contingency planning. There will need to be adequate politico-military interface with the JCS/Joint Staff and OSD on these matters, especially in the light of the early RDP focus on the Middle East/Persian Gulf area. The liaison office will therefore have to be appropriately staffed, and in my judgment this will require on the order of 15-20 people."

(U) When Major General P.X. Kelley was designated to be the first Commander, RDJTF, the CJCS requested that General Kelley operate initially from the Pentagon. While his new Headquarters was being established, General Kelley was provided direct access to two OJCS ad hoc planning groups. Two groups, Crisis Planning and Assessment Group (CPAG/J5) and the Contingency Review Group (CRG/J3) served as his initial planning staff. These groups worked previously under the overall direction of the Director, Joint Staff to develop options for the JCS to use in politically sensitive contingencies, and were redesignated the Contingency Planning Group (CPG). Brigadier General Vesser visited CINCPAC, DCINCEUR and CINCPAC to establish contact, develop support and identify issues. General Kelley provided guidance concerning future working relationships and substantive matters until his departure for MacDill AFB to join the RDJTF Headquarters in late April 1980.

(U) General Vesser organized the CPG to serve as the initial WLO. In March 1980 the JCS approved manning for the WLO at 16 officers and three enlisted. The CPG, which totalled 15 officers and two enlisted, was designated to serve as the WLO until the Services provided permanent manning. The CPG had a nearly complete personnel turnover before permanently assigned personnel began to arrive between May and August 1980.

(U) The WLO moved its offices four times through the period May to August 1980 before arriving at permanent quarters in Room 1B737, Pentagon. Initially, the WLO shared these new offices with the Southwest Asia Planning Center in J5 which was created to disseminate information about planning to interested parties. The WLO also maintained a vault within the NMCC. The disestablishment by J5 of the Southwest Asia Planning Center in April 1981 has permitted consolidation of all members of the WLO within the same office.

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b. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) The WLO conducted business continuously while making transition from TDY personnel and temporary quarters to permanent arrangements. It influenced studies under way concerning the Southwest Asia region, combat attrition in Southwest Asia, and tactics appropriate for fighting in the mountains and deserts. The WLO also provided strategic intelligence while HQ RDJTF developed its own capability, made political-military assessments concerning developments expected in Middle East countries and participated, with the Joint Staff, in the development of a strategy for Southwest Asia. The strategy included approaches to deterrence and options for delay, denial and defense. In addition, the WLO participated in ongoing contingency planning, had major responsibilities in connection with executable OPLAN development and worked with HQ RDJTF to facilitate the transfer of planning responsibilities from the area CINCs to HQ RDJTF.

(U) Individuals within the WLO also pursued a variety of political-military and contingency related support projects and emphasis was on developing a viable capability to deploy substantial four Service combat forces to Southwest Asia which would provide a credible deterrence and could be sustained in combat. The most significant contributions involved communication support, map and chart support, use of regional and extra-regional forces, interdiction measures, military construction, perception management and participation in air and sea-lift enhancement efforts. The WLO further performed representational and liaison functions. It reflected COMRDJTF's position in the Joint Action process at conferences and coordination meetings, and in Congressional hearings where appropriate.

(U) Members of the WLO participated in the REDCOM Command Post exercises "POSITIVE LEAP" and "GALLANT KNIGHT". A major initiative by the WLO involved development of an overseas exercise program. The WLO facilitated coordination with OSD and the State Department on exercises "BRIGET STAR" and "ACCURATE TEST" in Egypt and Oman respectively. Working participation in these exercises by WLO members contributed significantly to the development of an enhanced Southwest Asia area appreciation within the WLO. This experience was applied in the ongoing efforts described earlier and in political-military assessments to facilitate future actions and exercises.

(U) The WLO worked carefully within the Joint Staff system and through the Joint Staff whenever possible. It participated with the Joint Staff and OSD in preparation of materials for use by the Chairman, JCS or others within the NSC system. It also influenced the development of papers concerning RDJTF by the Joint Staff and Services. These inputs from the WLO have often changed the outlook of national level decision makers by giving them realistic expectations from the perspective of the Commander, RDJTF. The WLO has worked closely with the Joint Staff and Services concerning military requirements in Southwest Asia. It has participated in studies with the Defense Science Board, Programs Analysis and Evaluation and Manpower Reserve Affairs and Logistics to identify programs necessary to support present and projected force structures should they be deployed in Southwest Asia. During the Defense Resources Board addressal of

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programs for the RDJTF, the WLO provided coherent, clear proposals which influenced the addition of some 2 1/2 billion dollars to the FY 81 supplemental and FY 82 amendment. If enacted by the Congress, these monies would provide the minimum essential needs for COMRDJTF to fight in Southwest Asia. Further, they would reduce substantially the time necessary to deploy forces in a contingency.

(U) In the event of a crisis in Southwest Asia, the WLO has been designated to assist and support COMRDJTF through direct liaison among Washington organizations relevant to supporting CINCs and HQ RDJTF deployed in the field. The members of the office are POR qualified to facilitate rapid movement to Southwest Asia if required.

(U) Through the year under review, working relationships between HQ RDJTF and the WLO have evolved to improve effectiveness. WLO officer personnel visit MacDill for orientations, staff interface, briefings, and participation in planning activities. Exchange of personnel in both directions has markedly expedited contingency planning. Recently, closer functional coordination has been established between WLO and HQ RDJTF.

(U) The WLO has provided a structure within the Washington environment for Southwest Asia where none existed. Previously the military staff in the Washington area addressed primarily the political aspects in detail of the Middle East and Persian Gulf areas. Further, as the United States has not had forces stationed in the Middle East except for personnel assigned to the security assistance tasks, few personnel are available who have served in Southwest Asia. The creation of the WLO provided a focus for all ongoing military planning efforts which had previously been ad hoc.

2. (U) SAC Liaison Office

a. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) Strategic Air Command Operating Location MacDill (SAC OL-MD) was activated on 4 August 1980. The mission of OL-MD is to provide support to the RDJTF for the inclusion of SAC capabilities into the concept of operations for the Rapid Deployment Force. Also OL-MD provides liaison and continuity between HQ SAC and RDJTF.

(U) SAC OL-MD manning consists of a director (0036) who also performs duties as a bomber planning officer, one logistics planning officer (6616), one tanker planning officer (1435C), one reconnaissance officer (2265), and one administrative technician (70270B). The SAC liaison office is an extension of HQ SAC/XO (Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations Plans).

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b. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) SAC OL-MD became fully manned and operational on 11 Aug 1980. Adequate office space and equipment was obtained and administrative policies and procedures were integrated with those of USREDCOM, RDJTF and pertinent USAF and SAC requirements. As a matter of policy, OL-MD will comply with USREDCOM and RDJTF administrative regulations for MacDill operations. Applicable USAF and SAC regulations are complied with for external communications.

(U) During the month of October 1980 supply accounts were designated and funded for OL-MD. Mobility equipment was placed on order and personal mobility equipment was issued to all OL-MD personnel IAW TA-50. Also during October all personnel obtained passports and shot records were updated. RDJTF J-1 then declared the OL-MD as ready for world wide deployment as necessary.

U ~~(S)~~ From 21 October to 29 October 1980 three personnel from the liaison office supported exercise GALLANT KNIGHT at Fort Bragg, NC. Coordination with the RDJTF staff was provided on a 24 hour basis. The OL-MD field office was established in the Joint Operations Center which allowed effective interface with J3 (air, ground and sea), and J2 (intelligence). Two of the members maintained a 24 hour desk with J3 air operations interfacing SAC bomber and tanker activity as reflected by the SAC Frag orders, and the third member assisted in J2 in the proper tasking of SAC Recon platforms in coordination with the AFFOR and SAC ADVON.

U ~~(S)~~ On 25 October 1980 SAC OL-MD worked with HQ SAC/DOC and the RDJTF J3 and J6 developing the deployment concept for BRIGET STAR. SAC OL-MD also coordinated the battlestaff efforts with J3 and J6. After approval by the Deputy Commander, General Kelley was briefed on the EC-135 with the RDJTF Battlestaff which deployed on 10 Nov 80 with Lt Col (b)(6) (Director SAC OL-MD) aboard. OL-MD personnel provided liaison between RDJTF, 56 TFW, and the SAC 55SRW EC-135 flight crew during the MacDill stop. OL-MD funds were used to bring two SAC communications personnel to MacDill to ensure communications capability between JCSE equipment and the EC-135.

U ~~(S)~~ On 9 December 1980 OL-MD personnel researched, at Major General Taylor's request, the possible RDJTF usage of Boeing 707's. Information was provided for staff use.

U ~~(S)~~ OLMD provided extensive guidance and B-52 capability information to the Combat Capabilities Assessment Group (CCAG) when the initial concept was developed for an air interdiction campaign in Southwest Asia.

U ~~(S)~~ On 22 December 1980 a Battlestaff Concept paper was initiated and delivered to the command section for ACCURATE TEST 81-2.

U ~~(S)~~ SAC OL-MD was actively engaged in planning for ACCURATE TEST 81-2 scheduled for 14-26 Feb 1981. A SAC EC-135 was requested to deploy the RDJTF battlestaff to (1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) where the communications exercise took place. Enroute join up with two C-141's was envisioned with emphasis placed on establishing electronic signatures throughout the Middle East and testing deployed communications with other forces in the area.

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~~S~~UOL-MD was actively involved in developing USREDCOM/COMRDJTF message
02 Dec 81, Subj: Prepositioned Support for SAC's Strategic Projection
(SPF), to JCS. Reference message again surfaced the requirement for pre-
positioned support equipment at (b)1.4 a, b, d for B-52 operations.

1. (U) MAC LIAISON OFFICE

(U) In November 1980, the Military Airlift Command assigned a permanent
liaison officer to the RDJTF. The RDJTF dependence on airlift makes the MAC
liaison an essential function in this headquarters. Since his arrival, the MAC
has helped develop new airlift request procedures, participated in exercise
DATE TEST as part of the battlestaff and helped plan new exercises as well
providing assistance to the staff for OPLAN 1003. The MAC LNO to the RDJTF
reports to the HQ MAC DO through the REDCOM MAC LNO.

(U) USEUCOM LIAISON OFFICE.

(U) The United States European Command assigned a permanent liaison officer
to the RDJTF in July 1980. Through participation in several exercises, the
LNO has determined the following responsibilities to the RDJTF:

- a. (U) Remain an integral unit while in the field providing expertise
to the RDJTF on USEUCOM command relationships, plans and operations.
- b. (U) Be responsive to information requests from all RDJTF
agencies, components and other liaison elements and responsible to COMRDJTF.
- c. (U) Insure continuity of operations between HQ USEUCOM and HQ RDJTF
as required.
- d. (U) Coordinate RDJTF requirements for USEUCOM support and
assistance.

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V. (U) JOINT PLANNING, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

A. (U) PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The Director for Personnel has staff responsibility for the personnel, manpower, morale and welfare aspects of the RDJTF. The Director, an Air Force Colonel, is responsible for the preparation of all supporting personnel annexes for RDJTF contingency plans and exercises.

(U) The Personnel Plans Division prepares supporting personnel annexes for all RDJTF contingency plans and exercises. Coordinates force replacement policies and procedures with all service military personnel centers. Monitors the component forces personnel status and provides technical advice in all personnel areas of interest.

(U) The Personnel Services Division provides all personnel services to the RDJTF Staff in garrison and when deployed. Services include; records maintenance, promotion, selection, OER/EER processing, and other individual personnel actions.

2. Plans and Exercises

(U) Prior to the activation of the RDJTF on 1 March 80, RCJ1 had completed the Personnel Annex (Annex E) to COMRDJTF OPORD 3-80 (U), POSITIVE LEAP. Resulting from POSITIVE LEAP, the following observations were made:

a. (U) Personnel Replacements. Replacement forecasting, requisitioning, and distribution was not played in sufficient depth to evaluate the effectiveness of the replacement system.

b. (U) Casualty Reporting. Although casualties were being assessed, in some cases, components did not report them.

c. (U) Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Reporting. EPW reporting was not properly and accurately accomplished.

d. (U) EPW Processing Shortfall. There was no EPW processing capability within Military Police (MP) units currently assigned to the RDJ-A.

e. (U) Host Nation EPW Support. Current plans called for transfer of custody of EPW to host nation. National policy precludes transfer of EPWs without prior approval of ASD (JSA) and an executed Host Nation agreement.

f. (U) Personnel Status Report (PERSTATREP). The PERSTATREP, as structured in Annex E, OPORD 3-80, was not understood by all services and did not reflect all necessary information.

(U) Annex E to COMRDJTF OPLAN 0001-81, was developed during the period April 80 thru July 80. The draft was forwarded to RDJ5 on 31 July 80. RDJ1 continued to provide responses/input to guidance issued thru December 80.

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(U) Annex E to Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 81, was developed from August 80 thru October 80.

(U) From lessons learned at GALLANT KNIGHT, the following areas were identified as significant problem areas:

- a. (U) Personnel Replacements. Need to examine personnel replacement policies and procedures of all component forces.
- b. (U) Casualty Reporting. Emphasis to be placed on accuracy of reporting.
- c. (U) Replacement Reporting. Emphasis to be placed on accuracy of reporting.
- d. (U) PERSTAT. Following POSITIVE LEAP, the PERSTAT was modified. Additional instructions were provided to the components.
- e. (U) Reserve Call-up. Requirement exists for components to establish a policy/plan for Reserve/National Guard call-up.

(U) Annex E to COMRJTF OPLAN 1003-81 and Exercise BRIGHT STAR 81 were developed during the October and November 80 timeframe.

(U) Personnel statistics for POSITIVE LEAP, GALLANT KNIGHT, and BRIGHT STAR were as follows:.

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PERSONNEL STATISTICS

EMPLOYMENT CPX POSITIVE LEAP (U)

<u>TOTAL PARTICIPATION</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>SIMULATED</u>
JECG	1,352	N/A
RDJTF	318	318
ARFOR	5,162	116,235
AFFOR	882	21,873
MARFOR	320	41,896
NAVFOR	91	56,173
JUWTF	196	2,020
JCSE/SIGNAL	1,916	1,916
OTHER	18	N/A
	<u>10,255</u>	<u>240,431</u>

PERSONNEL STATISTICS

EMPLOYMENT CPX GALLANT KNIGHT (U)

<u>TOTAL PARTICIPATION</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>SIMULATED</u>	
	<u>23 Oct 80</u>	<u>29 Oct 80</u>	<u>23 Oct 80</u>	<u>29 Oct 80</u>
RDJTF	278	299	647	647
ARFOR	5,144	5,582	106,907	149,299
AFFOR	1,462	1,458	25,650	44,662
NAV	5	5	45,215	40,272
MC	417	415	58,411	80,459
JUWTF	<u>210</u>	<u>210</u>	<u>2,769</u>	<u>3,112</u>
TOTAL	7,536	7,969	239,599	318,451

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PERSONNEL STATISTICS EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR (U)

<u>TOTAL PARTICIPATION</u>	<u>5 NOV 80</u>	<u>22 NOV 80</u>
RDJTF	3	103*
ARFOR	5	896
AFFOR	3	260
Comm		93
MAC	—	<u>34</u>
TOTAL	11	1386

*Includes 42d MP Customs Detachment.

(U) Manpower Review

(U) Due to the revised Terms of Reference (TOR) dated 13 August 1980, a study was conducted by the RDJ1 which addressed potential changes to the Joint Manpower Program (JMP) as a result of the mission change. RCJ1, in conjunction with RDJ1, held an action officers meeting to discuss the results of the study. Subsequently the RDJTF staff reviewed their manning requirements to determine whether sufficient personnel existed to perform the missions as outlined. Personnel requirements, due to the new TOR, were submitted to USREDCOM on 10 September 1980. The total increase required to the RDJTF JMP to adequately perform the new TOR mission was seventy military and four civilian personnel. This increase provided for a staff increase of fifty personnel (O-39, E-11), staff support increase of twenty enlisted personnel and four civilian personnel.

(U) USREDCOM dispatched a message to JCS on 17 September 80 requesting the aforementioned increase. On 3 October 80, JCS requested a detailed review of requirements and alternatives for realignment of existing assets and concurrent consideration of all known near and long term requirements. A joint USREDCOM/RDJTF committee was established to address the issues.

(U) The RDJTF continues to assess manpower needs, internal realignment, dual-hatting, etc. Justification is based on/around operational requirements, particularly those requirements resulting from experience gained on POSITIVE LEAP, GALLANT KNIGHT, BRIGHT STAR, as well as those generated by the revised TOR.

3. (U) Significant Activities

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(U) Foreign Language Training

(U) RDJL in coordination with the Base Education Office, negotiated arrangements for instruction in the basic Arabic language course for RDJTF personnel. The 10-week course was conducted by Mrs. (b)(6) during the period 26 August 1980 thru 30 October 1980. Attendees were presented with an introductory level of conversational phrases and discussions of the various Arabic cultures.

(U) RDJTF Awards and Decoration Board

(U) RDCS letter dated 28 August 1980 to RCJL requested approval authority for COMRDJTF for decorations, awards, and honors for personnel assigned to Headquarters, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, to include joint service decorations and awards not preempting respective service authority.

(U) Reference RCJL Form 14 dated 19 September 1980, USCINCPAC deemed it inappropriate to delegate approval authority to the COMRDJTF for the joint service decorations. However, delegation of authority to convene an Awards and Decorations Board and make appropriate recommendations to HQ USARPAC was granted to the COMRDJTF. The delegation included authority to approve certificates of commendation or appreciation for RDJTF personnel. The RDJTF Awards and Decoration Board members were designated on 26 October 1980.

(U) Dedicated Housing

(U) The RDJTF is required to constantly be prepared for no-notice deployments to respond to contingencies threatening U.S. interests. The place of residence of key staff personnel is directly related to the command's ability to accomplish its mission. Therefore, it was deemed imperative that certain key personnel be provided on-base housing. A thorough analysis of key personnel requirements associated with crisis action planning and no-notice deployments revealed that a minimum of 42 housing units were needed at MacDill AFB for RDJTF personnel. The requirement for future dedicated housing was identified and articulated in a staff paper which was forwarded to RCCS for review and signature for dispatch to 56CSG/DEN on 3 September 1980.

(U) 1980 Combined Federal Campaign

(U) The USARPAC 1980 Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) fund drive was announced by a USARPAC, Chief of Staff memorandum dated 21 October 1980. Included in the USARPAC campaign were RDJTF, JSOSE and the Deployment Cell. Specific guidance provided for insuring a successful 1980 campaign included a reminder that a careful selection of highly motivated key workers was necessary in obtaining the goal of seeking maximum voluntary participation.

(U) The total dollar pledge/donation: \$6,118.25. As a result of a large number of personnel being assigned TDY and in anticipation of meeting the 1980 CFC established goals, an extension to the campaign was authorized extending the closing date from 27 November 1980 to 5 December 1980.

(U) Processing for Overseas Replacement

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(U) Based upon the requirement, as established in the mission of the RDJTF, to prepare the Headquarters RDJTF personnel for no-notice deployments, a POR Qualification SOP (completed 14 April 81) and a POR Deployment Processing SOP (completed 8 May for incorporation into the Readiness SOP) were developed.

(U) The following actions were identified as requirements for deployment and a package was designed for personnel assigned to the headquarters as well as designated augmentees.

- a. (U) Be qualified in specialty code for position assigned.
- b. (U) Be available for immediate deployment.
- c. (U) Be physically qualified to perform field duties for extended periods of time.
- d. (U) Possess required security clearance.
- e. (U) Maintain worldwide immunization standards in accordance with current service directives.
- f. (U) Possess official passport, identification tags, and ID card.
- g. (U) Be familiarized with individual weapon.

(U) POR processing was implemented on 17 March 1980, and a system was designed to control and maintain the current status of personnel deployability.

(U) During July 80, in an effort to streamline the POR management and administrative time, a software computer program was developed to track and suspense recurring POR requirements. The program was finalized 14 August 1980 and includes major requirements such as immunization, passport expiration dates, and medical and dental examination data.

(U) Additional requirements and information will be incorporated into the program as the requirement occurs. To expedite the processing of passports/visas and provide a capability to quickly respond to no-notice deployments/trips while retaining positive security RCJ1-PM letter dated 18 August 1980 to the State Department requested authorization for the designation of a passport agent within the RDJ1. The authorization was received on 6 October 80.

(U) On 30 December 1980, 231 of 254 personnel met the POR requirements, equating to 91%. The remaining 9% mainly represent newly assigned RDJTF personnel and/or personnel awaiting passports.

(U) Validation of Augmentee Positions

(U) Based on POSITIVE LEAP experience, the RDJTF staff reviewed its requirements for augmentation from USREDCOM and supporting component forces. The results of the review were:

- a. (U) USREDCOM Augmentees:

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Additions - 6 officers, 5 enlisted

Deletions - None

b. (U) Component Augmentees:

Additions - 14 officers, 11 enlisted

Deletions - 2 enlisted

(U) If approved, the total augmentee support for HQ RDJTF would be:

USREDCOM Augmentees	72
Component Augmentees (Individual)	103
Component Augmentees (Team)	<u>249</u>
Total	<u>424</u>

(See Appendix J)

(U) The results were forwarded to RCJ1 on 7 July 80. Requirements were briefed to the USREDCOM Commander's Conference 10-11 July 80. During the 24 July 80 In-Progress Review, the RDJTF staff was tasked to (1) review augmentation requirements of the headquarters to determine if previously submitted lists were valid and (2) review the augmentee package with an aim of decreasing Army requirements and redistribute those requirements among the other services. Results of the review were:

a. (U) USREDCOM Augmentees	70	(-2)
Component Augmentees (Individual)	86*	(-14)
Component Augmentees (Team)	<u>290*</u>	(+41)
Total	<u>446**</u>	(+41)

*Indicates a deletion of Army Engineer augmentation support (-24) with addition of a MC Combat Engineer Platoon (+37).

**Represents an increase of 22 to the augmentation package submitted 1 July 80.

(See Appendix K)

b. (U) Decreased 3 officers and 15 enlisted previously requested Army augmentees and redistributed among the other services.

(U) Approval was also received to task components and forces designated in support of the RDJTF for pre-identification, pre-processing for deployment, and training and equipping individual augmentees. This included training with the RDJTF on an at least once a year basis.

(U) The results of the augmentee requirement review were briefed to the COMRDJTF on 21 August 80. The completed report was forwarded to RDCS for signature on 22 August and forwarded to USREDCOM on 29 August 80.

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(U) Service Member of the Quarter

(U) Senior Airman (b)(6), USAF, was named as the United States Readiness Command Service Member of the Quarter 1 April to 30 June 1980.

(U) Sergeant (b)(6) USMC, was named as the United States Readiness Command Service Member of the Quarter 1 October to 31 December 1980.

(U) Service Member of the Year

(U) Sergeant (b)(6) USMC, was also named as the United States Readiness Command Service Member for the Year 1980.

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B. (U) INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) (G) The Intelligence Directorate (J-2) was initially organized under a JTD¹ developed by HQ USREDCOM.

(U) (G) Shortly after the RDJTF was activated on 1 March 1980, adjustments were made to the organization structure to establish a Targets Branch and a Systems Development Branch. The revised organizational structure is shown on page V-19.

(U) The mission of the J-2 was stated as:²

"The Director of Intelligence has staff responsibility for all intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) matters pertinent to missions assigned the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Has overall responsibility for the collection, production and dissemination of intelligence necessary to support the Command's mission. Represents the Commander with all appropriate national intelligence agencies and services to insure intelligence support of collection objectives. Coordinates with senior military intelligence officials of cooperating foreign governments and forces. Prepares intelligence planning inputs for concept and operations plans and develops appropriate intelligence recommendations regarding joint tactics, techniques and procedures for the joint employment of forces."

(U) (G) In August 1980³, the RDJTF Terms of Reference (TOR) were revised by the JCS, altering the Command's mission from a worldwide responsibility to emphasis on Southwest Asia (SWA). This required a further realignment of functions within the Analysis Branch to focus analysis on the SWA region.

(U) Because of the increased planning requirements placed on the directorate through this new TOR⁴, the J-2 formally requested a change in the JTD. This change not only functionally realigned current billet structure, but also asked for an increase of 18 J-2 manpower authorizations.

(U) Operations Division (OPS)

(U) The Operations Division is responsible to the Director of Intelligence, J-2 for all intelligence and intelligence products to support the mission assigned to the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. The division manning consists of personnel from all service branches, organized into four branches: Targeting; Collection Management; Current Intelligence; Analysis. This division handles all substantive intelligence matters. Additionally, all of the branches are tasked to provide coordination, support and guidance to the component/supporting forces to insure a timely exchange of intelligence information. The Division Chief also serves as the Deputy Director of Intelligence, J-2.

1. Document, RDJTF Headquarters Joint Manpower Program FY80/81, 1 Mar 80.
2. IBID
3. Memorandum, JCS SM480-80, Terms of Reference for the RDJTF, 13 Aug 80.
4. Letter, USREDCOM, RDJTF Manpower Requirements, 10 Sep 80.

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(U) Plans, Programs & Security Division (PP&S)

(U) The Plans, Programs and Security Division is responsible to the Director of Intelligence, J-2 for all aspects of intelligence planning required to support the various command OPLANS/OPORDS, the intelligence architecture and systems necessary to support intelligence requirements and for Special Security and Counterintelligence functions. The division has personnel assigned from all four military services. They are tasked to develop the intelligence planning inputs for the command concept and operations plans, support the planning requirements of the HQ staff and to coordinate and support the planning effort of the component/supporting forces, develop an intelligence architecture and determine the intelligence support requirements necessary to adequately support the mission assigned to the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, to provide secure communications for the Commander and the HQ Staff and to insure an effective counterintelligence program.

(U) Cryptologic Support Group (CSG)

(U) The CSG is tasked to provide SIGINT support to Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force during contingencies, exercises and the deployment of the Joint Task Force (JTF), and will extend such support to the JTF Commander during periods of deployment and employment. The CSG is staffed by two officers and one enlisted and is augmented as required by personnel from the National Security Agency (NSA).

(U) Weather Detachment

(U) The Weather Detachment is tasked to provide environmental services to Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. In addition, they provide or coordinate weather forecasts and advisories to the component/supporting forces. In garrison the RDJTF Weather Detachment consists of one officer and one enlisted. When deployed for exercise or contingency operations, the Weather Detachment is augmented as required from the First Weather Squadron and the Air Weather Service.

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2. (U) Plans and Exercises

~~U~~ ~~(S)~~ Immediately after the command was formed, all branches of the directorate became heavily involved in the task of providing the intelligence input to the command was tasked to (b)1.4 a In September

(b)1.4a The intelligence input to these OPLANS required a concentrated and coordinated effort to develop the threat, develop target lists, provide a comprehensive collection plan, order of battle (OB) information and a myriad of intelligence support details required in these documents.

~~U~~ ~~(S)~~ On 23 May 1980, J2 personnel participated in communications exercise RAPID DELTA ALPHA. J2 personnel were involved in all phases of the exercise from the development of scenario intelligence to the actual parachute assault. Throughout the planning and execution sequence, intelligence information was developed, analyzed, transmitted and acted upon by commanders and principal staff, at the fixed headquarters, in the airborne command post, and on the drop zone with the lead elements. The intelligence objective of providing timely, accurate, secure information to the Commander was met. Lessons learned contributed significantly to our knowledge and expertise and greatly facilitated future planning efforts for actual deployment and employment of component and in-support of forces.

(U) GALLANT KNIGHT-81 Intelligence Workshop

~~U~~ ~~(S)~~ On 21-22 July 1980 HQ USREDCOM hosted an intelligence workshop in preparation for Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT-81. The conference was attended by representatives from USREDCOM, RDJTF and RDJTF component forces. The objective of the conference was to discuss lessons learned in Exercise POSITIVE LEAP and to work out an operational framework for Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT-81. At this conference, the fusion center concept of intelligence analysis was worked out and the exercise scenario, ground rules and message traffic procedures were developed.

(U) GALLANT KNIGHT-81 21-30 OCT 80

~~U~~ ~~(S)~~ GALLANT KNIGHT-81, conducted 21-30 Oct 80 at Ft Bragg, NC gave the J2 directorate the opportunity to exercise its fusion center concept of intelligence support to COMRDJTF. In addition, secure communications to the RDF component forces were established. A number of problems were encountered but the concept was proved valid. The intelligence flow within the Joint Operations Center (JOC) was very much improved over that experienced during Exercise POSITIVE LEAP. Shortfalls in personnel were identified in the areas of collection management and Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) analysis and additional augmentee requirements in these areas were documented in an augmentee requirements package submitted to J-1.

(U) BRIGET STAR-81

(U) In November 1980 elements of the HQ RDJTF deployed to Cairo West Air Force Base, Egypt to participate in Exercise BRIGET STAR. The J-2 participation included preparation of the intelligence scenario and supporting documents,

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controlling/directing the aggressor forces and establishing secure communications connectivity during the deployment and employment phases with the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Military Command Center (NMCC)/National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC), HQ USREDCOM and other commands. The deployed J-2 simulated FTX play by generating message traffic and direct coordination with the aggressor force commander/controllers.

U ~~(S)~~ During Exercise POSITIVE LEAP (9-16 April 1980) the SSO facility deployed with a UGC-129 "table top" circuit with point to point connectivity to the USREDCOM SSO facility. During Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT-81 the deployed RDJTF SSO facility operated four point to point circuits, employing the Cryptologic Support Group (CSG) Mobile Cryptologic Support Facility (MCSF). This RDJTF SSO facility provided connectivity to component forces and provided the RDJTF director of intelligence with all-source intelligence information to exercise his fusion center concept.

U (S) In November 1980, SSO personnel deployed to Cairo West Airfield in Egypt to participate in Exercise BRIGHT STAR. Non-SCI circuit connectivity was established between the deployed HQ and HQ USREDCOM, NSA and the NMCC utilizing a TCG-27 van with four circuit positions. Sanitized real world intelligence was provided to the deployment commander and deployed J-2 throughout the exercise.

3. (U) Significant Activities

(U) Operations Division Activities

(U) The OPS Division was tasked by the J-2 to develop and refine a fusion center concept of intelligence support as a result of lessons learned in Exercise POSITIVE LEAP. This concept of deployed operations was successfully tested during Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT and formed the basis for a requested increase in manpower authorizations and for additional augmentee support when deployed. Coordination and liaison were effected with national agencies, HQ PACOM, and HQ EUCOM to enhance the intelligence support these HQ can provide to the Headquarters RDJTF and its component forces. Particular attention was paid to collection management, indications and warning (I&W), targeting and mapping, charting and geodesy (MC&G) support.

(U) The Collection Management Branch, working closely with the HQ staff, component/supporting forces and other joint planning headquarters, established the command collection management policy/procedures. From this coordination and lessons learned in Exercises POSITIVE LEAP and GALLANT KNIGHT procedures for all collection requirements to be validated by the RDJ2 were developed. The concentrated effort in this area has resulted in a centralized collection management program to determine optimum utilization of collection resources, and to ensure all intelligence requirements are satisfied in a timely manner.

(U) The capabilities of the Collection Management Branch were greatly enhanced through the acquisition of the Advanced Imagery Requirements Exploitation System (AIRES), that provides access to the national imagery data base. Participation in national level conferences on strategic and tactical collection systems, DIA schooling and experience gained in exercises POSITIVE

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LEAP, GALLANT KNIGHT and BLUE FLAG proved invaluable in developing the expertise required by branch personnel to manage an effective collection management office.

U (C) The initial organization did not provide for an I&W element on the J-2 staff. In June 1980 in an internal reorganization, this element was added from existing assets with the mission of developing I&W indicators for the RDJTF area of interest. Since June 1980, liaison has been conducted at the national level and with HQ EUCOM and HQ PACOM to focus attention on RDJTF requirements for I&W support in SWA.

(U) As a result of Exercise POSITIVE LEAP problems with administrative functions associated with targeting and weapons applications procedures required during the planning and employment phases of contingency operations surfaced. As a result, a Joint Targeting Coordination Board was developed and promulgated as a RDJTF Target procedure. The concept was proven valid in Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT and greatly enhanced the targeting coordination effort between HQ RDJTF and the component forces.

U (C) The Targeting Branch also has responsibility for the command's Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MCG) requirements. Few new maps/charts have been produced on SWA in recent years and a vigorous program has been instituted by Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) to support the very large requirements of the RDJTF. RDJ2 personnel have continually coordinated with DMA throughout the year and as a result of this and other actions, DMA has received increased budget and manning authorizations over the next five years to support the RDJTF requirements in SWA.

U (C) During this initial year the Analysis Branch was very heavily tasked to support not only the requirements of the J-2 but in addition provided installation and other types of data to all major staff elements. One of the more important products was the preparation of the "Command Threat" brief, which depicts probable adversary situations in the Southwest Asia region. This brief includes overviews of enemy orders of battle (OB), weather and terrain, and general geo-political factors affecting the RDJTF area of interest. In addition the Analysis Branch prepared briefs on Soviet forces mobilization/capability and SWA country briefs. Major intelligence products included a SWA biographic handbook, SWA interdiction study, capability and vulnerability assessments on SWA countries and assessments of probable Soviet courses of action in SWA.

(U) Plans, Programs and Security Division

U (C) The RDJTF SSO/Communications Center was activated on 1 Mar 1980 concurrently with HQ RDJTF. This RDJTF SSO initially shared facilities with the USREDCOM SSO pending facilities completion and equipment installation in Building 1105. Action was taken by SSO, USREDCOM to obtain approval from DIA for 119 Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) billets for the RDJTF.⁵

5. Message, SSO USREDCOM DTG 141300Z Feb 80, Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.

Message, DIA DTG 122006Z Mar 80, Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.

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These billets were not sufficient, however, to fulfill the requirements of the HQ at MacDill and the Washington Liaison Office and over the course of the year the billets steadily increased to a current total of 169.⁶

(U) (G) In June 1980, DIA designated the Commander RDJTF as "proper authority" for routine sanitization of special intelligence (SCI) material.⁷ Concurrently the SSO received authority from USREDCOM for the RDJTF senior intelligence officer to sanitize, decontrol and downgrade SAO materials.

(U) On 26 Sep 80 the SSO facility was relocated to the RDJTF HQ (Bldg 1105) and accredited by DIA to provide Commander RDJTF and the Director of Intelligence with daily SCI intelligence service.⁸ In addition it provides the Commander and his key staff members with privacy "back channel" message service. The facility operates eight hours a day, five days per week in garrison and with augmentation, 24 hours a day, seven days a week when deployed.

(U) The Counterintelligence (CI) section was created under the JTF with the mission of planning, implementing and supervising the RDJTF CI program through the detection and neutralization of sabotage, espionage, treason, sedition and subversion; and to insure that CI and security measures are adequate to protect the headquarters. The CI section is also responsible for coordinating the counterintelligence program with the component forces and with higher headquarters. Liaison is conducted with other elements of the CI community to include the services, U & S commands, CIA, FBI and State Department. Upon direction by COMRDJTF, the CI section must be prepared to establish and maintain liaison with friendly foreign CI and law enforcement agencies when deployed. The CI section has established and maintains a CI data base for use by the Director of Intelligence and other staff elements. Throughout the reporting period the CI section carried out a continuing program of enhancing the command security consciousness through films, pamphlets and security awareness bulletins.

6. Message, SSO USREDCOM, DTG 221330Z Apr 80, Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.
Message, DIA DTG 232216Z Apr 80 Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.
Message, SSO USREDCOM DTG 141558Z Aug 80, Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.
Message, DIA DTG 092203Z Sep 80, Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.
Message, SSO USREDCOM DTG 221600Z Oct 80, Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.
Message, DIA DTG 302146Z Oct 80, Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.
7. Message, DIA DTG 030031Z Jun 80, Subj: Designation of COMRDJTF as Proper Authority for SI.
Message, DIA DTG 071454Z Aug 80, Subj: Routine SI Sanitization Authority for COMRDJTF.
8. Message, DIA DTG 272229Z Feb 80, Subj: Interim Facility Accreditation, RDJTF, USREDCOM, Rooms 30,32,33, and 35, Bldg 1105, MacDill AFB, Florida.
Message, DIA DTG 171916Z Oct 80, Subj: Facility Accreditation, RDJTF, USREDCOM, Rooms 30,32,33, and 35, Bldg 1105, MacDill AFB, Florida.

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(U) On 24 April 1980 the CI section prepared a letter requesting that the Commander, RDJTF be granted authority to originate and classify top secret material.⁹ Authority was granted to USREDCOM by SECDEF ltr dated 5 Jun 1980,¹⁰ and subsequently by memo from USREDCOM to COMRDJTF.¹¹ In August, authority was requested for directorate/special staff heads to classify secret and confidential material.¹² That authority was granted by HQ USREDCOM in Sep 1980.¹³

(U) In Dec 1980 the CI section published a RDJTF information security standard operating procedure (SOP). Distribution throughout the command was accomplished in Dec 80. Also, on 10 Dec 80, the CI section established a program of monthly meetings for directorate/special staff security control officers for the purpose of promoting security awareness within the headquarters.

(U) On 9 Dec 80 a request was forwarded through HQ USREDCOM to the office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Director of Information Security for a waiver of requirements for administrative control of secret material within HQ RDJTF.¹⁴ A response is expected in early 1981.

(U) As the principal staff officer tasked to provide the essential intelligence required to support the COMRDJTF the J-2 must have available an extensive data base as well as the capability to rapidly task national level intelligence assets and to communicate with component forces in a timely manner. To accomplish this when deployed it is necessary for the J-2 and his staff to have a computer based, automated intelligence support system. Shortly after the RDJTF was activated it became apparent that the systems to provide timely support during deployment and the early stages of employment did not exist. A program was launched to define the concept of operations, the intelligence requirements and develop a functional description of intelligence support systems for enroute and employment intelligence support. Since activation of the RDJTF, J-2 personnel worked closely with USREDCOM, DIA, JCS and the component headquarters to identify requirements for a full intelligence capability during deployment/employment. The following conferences/visits were in direct support of this still unresolved problem:

a. (U) Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System (AIRES)
In June 1980 discussions were held between the J-2 and DIA concerning the problem of collection management. The AIRES systems was offered by the DIA to help solve this problem. The system was delivered to USREDCOM in Sep 1980 and is expected to be installed and on line to DIA early in 1981.

9. Form 14, COMRDJTF, Designation of Original Classification Authority, 24 Apr 80.
10. Memorandum, Secretary of Defense Memo For USCINCRD, Designation of Official to Exercise Original TOP SECRET Classification Authority under Executive Order 12065, 5 Jun 80.
11. Memorandum, USREDCOM Designation of Original Classification, 18 Jun 80.
12. Form 14, COMRDJTF, Delegation of Original SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL Classification Authority, 29 Aug 80.
13. Memorandum, USREDCOM, Delegation of Original Classification Authority, 23 Sep 80.
14. Letter, COMRDJTF, Accountability/Control Procedures for SECRET material, 9 Dec 80.

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b. (U) Aerospace Corporation, Los Angeles CA. In July 1980, the Commander, RDJTF was briefed by representatives from the Aerospace Corp who visited the RDJTF to discuss the functional design of an automated intelligence support system for the RDJTF. Topics discussed included a practical architecture of intelligence systems for RDJTF and "straw man" requirements for such a system, which included a review of various sensors, exploitation systems, communications systems and collection management systems/approaches.

U c. (G) HQ SAC - In August 1980 J-2 personnel visited HQ SAC to discuss the feasibility of utilizing existing SAC software to build an intelligence data base for use with the Rolm 1666 computer which is installed on SAC EC-135 aircraft. These aircraft would be used to deploy the RDJTF battlestaff upon direction by the National Command Authority (NCA). SAC has agreed to assist RDJTF and funding for this program has been identified in the FY1981 supplemental defense appropriations bill. The data base problems are expected to be overcome in the first half of 1981.

d. (U) RCA Auto Systems, Burlington, Mass - in August 1980, J-2 personnel visited RCA to discuss on-going RCA programs and contracts for automated intelligence support system which could be used to support the RDJTF and to receive briefings on SIGINT systems they currently produce for the US Army.

e. (U) DIA, Wash DC - In Sep 1980 DIA/DI-2 hosted a conference for RDJTF to assist in the identification of intelligence requirements and to establish an intelligence architecture upon which appropriate automated support systems could be designated and proved. The efforts begun here continued throughout the remainder of the year resulting in the RDJTF intelligence requirements and concept of operations being documented.

f. (U) HQ FMFLANT - In November 1980 J-2 personnel attended a briefing and demonstration of the Marine Air Ground Intelligence System (MAGIS) at FMFLANT in Norfolk, Va. The purpose of this visit was to determine if the MAGIS could fulfill the RDJTF requirement for a deployable automated intelligence support system.

U (G) The first RDJTF hosted intelligence conference was held 16-18 Sep 80. Participating were representatives from RDJTF, USREDCOM, DIA, designated RDP Planning HQs and service intelligence representatives. The conference focused on major areas of mutual intelligence concern including the refinement of the RDJTF intelligence architecture concept and a comprehensive review of near term RDJTF intelligence enhancements. The status of RDJTF OPLAN 1001-81 and Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT-81 was briefed and discussed. The conference served as a forum to voice and resolve the various concerns of the subordinate/supporting commands and contributed significantly to the intercommand flow of intelligence information/ideas and improved the RDJTF's ability to provide intelligence support to the components/supporting commands.

(U) The following national level intelligence conferences were attended by representatives from the intelligence directorate:

a. (U) DIA Intelligence Requirements Review - May 1980.

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- b. (U) Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) Manager's Conference - Sep 1980.
- c. (U) JCS Interdiction Seminar - Sep 1980.
- d. (U) Target Intelligence/Tactical Target Materials (TI/TM) Conference - Oct 1980.
- e. (U) Air Defense Systems Program Review Conference - Oct 1980.
- f. (U) Indications and Warning (I&W) Seminar and Policy Council - Oct 80.
- g. (U) Reconnaissance Operations Conference - Oct 1980.
- h. (U) DOD Plan for Intelligence Support to Operational Commanders Conference - Nov 1980.
- i. (U) Air Defense Systems Program Review Conference - Nov 1980.
- j. (U) Tactical Exploitation of National Collection Capabilities (TENCAP) Conference - Dec 1980.
- k. (U) Defense Steering Group (DSG) Conference - Dec 1980.

(U) RDJTF participation in these conferences not only insured that the commands intelligence requirements were made known community wide but also provided the vehicle to inform the intelligence community of the mission and problems confronting HQ RDJTF and solicit their support and assistance in solving the unique problems associated with this "one of a kind" command.

(U) Cryptologic Support Group (CSG) Activities

~~U~~ Since its establishment on 1 Mar 1980 the RDJTF has received cryptologic support from the Cryptologic Support Group (CSG) USREDCOM. As planning progressed it became apparent that additional personnel would be required to adequately support the cryptologic requirements of both USREDCOM and the RDJTF. In a letter dated 7 Aug 80,¹⁵ to the Director, NSA, USCINCPAC requested additional NSA personnel to fully support the mission of the RDJTF. On 29-30 Sep 80 a two man team from NSA, led by the Chief of NSA's Office of Support to military operations visited HQ USREDCOM for the purpose of validating the request for additional support personnel. As a result of this visit a recommendation was made to the Director, NSA that CSG billets be increased by four (two officer/two NCO). This action was approved and the additional personnel are expected to arrive during 1981.

~~U~~ In addition to an increase in cryptologic support personnel, USREDCOM CSG advised NSA via message¹⁶ that to fully support COMRDJTF potential deployment/employment options in Southwest Asia (SWA) the Mobile Cryptologic Support Facility (MCSF) would require the following upgrades:

15. Letter, USREDCOM, No Subject (Personal For), 7 Aug 80.

16. Message, USREDCOM (USF-784) DTG 161430Z Dec 80, Subj: MCSF Improvements.

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U a. ~~(S)~~ An increase of two secure teletype terminals. The current configuration of the MCSF permits communications to only four components. With the addition of Navy/Marine forces and the SAC Strategic Projection Force (SAC/SPF) there is a requirement for a total of six in-theater OPSCOM circuits to the RDJTF CSG.

b. (U) Back-up communications terminals which are non-computer dependent to provide a fail safe, minimum communications mode of operations.

U c. ~~(S)~~ A secure voice capability to permit direct voice communications between the MCSF and the National Sigint Operations Center or Component Cryptologic Support Elements (CSE) as required.

(U) NSA approved the upgrades to the MCSF and advised CSG USREDCOM that it would be accomplished by 5 December 1980. However, as of the end of CY 80 the upgrading of the MCSF was not complete.

U ~~(S)~~ During Exercise POSITIVE LEAP at Ft Bragg, NC (10-15 April 1980) the MCSF formed part of the national intelligence display for tactical commanders. The purpose of this display was to familiarize combat commanders and key staff elements with the capabilities of national intelligence assets to support tactical planning and operations. The CSG also provided SIGINT support to COMRDJTF and the component forces during Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT-81 at Ft Bragg, NC.

(U) Weather Detachment Activities

(U) Since the activation of the RDJTF, weather support to the RDJTF HQ has been provided by the 1st Weather Squadron (MAC), MacDill AFB, Florida, under authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff J3M-1882'80, subject: "Designation of Mission Meteorological Support Responsibility for the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)", 29 October 1980. A Weather Division (RDJ2-W), manned from 1 WS resources, was formed under the Intelligence Directorate to fully integrate RDJTF weather support.

(U) A Weather Support Element (WSE) supported each exercise during 1980 in which the RDJTF participated. Support began with Exercise POSITIVE LEAP 80 in which four RDJ2-W personnel participated. During Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 81, RDJ2-W deployed with the RDJTF HQ to form a WSE at Fort Bragg, NC. The WSE consisted of seven persons from RDJ2-W, augmented by 47 other Air Force and Navy weather personnel. Support was provided to the RDJTF HQ and all components down to division/brigade and wing level. Joint weather support to the RDJTF became a reality during GALLANT KNIGHT 81 when the Naval Oceanographic Command (NOC) deployed a Navy weather officer to augment the WSE. During Exercise BRIGHT STAR 81, RDJ2-W deployed two weather forecasters with the JTF HQ to provide around-the-clock weather support.

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C. (U) OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE (J3)

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The Director of Operations, An Army Colonel, has the staff responsibility for coordinating and directing all operational and joint training aspects for missions assigned to the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. The Director's duties include but are not limited to:

a. (U) Advising the commander on all matters that pertain to joint operations joint training, combat readiness of assigned forces and other requirements as directed.

b. (U) Supervising the staff to ensure adequacy of training and operational preparedness of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to deploy and to conduct joint exercises and contingency operations.

c. (U) Monitoring component task organizations and the operational procedures to assign forces to insure the maximum operational effectiveness and optimum utilization of available resources.

d. (U) Translating approved plans into contingency actions and orders to include the planning for supervision of and the conduct of component "no notice" unit alert exercises; exercising staff supervision over, planning for, the conduct of directed joint readiness exercises and the monitoring of joint training of assigned forces. To assist the director with his assigned tasks, he has cognizance over three divisions - Current Operations, Special Operations and the Exercise and Readiness Division.

(U) Current Operations Division

(U) The Current Operations Division is directly responsible to the Director of Operations, J3 for all Operational aspects of missions assigned the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. The Division consists of 34 personnel from all services:

	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
a. ARMY	7	7
b. Air Force	5	4
c. Marine Corps	5	2
d. Navy	4	1

(U) They are organized into 6 branches: Air Defense Operations; Air Operations; Command, Control and Communications Countermeasures; Emergency Actions; Ground Operations and Naval Operations. These branches are tasked to provide, in each of their areas of expertise, advice on all matters concerning joint operations and combat readiness of assigned forces. Additionally, each branch monitors component task organization and operational procedures of assigned forces to insure maximum operational effectiveness and optimum utilization of available resources as well as translating approved plans into contingency actions and orders. The division chief also serves as the Deputy Director, Operations Directorate, J3.

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(U) The initial nucleus of the Current Operations Division reported for duty prior to 1 March 1980 and began to organize the framework of a viable organization. A rapid influx of personnel from all four services quickly built up the strength and operational capability of the division during March through May. Full operational strength was essentially achieved by the end of July.

(U) Exercise and Readiness Division

(U) As in the case of the Current Operations Division, the Exercise and Readiness Division was formed concurrently with the activation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force on 1 March 1980.

(U) The Exercise and Readiness Division is responsible to the Director of Operations, J3 for pre-joint exercise planning, exercise control, and monitoring the operational readiness of assigned forces. The division also develops joint exercise control organizations and prepares detailed exercise scenarios and exercise control plans. Additionally, it establishes procedures for and monitors the readiness of assigned RDJTF forces. To accomplish these tasks this division has six assigned personnel. Distribution is as follows:

	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
a. Army	1	0
b. Navy	1	0
c. Air Force	2	1
d. USMC	1	0

(U) Special Operations Division

(U) The Special Operations Division is directly responsible to the Director of Operations, J3 for all matters pertaining to unconventional warfare, political/military operations, civil affairs, special planning and escape and evasion as pertains to missions assigned the Commander, RDJTF. The division also conducts unconventional warfare planning for joint readiness exercises and contingencies, serves as a technical adviser to the Commander on special/unconventional warfare matters and, in coordination with the Chief of the Current Operations Division, translates approved plans into contingency plans and orders. The division is comprised of 11 individuals with distribution as follows:

	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
a. Army	4	1
b. Navy	3	1
c. Air Force	2	0

The division chief supervises branches with responsibilities that include unconventional warfare, political/military/civil affairs, special plans and an administrative cell.

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2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) Forces

U (S) RDJTF forces are regularly assigned to unified or specified commands and, in some instances, are committed in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. It is not intended to assign these forces to HQ, RDJTF on a routine basis. When required, and as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, forces will be assigned to, or operate in support of HQ RDJTF as determined by individual requirements. Tentative RDJTF forces with the capability to respond to non-NATO combat contingencies were originally identified in Appendix B to JCSM-318-79, 15 November 1979. In coordination with the services and the unified commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would designate specific forces to satisfy requirements identified by Commander, RDJTF, and Service component planning headquarters. Additional forces could be tasked in OPLANS and OPORDS if approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Identified RDJTF forces were so recorded in applicable Joint Strategic Planning System documents. The size of the RDJTF force was derived from a planning requirement for a swift response to a demanding non-NATO contingency in which there may or may not be (b)1.4 a, c Should there be direct Soviet involvement, the RDJTF would be reinforced by additional units assigned or earmarked for NATO.

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FORCES (U)

US ARMY FORCES^{1*}

XVIII Airborne Corps, HQ
4th Infantry Division (Mech)
194th Armored Brigade
Squadrons^{4*}
82d Airborne Division
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
1st/75th Infantry Battalion (Ranger)
2d/75th Infantry Battalion (Ranger)

*Notes to Above.

1. U (S) Unit shortfalls or reduced equipment/personnel levels will occur in support forces if simultaneous employment of RDP-Army exceeds 2-1/3 divisions.

(b)(1)1.4a

3 U (S) These USREDCOM forces would be augmented with appropriate USAF support units, including 6 E-3A AWACS aircraft, 24 F-4G WILD WEASEL aircraft and air rescue helicopters.

4. U (S) Air-National Guard units requiring mobilization. (Since 3 active tactical reconnaissance squadrons located in CONUS are dual-based under operational command of USCINCEUR.)

5. U (S) CONUS-based MAC units with airdrop capability.

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US NAVAL FORCES^{6*}

Supporting FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING FOR
RDJTF

- | | |
|---|------------------------------------|
| 1 Surface Action Group | Strategic Refueling ^{8*} |
| 3 Carrier Battle Groups | Strategic Airlift ^{9/10*} |
| 1 Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) ^{7*} | Strategic Sealift ^{11*} |
| 5 Patrol Squadrons P-3 | |

*Notes to Above.

6. ~~U (S)~~ Consists of forward-deployed and CONUS-ready forces assigned to CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, or CINCPAC. RDJTF forces may be drawn from the appropriate unified or specified command, depending upon the location of the contingency.

7. ~~U (S)~~ Made available from 3 MAFs currently under operational command of CINCLANT and CINCPAC. All three, or elements thereof, possess rapid deployment capability. Amphibious lift is available for 1 MAF assault echelon. MAFs are capable of rapid deployment via sealift and/or airlift.

8. ~~U (S)~~ Strategic refueling resources for the execution of a specific OPLAN will be allocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as required, at the time execution planning is directed.

9. ~~U (S)~~ Strategic movement resources for the execution of a specific OPLAN will be allocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as required, at the time execution planning is directed.

10. ~~U (S)~~ Planning for any single non-NATO contingency may assume use of up to (b)1.4a of mobility assets that are available at the assumed level of mobilization.

11. ~~U (S)~~ Sealift forces available for planning include:

a. ~~U (S)~~ Nonmobilization—Military Sealift Command (MSC)-controlled fleet, US-flag ships in the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP), and the Ready Reserve Force (RRF).

b. ~~U (S)~~ Partial Mobilization—MSC-controlled fleet, US-flag ships in the SRP, and the National Defense Reserve Fleet, including RRF ships.

(b)(1)1.4a

~~U (S)~~ The force list above modified the specific type of Army units available and noted that shortfalls or reduced equipment/personnel levels would occur in support forces if more than 2 1/3 Army Divisions were simultaneously employed. It also provided more specific guidance on the

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number and type of Air Force squadrons and added 5 Bomber Squadrons (Heavy) to the list of available forces. No changes occurred in the list of Naval Forces available.

(U) Readiness

(U) In accordance with the FY81 JCSP and the Terms of Reference (TOR), Readiness data for all service forces assigned as part of, or in support of, RDJTF was provided HQ RDJTF through the established chain of command as required by JCS Pub 6, Vol II, Part 2, Chap 1 (UNITREP).

a. U (S) US Army and US Air Force RDJTF units provided their UNITREP status to US Readiness Command, and in turn, USREDCOM provided the information to HQ RDJTF. Identification and status of assigned units as of 1 Mar 1980, the date Headquarters RDJTF was activated, and on 31 December 1980, the end of this first command history reporting period, are shown below:

		STATUS AS OF 1 Mar 80	STATUS AS OF 31 Dec 80
<u>Army</u>			
4th	Infantry Division	C3	
9th	Infantry Division	not assigned	C3
24th	Infantry Division (Mech)	not assigned	C2
82d	Airborne Division	C2	C2
101st	Air Assault Division	C4	C3
6th	Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)	not assigned	C3
194th	Armored Brigade	C2	
<u>Air Force</u>			
563	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-4G)	C5	C2
390	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-11A)	C2	C2
522	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-111D)	C2	C1
353	TAC Fighter Sqdn (A-10A)	C2	C1
355	TAC Fighter Sqdn (A-10A)	C1	C1
336	TAC Fighter Sqdn (A-10)	C3	not assigned
356	TAC Fighter Sqdn (A-10A)	not assigned	C2
68	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-4E)	C1	C1

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70	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-4E)	C1	C1
339	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-4E)	C1	C1
7	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-15)	C1	C1
8	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-15)	C2	C1
9	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-15)	C1	C1
76	TAC Fighter Sqdn (A-7)	C1	C1
16	Spec Operations Sqdn (AC-130)	C2	C2
552	Abn Wing Control Wg (E-3A)	C2	C1
7	Abn Command/Control Sqdn (C-130E)	C2	C2
188	TAC Fighter Sqdn (A-7)	C1	not assigned
106	TAC Reconnaissance Sqdn (RF-4C)	C1	C1
165	TAC Reconnaissance Sqdn (RF-4C)	C1	C1
118	TAC Fighter Sqdn (A-10)	C3	C3
193	TAC Electronic Warfare Sq (EC-135)	C5	C4

The readiness of Army units was degraded primarily by a shortage of Senior NCO's. Air Force forces were experiencing a degradation of readiness due to shortages of War Reserve Spare Kits (WRSK).

U (E) The Naval forces available for RDJTF planning consisted of forward-deployed and CONUS-ready Naval Forces assigned to CINCLANT, USCINCEUR or CINCPAC. RDJTF Naval Force could be drawn from appropriate unified or specified commands, depending on contingency location. Since the RDJTF's planning throughout the year was focused on SWA, the RDJTF concentrated on monitoring, through JCS, the location and status of Naval forces forward-deployed in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. During the majority of the year, two Carrier Battle Groups were forward-deployed in the Indian Ocean. These were in addition to the Naval Forces attached to COMIDEASTFOR which were forward-deployed in the Persian Gulf. The Navy's major factor degrading readiness was a shortage of personnel.

U (E) RDJTF Marine Forces were available from elements of the three Marine Amphibious forces under the operational command of CINCLANT and CINCPAC. The three Marine Divisions remained C-2 throughout the year. The Marine Corps major readiness deficiency was shortage of personnel. Further, during this period a Marine Amphibious Unit was periodically forward-deployed to the Indian Ocean aboard amphibious shipping.

(U) Training and Exercise Program

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(U) The RDJTF Training and Exercise Program was an essential element of efforts to establish and maintain the required state of operational Readiness for the RDJTF and its component headquarters. As of 31 Dec 81, HQ RDJTF had participated in eight exercises. These included four Command Post Exercises (CPX's), one OCONUS Field Training Exercise (FTX), Two Rapid Deployment Readiness Exercises (RDRE) and a Communications Exercise (COMMEX) conducted at home base.

(U) Command and Control of Small Rapid Response Forces

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(U) The RDJTF command and control element to support this concept consisted of 116 Headquarters staff and support personnel. The package provided for an Airborne battle staff and an airdrop as well as an airland element. The development of this command and control package was significant since it was the first such requirement placed on the Headquarters RDJTF and since then has served as the basis for subsequent similar Command and Control requirements.

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(U) Operations Standing Operating Procedure (SOP)

(U) During the period of 1 Mar - 1 July 1980, this Headquarters developed the organization/format and basic contents and philosophy for the Operations SOP. The purpose of the SOP is to provide command policy, procedures, guidance, and taskings to the Headquarters, RDJTF, commands and units designated as component forces, and to commands/units designated as forces in support of. It was decided that the organization would, to the extent possible, follow the Joint Operational Planning System (JOPS) format. The SOP includes the voluminous amount of routine unclassified material that is normally found in operation plans/orders and also prescribes the methods by which COMRDJTF will conduct combat operations and exercises. In general, the information and procedures contained in the SOP are designed to promote understanding and unity of effort for this Headquarters and all participating forces.

(U) The first draft COMRDJTF Operations SOP was published on 1 Aug 1980. It was closely reviewed by all BQ RDJTF Directorates for the next sixty-day period to ensure that all policy, procedures and requirements contained therein were consistent with current direction on such areas as command relationship being formulated and refined by higher headquarters. On 1 October 1980, the first approved COMRDJTF Operations SOP was published and distribution was made so this document could be used/referenced for CPX GALLANT KNIGHT (conducted at Fort Bragg, N.C. 23-30 Oct 1980).

(U) All commands and forces participating in CPX GALLANT KNIGHT were given an opportunity to provide comments/recommendations on this SOP. All input was reviewed, staffed, and incorporated into a draft revision dated 31 Dec 1980. Distribution was made with COMRDJTF OPLAN 1003-81. All addressees were requested to identify additional changes and submit comments/recommendations as a result of reviewing this manual in support of COMRDJTF OPLAN 1003-81.

(U) As a result of this tasking, numerous issues were forwarded to this Headquarters requiring staff coordination and resolution with components and supporting forces prior to the next approved publications of this manual. All issues have been resolved at this time. Those issues considered to be significant were: airspace management, common-air tasking procedures, reporting requirements by forces in support of, and standardization of joint operational procedures encompassing most functional areas throughout the SOP.

(U) A second COMRDJTF Operations SOP is scheduled for publication during the first half of calendar year 1981. The publication/distribution of this SOP to all components, forces in support of and other selected headquarters/organizations will serve as a major contribution toward the preparedness and readiness of the RDJTF to execute short notice missions. By referencing this document the requirement to prepare large voluminous OPLANS/OPORDs will be virtually eliminated.

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(U) Command Post Field SOP

(U) During May of 1980 the decision was made to prepare a Command Post (CP) Field Standing Operating Procedure (SOP). The SOP would provide command policy, procedures, guidance and tasking for the conduct of HQ RDJTF CP operations in the field. Additionally, this SOP would include that information needed by HQ staff elements to promote a clear understanding of the organization and functions of the RDJTF Headquarters while operating in the field. General subject areas included in the SOP are:

- a. Personnel
- b. Intelligence
- c. Operations
- d. Logistics
- e. Plans
- f. Communications
- g. Special Staff Activities

(U) The initial draft of this SOP was prepared during the period 13 Jun - 10 Oct 80. The first field check of the information contained in the SOP was conducted during Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT, 21-31 Oct 80, at Ft Bragg, NC. Changes based on Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT were incorporated into the SOP during the period 1 Nov 80 - 30 Jan 81.

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(U) Readiness SOP

(U) The activities chronicled in this Command History provided many invaluable insights especially in the deployment of the Headquarters, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. These insights were of such significance that COMRDJTF desired to incorporate them into the permanent institutional memory. Therefore on 10 March 1980, the Current Operations Division, Operations Directorate, J3 was directed to take the lead in developing a Readiness SOP. Mobilizing the efforts of the entire staff, the Readiness SOP evolved from merely recording lessons learned to that of serving as a Headquarters deployment guide.

(U) The basic rationale behind the development of the Readiness SOP is that the Headquarters deployment process will be incremental in nature and keyed to the size of the total deployed force. The Headquarters will optimally perform its functions if each deployment increment provides a balanced capability to command and control forces from all four services. If the actual force deployed is skewed toward a particular service capability the deployment increment would be tailored to reflect force composition using the deployment increment in the Readiness SOP as a baseline. Within the incremental deployment concept is an additional option for the commander: the provisions of an inherent airdrop capability. Airdrop entry of the operational area, however, is not the most likely deployment option, therefore the provision of this capability has not driven the composition of the increments. Command and control deployment increments are being developed for three different force packages:

- a. (U) A reinforced battalion/squadron(s).
- b. (U) A division/multi-wing force.
- c. (U) The entire force list.

(U) In addition to the three command and control increments, a liaison increment was developed to act as an advance party and to assist the commander in planning force deployment. Consistent with the incremental deployment process, the liaison element will be deployed into objective areas prior to force deployment or, with appropriate permission, prior to a decision by the NCA to deploy all or part of the RDF. It relies on local subsistence, security, billeting, and transportation support. This increment was designed to perform the following functions:

- a. (U) Establish liaison with local national security forces.
- b. (U) Prepare for introduction of US combat forces.
- c. (U) Establish liaison with US government agencies already in the area. (embassy, military assistance team, etc).
- d. (U) Establish communication with the appropriate CINC and COMRDJTF.

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(U) The Initial Increment provides a minimum capability to command and control a major buildup of a multiservice force during the first several days of low intensity combat operations. This increment is designed principally for an airland mode of insertion but possesses an inherent airdrop capability. Additionally this increment provides the battle/staff expertise for use in an airborne command post. This package will include the liaison increment if it had not originally deployed. It has an organic capability for a minimum level of subsistence, security, billeting and transportation selfsupport. The initial increment was designed to perform the following functions:

- a. (U) Provide a minimum capability to command and control a multi-service force.
- b. (U) Control a small show of force (battalion/squadron(s)/MAU) for 30 days.
- c. (U) Command and control the force during the buildup of the RDJTF prior to the arrival of the second increment.
- d. (U) Control a low intensity combat operation.
- e. (U) Coordinate the arrival of units into the operational area.
- f. (U) Establish communications with the supporting CINCs, NCA, REDCOM/JDA and RDJTF(rear).
- g. (U) Establish communications required to command and control forces in the operational area.
- h. (U) Assume operational control of all assignment forces and coordinate naval forces in support of the RDJTF.

(U) The Second Increment, in conjunction with the previous increments, provides the capability to command and control a division/MAB/multi-wing/CVBG (in support) force in medium intensity combat operations. This increment, designed solely with an airland capability, has the following functions:

- a. (U) Control forces engaged in medium intensity operations for an indefinite period.
- b. (U) Control high intensity operations until the arrival of the entire headquarters.
- c. (U) Operate from a bare base environment.
- d. (U) Provide full communications connectivity necessary to support combat operations.

(U) The Final Increment, in concert with all preceeding increments, provides the capability to command and control all deployed forces in sustained combat operations.

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(U) The Readiness SOP, incorporating the deployment rationale discussed in the preceeding paragraphs, will include other readiness enhancing topics. Alert notification procedures, personnel readiness requirements, deployment checklists and crisis action procedures are topics slated for inclusion in the Readiness SOP with a scheduled publication date of late June 1981.

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(U) HQ RDJTF Hurricane Relocation Plan

U (P) RDJ3 was tasked in July 1980 to develop a HQ RDJTF Hurricane Relocation Plan. The plan gives COMRDJTF the option of relocating, with USCINCPAC and JCS approval, HQ RDJTF operations away from hurricane conditions at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida to maintain a deployment capability for HQ RDJTF. It provides for relocating up to 125 personnel with required equipment (Small Rapid Response Force -- SRRF) to one of three relocation bases: Ft Bragg, North Carolina or Ft Campbell, Kentucky by airlift; or Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida by convoy. The plan was coordinated with United States Readiness Command; Commander, Forces Command; Commander, Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida; and 56 Tactical Fighter Wing, MacDill Air Force Base Florida. Plan development was completed in December 1980 with a publication date of 1 January 1981. It will be reviewed and updated annually in the month of January.

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(U) Employment CPX POSITIVE LEAP 80

U (S) Employment Command Post Exercise (CPX) POSITIVE LEAP was conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, during the period of 10-15 April 1980. The purpose of the exercise was to provide a simulated combat environment to train the commander and staff of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and its Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Joint Unconventional Warfare components/supporting commands in planning and conducting large scale military operations. The exercise objectives achieved included exercising the RDJTF in contingency operations based on real-world contingency plans; exercising RDJTF command, control, communications procedures; validating RDJTF force structure; developing RDJTF force closure data, refining airlift requirements; and identifying logistics issues. A total of 10,255 personnel from all services participated in the CPX.

(FOOO) Participating Headquarters and key commanders/players are listed below:

U (S) Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Headquarters

COMRDJTF	Lt Gen P. X. Kelley
Deputy COMRDJTF	Maj Gen R. C. Taylor
Chief of Staff	SG C. W. Stiner

(U) Army Forces (ARFOR).

U (S) COMARFOR/Commander, XVIII Abn Corps	LTG T. Tackaberry
HQ, 82nd Abn Div	MG G. S. Meloy III
HQ, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)	MG J. N. Brandenburg
HQ, 24th Inf Div (M)	MG J. F. Cochran III
HQ, 194th Armd Bde	COL
HQ, 197th Inf Bde (M)	COL
HQ, 1-75 Inf Bn (RGR)	LTC
HQ, 2-75 Inf Bn (RGR)	LTC
HQ, 96th CA Bn	LTC
HQ, 8th PSYOP Bn	LTC

(b)(6)

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(U) Air Force Forces (AFFOR), POSITIVE LEAP.

UNIT

U ~~(S)~~ COMAFFOR/Commander Ninth Air Force Lt Gen A. S. Braswell
4 Tactical Fighter Wings
2 Tactical Recon Squadrons
6 E-3A (AWACS)

U ~~TST~~ SAC ADVON Maj Gen P. J. Balloran
5 Squadrons B-52

(U) JOINT RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER (JRCC)
Air Rescue Helos

(U) COMALP Brig Gen D. D. Brown
2 Tactical Airlift Wings

(U) Naval Forces (NAVFOR).

UNIT

U ~~(S)~~ COMNAVFOR RADM R. P. Dunn
1 Surface Action Gp
3 Carrier Battle Gp
1 Amphibious Task Force
5 Patrol Squadrons (P-3)

(U) Marine Forces (MARFOR).

UNIT

U ~~(S)~~ MARFOR HQ Brig Gen E. C. Cheatham, Jr
MAF

(U) Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF).

UNIT

U ~~TST~~ JUWTF BQ COL (b)(6)
Special Forces Operational Base
Special Forces Group (A)
Op Det 8th PSYOP Bn (+)
Air Force Special Operations Base
1 SOW

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5 MC-130E
6 UH-1N/4 CH-3
4 AC-130H
SOCCT/WT

Navy Special Warfare Group HQ

3 SEAL Plt
2 Swimmer Delivery Vehicle Det
1 Special Boat Unit

(b)14a

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advance. US ground "Show of Force" forces located in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were redeployed to Iran and the remaining RDJTF forces in CONUS commenced deployment. Near Term Prepositioning Shipping (NTPS) was moved from Diego Garcia to the United Arab Emirates and joined by airlifted elements of a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB).

(b)(1)1.4a,b,d

U ~~(S)~~ CPX POSITIVE LEAP was a significant milestone in the evolution of the RDJTF concept. It represented the first time Commanders and staffs of all RDJTF earmarked forces were able to exercise together. The CPX proved to be a timely and valuable training vehicle for getting planners involved with RDJTF activities. Significant insights were gained as result of CPX POSITIVE LEAP which were documented in the United States Readiness Command's After Action report and forwarded to components and appropriate agencies.

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(U) Deployment CPX POSITIVE LEAP 80

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a2b

(U) The following commands and agencies participated in Exercise POSITIVE LEAP 80:

a. U (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff implemented the Emergency Operating Procedures at STARTEX. The Joint Staff, Services, and Defense Intelligence Agency personnel participated as members of the Operations Planners Group or appropriate response cells.

b. U (C) Personnel from the Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Services, and Coast Guard participated in their expected roles for a crisis situation.

c. U (C) LANTCOM, USEUCOM, MAC, PACOM, USREDCOM, SAC, and the RDTTF participated in the exercise with normal battle staffs. The TOAs participated with crisis action teams.

d. U (C) The JECG functioned in its accustomed role and controlled the exercise play. The representatives of the Department of State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the JECG functioned as both players and controllers. The representatives were several grades junior to the principals they represented. Thus, representatives' actions during Exercise POSITIVE LEAP 80 did not necessarily depict the same actions that would have been taken by their respective principals.

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(b)1.4 a, b, d

(U) The Planning Exercise Phase (12-17 May) covered CAS Phases III and IV: Course of Action Development and Decision.

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided a WARNING ORDER to the exercise participants at STARTEX. The JCS WARNING ORDER commenced CAS Phase III. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the WARNING ORDER, designated COMRDJTF as the supported commander and CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, CINCMAC, CINCPAC, USCINCPAC, and CINCSAC as supporting commanders. The WARNING ORDER contained a list of forces available for planning. The JCS WARNING ORDER contained a requirement for the RDJTF to submit a COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE with his COAs and forces by 151800Z May.

U (S) In accordance with CAS procedures, the RDJTF issued an Evaluation Request message which amplified the information contained in the WARNING ORDER to applicable organizations supporting the RDJTF. The Evaluation Request message contained two COAs and a request for an evaluation of the COAs. USEUCOM, PACOM, SAC, FURSCOM and TAC submitted Evaluation Response messages to RDJTF. The FORSCOM Evaluation Response message contained two additional COAs, one of which was adopted by the RDJTF. The RDJTF sent (150800Z May) its COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommending FORSCOM's proposed COA.

U (S) Other actions taken during the Planning Exercise included preparation of closure estimates by the TOAs and the RDJTF, development of the JDS data base, and determination of JDA boundaries.

U (S) On 17 May the OJCS presented a decision briefing to the acting Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the three RDJTF COAs. The OJCS prepared an ALERT ORDER reflecting the COA decision. The last action ended the Planning Exercise.

(U) The OJCS scheduled no exercise activities during the period 17 May - 2 June. RDJTF, JDA, and supporting commands continued to work on the force list, logistical support, and the JDA data base.

U (S) The Deployment Exercise Phase was conducted during the period 2-6 June. The RDJTF and supporting commands started this phase by initiating actions to implement the guidance and tasking contained in the ALERT ORDER.

U (S) The OJCS sent the EXECUTE ORDER on 4 June to the exercise participants with L-hour set for 042100Z June. The TOA's Services, RDJTF and its component commands and the JDA continued implementation actions. By ENDEK, the RDJTF had deployed the first 2 days of airlifted forces.

U (S) This exercise was the first JCS sponsored CPX involving the RDJTF. The RDJTF and other commands made substantial progress in developing initial planning for a RDJTF deployment, and the following significant problem areas

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requiring review and corrective action by the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Services were identified.

a. U ~~(S)~~ Command and Control arrangements for the RDJTF as the supported CINC.

b. U ~~(S)~~ Logistic supportability of a large deployed force in the Arabian Gulf area.

c. U ~~(S)~~ ADP and WIN support to the deployment community.

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(U) BRAVE SHIELD 80 Rapid Deployment Readiness Exercise (RDRE)

U (S) BRAVE SHIELD 80 RDRE was conducted at Fort Bragg, N.C. and at Polk AFB, Louisiana during the period of 13-21 Aug 1980. The purpose of the exercise was for HQ RDJTF to monitor the operational readiness of an RDF unit. This responsibility is contained in the JCS Terms of Reference for the RDJTF dated 13 August 1980. The major objectives of the exercise included: developing staff functioning procedures required for planning and deploying a small response force; exercising airborne battle staff procedures in an EC-135 aircraft; and to exercise chop procedures of the airborne assault deploying force from the RDJTF to an employing force on the ground.

(U) Participating player headquarters and key commanders/players are as listed below:

U (S) RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS BATTLESTAFF

COMMANDER	BG STINER
J3	COL (b)(6)
J3 GROUND	LTCOL (b)(6)
J3 AIR	LT COL (b)(6)
J2	COL (b)(6)
J6	CAPT (b)(6)
MAC LNO	LTCOL (b)(6)
BN LNO	MAJ (b)(6)

U (C) RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS STAFF MONITORING TEAM

J3 (TEAM CHIEF)	LTC (b)(6)
J1	LTC (b)(6)
J2	MAJ (b)(6)
J4	MAJ (b)(6)
J6	SSGT (b)(6)
USREDCOM J4	LTC (b)(6)
USREDCOM J3	LTC (b)(6)

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U (S) RAPID DEPLOYMENT AIR FORCE FORCES (RDAFFOR)

1/EC-135

1/C-5

7/C-141

1/C-130

U (S) ARMY FORCES (ARFOR)

502nd Engr Airborne Bn, 82nd Abn Div

U (S) The setting for the exercise was that a RDJTF ARFOR unit needed to be reinforced at a designated area within a 24 hour time frame. The selected organization was given the mission of planning and conducting an airborne assault and follow-on air land operation. This exercise originated at Fort Bragg, N.C. and the exercise area was at Fort Polk La. The BQ RDJTF Battle Staff and Monitor Team were present when the Engr Bn was given the mission. The Engr Bn then briefed on their concept for conducting this operation. The RDJTF Monitor Team then accompanied respective functional counterparts throughout the exercise to include the parachute assault. The RDJTF Battle Staff relocated to Seymour Johnson AFB, boarded an EC-135 and then rendezvoused with the airborne battalion near the exercise area. The Battle Staff exercised command and control over the airborne battalion during the parachute assault. After the battalion was on the ground and had linked up with the ground forces commander, the chop was effected. The Battle Staff then returned to MacDill AFB. The RDJTF Monitor Team stayed on the ground with the airborne battalion until the exercise secured.

(U) Overall the RDRE was conducted in a timely and professional manner. The Engr Airborne Battalion demonstrated that although this type of an operation was their secondary mission, they possessed the skills, proper attitude and the degree of readiness to complete this assignment in an outstanding manner. The RDJTF Battlestaff and Monitor Team were fully utilized and achieved the objectives as described above.

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(U) Employment CPX GALLANT KNIGHT 81

U (S) Employment Command Post Exercise (CPX) GALLANT KNIGHT 81 was conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina during the period 23-30 October 1980. The purpose of the exercise was to provide a simulated combat environment in which to train the commanders and staffs of the RDJTF and its Army, Air Force, Marine and Joint Unconventional Warfare Components as well as the Navy supporting Command in planning and conducting large scale military operations. A major objective of the exercise was the examination of strategic concepts for employment of the RDJTF in Southwest Asia. Other objectives included exercising the RDJTF in employing reinforcements; exercising the conduct of an interdiction campaign; validating interservice logistics requirements/procedures; exercising an integrated air defense data; analyzing the sustainability and adequacy of the RDJTF in Southwest Asia; and exercising/evaluating all-source intelligence support of the RDJTF. A total of more than 8000 players from all services representing as many as 300,000 personnel participated in the CPX.

U (S) Participating player headquarters and key commanders/players are listed below:

U (S) RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

COMRDJTF	LtGen P.X. KELLEY
DEPUTY COMRDJTF	Maj Gen R.C. TAYLOR
Chief of Staff	BG C.W. STINER

U (S) ARMY FORCES (ARFOR)

COMARFOR/COMMANDER, XVIII ABN CORPS	LTG T.H. TACABERRY
HQ, 82d ABN DIV	MG G.S. MELOY III
HQ, 101st ABN DIV (AASLT)	MG J.A. MACMULL
HQ, 24th INF DIV (M)	MG J.F. COCHRAN III
HQ, 194th ARM BDE	COL (b)(6) JR
HQ, 2-75 INF BN (RGR)	LTC (b)(6)
HQ, 96th CA BN	LTC (b)(6) JR
HQ, 8th PSYOP BN	LTC (b)(6)

U (S) RAPID DEPLOYMENT AIR FORCE FORCES (RDAFFOR)

COMRDAFFOR/Commander 9th AF	Lt Gen A.S. BRASWELL
4 Tactical Fighter Wings	
2 Tactical Recon Squadrons	V-42

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6 E-3A (AWACS)

SAC ADVON

Brig Gen J.A. SHAUD

5 Squadrons B-52

JOINT RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER (JRCC)

Air Rescue Helos

U (S) COMALF

Brig Gen D.H. CASSIDY

2 Tactical Airlift Wings

U (S) NAVAL FORCES (NAVFOR)

COMNAVFOR

CAPT (b)(6)

1 Surface Action Gp

3 Carrier Battle Gp

1 Amphibious Task Force

5 Patrol Squadrons (P-3)

U (S) MARINE FORCES (MARFOR)

MARFOR HQ

MajGen K.L. ROBINSON JR

I MAF

U (S) JOINT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TASK FORCE (JUWTF)

JUWTF HQ

BG J.C. LUTZ

Special Forces Operational Base

Special Forces Group (A)

Op Det 8th PSYOP BN (+)

Air Force Special Operations Base

1 SOW

5 MC-130E

6 UH-1N/4 CH-3

4 AC-130H

SOCCT/WT

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Navy Special Warfare Group HQ

3 SEAL Plt

2 Swimmer Delivery Vehicle Det

1 Special Boat Unit

(b)1.4 a, b, d

U (S) Each phase of the exercise involved attacks by Soviet Forces far outnumbering the defending U.S. units. This high level of intensity required the development and utilization of innovative tactics on the part of U.S. forces and provided the RDJTF staff with opportunities to resolve complex issues of joint command and control. The exercise was terminated prior to any decisive breakthrough by the Soviets and without any significant offensive action on the part of the RDJTF.

U (S) CPX GALLANT KNIGHT provided opportunities to examine several newly formed U.S. strategic concepts. The exercise was a success and substantiated the requirement for such exercises for commanders and staffs of the RDJTF to develop the joint operational expertise essential for success on a Southwestern Asia Battlefield. Significant insights, problems and solutions were as a result of CPX GALLANT KNIGHT 81 which were documented in the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force After Action Report and forwarded to the components and appropriate agencies.

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(U) BRIGHT STAR 81

(U) During the period 7-27 November 1980, the RDJTF conducted its first OCONUS exercise - "BRIGHT STAR 81" - in Cairo Egypt. During the deployment and employment phases of this exercise, USCINCEUR was the supported commander. USCINCRD, CINMAC and CINCSAC were supporting commanders. Operational command of deploying forces passed to USCINCRD upon their departure from home station(s) and passed to USCINCEUR at 10 degrees west longitude. Commander of BRIGHT STAR 81 assumed operational control of deployed forces upon their arrival at Cairo West Air Base.

(U) The purpose of this exercise was "to participate in a combined Egyptian/United States exercise which was mutually beneficial to the Armed Forces of both nations. Additionally, for U.S. Forces, to exercise the RDJTF HQ and demonstrate the rapid deployability, mobility and combat readiness of a selected Army/Air Force Task Force."

(U) The exercise objectives were to:

- a. (U) Conduct combined training with Egyptian Armed Forces.
- b. (U) Familiarize selected personnel and RDJTF units with environmental and operational characteristics of SWA.
- c. (U) Demonstrate RDJTF capability to establish and operate from an austere location.
- d. (U) Establish command and control communications during deployment, employment, and redeployment in SWA, to include validating RDJTF SOP.
- e. (U) Validate logistical requirements for operating in SWA.

(U) The planning for Exercise BRIGHT STAR 81 began in late July after a decision by the National Command Authority (NCA) to consider one RDJTF Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) exercise per year, as a part of the RDJTF's five year training program. NCA planning guidance indicated that Egypt would be the site of the first RDJTF OCONUS exercise in SWA.

(U) After detailed staff planning/study, it was decided that a Battalion-sized Army/Air Force Task Force comprised of an air assault battalion and an Air Force element of approximately eight (8) aircraft would be the optimum size/mix force to participate. The name chosen for the exercise was "BRIGHT STAR 81".

(U) The major exercise participants were notified in late July and early August and the first planning conference was conducted at HQ RDJTF, Tampa Florida, on the 21st and 22nd of August 1980. The final planning conference was conducted at Ft Bragg, NC, during the period 24-25 October 1980.

(U) A predeployment team of 15 members visited Cairo Egypt during the period 20 September through 8 October and conducted detailed coordination with Egyptian Defense Officials (GOE), on all aspects of the exercise. The GOE

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agreed to provide US forces an austere air base from which to operate; a desert area for the conduct of the PTX; permission to enter the country using military ID cards and certified unit rosters (instead of passports and visas) and logistical support in the form of water, ice and fuel. The team was headed by the RDJTF.

(U) As a result of US/GOE coordination it was agreed that BRIGHT STAR 81 would be a six-phased exercise conducted in the desert, west of the Nile River. It was further agreed that all US forces would be based at Cairo-West Airbase.

(U) The JCS Terms of Reference (TOR) for BRIGHT STAR 81 restricted the number of exercise participants to approximately 1400. Major exercise participants were HQ RDJTF; Bn Task Force, 101st Abn Div (AASLT); 150th TFG (ANG); 226th/240th/3rd Combat Communications Groups (ANG), and Combat Service Support Elements of the XVIII Abn Corps.

(U) The Strategic Air Command provided an EC-135 Airborne Command and Communications Platform for use as an enroute command and control vehicle. The EC-135 allowed the Commander, RDJTF to maintain communications with Army Forces (ARFOR) Commander and the Exercise HQ at Cairo-West while deploying from the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) at Rhein Mein to the exercise site at Cairo-West Airbase.

(U) Military Airlift Command (MAC) provided deployment and redeployment airlift for BRIGHT STAR 81. During the deployment phase seventy-seven (77) C-141 and twelve (12) C-5A missions were flown. A total of eighty-two aircraft missions were required to redeploy all BRIGHT STAR participants to CONUS.

(U) The exercise phases were:

*PHASE I (7-11 Nov)

- Deploy ADVON

*PHASE II (12-13 Nov)

- Deployment

*PHASE III (14-15 Nov)

- Establish Bivouac Site

- Individual Training

- Equipment Preparation and Maintenance

*PHASE IV (16-18 Nov)

- Combined Training with Egyptian Armed Forces

*PHASE V (19-22 Nov)

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- Combined Field Training Exercise

*PHASE VI (22-27 Nov)

- Redeployment

a. (U) During Phase III of the exercise, US Army and Egyptian Air Force pilots conducted combined helicopter training. Egyptian pilots provided orientations on desert flying operations and US pilots provided classes on US air assault doctrine and tactics.

b. (U) The soldiers of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) received orientations on and fired several US small arms (M-16 Rifle, M60 Machine Gun, M203 Grenade Launchers); and US soldiers received orientations on and fired some EAF small arms (AK-47 Rifle, Lt Machine Gun, RPG-7). The 101st Abn Div (AA) provided interpreters for the training. This combined individual training took place on a range north of the airbase and was conducted in a most professional manner by forces of both nations.

c. (U) Phase IV was highlighted by the conduct of a Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise (CALFEX) conducted at WADI NATRUN Air force Range (50 KM NW of Cairo West) on 18 Nov 80. During this exercise, US and Egyptian Armed Forces conducted live fire exercises against an advancing armored force (notional). US Army forces conducted an air assault, and fired TOWS and rockets from the COBRA Helicopter (AB-1). US Jet Fighters (A-7D's) dropped live ordnance (MK 82's - all on target) during the CALFEX. The EAF conducted an air assault, fired missiles from the Gazelle helicopter, and fired Sagger missiles.

U (U) During Phase V of BRIGHT STAR US/EAF units conducted combined maneuvers in a desert area located southwest of Cairo-West Airbase. The combined Army task force, commanded by the US Battalion Commander, consisted of 1st BN, 502 Inf (-), and one Egyptian airborne rifle company (REINF). A US rifle company equipped with Russian vehicles (BTR-50 PK) provided the BLUE (enemy) forces for the exercise. BLUE forces were commanded by a US captain and the BTR-50's were driven by Egyptian drivers.

(U) The Field Training Exercise was conducted in six phases:

FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE (U)

PHASE V

PHASE	DTG	ACTIVITY
I	190600-101300	Occupy assembly area
	(7 hrs)	Prepare for air Assault
II	191300-191600	Conduct daylight attack
	(3 hrs)	Secure objectives

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III	191600-202200	Defend objectives
	(30 hrs)	
IV	202200-210400	Conduct 10KM MVT to contact
	(6 hrs)	Conduct night attack to secure
		A 2d objective
V	210400-220800	Defend objective
	(28 hrs)	Plan and conduct a simulated
		Relief in place
VI	220800-221030	Conduct air assault to secure
	(2½ hrs)	Abandoned airfield
		Secure airfield and repel attack

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U a. ~~(S)~~ The FTX began at 0800 on the 19th of November with the Battalion TF conducting an air assault from Cairo West to an assembly area, an abandoned airfield, approximately 12 KM northwest of Cairo West. There the TF linked up with the Egyptian airborne company.

U b. ~~(S)~~ At 1300 hours on the 19th of November, the TF conducted a combined US/Egyptian air assault from ABUI SIMBOL to seize three company size objectives in the vicinity of ASWAN HILLS. Seizure of these objectives was preceded by tactical air strikes (no live ordnance) from Egyptian MIG-17s and US A-7 fighters.

c. (U) On the evening of the 20th, the TF conducted a night movement to contact, over a distance of 10km, and then successfully conducted a night attack (Objective LUXOR HILLS) beginning at 0200 hours on the 21st of November.

d. (U) On the morning of 22 November, the TF conducted an air assault to secure an airfield and then defended the airfield (objective ABUI SIMBOL) from attacks by the opposing (BLUE) force. The FTX exercise ended at approximately 1030 hours on 22 November 1980.

(U) The 150th TFG (ANG) was scheduled to deploy from Albuquerque, New Mexico to the Azores and then to Cairo West. Due to high wind conditions in the Azores, the eight (8) A-7D jet aircraft flew non-stop from Pease AFB, NH to Cairo Egypt. The trip took 11½ hours and required seven refuelings enroute. The planes were back in the air (with fresh pilots) for six training sorties within two hours of the time they touched down at Cairo West. The unit was operationally ready 97% of the time. The following are highlights of the 150th TFGs other activities during BRIGHT STAR 81:

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- Sustained a 1.5 sortie rate throughout the exercise
- Expended 71 (live) Mark-82 bombs and 5,000 rounds of 20mm HEI
- Participated in a live firepower exercise
- Operated effectively in an austere environment

Conducted information displays/ground training with Egyptian Armed Forces.

U ~~(S)~~ Exercise Overview: Exercise BRIGHT STAR 81 provided an excellent vehicle to demonstrate the United States capability to project a Joint Task Force in SWA. The exercise tested the RDJTF's capability to plan for deployments OCONUS. It improved/tested staff procedures between the staffs of RDJTF, MAC, SAC, TAC, and the joint staffs of USCINCPAC, USCINCEUR and JCS. This highly successful exercise stands as testimony of our capability for deploying selected Army and Air Forces to SWA.

(U) Although the exercise was successful in every way, there were many significant lessons learned; the most important lessons are as follows:

U a. ~~(S)~~ Enroute Staging Bases - There were insufficient enroute staging bases available. The entire deployment (except one fighter support

(b)1.4 a, b, d

b. (U) Refueling for MAC Aircraft - No fuel was available at Cairo-West for MAC missions. The constraint of having to land at Cairo West with sufficient fuel to recover at a stage location created most of the deployment routing problems. This severely limited our operating range and degraded allowable cargo loads. Recommend negotiation for refueling MAC aircraft have high priority in future deployments.

U c. ~~(S)~~ Deployment Planning - Exercise deployment planning was accomplished late. This exercise was an add-on to the annual schedule and was not formally approved until late in the JCS established planning cycle. Finite planning did not take place until host nation approval and return of the RDJTF predeployment team. Determination and sourcing of participating

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forces and, subsequently, their airlift deployment requirements were all accomplished in a compressed time frame. This led to late development of the airlift flow and all associated MAC actions regarding ALCZ sourcing, sizing and logistics support, aircrew/airframe management, diplomatic clearance requests for overflight/landing rights, and customs support. Accomplishment of milestones established in JCSM 437-79, the JCS-directed and JCS-coordinated exercise program, should be followed, when possible, in order to effectively plan and execute future deployments.

U d. ~~(C)~~ RDJTF FM Communications - Due to the nature, composition and size of the exercise force, a need existed for the establishment of an RDJTF FM Command/Safety Net and an OPFOR Control Net. Communications equipment limitations provided only for a combined Command/OPFOR Net. Participating units did not possess sufficient communications equipment for establishing these nets. The arrangement was less than satisfactory. Recommend that the requirement for RDJTF FM communications capability be realistically considered in future exercise planning.

U e. ~~(C)~~ Desert Uniform - The present camouflage uniform does not provide sufficient concealment in the desert. Consideration should be given to developing a reversible camouflage uniform. Recommend that efforts to produce/procure a suitable desert uniform be continued.

U f. ~~(C)~~ Identification of Communications Support Units for HQ RDJTF - Late identification of communications support units caused some difficulties during initial stages of the exercise. Although SHF Satcom reliability was generally outstanding, problems were encountered on the Narrowband Secure Terminal (NBST) in setting correct levels and alignment of echo suppressors. For the HF DCS entry, it was determined that Nea Makri Autovon switchboard was not compatible with our equipment. As adjustments were made, the HF trunk improved to 100 percent reliability. A frequency system (AN/TRQ-35) would probably have reduced the initial outages on the HF trunk. Had comm support units been identified earlier, TSR/TSO's could have been issued in a timely manner thus surfacing problems prior to STARTEX. Recommend that communications support units for HQ RDJTF be identified at least thirty days prior to STARTEX and a frequency management system (AN/TRQ-35) be utilized whenever HF DCS entry is being operated.

U g. ~~(C)~~ Desert Environment Impact on Communications Equipment - While relatively ideal (temperatures range mid-fifties to low-eighties) desert conditions existed during the exercise, equipment malfunctions, which can be attributable to sand, did occur. Teletype machines were particularly susceptible to blowing sand and dust and should not be operated except in shelters with environmental control units and extra external air filters. Recommend that expando shelters or regular comm center vans be used for teletype equipment operations to minimize malfunctions.

U h. ~~(C)~~ Effect of Desert Operations on Helicopters - extensive wear on the main/tail rotor blade tip caps was a significant problem during the exercise. This was particularly true for the UH-60 Blackhawks as loose desert sand blasted the blades and blade tips during hovering, takeoff/landing, and

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slingload operations. Additionally, the UH-60 experienced an above average failure rate in APU's due to sand ingestion and a higher than expected tire failure rate from landing on lava rocks which were imbedded in the sand. The particle separator on the OH-58 functioned very effectively in preventing excessive engine turbine blade wear; a similar modification should be considered for the AH-1's. Sand also caused increased stoppage of the Cobra's .20mm weapon system. Recommend that appropriate project managers assist in determining corrective/preventative measures for the problem areas identified above.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~D. (U) LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE (J4)1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The Director for Logistics (J4) is an Army Colonel, with an Air Force Colonel as Deputy. The Staff is organized into Logistics and Transportation Support Divisions, the Civil Engineering Office, and a central administrative support section. Personnel began reporting for duty 15 February 1980, and the Directorate was fully manned by September 1980.

(U) The Directorate is composed of 14 officers and four enlisted persons representing all four Military Services. One Army Medical Services Officer and one HQ Military Airlift Command Liaison Officer (MACLO) are attached. Service representation is:

Army - 7 officers 1 enlisted
 USAF - 5 officers 2 enlisted
 Navy - 3 officers
 USMC - 1 officer 1 enlisted

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

^U (G) During 1980 the main pursuits of the J4 Directorate were exercises and the development of two OPLANS, 1001-81 and 1003-81. Efforts expended on these plans surfaced many logistics and transportation deficiencies that needed considerable work if the RDJTF was to be capable of rapidly projecting a credible fighting force seven or eight thousand air miles from the CONUS supply base.

(U) In recognition of the extremely limited numbers of personnel on the staff as a whole, and the J-4 in particular, COMRDJTF provided his basic logistics philosophy early:

- a. (U) Go with minimum essential
- b. (U) Get all the help we can
- c. (U) Leave nothing in the "too hard" box
- d. (U) Keep problems visible and working
- e. (U) Delegate to maximum extent feasible (while retaining directive authority)
- f. (U) Help components to maximum extent possible

(U) These tenets have influenced all concepts development and planning activities during our first year of effort.

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(U) Development of the Logistics Annex (Annex D) to OPLAN 1001-81 (initially OPORD 0001) began in April 1980 and continued through the end of the year. The Phase I TPFDD Refinement Conference was held in early September. This plan was the headquarters' first major planning effort and its first exposure to the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS). New ground was broken (or forgotten lessons relearned) at every step, particularly in joint logistics doctrine, Service responsibilities, and inter-Service coordination. Two officers devoted full time to this effort, frequently augmented by the entire Directorate Staff. Many problems were met during this initial effort at using the JOPS in detailed logistics planning, but after close staff coordination and many iterations, difficulties in this planning process were overcome. These planning efforts provided valuable experience in development of time-sensitive and highly classified contingency plans, and highlighted the handicaps generated by using compartmented planning cells (and thus precluding full coordination).

(U) Planning for OPLAN 1003-81 began in September 1980 and continued through the end of the year. Although larger and more complex than 1001, the 1003 effort was greatly facilitated by the lessons learned and the personal contacts made during the earlier effort. An expanded account of planning accomplishments (both 1001 and 1003) can be found in the J-5 section of this history.

(U) Logistics Concept

(U) Much Logistics Support Division effort was focused during the year on development and publication of a "Logistics Concept in Support of RDJTF". (This has been a joint effort by RDJTF and logisticians from the HQ USREDCOM Staff.)

(G) The purpose of the Log Support Concept document is to provide a basis and guideline for joint planning relative to the rapid deployment and sustainment of the RDJTF in the exceedingly austere environment of SW Asia. The concept is intended to be flexible and readily adaptable to any plan and any force mix that might be called upon to respond in such an environment. Throughout the document, emphasis has been placed on initiatives to enhance rapid deployment, sustainability, effectiveness, efficiency, and economy (in a force sense as well as in a financial sense).

(U) The document is a broad, omnibus concept with utility at all planning levels. It has assisted planners in developing more detailed logistical plans and procedures and has aided in a smoother implementation and execution of current and evolving logistical options.

(U) Five sequential drafts of the document were developed and published during 1980 with the last version dated 30 September. To reflect the dynamic nature of the joint planning world, there are provisions for another update during the next 6 months, based upon inputs from all interested headquarters and activities. The Log Concept provides a joint forum through which logistics planners can develop innovative and creative concepts outside the constraints of formal OPLAN preparation, JCS publications changes, etc.

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(U) JSCP Planning Factors

(U) (S) Early in the planning effort our logisticians recognized wide and unexplained variations in Military Service resupply planning factors. Also noted was the absence of factors specifically tailored to the SW Asia theater. The variations and lack of a theater multiplier have influenced RDJTF planning efforts and caused the validity of some resupply tonnages to be questioned. (Inaccurate estimates of tonnages to be moved could have drastic impact on strategic and intra-theater lift requirements.) At RDJTF request, JCS has tasked the Services to review and refine their planning factors (by class of supply) for SW Asia and to undertake a reassessment of logistics and operational concepts for this area of the world. A proposal has been made to hold a Joint planning conference to resolve concept and procedural differences among the Services; some real, substantive, and tangible results of this focus are already in evidence.

(U) Supply Committee

(U) The RDJTF Supply Committee, a problem-solving outgrowth of the July 1980 Logistics Conference and the resultant Log Concept document, is chaired by the Director for Logistics and consists of members from components, Services, supporting CINCS/commands and other agencies. It meets as required and provides a forum for coordination and problem identification/resolution, as well as updating the Log Concept document. Issues addressed include logistics communication and ADP support, Initial Preplanned Supply Support (IPSS), OPLAN supply planning problems, graves registration, Inter-Service/Cross-Service (IS/CS) support, theater stockage objectives, emergency resupply from supporting CINCS, and prepositioning.

(U) Petroleum Support Requirements

(U) RDJ4 identified, compiled and disseminated OPLAN 1003-81 petroleum requirements (in JOA) during the initial phases of the planning cycle to enable the supporting agencies and activities to gage support requirements, including the force structure required to meet IS/CS needs, and assess overall supportability. The overall concept for POL support of the RDJTF in SWA has also been developed and promulgated for further refinement.

(U) Desert Camouflage Fatigue Uniform

(U) RDJ4 has identified a critical need for expedited procurement of desert camouflage fatigues for all land-based Rapid Deployment Forces. This office has initiated action with USAF, USMC, and the USN to follow the Army's lead in identifying requirements and getting them on order.

(U) Logistics Communication/Automatic Data Processing (LC/ADP) Concept

(U) The LC/ADP Concept was initiated in recognition of potential equipment shortfalls and coordination problems between logisticians and communicators. It has been incorporated into the Log Concept document, after much confusion arose in our first year of planning and exercising. The concept was developed under the purview of the RDJTF Supply Committee and in coordination

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with the USREDCOM Logistics and Communications staffs. The purpose of this concept is to provide a Joint LC/ADP blueprint that provides a common ground, a general guide, and a point of departure for logisticians and communicators to identify and understand mutual requirements for SWA-Region planning purposes. LC/ADP requirements were clearly stated in the Joint Logistics Review Board Report on the Vietnam War (1971), Communications monograph.

(U) Transportation

(U) Force sustainment via all modes of transportation (both strategic and intra-theater lift) has been and is still a prime concern. Considerable strides have been made to enhance the strategic movement of forces vital to the success of RDJTP plans, and intra-theater distribution unknowns have largely become working problems areas.

(U) Strategic Airlift Enhancement

U (C) RDJTP planning efforts have helped to quantify requirements and strengthen justification for strategic airlift enhancement programs. Progress is currently underway with the improved C-5A wing, the C-141B stretch program the KC-10 tanker, and the development of requirements for a new CX Transport. Efforts of this Division have supported each of these valuable programs.

(U) Intra-theater Airlift

U (C) RDJ4 planning efforts have further reinforced Service needs for the SL-7 Rapid/Surge Force Program (T-AIRX) which involves the purchase and subsequent conversion to a RO/RO configuration of eight existing 33-knot civilian containerships. These ships, once converted, could be selectively prepositioned at CONUS SPOE's and partially crewed to provide a rapid response capability. They will provide a considerable enhancement in speed alone, averaging up to 25 knots to the SWA-Region.

(U) Intra-theater Sealift

U (C) In the course of more detailed planning and exercising, considerable effort has been directed toward identification of intra-theater sealift capabilities and requirements. This is a soft area in logistics supportability within the Arabian Gulf scenario to date. To provide a single point of focus for this essential factor, the Military Sealift Command was tasked to provide intra-theater sealift within the JOA. MSC has undertaken this responsibility and is in process of identifying assets, in conjunction with on-going efforts by planners to refine requirements.

(U) Near Term Prepositioning Ships (NTPS)

U (C) In August 1979 The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directed the Navy to establish a Maritime Prepositioning Ship Program (MPS) and to acquire sufficient commercial type ships to preposition three specially organized Marine Amphibious Brigades (MAB) with specified schedules and funding guidelines. To provide an interim (Real World...NOW) prepositioning response capability which could be on station in the Indian Ocean in the near term, the

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1980. This was accomplished, on schedule, representing a tangible and quite credible U.S. commitment to any interested party.

U (G) Upon direction from JCS, CDPAC, in conjunction with its component and supporting forces, and the RDJTF developed an NTPS concept of operations and maintenance. By late summer the NTPS fleet was prepositioned at Diego Garcia (three RO/RO and two breakbulk ships, one water tanker, and one POL tanker), thereby significantly enhancing RDJTF flexibility and sustainability until Sea LOC establishment.

(U) Water

U (C) The RDJTF J4 has developed a concept of operations for water support of RDJTF in SWA-Region and identified a need to further refine water doctrine and concepts for RDJTF employment in SWA. The Army has been designated DOD Executive Agent for land based water resources, and working groups have been established to develop plans for equipment procurement and a concept of operations for water support of RDJTF in SW Asia. Given current programs, water as a limiting factor in sustainment planning should not be a issue by March 1982.

(U) Host Nation Support

U (C) Identifying locations and functional areas for Host Nation Support of the RDJTF resulted in the establishment of a DOD working group to analyze RDJTF HNS requirements in preparation for negotiating agreements with countries in SWA. J4E participated in OJCS-J4 sponsored conferences to identify and refine Southwest Asia military construction programs in support of the RDJTF, and coordinated development of procedures for the preparation of civil engineer support plans for RDJTF OPLANS 1001-81 and 1003-81.

(U) During 1980, J4 participated in two OCONUS Exercises during 1980, a combined FTX with the Egyptians at Cairo West (Bright Star), and a joint communications exercise in Oman (Accurate Test). The exercise schedule has been fully discussed in the J3 section of this history.

(U) Commander Mideast Forces (COMIDEASTFOR)

U (S) Since August 1980, the Logistics Directorate has maintained an officer on continuous temporary duty (90-day rotation) in the Arabian Gulf area aboard the COMIDEASTFOR flagship. This officer has constituted the Logistics element of the forward-deployed RDJTF Staff. The mission of the team of which this individual is a part has been to obtain logistics intelligence and area familiarization, establish an interface and develop working procedures with the COMIDEASTFOR Staff, and provide a nucleus for the forward RDJTF HQ in event of contingency. (Restricted travel in the theater has somewhat limited the opportunity for intelligence-gathering and familiarization.)

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(U) Manpower/Joint Manning Plan

(U) Staff Participation in exercise Positive Leap identified the requirement for augmentation positions to provide adequate manning for the headquarters and support components.

(U) Refinement of permanent and augmentation positions continued as an on-going project during the year. Exercise Gallant Knight, combined with an In-Progress Review, provided further refinement of additional personnel positions required to properly execute all task assignments and responsibilities.

(U) Further review of the HQ RDJTF manning posture was directed due to a change of emphasis from potential world-wide employment to primarily focusing on planning responsibility for the SWA-Region.

(U) Special augmentation was requested and provided from USREDCOM for Exercise Gallant Knight 81 to ensure planning continued for real-world OPLANS 1001 and 1003 while most of the staff was deployed to the exercise location at Ft. Bragg, N.C.

(U) During late December, a USREDCOM/JDA/HQ RDJTF organization and manpower study group conducted preliminary meetings to establish parameters for the working groups and chairmen during January 1981. More details on these actions are provided in the J-1 section of this history.

(U) Environmental Problems Associated with SWA Operations

(U) To determine specific medical problems associated with operations in the SWA area, the Host Research Division, U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine was requested to provide results of tests conducted on personnel under hot weather conditions. The Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency was requested to provide current health data on the Southwest Asia region. From information received, a report was prepared and distributed to RDJTF staff and Component Commanders that discussed effects of heat, acclimatization to heat, water replacement requirements, clothing and equipment, mosquito and flyborne diseases, and patient evacuation.

(U) Current Medical Information

(U) To ensure information on health and environmental factors relative to the designated area of operations was available to the RDJTF Staff and Component Commanders, five separate reports were prepared and distributed. The source documents for each report were provided by the U.S. Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency.

(U) Medical Support

(U) Through the efforts of OJCS J4 and USREDCOM Command Surgeon the health services required to support the RDJTF were identified. These efforts resulted in a series of meetings with Service Medical Departments and culminated with a Medical Plans Conference convened at HQ USREDCOM. From the

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meetings and the conference, near-term and long-term actions were identified that could be taken to improve the medical support structure for the RDJTF.

(U) Distinguished Visitors

(U) During the period, visits were made by Lt Gen Paul W. Meyers, USAF, MC Surgeon General, U.S. Air Force and the Honorable John E. Moxley III, M.D., Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs.

(U) Major Exercise Participation

(U) Gallant Knight was the first exercise that afforded the RDJTF Office of the Surgeon the opportunity to participate. During the exercise, scenario problems were introduced that required the efforts of the Joint Medical Regulating Office (JMRO), Joint Military Blood Program Office (JMBPO) and the Surgeon Staff in coordinating and directing medical support activities for the component Services. As a result of this exercise, additional detailed guidance will be provided the JMRO, JMBPO, and component Services during future exercises. JRY Bright Star 81, a combined exercise with Egyptian Armed Forces and a selected U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force Task Force, was conducted at Cairo West Airbase, Egypt during November. Medically, the exercise was supported by a U.S. Air Transportable Clinic (ATC) and a U.S. Army (Unit Medical Support) Medical platoon. There were no serious health problems encountered during the exercise and the medical support available was adequate. Medically, the exercise reinforced the requirement for command emphasis on field sanitation and preventive medicine functions in a hot, dry environment.

(U) Personnel Augmentation Requirements

(U) The personnel requirements to adequately staff the RDJTF Office of the Surgeon, establish the Joint Medical Regulating Office, and the Joint Military Blood Program Office have been identified and documented.

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E. (U) PLANS DIRECTORATE (J5)

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The J5, a Navy Captain, has staff responsibility for the preparation and maintenance of operations orders, plans and concept plans for Southwest Asia. Advises the Commander on matters relating to command policy, missions, functions responsibilities for the joint deployment, employment and redeployment of RDF forces. Provides the staff focal point to review, analyze and provide recommendations for development and/or tasking documents pertaining to policy, command relationships, requirements and doctrine development to include techniques for joint deployment, employment and redeployment of RDF forces.

(U) The Plans Division is responsible for preparing, coordinating and maintaining operations orders, plans and concept plans for the Southwest Asia region. It monitors events and conducts studies of the area to identify trends and other factors which affect current plans and requirements for new initiatives. Monitor the Joint Exercise Program to insure RDF exercises are consistent with OPOD/OPLANS. Establish techniques for joint deployment, employments and redeployment of RDF forces. Review component supporting plans for employment with RDF and provide personnel for the forward deployed element.

(U) The Policy Branch is responsible for matters relating to command policy, missions, functions, responsibilities, requirements and doctrine development to include crises planning and assessment of National Security Council/Joint Chiefs of Staff actions, (thru the Washington Liaison Office) pertaining to Southwest Asia. Service component liaison when committed, and automated data systems support. Provides the Commander with political assessments, trip preparation, policy review and all other matters relating to J5 functions. The branch maintains and presents the RDJTF command brief.

(U) The Administrative Branch provides administrative support to the J5 Directorate to include filing, correspondence preparation, graphic support and personnel administration. The J5 Administrative/Executive Officer acts as a special assistant to the J5 and performs special projects as directed by the Director J5.

(U) The original Plans and Policy Directorate, established on 1 Mar 80, was reorganized on 11 Aug 80. The reorganization was accomplished to meet the functional responsibilities of the Plans and Policy Directorate as evolved during the first five months of operation and to adhere to the terms of reference approved by SECDEF on 4 Aug 80. The reorganization deleted the Middle East/Europe Branch, the American/Caribbean/Atlantic Branch and the Southeast/Northeast/Pacific Branch. A Current Plans Branch, a Plans/Exercise Branch and an Administrative Branch were established in Lieu of the branches listed in the JMP dated 1 March 1980.

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2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) Deployment planning in support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

U a. ~~(S)~~ OPLAN 1001-81 -

(b)1.4a

U ~~(S)~~ On 18 March 1980, a Planning Group was formed and directed to review and/or rewrite JCS OPORD 001 and to proceed in developing an Operation Concept Order in order to preclude Soviets easy access to the Persian Gulf. The JCS was provided an initial brief on 6 April and selected component personnel were briefed 10-11 April. Draft OPORD 0001 was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, components and planning elements in support of RDJTF on 2 May for informal review. Informal comments on the draft OPORD were received during the latter part of May and early June and were incorporated as appropriate.

U ~~(S)~~ On 1 August the JCS OPDEP's were briefed on OPORD 0001 and draft OPORD dated 31 July 80 was distributed to the CINC's, Services, Components, and forces in support of RDJTF. OPORD 0001 was briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 August, PACOM on 22 August, and USEUCOM on 25 August. During briefings of OPORD 0001 to the Unified/Specified Commands and the JCS, the following deficiencies were identified:

(b)1.4a

(U) These deficiencies were not included in OPORD 0001 but would be addressed in subsequent OPORD's. Completion of OPORD 0001 without those major changes was recommended because it would serve as a base for analysis of a balanced force in determining logistical supportability and sustainability for follow-on OPORD's in the critical areas of communications, water, POL, and ammunition; established airlift/sealift requirements for the size force and highlighted the need for enhanced lift capabilities to support other OPORD's; and would complete the JOPS planning cycle culminating in an executable OPORD. Comments from all commands were forwarded with recommended action to the JCS on 22 September. JCS message of 22 October¹⁵ stated that OPORD 0001 formal comments by the JCS would be completed no later than 1 December. During the review process at the JCS, all four services and the J4 recommended that OPORD 0001 not be processed in accordance with JOPS. As a result, 340 comments from the Services, agencies, and JCS/J4 were informally provided to this Headquarters by the JCS for consideration and incorporation in the OPORD as appropriate. It was determined at this time that the OPORD would be published and submitted to the JCS

15. JCS Message 221916Z October 1980.

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as COMRDJTF OPLAN 1001-81 by 15 February 1981 with the completed TPFDL. The OPLAN provides for the deployment of a balanced, joint US military force to

(b)1.4 a

(U) If accepted by the JCS for review IAW JOPS, it is expected that the results of the review by the Services will be forwarded to the JCS in April 1981.

U b. ~~(S)~~ OPLAN 1002-81 -

(b)1.4 a

(b)1.4 a

U ~~(S)~~ During the review of OPORD 0001 in April/May 1980 and in view of the rapidly changing international situation the need to develop at least two more options to OPORD 0001 was identified. These were OPORD 0001A, (b)1.4 a basing, and OPORD 0001B, (b)1.4 a Planning for OPORD's 0001A and 0001B was interrupted during the time frame May through August pending completion of OPORD 0001.

U ~~(S)~~ In September, OPORD 0001A was re-designated OPORD 0002 and the Headquarters commenced drafting planning guidance and the concept of Operation/Mission was defined. JCS message of 26 September ¹⁶ as revised by JCS message 25 October ¹⁷ shifted the planning focus to JCS Options 1 and 2. Consequently, this higher priority and shortage of planners and ADP software support suspended efforts on OPORD 0002. Upon receipt of the JCS comments on OPLAN 1001-81 planning will resume on development of OPLAN 1002-81. This effort when completed will satisfy the intra-regional planning requirement of JSCP FY 81. OPLAN 1002-81 will include a revised mission statement, an interdiction capability, the 7th MAB and NTPS shipping, and basing exclusive of KUWAIT.

c. U ~~(S)~~ OPLAN 1003-81 -

(b)1.4a

U ~~(S)~~ In response to RDJTF message of 10 September, ¹⁸ JCS responded with a message on 26 September ¹⁹ which provided planning guidance and planning factors with two options. RDJTF hosted an action officer planning conference on 9 October and briefed component AO's concerning the JCS options. After comprehensive study, COMRDJTF briefed the OPDEPs on 15 October concerning planning guidance and Options 1 and 2 and recommended consolidation of JCS Options 1 and 2 to form an alternative option subsequently designated OPLAN 1003-81 and tabled 25 recommended changes to the planning guidance. On 25 October ¹⁷ JCS approved 18 recommendations, 14 of which concerned planning factors and deferred decision on seven of the twenty-one planning factor changes proposed by COMRDJTF for OPLAN 1003-81. Deferred planning factors were:

16. JCS Message 262336Z September 1980
17. JCS Message 251727Z October 1980
18. COMRDJTF Message 102200Z September 1980
19. JCS Message 262336Z September 1980

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- Responsibility of support for RDJTF Forces outside of JOA
- Medical Evacuation Policy
- Priority to RDJTF for Strategic Lift
- Host Nation Support

(b)1.4b

RDJTF called a planner's conference at Ft Bragg NC, 27-29 October and published COMRDJTF Planning Guidance/Component Tasking and milestones in a message on 4 November ²⁰ with inputs from Component Commanders due to COMRDJTF not later than 21 November. To augment the planning effort the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army provided nine TDY personnel; seven officers were provided for up to sixty days, and two officers were provided until 7 November. Additionally, five officers, one TCAIR and four communications officers, were provided by USREDCOM.

~~U~~ ~~(S)~~ In response to COMRDJTF tasking, XVIII Airborne Corps planners provided a concept briefing to COMRDJTF on OPLAN 1003-81 19 November. COMRDJTF approved the concept, provided that the sustainability and communications capability of the force could be accomplished. Concepts of Operations for the remaining component/supporting commands were scheduled to be received by message at RDJTF HQ on 21 November. Due to Exercise "PROUD STRIKE," the Component/Supporting commanders had difficulty in obtaining adequate computer support and COMDAFFOR on 8 November ²¹ stated that all milestones, especially TPFDL submission, could not be met by 21 November. COMRDJTF emphasized the essentiality of providing a concept of operation by 21 November and requested that component/supporting commands advise COMRDJTF of any inability to meet milestones. The COMRDJTF Concept brief was presented to USREDCOM on 24 November and to the OPSDEPs on 26 November. In addition, revised milestones were briefed and approved by the OPSDEPs. Component/supporting commands' concepts were received and the Headquarters commenced study to determine adequacy and feasibility of the proposed concepts.

~~U~~ ~~(S)~~ OPLAN 1003-81 concept of Operations was briefed to the JCS on 12 December. Inferred guidance from the JCS was to proceed with the development of the OPLAN. CJCS requested COMRDJTF assessment statements for denial of

(b)1.4 a, b, d

to the CJCS on 16 December. The Chairman requested that an assessment of our assumptions regarding Saudi Arabian facilities and Host Nation Support be obtained from CHUSMTM during his visit to the RDJTF on 17 December. CHUSMTM was supportive of the planning effort and suggested that planning continue so that a "baseline" case could be developed that would offer a means by which excursions can better be judged and evaluated. A personal message ²² was sent to CJCS forwarding CHUSMTM's assessment with appropriate comments by USCINCRD and COMRDJTF.

20. COMRDJTF Message 042200Z November 1980

21. COMDAFFOR Message 081700Z November 1980

22. COMRDJTF Message 182225Z December 1980

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U ~~(S)~~ On 29 December²³ the JCS provided additional guidance to COMRDJTF and clarified the seven planning factors which had been deferred by the JCS. In order to address a more constrained basing option, JCS directed that a concurrent planning cell be established with augmentation from component/supporting commands. A draft of OPLAN 1003-81 will be forwarded to the JCS on 6 April 81 which provides for the deployment of a joint US military force to the Southwest Asia region to conduct military operations to (b)1.4 a

(b)1.4 a

(U) JOPS Volume I, dated 7 October 1980, provided Plan Identification Number block of 1000-1999 for COMRDJTF, and on 19 December all OPORDs were redesignated OPLANS to conform with JSCP FY 81 guidance and were redesignated with corresponding numbers.

(U) Deployment Planning in Support of USCINCEUR, USCINCSO, CINCLANT, and CINCPAC.

a. (U) In addition to responding to JCS tasking, various OPLANS and CONPLANS were reviewed in order to determine RDJTF tasking and requirements for supporting plans. The following plans were reviewed: USCINCEUR OPLANS 4221, 4224, 4274, CONPLAN 4338, USCINCSO OPLAN 6501, CONPLAN 6100, CINCLANT CONPLANS 2348, 2360, 2362, 2371, 2373, CINCPAC OPLAN 5027 and CONPLANS 5020 and 5092.

b. (U) The out-of-cycle change to JSCP FY 81 Vol I tasked RDJTF for the following plans:

(b)1.4 a

23. JCS Message 292152Z December 1980

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F. (U) COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS (C-E) DIRECTORATE (J6)

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The directorate has overall staff responsibility for C-E aspects of the command. The Director, an Army Colonel, advises the COMRDJTF and staff on all C-E matters, prepares and reviews C-E policies, programs, and plans, and coordinates and directs the employment of all C-E facilities to support HQ RDJTF. The RDJ6 operates a C-E management facility on a 24 hour basis for the deployed RDJTF and exercises staff supervision of all communications support elements assigned or attached. The Director conducts and coordinates radio frequency engineering and management within the RDJTF and is responsible for the development of policies and procedures for communications security (COMSEC), the use of codes and authentication systems, and keying materials. Communications support of HQ RDJTF is provided on a day-to-day basis and communications plans and activities are coordinated with the JCS, USREDCOM, the NCA assigned subordinate forces and other joint and national force commanders.

a. (U) Plans and Operations Division (RDJ6-O).

(U) RDJ6-O is responsible for the preparation and review of C-E annexes, operating instructions, and procedures to support exercises and contingency operations of the command. The Chief develops policy and establishes priorities for the employment of C-E facilities, provides the operational direction to assigned and attached communications support elements, and manages the communications operations status center on a 24-hour basis when the RDJTF is deployed. The division also keeps the COMRDJTF and staff advised on the status of communications throughout the command. Manning within this division consists of four officers and five enlisted personnel.

b. (U) Systems Engineering Division (RDJ6-E).

(U) RDJ6-E is responsible for the development of detailed system engineering specifications and facility layouts required to support the command. The division determines radio and wire systems requirements, develops the tactical automatic switching scheme and teletype network requirements, and manages the radio frequency spectrum for the command. The Chief, RDJ6-E develops COMSEC policy, monitors COMSEC practices, and provides technical expertise on communications center terminals and relay operations for the command. Manning within this division consists of four officers and two enlisted personnel.

(U) The J-6 Directorate was formed and originally manned to support an operational headquarters in the field. The Joint Manpower Program of 8 officers and 7 enlisted (3 of the enlisted are administrative specialists) is inadequate to fully support an operational headquarters and totally unsatisfactorily to conduct the extensive communications planning for the RDJTF HQs, four component force HQs and the JWTF HQs. Several manpower packages have been submitted to RDJ1 requesting relief in the communications planning, automatic switch network engineering, frequency management and communications operations areas in order to provide adequate personnel

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requirements to satisfactorily conduct the extensive overall communications planning efforts which cover the entire spectrum of communications systems, i.e. wideband terrestrial systems, HF radio, automatic telephone switching, UHF and SHF satellites, and high speed data systems. The requested manning increases range from 10 personnel increase for day-to-day planning, to 60 additional personnel to support a unified command in the ME/SWA area.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) Plans

a. (U) COMRDJTF OPLAN 1001-81

(U) Annex K to COMRDJTF OPLAN 1001-81 was completed on schedule. The plan was developed with the guidance that communications equipment for the plan was in the DOD inventory or would be available within six months of when the plan was being developed. Coordination is continuing with USCINCEUR and CINCPAC for radio frequency assignments in the joint objective area. RDJTF and RDAFFOR wideband circuit requirements are being coordinated with the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center (ECAC) for proper circuit analysis and frequency engineering.

b. (U) COMRDJTF OPLAN 1003-81

(U) JCS Msg 262336Z Sep 80 initiated C-E planning for Annex K to OPLAN 1003-81. All JCS planning factors were evaluated as they relate to C-E requirements. On 15 October 1980, COMRDJTF briefed the OPSDEPS and recommended changes to the JCS planning guidance. The JCS responded with a 251722Z Oct 80 message which approved eighteen of the RDJTF recommended changes. This JCS message approving the RDJTF concept for 1003 planning marked the beginning of the development of Annex K to 1003-81.

(U) To assist in the development of Annex K, the RDJTF J6 staff was augmented with four Lieutenant Colonel communication staff officers from USREDCOM and two from Fort Gordon, GA.

(U) A joint 1003-81 C-E planning conference was conducted with the component C-E elements during the Gallant Knight Exercise at Fort Bragg, NC during 27-29 Oct 80. During this conference, the joint C-E concept, planning factors and considerations impacting on the total C-E planning were discussed. The components' informal inputs to the C-E planning milestones were considered. The results of this conference were refined and considered in the RDJTF milestones and component and supporting command taskings published in COMRDJTF message 042200Z Nov 80.

(U) In mid-November 1980, planners from XVIII Abn Corps (ARFOR), the RDAFFOR and supporting commands briefed their concept of operations and milestones. These component concepts were incorporated into a refined RDJTF concept and milestones which were briefed to the OPSDEPS on 26 Nov 80. The OPSDEPS approved the concept and milestones as briefed and refinement of OPLAN 1003-81 continued.

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(U) JCSE Enhancement

(U) The Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) has been designated to provide communications support for the deployed RDJTF and JOWTF HQs. The JCSE is inadequately manned and equipped to presently carry out this tasking. In Jan 1980, USREDCOM submitted the first proposal to the JCS for enhancement of the JCSE to support the RDJTF and JOWTF HQs. In June 1980, the JCS approved a modified concept of the JCSE Enhancement (JCS Msg 242110Z Jun 80). This 24 June 1980 concept tasks the JCSE to provide both ends of satellite communication links between RDJTF, JOWTF, the component HQs (less Navy) and subordinate JOWTF HQs (less NSWTG); one end of HF radio links to the 4 component HQs and the DCS; both ends of HF radio and terrestrial system between RDJTF and JOWTF HQs, and any additional communications support at the RDJTF and JOWTF HQs. The JCSE will not provide support to component HQs other than that stated; the components will install both ends of terrestrial wideband multichannel systems to the RDJTF HQ, and provide all other communications support at the component HQs. Actions are ongoing to provide the required equipment and personnel to support this concept.

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(U) Exercises

a. (U) POSITIVE LEAP 80

(U) Exercise POSITIVE LEAP 80 was a three-phase exercise conducted at Ft Bragg, NC during April, May and June 1980. RDJTF J6 personnel were involved in all three phases and received invaluable experience for future operations. Planners worked with RCJ6 communicators to prepare a detailed Annex K to support the exercise. RDJ6 personnel were involved in the day-to-day operational activities of the Systems Control Facility (SYSCON) which controlled support communications as well as realtime planning in reaction to JECG scenario-related actions.

(U) Numerous communications-related areas were identified as requiring increased command attention. Shortfalls were highlighted for resolution in future OPLAN/CONPLAN(S).

b. (U) RAPID DELTA ALPHA

(U) On 23 May 1980 a communications exercise, Rapid Delta Alpha, was conducted to select an airborne platform suitable to meet COMRDJTF command aircraft requirements. Candidate aircrafts consisted of the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC), the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and the SAC Airborne Command Post (EC-135C). Each aircraft was evaluated and the EC-135C was recommended as the aircraft which could best support the COMRDJTF. Significant findings which arose during the evaluation process are identified below:

(1) (U) The EC-135C met most of the deployment needs of the RDJTF. There was sufficient space to accommodate the Battle Staff and communications connectivity to all desired terminals was achieved.

(2) (U) A secure enroute communications package (SECOMP) consisting of UHF radio with NESTOR security device was installed for the test and worked satisfactorily. As a result of this test, a SECOMP was placed on the EC-135C for all subsequent RDJTF exercises for air-air and air-ground secure communications.

(3) (U) It was determined the aircraft required UHF satellite voice capability to provide long range secure voice aboard the aircraft. As a result, the AN/WSC-3 with Parkhill (KY-65) device was later tested and approved for use on the EC-135C for satellite secure voice communications.

(4) (U) The E-3A would require extensive modifications to provide the necessary communications connectivity for command and control (C3) by the RDJTF Battle Staff during deployment operations. The aircraft does, however, complement the RDJTF by executing its normal missions and integrating into the overall C2 structure of the deploying RDJTF.

(5) (U) The ABCCC is an ideal C2 platform once in the objective area due to its communications capability. The aircraft, however, is not optimized for the deployment role due to its lack of speed and staff

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accommodations. To accomplish the RDJTF C2 mission, more positions would be required, and this would have a major impact on normal ABCCC Battle Staff operations during actual employment.

c. (U) GALLANT KNIGHT 81

(U) RDJ6's participation in JRX Gallant Knight 81 at Ft Bragg, NC, from 21 - 30 Oct 80 was extensive. RDJTF J6 personnel assisted USREDCOM J6 in planning and establishing C-E systems and procedures supporting the CPX, prepared a 131 page Annex K to support CPX scenario operations and an FTX operation at Ft Stewart, GA and Hunter AAF, GA. The CPX provided a further insight into C-E problem areas disclosed during CPX Positive Leap 80 and enabled better refinement and definition of C-E shortfalls. Although the FTX portion of the exercise was cancelled before C-E support plans were completely developed, valuable experience in exercise planning was gained from the effort. After action items aided RDJ6 in the planning for other exercises and contingencies and are contained in the Gallant Knight 81 After Action Report.

d. (U) BRIGHT STAR 81

(U) Exercise Bright Star 81, a combined exercise with elements of US and Egyptian Forces, was conducted 8-27 Nov 1980, at Cairo West, Egypt. The total U.S. force commitment numbered nearly 1,400 and included both air and ground units. For the period of the exercise, communications support was provided by the 3rd Combat Communications Group (CmbtCGp), Tinker AFB, OK and the 226th CmbtCGp, Alabama Air National Guard, Gadsden, AL. The 3rd CmbtCGp provided the SHF satellite communications terminal (TSC-94), the Technical Control Facility (TSC-62) and the required personnel. The 226th CmbtCGp provided two communications center vans, a message preparation facility, two weather vans, an HF radio facility (TSC-60 (V) 2/3), and the required personnel. The 11th Signal Brigade, Ft Huachuca, AZ, provided an BY-2 (Narrowband Subscriber Terminal) secure voice unit and two operators/technicians. The HF DCS entry was terminated by NAVCOMSTA, Nea Makri, GR and the link operated as a 4 channel (12A9B emission) system carrying 3 AUTOVON and one teletype multiplex channels. The SHF satellite system carried 12 channels and utilized the DCS gateway station at RAF Croughton, UK.

3. (U) Significant Activities

(U) Word Processors

(U) In the June/July 1980 timeframe this HQ ordered several WANG word processors in an effort to upgrade administrative support within the command. The WANG processors were ordered by the staff without regard or knowledge of the TEMPEST implications associated with using electrical processors for classified material. The WANG processors were never placed into operation since they did not meet TEMPEST requirements nor did they appear on the quarterly Preferred Products List (PPL) issued by the Subcommittee on Compromising Emanations (SCCE).

(U) VYDEC 1200-15T (10 each) were ordered and placed into operation in the September 1980 timeframe. This processor was TEMPEST approved and

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appeared on the PPL. In late December 1980, the VYDEC 1200-1ST processor was removed from the PPL for technical reasons which resulted in it not being approved to process nationally classified material.

(U) Intertheater Command and Control Communications COMSEC Package

(U) In Feb 80, OJCS hosted a meeting of representatives from all unified and specified commands, service HQs and service cryptologic depots to find out the feasibility of fielding a COMSEC package that would meet contingency or crisis secure communications interoperability needs. Heretofore, each area CINC specified keymats to be used in each promulgated OPORD/OPLAN.

(U) USREDCOM was selected to be the COMSEC controlling authority for the initial seven short titles that eventually became known as the Inter-theater Command and Control Communications (C3) COMSEC Package. This package contains keylists for the KW-7 ORESTES (SI and Non-SI), KY-65/75 PARKHILL, KY-8/28/38 NESTOR, and KY57/58 VINSON security devices as well as an Operations Code and DRYAD Cipher/Authentication System.

(U) Users/holders for the Intertheater C3 Package are nominated by area CINCs and validated by USREDCOM/RDJTF to service cryptologic depots for distribution. There are approximately 400 crypto accounts involved in the Intertheater C3 Package. Copy count for the seven crypto keymats range from 500 to 1200 copies per short title.

(U) In-Garrison Communications Upgrade

(U) With the activation of HQ RDJTF in Mar 80 and the location of the staff within Bldg 1105, it became apparent that a total communications upgrade was necessary to properly support the envisioned operation.

(U) Initially, the staff was provided over-the-counter service for record telecommunications actions (both GENSER and SI) via existing USREDCOM 1928CG operated assets. In late May 80, a USAF Automatic Message Processing Equipment (AMPE) remote AUTODIN terminal was installed within the Adjutant Generals spaces of the HQ. This installation allowed for the automatic receipt of any GENSER traffic addressed to this HQ. Outgoing messages could be prepared locally on the AMPE input device but due to shortage of personnel all outgoing messages are carried to USREDCOM for processing.

(U) A five-hundred pair telephone cable expansion project was initiated by the 1928CG to satisfy HQ RDJTF and other subscribers located at the southern end of MacDill AFB. This will substantially upgrade telephone access and eliminate the overload of staff personnel using a single assigned line. This project is scheduled for completion in early 1981.

(U) Initially, the HQ was serviced by one AUTOSEVOCOM drop tied to the USREDCOM switch. Planning and acquisition were expedited and resulted in the installation of nine KY-3 secured AUTOSEVOCOM drops in the RDJTF Headquarters area.

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(U) Planning and initiation of a Statement of Requirement (SOR) was begun to acquire a CY-104 installation to interconnect the RDJ2 personnel located in Bldg 1105 with RDJ2 personnel located in Bldg 501. USAF Southern Communications Area engineers tested the existing base interconnect cable to ascertain if the system would support a T1 carrier (1.554 MB) CY-104 system. Initial determination was that it would not.

(U) USREDCOM J6 then looked into acquiring a GFE microwave system to support the required interconnect; no system was currently in the AF system. GTE was contacted as to what services could be provided to accommodate the interconnect. It was determined that the existing cable did not meet commercial standards for a T1 carrier system and that replacement would cost \$126K. GTE did not propose use of a microwave system due to routing over an active runway and possible interference with navigational aids already installed. At years end, this project was completely engineered and was awaiting acquisition of the bill of materials and installation scheduling.

(U) A Statement of Requirement (SOR) was initiated for the upgrade of a secure facsimile capability in the J3 Operations Center. This project will result in the installation of two KG-36/4 security devices and associated red patch panel providing the capability to use a single DACOM-412 in either exercise or real world mode without having to rekey the crypto device and manually switch circuit paths. At years end this project was engineered and awaiting an out-of-cycle CEP submission to validate the added KG-36 requirement.

(U) Closed Loop Secure Telephone Configuration for Exercises

(U) In the February/March 1980 timeframe it was determined that a specially designed secure telephone loop would be required to support Exercise Positive Leap 80 due in part to the newly formed RDJTF, the planned location of the exercise at Fort Bragg, NC, and the real-world related scenario to be used.

(U) Basically, Exercise Positive Leap was designed to test the RDJTF capability to command service components in a Southwest Asia (SWA) employment scenario with emphasis on field emplacements and tactics. As such, the exercise was conducted in the old 82nd ABN Div area and in one field location occupied by XVIII ABN Corps and the MARFOR contingent. To facilitate the interplay of the RDJTF with participating service components, the closed loop secure voice telephone system was designed.

(U) The closed loop system used KG-27 secured PCM radio links to interconnect the components and the Joint Exercise Control Group (JECG). This configuration was approved by the National COMSEC Authority (NSA) for use at the TOP SECRET level. In order to accomplish the installation of the loop and meet the MILENBR-232 requirements for protected wireline distribution systems (PWDS), rigid standards were written and promulgated. These instructions met with much resistance since components were unaccustomed to applying the red/black criteria associated with PWDS. Moderate success was achieved with meeting established criteria during the exercise.

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(U) The closed loop configuration was used again during exercise Gallant Knight 81 held at Fort Bragg, NC. The success and understanding of the installation parameters was greatly improved and well received by the components and user subscribers.

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APPENDIX A

NEWS CONFERENCE BY
GENERAL BERNARD W. ROGERS
CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY
AT THE PENTAGON
THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 1979
11:30 AM

General Rogers: This is my last day as the Chief of the Army. I have always enjoyed my association with the members of the Pentagon press corps over the past -- well, during the 13 -- almost 14 years that I've served in the Pentagon. Some of you I know better than others, and have seen more often than others. So I'm prepared today to answer what questions I can.

Before we throw it open to questions, though, just let me make one comment about a subject in which I know you are very interested, and that's the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to SALT.

I just want to underscore the statement that was made yesterday by General Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, when he pointed out that the Chiefs have, and will continue to give their advice to the President on SALT, and we will provide our advice to the Congress during the time of the ratification hearings. And that we, as Chiefs, do not intend to make any public comment on the subject prior to our testimony. That testimony will be commencing, I believe, the second week in July before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Now, with that, I'm prepared.

Q: As long as you brought that up -- (Laughter)

A: George?

Q: Does that mean that you have not reached a consensus of the Chiefs for or against SALT? Or that you have reached such a consensus, but you are holding your position close to the vest until you go up to the Hill?

A: Well, it means two things: one, that the Chiefs are making a final evaluation of the final language of the Treaty, and we have all along given our advice as the language was being developed. We did that right up until the time of the Summit.

Q: But have you decided a position for or against?

A: I'm just not going to comment on that, George, until the testimony before the Committees.

Q: But isn't it true, General, that there would not be a treaty unless the Chiefs had agreed, in principle, to the provisions of the treaty? We were told by General Jones, we were assured that there would be no Treaty, there would be no signing unless there was concurrence by the Chiefs. So it's implied that the Chiefs agree.

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A: Well, Ika, you're just going to have to read it whichever way you wish to. The Chiefs offered their advice to the Secretary of Defense and to the President. The advice of the Chiefs, of course, is important to the President. He has to consider a number of other factors just besides the Chiefs' advice, as he makes his decision.

Q: General Rogers, were you quoted correctly in recent days when you were supposed to have said that the United States will go through a period of strategic inferiority in the early eighties, into the late 1980s, before we gain that superiority or that equality, rather?

A: It depends upon which column you read with respect to the accuracy of my quote. What I did say is that it is my opinion that this country is approaching a time when we will no longer have the essential equivalents which is one of the basic requirements of our U.S. strategic policy, and that time frame, in my opinion, is in the early eighties.

Q: This is the same, isn't it, General, of saying "inferiority?"

A: Well, to me if we are unable to maintain essential equivalents, it certainly, to put it another way, does not place us in a position of superiority. But there are, of course, two basic requirements for our U.S. strategic policy. Essential equivalents is one, and credible deterrents is another, and I am speaking in terms of essential equivalents.

Q: Sir, if you had your way, which would you send to the conventional forces in Europe; troops or equipment?

A: Well, Sarah, we have been taking steps with respect to the numbers of troops in our forces in Europe over the past several years. It really didn't make any sense to me that we had the authorized level of organization for our units in Europe set at two, and those here in the States at one. One being, of course, a higher level of authorization for organization with respect to the numbers of soldiers that are in the units. So we've changed that with most of our units in Europe, and as a consequence, we have placed additional soldiers in those units, to bring them up to the proper level of organization.

With respect to the numbers that we have there, under current conditions, I am fairly well satisfied that we have about the right numbers of divisions and brigades and supporting units. Supporting units, I'm talking about combat support units, not combat service support units. I am very interested in providing the soldiers with the kinds of equipment that they need on the modern battlefield.

Those equipments, those combat vehicles, are just coming into our inventory. The M-1 tank, the first 110 will be starting to roll off the production line next February. We need that infantry fighting vehicle to accompany them. The advanced attack helicopter is necessary on the modern battlefield. The new Patriot Air Defense System. Those kinds of equipments are just now coming into our inventory. I'll be much happier when they are in the hands of the troops, particularly in Europe.

Q: General, I'd like to ask you to share your thoughts with us on manpower requirements of the All-Volunteer Force and the future of the draft.

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A: Well, with respect to manpower requirements, I need to address that, both quantity and quality. And I need to break that down into Active components and Reserve components, and the Individual Ready Reserve, which is the manpower base for mobilization. There is some confusion, perhaps not among you ladies and gentlemen, but there is some confusion as to what we're talking about, because we have three packages of personnel.

First, the Active component. I am satisfied, from the standpoint of quality, that we're getting the kind of a soldier that we need in the volunteer environment to man and to maintain the equipment that we have and will have.

We have been successful on the quantity side, in the Active component, in meeting within a percentage point or two each year in the volunteer environment, our objectives from a standpoint of recruiting. We are not being as successful this year. In fact, we're running just about 90 percent of our objective. We've taken some steps to try to improve that, that take, recruiting take between now and the end of the fiscal year. I'm not too optimistic that we will meet our objective.

Now, with respect to the Reserve components. First let me go back with the Active component and just add a footnote. And that is that so long as our end strength remains around — somewhere between 770 and 780,000, I am convinced that we can recruit the quality of the soldier that we need in those conditions.

Now, with respect to the Reserve components. Reserve component units is what I want to talk about, the divisions and the brigades and the regiments, the companies. Right now we are about 20 percent under-strength across the board in the U.S. Army Reserves and the National Guard. That's about 128,000 less than we would like to have in peacetime, grouping both the Guard and the Reserve together. That doesn't mean that we don't have some units out there that are over-strength, but it also means we have some that are under-strength.

We have taken some steps in the past few months to increase our capability to recruit for the Reserves. I won't tick those steps off now, and we are seeing slight gains being made in both the Guard and Reserves of the numbers that they're bringing in, versus the losses.

The major challenge that the Army faces, and it becomes a national challenge, is with respect to the Individual Ready Reserve. That's that pool of trained soldiers that still have a commitment for service. As you recall, when a soldier comes in he signs up for six years of service. If he enlists for two years in the Active force and he gets out, that means four years yet in the Reserves, either in the Selective Reserve in a unit or in the Individual Ready Reserve.

That's a pool from which we would draw, come mobilization, to fill the vacancies within our Reserve component units, and our Active units, because we do not man it at wartime levels, even in the Active force. But also to provide the replacements for the combat casualties in the first months of a war until a draft can take over and start providing us with the trained skills that we need as combat replacements.

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There is a major shortfall in the numbers of personnel that we have in the Individual Ready Reserve pool today. You can pick several numbers; it depends on what time frame you're talking about. By 1985 it's estimated, if we make progress in several areas, which project a gain of about 230, 240,000 in the pool in that time frame, that the shortfall will be something like about 170, 180,000. Another figure that you hear from time to time is by the end of 1984, agreed with OSD, somewhere between 200 and 250,000. And then the question is, what's the figure today.

I mentioned that those figures of 1984 and 1985 projected that we would have some improvements, and among those things that we will do will be to identify at least 80,000 retirees who will be told that, "Come mobilization, you will report to this station for this kind of an assignment." And we anticipate we can find those 80,000 who can do that. But that's one of the improvements I'm talking about to be included in that 230,000 projected improvements. If we went to war today, obviously, the shortfall is going to be greater than the figures I gave you, because we haven't had time to make those projected improvements and there's a debate as to just what that number may be. It certainly falls within the realm of somewhere from 200 to 500,000.

The point is this: even if we had registration today, and registration would give us our first draftees in about 120 days coming out of the training command and going to units as replacements. Even if we had registration today, we would run out of infantrymen, tankers, artillerymen and medics before that 120-day period is up and the draft could take over. That's the major challenge that I see in the volunteer environment as far as the Army is concerned, and as far as the country is concerned. What that really means is that we do not have, in this country today, the trained manpower to provide the manpower base for mobilization. We need to solve that problem, and solve it in a time frame that should be relatively soon. There are a number of options on how to solve that. You mentioned the draft.

One option, of course, is to provide sufficient incentives to attract individuals to enlist in the Individual Ready Reserve, be trained in one of the critical skills, and then we keep a string on him for a certain period of time, providing bonuses for them as long as they stay in the Individual Reserves. Another is to provide incentives to have him extend in the Reserve component units, because that would reduce the requirement. Another would be to draft for the Individual Ready Reserve. It lends itself to bulk draft. You would draft by skills, train them for the necessary amount of time in those skills, send them back home and keep a string on them, knowing where they are during this time so that they can be called in on very short notice come mobilization.

General Marshall, in his report to the Secretary of War on the 30th of June, 1945, recognized even in those days that the luxury of a long time frame for mobilization would no longer exist for this country. He recommended as an option universal military training. Not service, but universal military training, so we would have that pool of trained manpower ready to go. My point is, it's a major challenge. It's one for this country — we've got to find a solution. We cannot continue to wring our hands about it and ignore it. In my opinion something must be done.

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Q: You've discussed your options, but could I just follow it by asking you what your preference is. If you had your way, what would you do?

A: It really does not matter to me, so long as it can be resolved, on a timely basis. I am hopeful that the steps that I see being taken — I am hopeful but not optimistic that they will lead to a resolution of this problem.

Another spin-off of this is, of course, that there will be those who would tell you that we do have a source of trained manpower in this country, and those are the veterans who have already served their country.

There is a school of thought that says that we should have an Emergency Reserve, which would draft the veterans come mobilization for service. To me that does not seem equitable, that we would draft a veteran to serve when there are so many others who have not yet served their country.

Q: General, do you think that without resorting to the use of tactical nuclear weapons that NATO could resist a direct attack from the Soviet Union or from the Warsaw Pact today? Could they win in Europe right now?

A: You know, the scenarios that you could create for that, Ike, are so varied. Just let me say that we are attempting, within the Alliance, with the near-term and long-term defense programs, to enhance the conventional capability of the Alliance, so that we can meet the initial thrust of the Warsaw Pact forces, should it come.

As I say, depending upon the scenario, it depends upon how long that force might be able to hold. But we must continue to maintain within the Alliance, in my opinion, the continuum of forces of the conventional and modernized theater nuclear forces, with the strategic nuclear capability as the overall umbrella.

Q: General, I'm going to ask you a three-part question — all at the same time. Number 1, you did not repeat what you have said in testimony on the Hill, that you favor a draft for the IRR. Have you changed your position on that?

A: I have not changed my position. You see, Fred, the first thing we would have to have is registration. It's going to take some time to get that organized. Secondly, we have to then have a capability to classify, and of the 17 categories of classification for a draftee, five are determined by the local board. So local boards would have to be established. That, again, would take time. Now, meantime, I believe that there will be steps at least proposed and, hopefully, supported financially, to try to overcome the shortfall.

If it is not overcome, or the solution doesn't seem on the horizon by the time we would have registration and classification established, then we would have to resort, in my opinion, to the draft of the IRR. Not the draft for the Active Force, and I didn't make that point with you before. Not the draft for the Reserve component units; because it's very difficult, because of the geographical locus of the Reserve components to draft for them. But the draft for the IRR. And if you draft for the IRR, I personally am convinced that the salutary effect, one, will be easing the strain on our recruiters, both for the Active components and the Reserve components. Because this younger generation of potential soldiers are no different from those we've always had. They are interested in selecting

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the time and the place and the type of unit in which they wish to serve. So that I personally am convinced that there would be a number of them who would make their way to both Active and Reserve component recruiters.

Q: The second part of my question. On the retirees. Would there be an upper age limit? And how would you break that out, as approximately between enlisted and officer retirees?

A: Fred, I don't have the details on the plan. The plan is being devised, but you could, for example, foresee a colonel who had retired in the Engineers being recalled to be a facility engineer at an installation. You could also see a number of non-commissioned officers and officers who might be utilized in the training bases as retirees, assisting us in training the additional troops, come mobilization. I don't have the details of that plan at the present time, Fred.

Q: The last one, on Korea. What is your present position on the question of continuing the withdrawal, slowing it down or changing direction entirely?

A: I understand your question, yes. Well, the Chiefs have taken a position on our evaluation of the new assessment of the threat from North Korea, based upon a better analysis of the intelligence information that had been available over almost the past decade. We have made our recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, and that recommendation will be among those recommendations considered by the interagency group that is currently assessing the entire situation on the Korean Peninsula, leading to a recommendation to the President as to what to do. At this juncture, I am not prepared to tell you, Fred, what the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs is.

Q: Not even as a farewell present?

A: Not even as a what?

Q: A farewell present?

A: Not even as a farewell present. But one cannot ignore the fact that the most recent assessment does provide sufficient indicators of a greater capability on the part of the North Koreans than we had originally thought.

Q: Your remarks on the draft, could you just walk it through so we can get it clear? You would draft a young man and send him to a training school to be a medic, say, and then he would go home and resume his civilian life unless we had mobilization? How do you envision that working?

A: What I would envision, George, is just about that. The critical skills I've outlined to you, and it would be that the individual would be drafted under a random sequence lottery, similar to what we had at the end of — just before the draft expired in 1973. It should be a draft that is as equitable as possible, namely, with the fewest number of exemptions as possible. The individual would be drafted for a particular skill, and would be trained the number of months necessary, paid while he is being trained, and then sent home, and remain vulnerable for recall on mobilization, immediately upon mobilization, for the length of time that the legislation provides.

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If the legislation were to say that the individual is vulnerable for six years, it would mean we would need to bring him back in for some refresher training at least once, probably twice during that period. If it were for two years, then I don't think we would need to bring him back for refresher training. And the individual would have the option, after he's finished his training, to become a member of a Reserve component unit, or he could enlist in the Active forces, if he wished.

Q: When you talk about that 120 days, well, 120 days plus how many months of training?

A: Well, that includes the training.

Q: I see.

A: You see, today, Sarah, our estimate is that if we had to mobilize and got authority to draft, it would take us about 110 days to get the first group of draftees into the Training Command, train them for 100 days, that's 210 days before the individual is ready to go.

If we have registration we can reduce that 110 days to at least 30 days and maybe short of that, but at least 30 days. We train them for another 100 days, so you've got about 130 days before the individual would be ready to go to a unit as a replacement.

Q: General, you mentioned tactical nuclear force modernization to include strategic capability. Could you be more specific about what needs to be improved in NATO in terms of tactical nuclear forces, what kind of weapons systems, cooperation with the Allies?

A: Your question was not quite accurate of what I said. I did not associate a strategic capability for the theater nuclear forces. I indicated that there should be that continuum in NATO as we've had in the past.

With respect to the modernization, in my opinion, and I certainly will be involved in this to a much greater extent after today than I am right now, in my opinion, we need to have new and modern warheads on the theater nuclear weapons that we currently have and we're taking steps to modernize in those areas. I also think that a very careful consideration must be given to extending the range of those theater nuclear forces if, in fact, our deterrent is going to cover the spectrum of the threat that we face.

Q: General, should those warheads include the neutron warheads?

A: In my opinion, they should include the neutron warhead. It's a much more effective weapon, and I look at it, perhaps, in a different light than some. If we have to resort to the use of theater nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, the kind of weapons in which we would have the enhanced radiation reduced blast warhead, it will be at a time when our soldiers, NATO soldiers, are in very close proximity to the Warsaw Pact soldiers.

We can get the same effects of blast and thermal and nuclear effects, radiation effects, with our current inventory of warheads. But with the so-called

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neutron warhead, we can reduce the thermal damage and the blast damage radius by at least ten times, which means we can use that warhead much closer to our own troops than we can with the current inventory. That's why I believe that we have the capability, we should, in my opinion, make those warheads as we modernize into the enhanced radiation reduced blast capability.

I was very pleased that the President left that option open, because when he approved our modernizing some of our warheads, he also approved leaving the capability there so that within a very short time we could make the proper insertion and make them into the enhanced radiation reduced blast weapons.

Q: General, on this subject, should the Pershing II be approved for production and deployment be deployed in several NATO countries, or should they continue to be deployed only in Germany?

A: Well, that's really not for me to answer. That's for the Alliance itself to determine. As you know, that is being discussed within the Alliance, and shortly I will become a party to that discussion.

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Q: What is your opinion, at this point on the deployment of the cruise missile?

A: I do not wish to comment until I have been over there and become further enmeshed in the overall discussion.

Q: What about the medium-range ballistic missile? Is that also a consideration in your view? Is this what you have in mind in extending the range?

A: It is a consideration; medium-range ballistic missiles.

Q: As the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, as I understand it, you do have control or have assigned to you certain strategic weapons that could be used to support NATO. Do you have anything that you can say on the kinds of weapons or the numbers of weapons that you will see a need for as part of that capability?

A: Not at this juncture, Lloyd; talk to you in six months.

Q: Kind of a home-run pitch, I'm afraid, but I think we ought to give you that inning. There has been some talk that the new modern volunteer Army won't fight. It's a nine-to-five Army, it's not ready, it's a bad idea, it hasn't worked. You've heard all the criticisms from the Hill and elsewhere. In your last day as Commander of the Army, what is your fitness report on the U.S. Army today? Will it fight? Is it good? Is it ready? Is it worse than it used to be; is it better than it used to be?

A: One can only judge an Army when it is put to the supreme test, which is on the battlefield. So it would be unfair for me to attempt to compare today's Army, which hasn't been tested on the battlefield, with those in Vietnam and Korea and World War II.

But I also was a soldier in all of those three wars, and I just tell you, George, that in my opinion these are among the finest soldiers with whom I've served in 36 years of service. They will fight. They wish to succeed. For some, when they finish basic training that's a major success for them. The challenge for the leaders of the Army is to ensure that we have the same decisiveness of action, the same good judgment as to how those soldiers should be trained and employed that would equate to the aggressiveness, initiative, desire to succeed that you find on the part of a soldier. My fitness report of the soldier today would be very high.

If you are talking about the whole Army, you see, the total Army, I mentioned we have the difficulties with the manning and particularly in the Reserve components. We have a need and a major challenge that faces us is the capability to procure the weapon systems and the equipment that we must have if we're going to fight successfully on the modern battlefield. Those have not yet come into our inventory, but we are making progress in that area.

Q: I just wanted to clarify one of your earlier answers. The President, you mentioned that he left open the option to deploy the neutron bomb. The President — one of the provisions involved is that the Russians show restraint on their side, too, in the deployment of nuclear weapons. Are you advocating

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not going with that, possibility of that option, but are you advocating the immediate or as soon as possible deployment of neutron weapons in Europe?

A: Well, Ike, I have always been in favor of having the enhanced radiation reduced blast warhead on our weapons. As I indicated, I was encouraged that the President left that option open, and he did caveat his option by saying that it depended upon the reaction of the Soviets. But I, personally, have always recommended having that warhead.

Q: Sir, when you get through all these questions, there's one I wanted to ask you before you go.

A: All right.

Q: Somebody else?

Q: The General on the —

(Laughter)

Gen. Rogers: I can hardly wait, Sarah.

Voice: Sarah, you tell him.

Gen. Rogers: She has, hasn't she?

Q: You mentioned the need for sufficient incentives to enlist, and this is one of the categories that — I wonder if retirement is that and what you would see as needed in terms of an improvement to the Army retirement system?

A: Well, when a soldier comes into the Army, I suspect that retirement benefits is very low on his checklist. We find that it becomes a little higher on his priority list after he's served two or three tours, reenlisted two or three times. So that I, personally, don't believe that from the standpoint of the soldier that retirement benefits means too much to him. It does, though, for the career force.

My position has always been, after I studied the various options, in projecting out the costs in constant dollars, not in inflated dollars, that we should retain what we have today, which is the option to retire at the end of 20 years with 50 percent of base pay at that time. And I would change our procedures just slightly by paying some kind of an allowance to a soldier who is discharged, through no fault of his own, such as we do to officers today when we — a severance pay of \$15,000 to officers, I would make that more equitable for our soldiers, too.

Q: General Rogers, there has been talk in the last couple of years about the creation of a quick reaction force or Persian Gulf force, something like that. Where does that stand? In particular, how does it relate to the recent review of our posture in the Middle East.

A: Well, the Army has always had, Ken, what we call the heavy/light corps, which was a spectrum of forces from a platoon of rangers all the way up to a three-division corps, with supporting forces, of about 100,000. We are designing what will be known as the unilateral corps, and it will be a spin-off from that

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heavy/light corps. When finally designed it will not include forces which are earmarked for initial deployment from this country to NATO. So that we could deploy that force of up to about 100,000, or any part thereof, to a non-NATO contingency, such as the Persian Gulf or the Middle East or Northeast Asia, and have it fight in that contingency and not have to reach in and pull out forces from it, if we go, shortly thereafter, into a NATO contingency.

The Army is designing that now. I have to leave to my successor just what the time frame is that we are going to have ours prepared. And what we're working towards, Ken, is a self-contained corps, one that will have sufficient combat service support units in it that it can maintain itself for X number of days, X being classified. So that we will not have to depend upon host nations support, because it may not be available in some of the areas in which we go. So that we will not have to mobilize, even under the option of the President to call up 50,000, we wouldn't have to mobilize initially even at 50,000 in order to be successful in maintaining ourselves for X number of days.

Q: This will have its own indigenous equipment so it won't have to borrow from other units in NATO or elsewhere?

A: It will have its own equipment and it will be fenced. What I mean by that, it will be protected with respect to its equipment. The reason I say that, Ken, is you know as we pre-position more division sets of equipment in Europe, so that we can pick up our soldiers by aircraft and fly them over to marry up with that equipment, we have to pull that equipment from someplace. We don't get a double issue of equipment. So it comes from our Reserve components and it comes from our Active components.

We are anticipating, under the current plan for POMCUSing that we will have a drawdown on the Active component units that are not protected, down to about 70 percent of their issue of equipment, and in our Reserve components about 50 percent. With the 70 percent will not be the forces in the unilateral corps, they will be protected. Now I say that just as if I can predict what the future holds with respect to budgets and our procurement accounts and all of those kinds of things. But that's what we're looking towards.

Q: Can you explain why that's different? I mean I would suspect if you went down to the 82nd Airborne they'd say, "Well, that's what we can do now." I'm not too clear on how the unilateral corps would be, (a) different from what you've got today; and, (b) whether there's any features of it which lend itself particularly to the Persian Gulf.

A: Well, (a) different, is that it will not include the units that are earmarked for early deployment to NATO. (b) as far as its composition is concerned, it will be dependent upon, one, where the contingency occurs; and, two, what the Commander-in-Chief of the unified command, who has cognizance of that area, wishes in his force to meet that contingency. So there will be some differences.

Q: Will it be a force of X how many people?

A: I would estimate when finally designed it will be up 100, 110,000. About the size of what we would have with a heavy/light corps. Remember in

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the heavy/light corps you had light divisions and you had heavy divisions, which could be mixed. Well, you'd have a similar situation in this one, and about the same strength, in the final analysis.

Q: If all and well, it would be ready when?

A: I can't give you that answer.

Q: Fiscal '80?

A: I mentioned I'd have to leave that answer to my successor.

Q: It's well along, but it's still on paper; is that right?

A: Well, the forces exist out there. It's a question of our getting them in the proper status and ready to do, and depends somewhat upon what occurs with respect to the Second Division, for example.

Q: But it's decided to do this or it's under consideration?

A: It is decided to do this. Now the Army intends to do this, and the Defense Department, or Office of the Secretary of Defense also will ensure that the other Services have a capability along the same lines.

Q: One further question on this. How does it differ from the light/heavy corps arrangement you have now? Is it slightly different -- is it much more than an organizational change?

A: Primarily, the units that will be designated within that corps will not be those that are earmarked for early deployment to Europe. Today, in the heavy/light corps --

Q: Are you taking troops that are -- where are you going to find these troops? What are they designated to do now, if they're not going to --

A: Well, obviously, the 82nd Airborne would be one, you know, obviously. And there will be others. Now another difference will be, as I mentioned, we want to make this a self-sustaining force from the standpoint of support. We have, in our budget, a wedge -- in our program a wedge of spaces to go to combat service support units in the Active force, so we won't have to depend upon Reserve component units, you see. So there's another difference.

Q: Just to be clear again. Would we be accurate in describing this as a force particularly suited for combat in the third-world, Persian Gulf, Number 1, and, secondly, has that old idea of having two Army Divisions plus the Marine wing, is that still alive? Or is this independent of that concept?

A: There will be other forces in it, besides Army forces. You could expect it to be used to meet contingencies anywhere, George, not in any specific area.

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Q: The figure of 110,000 includes the Marines?

A: That's the Army.

Q: As SACEUR, will you continue to be responsible for the Middle East area, or is that going to be broken off into a separate command or a subsidiary command?

A: That still is the responsibility of CINCEUR, the European Command, and I know of no movement about to change that, Lloyd.

Q: General Rogers, will you continue General Haig's efforts to get Greece back into the integrated NATO command on the southern flank, and on the northern flank will you be working on the concern of the Scandinavian countries about gaps up there, particularly manpower, U.S. manpower assignment on the northern flank?

A: Well, needless to say, I'll have an interest in both flanks of NATO. Specifically, whether or not I will be charged by the North Atlantic Council and Secretary General to carry on the discussions that General Haig has been having, I don't know. I won't know until I get aboard. But he has been working very diligently in that area, as you indicated.

Q: General, could you explain one thing, the unilateral corps. What is behind that designation of "unilateral"?

A: Well, maybe it's for want of a better name, you know--

Q: Unilateral in the sense of what?

A: Well, it means that it can be used anywhere in the world, and would be intended to be other than in the early deployment phasing of NATO. Now, why the word "unilateral" was selected, I'm not sure. But it certainly differentiates for us in our mind the difference between that corps and the heavy/light corps organization that we have had for some years, as a quick reaction force.

Q: In other words, it's not interdependent or not dependent upon any other --

A: We would hope it would be self-contained, you see, and our heavy/light corps today, one, we would have to call on units that are early deploying to NATO; and, two, we would have to call in combat service support units that also should be early deployed to NATO. We're hopeful of changing both of those, you see.

Q: So those are your half war outfit. In other words, the other one being (inaudible) and this would be the half?

A: I suppose, Lloyd, that's as good a way to look at it as any. For a soldier any contingency is a major one.

Q: But there would be other elements to this force; is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Air and naval?

A: There would have to be.

Q: Can you estimate how large that would be?

A: No.

Q: But it would be considerably more than the figure you gave us for exclusively Army?

A: Yes. We would expect the Army to run somewhere between 100 to 110,000 at the maximum including the support forces.

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Q: Along this line of words, would you give us a little help translating from the Army talk. Suppose you were talking to Mom and Pop Jones, and you wanted to tell them that we don't have the strength in this country today to provide the manpower base for mobilization. Now what would you mean? What would you be telling them about their country's defenses?

A: What I'm saying is that today, in my opinion, we do not have the manpower base from which to mobilize to go to war and to continue to fight. As indicated, that even with the registration, we would run out of the critical skills today before the draft could take over. If that is a fact, which I believe it is, my judgment tells me that that's not the posture that this country wants to be in, so the country faces a challenge, and something must be done. I've ticked off a series of alternatives to solve that. Sarah, any one of which would be agreeable to me with the exception of this Emergency Reserve of recalling veterans, which I do not think is proper.

I should also point out that even if we were to take the late-deploying Reserve component units, deploying late in our mobilization schedule, and broke those units up and brought those skills forward into our IRR, come mobilization, we still would run out of the critical skills before the draft could take over. That is another source of trained manpower to go back and break up those late-deploying Reserve component units. But even doing that we still would run out of the critical skills before the draft could take over, even with registration in existence.

Press: Thank you, General.

General Rogers: Thank you. Good luck to you. Nice to be with you.

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APPENDIX B

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAROLD BROWN
THE PENTAGON
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1979
1:45 PM (EST)

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

I have one item on which I want to comment and then I will take questions. I understand that there have been some questions about the organization of rapid deployment forces and what the command organization might be. I should soon be establishing that organization formally, but I can tell you what is planned.

The arrangement that we plan is to have a joint task force to do the planning for various contingency uses of the rapid deployment forces and the rapid deployment forces, as you heard, could comprise anywhere from battalion to an Army corps in size, and would involve the elements from all of the Services, or could involve elements from all of the Services.

The Joint Task Force would be headed by a three-star officer, lieutenant general. It would be assigned as part of the Readiness Command, the Unified Command whose headquarters is located at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. This joint task force would contain elements from all of the Services. It would do the planning for deployment and operation of whatever parts of the rapid deployment forces were to be used in a given contingency. It would examine the various contingencies. It would look at the deployment lists to see what would be shipped first and in what kind of a lift. And then in case any of these contingencies, which are not limited to any one part of the world, they would cover not only the Middle East, they would cover various other parts of the world.

If these contingencies actually occurred and an operation had to be mounted, the Commander of the Joint Task Force would become the operational commander. He would either be — that headquarters would either be subordinate to the Unified and Specified Commander in the area, whatever the area happened to be, or could report directly back to the national command authorities here in Washington.

I should note that the establishment of this Joint Task Force will probably take place soon. I don't want to say whether it's within weeks, but it certainly won't take very many months. We have not been idle over the past months in working on this question. Following the Nifty Nugget Exercise that took place last year, a Joint Deployment Agency, responsible directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was established to start on the job of looking at how deployments would take place; that is, prioritizing for each contingency plan, what would load first, what would load second, and so on, and also examining conflicts between different contingency plans for different areas of the world since there is always a tendency in establishing those contingency plans to assume that that's the only contingency and to assume also, therefore, that all of the airlift and sealift capability of the United States would be available to handle that contingency.

The so-called JDA has been active for a number of months. Moreover, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has established a small element reporting

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directly to him to look at the issue of the Rapid Deployment Force and how to operate it. It's out of those activities and further considerations by the Joint Chiefs and myself that this plan I have just described to you has been evolved.

Questions?

Q: Dr. Brown, could I ask you an essay question for a little bit more on the Rapid Deployment Force? What units --

A: Can I have a multiple choice?

(laughter)

A: Go ahead.

Q: What units would generally be assigned to it? We hear talk of the 82nd Airborne and the 101st, for instance -- how its performance in terms of speed and ability to move large units and endurance would compare to what we can do now and what its costs would be?

A: The Rapid Deployment Force would comprise essentially all the units that are not already committed to NATO or the 2nd Division, which is in Korea. In other words, the rapid deployment force would be selected from that very broad spectrum of units which includes, of course, the 82nd, the 101st, and a number of other Army units. Includes the great bulk of the Marine Corps. And also includes Air Force units, some of which are committed to NATO but can be moved back and forth easily, and also includes Naval units.

Therefore, a very large fraction of U.S. forces are available for use as rapid deployment forces. They would be tailored to the situation and contingency plans would be made up that would identify which ones would go to which places under which circumstances.

We are talking about deployment, as I said, of anywhere from a battalion to an Army corps, plus -- or, alternatively, plus or instead, naval units and plus air units. I think that really needs to be understood and perhaps the best way to do it is to tell an anecdote of the town in Texas that wired Texas Ranger Headquarters for help because there was a severe riot and within a couple of hours the train stopped and a Texas Ranger got off and the Mayor came up to him and said, "Are you the only Ranger they've sent?" And he said, "Yes, they only sent one Ranger, you ain't got but one riot, have you?"

(laughter)

Q: Can you confirm whether Iraq has invaded Iran?

A: I am aware of the Tehran radio reports alleging an invasion of Iran by Iraqi forces. As you know, there has been tension between those two countries and occasionally accusation of incursions. I have no information that would suggest that there has been an invasion.

Q: Would an invasion prompt the U.S. to do anything?

A: I am certainly not going to respond as to what the U.S. might do in such a case, because, as I say, we don't have any information that confirms this.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you testify that the Pentagon has decided to drop plans for a separate new cruise missile aircraft carrier; and if so, would you elaborate on that?

A: No, we continue to include in our five-year program the possibility of a cruise missile carrier aircraft beyond the B-52 which will be the first cruise

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missile carrier. As you know, the B-52s will start to carry cruise missiles operationally late in '82 and early in '83. And we plan to equip our B-52G's all with cruise missiles. We may go beyond that.

We continue to carry in the five-year program tests and designs for other aircraft as cruise missile carriers but we are not committing to the full scale development of another cruise missile carrier. The Air Force has concluded that the B-52 will serve well as a cruise missile carrier through the '80's. I want to keep some insurance in case the B-52 proves vulnerable to a barrage attack, but insurance is all we've got, is all we need. We don't need a full scale development program now, for a new cruise missile carrier.

Q: Mr. Secretary, on the budget, I wonder if you could tell us where the funds will come from to cover the increases that you are calling for. Will they come from other social programs? Will they come from making the deficit increase? How would you cover the increase that you're budgeting?

A: That, of course, depends upon additional economic decisions. If one is asking about the year 1984 or 1985, there can be predictions about what the tax revenues will be and about what other non-defense expenditures will be and therefore, what the deficit will be. But they're only predictions.

The rest of the government does not detail its programs over the next five years to the same degree that the Defense Department does and so it is difficult to make an overall estimate four or five years ahead. To the extent that other programs or it could be attributed to a smaller deficit. These numbers all add together to give you a net deficit or surplus, and to the extent that one believes they are interchangeable, you still can't identify a single one as the cause of the other numbers.

I believe, and indeed, I think it is coming generally to be understood, that the country needs to be militarily strong and that the funds that are being programmed for that purpose over the next five years are to serve that end. The United States can afford that. The United States can also afford to do what it needs to do for genuine non-defense, social needs. I would point out that the non-defense expenditures are now roughly three times the defense expenditures. For that reason, I think it's a mistake to infer, I don't think you implied, but some people do infer, that the size of the Defense budget determines whether there is a deficit or not. It certainly has an effect. It has one-third the effect of the non-defense programs.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you agree with other senior government officials who say that your new Defense plan represents sort of a final purging of our Vietnam hangups?

A: Well, it is tempting to see current events as some sort of great watershed or hinge of history and I must admit I, to a degree, succumb to the temptation. Whether it is or not, we don't really know until some years have passed. I will say this, the attitudes, both on the part of the public, on the part of the Congress, as I read it, and on the part of the Executive Branch, are very different in this regard than they were five years ago. The American people, I think, are convinced now that U.S. military capability is not the principal source of unhappiness in the world or instability in the world and that we need to be militarily strong. We need, in fact, I think, to be somewhat cautious to see that the pendulum doesn't swing too far back the other way to the point where we begin to believe that military strength can solve all of our international, let alone our domestic problems, because there continues to be a major and in most cases preponderant influence by diplomatic, by economic, by political factors in what goes on in the world. It's also true, and this is what we have come to realize, that in the absence of sufficient military strength, the others cannot do what we need to do.

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Q: Mr. Secretary, to what degree do you attribute these changes in attitudes to what has happened in Iran?

A: I think that the trend had set in well before then. The polls, which five years ago showed that 40 percent of the American people wanted to reduce defense spending and only 9 percent wanted to increase it, had already changed quite a lot six months ago or a year ago to the point where the numbers were that, perhaps, 30 percent of the people or 40 percent of the people thought there should be more defense spending, and 20 percent or so felt there should be less.

Iran — the events in Iran clearly have accentuated that trend to the point where now 60 percent think there should be more defense spending and only 10 or 11 think there should be less. That, I think, is a rather sharp temporary thing which, however, I think, will also leave considerable residue. So, I think it's a peak perhaps, but on a continuing trend.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you called recruiting and retention problems yesterday your most difficult problems and so forth. There is a new Pentagon pay study that identified over \$5 billion worth problems in the pay area. And yet not much of that money, I understand, is showing up in this budget. And you mentioned travel yesterday. And it's over \$1 billion that you are having trouble with, that the military people are paying for out of their pockets.

A: I didn't say 1 billion, but —

Q: No, the pay study did that. And I wondered if the Administration is committed enough to solve some of these recruiting-retention problems?

A: We are committed to solve the recruiting and retention problems. And it clearly will take more money. However, like many other problems, it can't be solved solely by throwing money at them and we'll have to take that — we will have to try to solve it gradually. We do feel that our military people, as is shown by the recruitment and retention rates deserve to be compensated better. They deserve to get some special compensation that goes with their special burdens, and they also deserve to have some general increases. We'll try to do some of both of those in the fiscal '81 budget and we will try to keep doing it in subsequent years. The President's Personnel Reform Acts, I think, will help. I also believe that the retirement changes that have been proposed but have not yet begun to be acted on in the Congress would also over an extended period have a beneficial effect.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there's been reports of possible conflict between Vietnam and Thailand, if and when Vietnam resumes its offensive in Cambodia. What role might the U.S. have if they do — those two countries do come into conflict?

A: Well, as you know, the U.S. has increased lately, in the last year or two, our military sales to Thailand. We've transferred some munitions to Thailand. We continue to have a close relationship and obligation to Thailand. I don't want to predict what would happen in case of some hypothetical action. But there's no doubt that the Vietnamese movement toward hegemonism over Indochina has already had a very serious negative effect on the relations throughout the area and if that were to extend to action into Thailand, that would make it still worse.

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Q: Do we have any treaty obligation?

A: We have a treaty with Thailand that requires consultation in the case such actions. We would then have to decide what we would do.

Q: In your testimony yesterday, you said the Navy would be coming up with a new smaller nuclear attack submarine.

A: Yes.

Q: Could you tell us some more about that submarine? Approximately when do you expect it to be coming out and will it be replacing the Los Angeles class sub? The last question: You made no reference to the TRIDENT. That was also the subject of the Mann Study. Is it the Defense Department's position that you are going to go with the TRIDENT and that you are not considering re-designing that?

A: The 688 will continue to be procured at the rate of -- well, at a roughly steady rate; one, some years; two, some years, for the next several years. A smaller, less expensive submarine, of somewhat different shape, is under design and we would plan, and this will be detailed in the budget and five-year program that gets sent up in detail in January, we would plan to introduce the lead ship of that class, if I remember correctly, in 1983. And then gradually would increase their number so that they would replace the production of the 688s.

In the case of the TRIDENT submarine, as I read the Mann Study, as I understood the results of that study, the savings from going to a new design may be somewhat less. We'll continue our design work but we do not -- I have not decided as of this moment that we will have new -- an SSBNX; that is, a new class. I don't rule it out but it's not in the same state of decision as the 688 follow on.

Q: In September, as was recalled to you yesterday, the President stood fairly flatly on a 3 percent increase, and it's now over 5. Would you --

A: It's 5 for 1981.

Q: 4.57638. (laughter) Would you say that in the interim that your studies and conclusions on what to do were responsive to Congressional examinations of Defense which concluded that it was inadequate or under financed?

A: Well, I think that there is -- I'm perfectly willing to spread the credit around. Certainly Congressional interest and inputs had an effect but it is part of the regular process of Defense and Administration, Defense Department and Administration, formulation of Defense policy, Defense programs, Defense budgets, for us every summer and fall, to go through and update of the 5-year program and to prepare the following year's budget.

During the course of that, there were Subcommittee meetings with the National Security Council, chaired in the case, in the particular case of the Defense Program, by myself with the Secretary of State and National Security Adviser and others, going over these issues of what does the United States need in the 1980s and 1990 in the way of military capability to back-up or to underlie, its foreign policy.

How much does it cost? What are the most effective programs? How shall we phase the acquisition of that capability in terms of hardware, in terms of new technology, in terms of the people to operate it? By comparison with many other areas of the new government or outside, it's a relatively orderly process no matter how disorderly it sometimes may seem to me. And it was on that basis, followed by a National Security meeting, chaired by the President, followed by detailed budget and program discussions within this department, with the participation of Office of Management and Budget and other people, that we arrived at this program, these numbers.

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Q: But you arrived at a program which is about \$3 billion lower in budget authority than in September you expected to do?

A: Yes. Some of it is cost and some of it is additional programs. Some of it is a more accurate estimate of the cost in constant dollars and some of it is additional program. The rapid deployment force part, forces part, for example, is additional program.

Q: Did you not conclude that the country was ready to spend more on defense? — Congress, showed you the way?

A: That's certainly — I am willing to spread the credit around. The fact that the country was ready for more defense is not completely independent of the fact that the country needs more defense.

One more.

Q: Did that poll that you took have anything to do with it?

A: No, the poll I referred to wasn't taken by us and it appeared well after these decisions were made.

Q: Does that mean that the number of the percentage of American people favoring defense spending has doubled since the Iranian crisis?

A: No. Probably doubled in the last year and a half or so. But, you know, that depends on whether you believe the polls.

Q: On the Hill you talked about the — the conception — the view that the United States is weak, maybe unnecessarily, a wrong view that we're too weak —

A: Yes.

Q: — has corroded our influence in the world.

A: Yes.

Q: Do you think that merely building up our forces will restore that influence or do you personally feel that we'll have to use force in order to fully restore an image of the strong, assertive country?

A: Let me make two comments on that. First of all, I think part of the problem of perceptions has to do with the confusion of present balance with the balance you can expect in the future if the trend stays the way it is. It's easier to see what the trends are than it is to make an absolute comparison of capabilities, especially in two sets of forces, geographical conditions, and so on, as different as those of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And so when I say people have misperceived the situation, I'm saying they sometimes confuse the future situation if the trends don't change and they take that to be the present situation. It's not, but it's a very important balance to weigh anyway and I have always tried to make the distinction. I don't know that I have been all that successful. But I am going to keep making it.

I believe, also, and this is a second point, that the stronger our military capability is, the stronger it's perceived as being and that will be a function of how strong it is and what the trends are. That is, what we are seen as doing that will make us more capable five years from now. The stronger that capability, the stronger that impression, the less necessary it is to use military force to, either to affect a political situation or a world situation, or to cause people to believe that you're strong. You don't have to exercise it if it's visibly strong enough.

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Q: I have been told that there were contingency plans. I am sure they were to take out the hostages and do other things. And the difficulty they ran into was shortage of equipment and particularly of vehicles. Is that a fact?

A: I am not going to talk about any potential or planned or conceived military operations. I just don't think that that's useful.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what the comparative cost of this new smaller sub would be as against the 688?

A: Advertised as about two-thirds and I think that's probably a reasonable estimate.

Q: How many do you expect to build?

A: Oh, I, myself, have never been convinced that the 90 SSN figure that has somehow become enshrined as a requirement is the only possible number. But I would expect that we would go to something like two a year for some years; maybe we could build more than that in some years.

Q: Do you see any need for the AV-8B in FY 81?

A: I don't want to talk about specific budget decisions on individual aircraft programs. I think that the AV-8B is a good thing to have and the question is, is it worth paying the extra price and the price in reduced total numbers of aircraft and there's a difference of view between various components of the DoD on that, in order to get the VTOL capability. It certainly is a less capable aircraft than the F-18; except for one thing, it's capable of operating vertically and a F-18 is not.

Q: I have one questions on the hostages. Actually, it's two parts. There seems to be a new air of optimism —

A: How are the credits divided? (laughter)

Q: — Well, I'll outline that. First, it's the White House gets the first credit and then it's the State Department. Anyway, there seems to be a new feeling of optimism that perhaps these hostages might be released soon and that there is something in the work, some arrangement in the works. That feeling, I believe, exists at the White House and at the State Department. Do you share that feeling? And if so, what has happened? Has there been a message, has there been a —

A: I think that some of the words coming out of Tehran in the last couple of days have been less negative than some of those that have gone before. That is naturally a hopeful sign. I don't place all that much weight on words and we'll just have to see what the actions are. I don't want to express either optimism or pessimism. I only want to say that the existence of — or the enunciation of some less negative words is — I am happy to see that.

Q: Dr. Brown, before we lose you, could I — get back to the last two parts of my last question.

A: Okay, you'll get the last two words.

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Q: The cost and the comparative performance of the new Rapid Deployment Force to what we have now.

A: Well, it's different on every different contingency. But I would expect that over the next five years we would be able to cut the deployment time for the first substantial elements to be deployed in distant places, at least by a factor of two and perhaps more than that. The subsequent build-up also would be completed much more rapidly. So I'm giving you a comparison. It's at least a factor of two in time and as I remember it, more than a factor of two in many cases. The relative cost, the cost mostly is going to go into the lift and the maritime prepositioning, including the extra equipment that you buy to deploy on the maritime prepositioning ships. And we're talking, perhaps, in the order of \$10 billion or so over the next five years. That, you know, that's a very large amount of money. It is however only a modest increase to the total amount of money that we spend on the Rapid Deployment Forces defined as I have defined them, which is all the non-NATO forces. So, that is, I think, as best I can answer the question.

Thank you.

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APPENDIX C

News Conference by
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
At Readiness Command Headquarters
MacDill AFB, Florida
Thursday, December 27, 1979 - 1:30 p.m.

I came here today to the Headquarters of Readiness Command to be brought up to date on the activities of the Command, its exercise program, and also to see how it, Joint Deployment Agency, and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force will fit together and work together.

Inherent in the structure and training of existing U.S. military forces is the ability to deploy across the seas, or over them, to where they may be required to deter or if need be to resist aggression. Indeed the military capability of the United States to project power to distant areas is greater than that of any other nation as has been demonstrated in innumerable exercises, and in several crises with which I'm sure you're familiar.

But the world of the 1980s will be in many ways even more demanding than the decade that we're about to conclude. Therefore, President Carter and I have concluded that we must improve further our ability to deal with crises that are at a long geographical distance from us. To focus this resolve and to improve our capabilities along these lines we have designated as our Rapid Deployment Forces, those forces of all the Services that are not assigned to or earmarked for early deployment to NATO or not now presently deployed to the Republic of Korea.

The Rapid Deployment Forces include, right now, the greater part of the Marine Corps, a number of Army units including but not limited to the 82nd Airborne and 101st Air Assault Divisions, and various air and naval units. Our needs in responding to non-NATO crises center on our ability to move available combat forces over vast distances quickly enough, either to deter conflict or if that's not successful to prevail in conflict.

To assure that we can deploy decisive force swiftly enough we're undertaking two major airlift and sealift enhancement initiatives. First, a force of maritime prepositioning ships that will carry in storage the heavy equipment and supplies, including supplies to sustain them in combat, of three Marine Brigades. The Marines themselves and that portion of their equipment that's not well suited to such prepositioning, in particular, helicopters for example, and fixed-wing air, would then be airlifted to marry-up with their gear and would be ready for combat on short notice. By 1983 we'll have built enough maritime prepositioning ships to carry new heavy equipment for the first of an eventual three Marine Brigade to be so equipped.

The second initiative to make the movement of our Rapid Deployment Forces swifter yet, is a new fleet of large cargo aircraft able to carry heavy, so-called outsized equipment over inter-continental distances. Our objective is pursuing these and related initiatives is to cut the deployment time for the first substantial combat units by at least a factor of two and perhaps by a factor of three from what it now is. The subsequent buildup would also be completed much more rapidly than we can now do it.

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The initiatives that I've mentioned will cost about \$10 billion over the next five years mostly for the lift and maritime prepositioning aircraft and ships. But some of it also for the extra equipment that would be deployed on the prepositioning ships. A joint task force headquarters to be located here at MacDill will do the planning for various contingency uses of the Rapid Deployment Forces. The Joint Task Force Headquarters will be subordinate to Readiness Command. For any given event, the particular force assembled for the purpose could include anything from a single battalion up to a force of the size of an Army Corps.

The Joint Task Force's responsibilities also would include operation of the Rapid Deployment Forces. The commander of the Joint Task Force would become the deployed force's operational commander if a deployment is mounted. In that case he would report either to the Unified and Specified Commander of all U.S. forces in the area or else he could report, under certain circumstances directly to headquarters in Washington.

In view of the unique and demanding responsibilities of this new Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Commander, his selection has been a most careful process in which the Joint Chiefs and I have considered very carefully. I'm happy to announce that the President has approved my recommendation that Major General Paul X. Kelley, USMC, be assigned as Commander. He's sitting right over there.

Coincident with this assignment, General Kelley who is now currently the Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Programs at Marine Headquarters, has been nominated for promotion to lieutenant general.

That is my prepared statement. I'll be glad to take some questions.

Q: Is this a little bit of an extension of the Readiness Command?

A: The task force headquarters itself will be part of the Readiness Command, it will be subordinate to the Readiness Command. It clearly is in line with the kinds of things that the Readiness Command now does. Readiness Command has responsibility for the readiness of forces in the United States, some of which of course are committed to reinforce our units in Europe, in NATO. The rapid deployment forces are not in that category but the category that they are in, that is forces that would deploy elsewhere in the world to a crisis, is also already within the responsibility of the Readiness Command.

The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force headquarters will be concentrating on these other areas. It will, for example, be preparing alternate contingency plans for events that might take place in those parts of the world that would require the deployment of U.S. forces. It would, that is the joint task force headquarters will come up with alternate force packages. It will select units that might be deployed to a particular part of the world in case of such a contingency. It will examine the various deployment routes and working with the Military Airlift and Sealift Commands and the Joint Deployment Agency, will work out ways for the equipment and the people to move very quickly in a contingency. Now it always is the case that a contingency turns out not to be exactly what you've planned for so that the work will not all have been done when the contingency begins but

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the Joint Task Force headquarters will be able to use the work that its already done on these plans, these force packages, these deployment routes and adapt them to a contingency as it arises.

One more thing that will happen with the Joint Task Force headquarters here, it will design and conduct training and joint exercises. The Readiness Command already does that, it does it primarily with two Services -- Army and Air Force. Clearly, the rapid deployment force concept envisages the use of all four Services and indeed the selection of a Marine officer as its first commander highlights that fact.

Q: Not trying to run somebody out of a job, but is the Readiness Command still necessary then?

A: The Readiness Command as I said includes a good many duties that have to do with deployments to NATO or to Korea, neither of which is a prime area for the in fact its not an area for the rapid deployment forces.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you know how soon this task force will be operational here at MacDill and how many individuals will be stationed here just for that purpose?

A: Well, we're working on the details of the table of organization. We're talking about the order of 250 people, maybe somewhat less, for the headquarters itself. We are aiming at a completion of and activation, early in March. We may not quite make that date but there will be pieces of it down here before then.

Q: Mr. Secretary, one of the obvious questions would probably be, has the Iranian situation given any impetus to this type of task force even though it may not have been the reason that this was developed?

A: Well, we've been working on mobility enhancement programs for several years -- on Defense Department organic airlift enhancement, on the enhancement of the civilian reserve air fleet, on sealift enhancement -- and we've actually been spending on the order of several hundred million dollars a year on this. In fiscal 1980, the budget for which was prepared before the Iranian crisis, it was prepared more than a year ago, we included about a half billion dollars in the budget for this kind of thing. In fiscal 1981, it will be more like a billion dollars.

So that there's no doubt what we've seen happening in Iran and in the Middle East, but not only in those areas, there have after all been considerable activity that impacts on the United States and other parts of the world, too. in the Caribbean and Africa. All of these things, I think, remind us that we need to be able to move forces quickly, when and if we decide that military action is needed. Now, in most cases, it won't be. In fact we hope it never will be but there are times when rapid movement of military forces can prevent a war and if it fails to prevent a war there are times when rapid movement of military forces are needed to prevail in a conflict. The Iranian situation is one of a number but a particularly visible one of a number of events that remind us that we need to be able to move forces quickly.

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Q: Now, Mr. Secretary, is this going to be covered under the current Defense budget or do you need more money to deploy these forces?

A: It is included in the fiscal year 1981 budget and the five year Defense program of which I gave a preview to Congress last month, so that it is included in that. It is one reason but by no means the only reason for the President's decision to increase the size of the Defense budget in real terms over the next five years at a rate of about 4 1/2 percent more in real terms each year. So, it's included in what I previewed to Congress last month and it is indeed a substantial portion of that increase.

Q: Mr. Secretary, how much problem are you having getting a volunteer force as far as the Army is concerned and the other Services?

A: We are able to meet the numbers and quality required for the active duty forces so far as accessions are concerned. Our active duty strength is about 1/4 percent below the authorized levels. We have very severe problems in retaining experienced and skilled people, people who've been in anywhere from six years to twelve years or more. Our shift to an all volunteer force is not directly responsible for our shortages or our deficiencies among those skilled and experienced people since the draft never did run to 10 or 12 years service. But we do need therefore to make military service more rewarding. We need to improve compensation. We need to improve working conditions. We need the best people in the country for this purpose.

Q: There are unconfirmed reports today of a coup in Afghanistan with former Prime Minister Babrek Karmel taking over the pro-Soviet backed Government of Amin. Can you confirm whether there has been a coup and if so how it would affect the tension in the Middle East right now?

A: I can't confirm it. There's just been one report from the PARS Radio which is the Iranian Radio Service and if you've watched what happens in Iran, almost every statement is followed by a contradiction or denial. It's clear that there is a great deal of unrest in Afghanistan. It is clear that the Soviets have in recent days greatly expanded their military presence in Afghanistan. It now runs perhaps 10,000 military people including a number of combat units. The Soviets are, by this military intervention, clearly engaged in helping to suppress national and Islamic feelings that have expressed themselves in Afghanistan in terms of instability and conflict. What the details are of what is happening at the top of the Afghan Government, we don't yet know. As you may recall, there was an overthrow of a pro-Soviet Government there by another pro-Soviet Government not very long ago. The so called Taraki regime was overthrown by the Amin regime and in the course of that Taraki died. I think we can expect more of this kind of instability and it's very unfortunate and I think deserving of world condemnation that the Soviets are engaged in fomenting it and in suppressing national feelings.

One more question.

Q: Is the United States contemplating taking counter measures, militarily or otherwise?

A: We do not contemplate military action in an area where we are very unhappy about military intervention by another country, but we certainly protest and we think that international condemnation is in order.

Thank you.

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APPENDIX D

News Briefing by
Lieutenant General P. X. Kelley, USMC
Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
at the Pentagon
Wednesday, June 18, 1980

Spokesman: The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force has been going now for about three and a half months, and we thought we'd come in, bring you up to date and let you have a go at us. General Kelley.

Q: On the record?

A: You know I always speak on the record.

As Milt said, I, of course, as many of you know, have moved to Tampa. I get up here about once every week or two. I thought it might be an opportunity to sort of run over, just for your edification, what we are doing in the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. I am well aware of the fact that there have been and possibly still are and always will continue to be many skeptics of the whole concept. Little did I think when I briefed you all on the maritime prepositioning ships last year and we got into a rather lengthy discussion on the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, that I would become it. But here I am, trying to answer all of those good questions.

I think, first of all, and I mean this very sincerely, and those of you who know me know that I am sincere when I say these kinds of things, that I think that the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force now, after having some five months of personal association, is unquestionably the most innovative military venture that I have personally seen in 30 years of active service. That it's the first time that I know of that we have ever attempted to establish, in peacetime, a full four-Service, joint Headquarters that has the responsibility not only to plan but to jointly train, to exercise, to prepare to deploy, and finally, actually employ, as the combat command, in combat. So I think in that respect it certainly is unique.

Since the first of March, we have organized the headquarters down in Tampa. We're almost 90 percent filled and I can say, without equivocation, that the personnel that we have from all four Services represent, I think, some of the best talent that these Services have to offer. Each one of them was chosen for his or her personal expertise in a particular functional area. So we have resident at Tampa experts in almost any functional area that you want to consider. And that's Military Airlift Command, Strategic Airlift Command, C³ electronic warfare, Navy, Marine Corps, almost any area that you want to talk about, we have expertise in that.

We've done a lot since the first of March, in fact, sometimes I have to look around to see where my shirttail is and see if it's catching up with me. As an example, in April we conducted a major employment command post exercise at Fort Bragg. This was a very large exercise. It included all of the component elements of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and these came from all four Services. So we had an Army component, a Marine component, an Air Force component and a Navy component.

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In May, we conducted what people tell me in the Pentagon was the most extensive Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed crisis action exercise in recent history. We were the ones who did all of the planning, all the field planning, all of the field organization and all of the activities to come up with a final plan, which was then ultimately approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In May, we conducted a very extensive communication exercise, using primarily airborne command and control, at MacDill. And again, this proved to be a very successful exercise, which has led me to the conclusion that today we have the capability of deploying an advanced echelon, which is not only organized, it is now trained and it has the command and control facilities to make it operational.

In June, we conducted a major worldwide JCS-directed deployment exercise, which on paper we deployed the entire Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to the Middle East, and I may say again, while we had some difficulties, which we anticipated, that the results in terms of the procedures and the way we have interfaced with all of the numbers and all of the units of RDJTF, were very encouraging.

In March, I personally visited EUCOM in Germany and had extensive discussions with General Allen on the situation in the Middle East/Persian Gulf.

In April, I was fortunate enough to visit with Admiral Long in PACOM where again, we had extensive discussions on military operations in the Indian Ocean.

I've been fortunate in visiting LANTCOM where we have discussed the use of their forces.

We have visited, or I have visited, the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg to look at their readiness; the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 5th Special Forces Group, and I must tell you that I was immensely impressed.

Last week I spent several days with the Strategic Air Command and the 57th Air Division at Minot, North Dakota. This division, incidentally, has been designated as the RDJTF Strategic Projection Force, and this will consist of a number of B-52 H's. My visit included a six-hour B-52 H flight, and when you take one of those, believe me, at low level, you have to be impressed.

Tomorrow, I'm to visit the 101st Air Assault Division at Campbell. As you well know, this is one of the RDJTF units also. They are in the process of converting to the Black Hawk helicopter, which again will improve their capabilities, I think, immensely.

Friday and Saturday, I'm to visit the Red Flag Exercise out in Nellis. Monday, TAC. Tuesday, a Blue Flag Exercise down in Eglin. Next month out with the Marines at Twenty Palms with their 7th MAB. That's the MAB which has been designated as their Near-Term Maritime Prepositioning MAB. And then next month, we'll visit the 24th Division at Fort Steward, Georgia, which has been now designated in lieu of the Fourth MEC Division, and will be the MEC division that will be assigned to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, effective later this summer.

So, frankly, when I weigh all of the pluses and minuses that I have seen, I have to say, in all honesty, that my reaction thus far to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is not skeptical. In fact, it's on the upbeat side. I think any of you who have gone out and visited the young troops, the young officers, and

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the people who are part of these units, will share my view that morale, generally speaking, is very high.

Even though I think we all recognize that there are some significant problems, we are taking some major steps. I think one of the advantages, the great advantages of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, aside from the fact that it did give us a headquarters to command and control the elements of four Services, is the fact that it's allowed one headquarters to focus on the problems of deployment. So we focus not only on the problems inherent in strategic airlift but also strategic sealift and prepositioning, which is sort of the triad of any successful future venture toward rapid deployment.

I think sometimes we are guilty of self-flagellation in that we do not look at the current assets we have. And the current assets are many, as I mentioned to many of you before — the 70 C-5's, the 234 C-141's and the 490 C-130's. If you add that into the 213 cargo aircraft and 248 passenger aircraft that we have in CRAF Stage 3, which we could get available to us if the President and the Congress so agreed, in 48 hours, you've got a pretty significant capability.

But we have recognized the problems and we are taking steps to improve them. It's not just equipment, however, it's a state of mind. One of the things that the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps units are doing is taking a hard look at their tables of equipment, their equipment lists. We're pruning those down dramatically, taking only those things into combat that we actually require to move, shoot or communicate. There will be no luxury items that will be taken aboard the first several weeks of precious strategic airlift.

We are very encouraged by the action of the Senate Armed Services Committee in the SL-7's. That's not to say we don't think we have a fairly decent capability today. But this will certainly help us if we can get them converted. They can be stationed in someplace like Savannah, Georgia, could help us move the 24th MEC Division. And eight of those ships converted could move a mechanized division, plus an armored brigade, to include 87 percent of their combat service support into the Persian Gulf in some 15 to 18 days. And this includes load and offload.

You all have read about the Near-Term Maritime Prepositioning Ships, and I've discussed with you before, a lot of you, the more mature maritime prepositioning concept. We're also encouraged that the CX did not die in Congress, that it's still alive, possibly not as well as we would like to see it. But it's alive. Also, it appears that the PD-214, now known as the C-8 Sealifter, which is the more mature ship for the Marines, will be in pretty good shape.

We've got problems. Over the years, you've heard the buzz words of the tooth to tail ratio. This was kind of the catchword of the 1970's and I'm the first to admit that I think in our overzealous movement we probably cut out too much of our tail. We've got sharp teeth, but now we need to take a look at the tail once more, and build that up to a level where it can support all of the combat units that we have in the RDJTF. Right now that would be difficult, if we did not call up significant numbers of reserve forces.

We believe that for a large-scale conflict, involving the RDJTF, a 50,000-man reserve callup is not sufficient and that we need at least double that to support our operations, if you're going to employ the entire RDJTF.

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We believe our weakest link right now is interoperability and connectivity to command and control between all of the four Services. We will have a joint headquarters with four Services under us. We will be required to communicate not only to them, but also to the next higher echelon, which could be a Commander-in-Chief of a Unified Command or, in all likelihood, would be the National Command Authority here in Washington.

We have discovered, not that we didn't know it, but we've discovered that we've got to move ahead now, and very rapidly, in improving our capability to produce potable water, that we are focused on the Middle East/Persian Gulf and water can be one of our most critical shortfalls. So the Services have identified and are now moving out in their programs, which will overcome this shortfall.

On balance, with all of that said, I still think we have come an awfully long way. We still have a long way to go. But I think we are guilty of underestimating our current capabilities. We've got a lot of reasons to think on the positive side. The trouble with the negative thinkers is all too often they never give me a real-time solution to the problem.

So, speaking as one individual, I think that we in the military have to think in a positive vein. We hope that other people think positively with us. If our friends don't think we're positive, they won't be our friends very long. If our enemies don't think we're positive, they'll be even more formidable enemies. If our neutrals don't think we're positive, then they probably won't be our neutrals much longer. And last of all, and most insidiously, if our own troops don't think we're positive, then we might as well give up.

I think that one of my jobs is to put together this force, with an attitude that we can do the job and I am convinced that we can. I'm convinced also with the utility of a pre-emptive strategy — and a pre-emptive strategy to me means that we get forces into an area rapidly, irrespective of the size, because once you get a force into an area that is not occupied by the other guy, then you have changed the whole calculus of the crisis, and he must react to you, and you not to him. And that is a significantly different problem, particularly for the Soviets.

If he has to react to you and your presence in the area, he's got a problem of a different magnitude. If you've got to react to his presence, then, of course, the big problems are on your side.

So with that said, I'm very happy now to — I probably spoke a little longer than I had anticipated — but I'm very happy to answer any questions.

Q: Do you draw on any lessons at all from the attempted rescue mission? Does that have any bearing on the sort of thing you're trying to do?

A: Don, as you know, we were not at all involved in the attempted rescue mission. That's not our job. So we weren't involved in any of the planning. We have learned a lot of lessons from the communication aspects. The rescue team built up an extensive and extremely capable command and control network. We are looking into that. Other than that, that was strictly a covert operation that was at a much lower order of magnitude, and a different thrust and meaning and mission than we would be involved in. So there will be some peripheral benefits that will come out of it, but there are no direct benefits of any meaningful size.

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Q: How large of a pre-emptive force do you think, from a practical standpoint, would represent the kind of a problem that you outlined for the Russians? I mean, putting a brigade in there in four to five days, which is what General Warner has testified, and I assume you agree with, would that constitute enough of a deterrent?

A: Well, that's kind of a question of, I'm not being flippant about it, but how high is up. If you, as an example, put an 82nd Airborne Division battalion, or say a brigade, we could get the lead elements incidentally of a battalion there in something on the magnitude of the order of 48 hours. If you put them in an airfield, we'll say in the vicinity of Abadan in Iran, if you had some indications that the Soviets were going to conduct an airborne assault in that area, it's not the question of the force ratios or the force balance or the force asymmetries, those are all things we get hung up on. It's a question then, and if you can do it in sufficient time so the Soviet commander can bow out gracefully, then you've caused a significant problem for him. It's just not a simple air-landed movement into an airfield. It then involves a direct military confrontation with the United States, irrespective of the size.

Q: Where were those places, Abadan?

A: Abadan, Charlie, which is up, you know, at the head of the Persian Gulf.

Q: I thought you mentioned another one. Was that the only one you mentioned?

A: Abadan is what I'm talking about. In view of the vital Khuzestan oil fields. That's a theoretical --

Q: Your view is that this would be enough to give the Soviets pause and make them think twice. What would prevent them from isolating and -- I think these are real questions, these are not theoretical questions. I've heard this theory expressed before by Mr. Komer and others on the Hill, that the presence of any size U.S. force would serve its purpose. I wonder whether or not the Russians couldn't get around that by simply putting a large force in elsewhere, say in Iran, and in fact making the position of that small force of yours untenable, so that you, in fact, would have to pull out, rather than they having to -- (inaudible) second thoughts.

A: Without getting into specific numbers and scenarios, let me say that if you were to give me -- and this is sort of a pet peeve of mine -- for some reason, and I'm not sure exactly what it is, but for one reason or another, everyone always seems to have the U.S. serviceman sitting at the edge of his foxhole, smoking marijuana or eating Big Macs or doing something like that, while the Soviet is leaning forward in his and he's ready to go to war. I don't subscribe to that thesis. If you give me the same amount of time to deploy my force, as you give the Soviets to build up his Category 2 and Category 3 divisions to mobilize and move his force in that geographical area, then I'll say I can give you a very significant force in that area, in that period of time. And that will give him pause to reflect.

Q: That's a big if, though, isn't it?

A: No, I don't think it's a big if at all.

Q: Given the geography?

A: Given the geography --

Q: He has an Airborne Division doesn't he up there in the Trans Caucuses? He also has tactical air that could presumably come in and ...

A: At the limits of that range. He has an airborne division.

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Q: How about the limits of our range?

A: He has an airborne division, which is the only Category I division he has in the whole area. He's got 1400 miles of some of the most tortuous terrain in the world to traverse, through the Zagros Mountains. He's got inhospitable local population. He would have the Kurds on his flank. His problems are not simple, as compared to ours. In a geographic asymmetry, he certainly has an advantage, and there's no question about that. We have to go 7,000 miles and he has to move 1400 kilometers.

Q: Kilometers or miles?

A: Translate that into about — what's 1400 kilometers?

Q: About 1,000 miles.

A: Yes, about 1,000 miles. From Joppa to Abadan would be about 1,000 miles — 1400 kilometers.

Q: There's been various figures given of the size of the force you're talking about. When you talk about the rapid deployment forces, how big is it? Can you put a number out?

A: This is kind of a misunderstanding — there is not an upward number, upper limit on the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Just like NATO has, we have certain forces that are designated priority to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. As you are well aware, that includes over three Army divisions. It includes a Marine amphibious force. It includes a number of carrier battle groups, a number of P-3 squadrons. It includes a number of Air Force tactical fighter wings. That's sort of the baseline designated force. That's the force that we will be working with on a day-to-day basis. But for those contingencies that require a larger force, that will be then at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the National Command Authority on how large that force would be. There's no upper limit to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force capability.

Q: How big is this force that you've just described?

A: In terms of numbers? We're talking several hundred thousand people.

Q: And, of those, how many are people who actually would be on the scene, say, if you're talking about putting a force into someplace in the other part of the world, how many of these would actually arrive there?

A: Well, if you're talking about the whole Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and you give us time to deploy the force, we're talking about the whole force. These are not rear echelon people who are sitting back in the States. These are deployable people.

Q: Some will be on ships and so on?

A: Oh, yes.

Q: I'm talking about troops (inaudible) —

A: Troops on the ground, again, we're getting into — I almost wouldn't rather — I'd rather not speculate. You can probably add up yourself, you've got roughly 20,000 people in an Army division and you've got 50,000 Marines in a MAE, so you can sort of add that up yourself, plus all the tactical fighter wings. We're talking about a very sizeable force.

Q: General, I'm going to (inaudible) on this baseline force. The Marine element of that is —

A: Marine Amphibious Force.

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Q: Which is a division size?

A: It's roughly a 50,000-man division-wing team. It's an air-ground task force. So it's a Marine division and a wing.

Q: General, on this pre-emptive strategy, I've been trying to run quickly through my mind, and I can't remember anytime in modern American history where the Americans have taken ground forces into a potential area of conflict first. We have always been the reactors to things. Has the President signed off on this strategy? And secondly, how do you square this with going to Congress, the War Powers Act, and things like that, where speed is going to be of the essence to you, but you have a political constraint behind you?

A: I think what you're asking are some rather, almost hypothetical questions, in a sense, but let try to --

Q: I don't think they're hypothetical. You think of what happened after the Iranian rescue mission. The first thing that ran up the flagpole was the War Powers Act.

A: I don't think right now, in my opinion, there is an area in the world that is as critical to Western civilization as the Middle East/Persian Gulf. It represents, as you know, 13 percent of our oil, 45 percent of the Germans and 75 percent of the French and Japanese. I do not personally see how, if we lost that, we could not have absolutely catastrophic results in NATO and with the Alliance. And I think to draw lessons or parallels from history really are not totally germane in this case, because I think that the importance of the Persian Gulf to the future well-being of our Nation and future generations is so significant that I do believe it will be recognized, not only by the National Command Authority -- it already has been by him -- but also by the Congress.

Q: The President has signed off on this then? This is established policy of the --

A: The President has said he will do everything, everything necessary to keep Middle East/Persian Gulf oil flowing. That's what he said. To say that he personally has endorsed this would not be a true statement. He has not ruled it out. I don't know whether he's endorsed it. He and I have never discussed it.

Q: Well, the Administration support of the whole idea or concept seems to me to carry with it the implicit support of such (inaudible) what I --

Q: It doesn't, that's just the thing that bothers me.

A: What you're saying is, and when I said, hypothetical. probably emotional would be a better -- you're asking for a decision now that will have to be made based on some very, very tight circumstances at the time and --

Q: You are raising the possibility, General, of pre-emptive strike or pre-emptive strategy on the ground is to revolutionize the history of American ground warfare. Can you recall a time that we have ever put ground troops in first, even when we've been warned?

A: Oh, I would say if you probably went back to the early stages of our country on the Barbary Coast and other places you would find some incidents where we have done this, yes. If you're talking about recent times, no. I can't think of any offhand.

(Break in tape.)

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Q: I think you've raised something here that I hadn't heard before and I think it's got enormous consequences, given the immediate past history, say, of Vietnam and the politics of Vietnam in this country, and Congress and so forth. I'm not quarreling with the military strategy of it. I'm talking about the political military aspects of it.

Q: Except for the terminology, wasn't this very scenario laid out by Komer and to some extent Brown, in their testimony?

A: Secretary Brown? I don't recall his. I know Ambassador Komer has laid out that same type of strategy.

Q: Brown has done it in posture statements and in a very long speech on getting there first with the least.

Q: General, could I ask a meat-and-potatoes type question which may not seem important to some of the big thinkers, but it is to me. The President has authority under the law to call up 50,000 reserves, without going to Congress, in an emergency. And you say you would need to double that?

A: We feel now after our experience and what we would need in terms of reserve forces from all four Services, these include Military Airlift Command crews, communications support elements from the National Guard Reserve, that we feel that the number more closely approximates 100,000.

Q: Are you recommending that Congress be asked to grant this type of legislative authority?

A: (Procedural comments deleted) I believe there is some legislation that's pending right now in the White House, but I'm not sure of the status of it, that does make such a recommendation. (Procedural comments deleted)

Q: That 100,000 would go together with deploying 200,000 RDF troops?

A: That 100,000, George, is additive. That's over and above the force list that we have for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

Q: Well, would they stay here for reserve or would they go over to Country X?

A: It would depend on their mission. There would be MAC crews. There would be — what do they call those guys that do all the material handling from MAC —

Voice: LC's.

General Kelley: LC's that would be deployed to other countries.

Q: So 100,000 on top of 200,000?

A: Not necessarily all of those would deploy, George.

Q: Who are the 200,000?

A: When you add it all up, Charlie, you are going to come to a figure that sort of starts pushing around 200,000. That's an approximation.

Q: I thought you said several hundred thousand.

A: Well, several hundred thousand.

Q: Could you just give that arithmetic again?

A: No, ma'am.

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Q: Why not?

A: You're getting down into very specifics on that. I've already given you about as much as we can give you. You've got over three divisions in the Army. You've got a 50,000-man Marine Amphibious Force. You've got several carrier battle groups. You've got a number of tactical fighter wings, plus a host of all sorts of support personnel. But figures start pushing around 200,000. I think we're getting hung up on specific numbers, and I don't think that's germane to the issue.

Q: Let's say the President wanted you for whatever reason to establish a presence at the head of the Persian Gulf, let's say Abadan, just for purposes of illustration. What advantages and disadvantages in comparison do the Russians have? And at what point in time do the lines cross, where you could see yourself having advantages over them?

A: Oh, boy, George, I wouldn't even attempt to answer that question without sitting down with you for about eight hours. That would depend on the world situation, the focus of their attention, whether they felt some kind of a threat in Eastern Europe, whether or not we felt some kind of a threat in Eastern Europe --

Q: Let's put it this way. What advantages and disadvantages do you have and the Russians have in getting 50,000 men to Abadan in two weeks? They obviously have TAC air. They have a border. You've got some things they don't have. Can you give us any kind of feel for (inaudible)?

A: I'm not sure, George, I understand the question. I think we're getting down into a specific scenario and I'm one that doesn't really get hung up on force balances and force asymmetries, like some people do.

Q: Let me put it this way. The object of the question is to find out when we're going to start approaching the Soviet's capability of establishing a presence in the Middle East.

A: George, let me put it this way. If the Soviets wanted to upgrade, say, 40 or 50 Category 2 and 3 divisions, and move them down through Iran, and draw down forces in other parts of the world to do that, then there's no way in God's world that we're going to have the kind of force to cope with that.

Q: Well, what I'm getting at is, there's been talk in this building and on the Hill, come 1983 we'll have a significant capability for the RDF.

A: Well, I think what happened on that -- I take a little heat for that one. I think that if anybody is to blame, it came almost from the press conference that I had in December when I was talking about the first MAB being ready to go with new ships in 1983. And that's where the misnomer came. That was talking about a specific program, which was the Maritime Prepositioning Program, with a specific number of ships, and really, at that time, had nothing to do with the 2DJTF as such. To say we don't have a capability today just ignores all of the aircraft and all of the ships and all of the things that we have to move a combat force into a particular geographical area.

Q: General, you don't mention the heavy lift shortfall, which no matter how optimistic spin you may put on it, is a continuing problem which will bear on the effectiveness of the kind of force you put in there against the kind of force the Russians put in.

A: The more we can improve upon our strategic airlift and improve upon our strategic sealift, the more basing rights we could get in the Middle East/Persian Gulf area to preposition equipment, all of those things have a profound impact on your ability to move forces rapidly. As an example, one C-4 break bulk ship, loaded with ammunition, equates to 500 C-141 sorties. That's a large number of sorties if you could preposition one break bulk ammunition ship.

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So there are a lot of things that you can do in the interim between now and the time we get the full-blown maritime prepositioning ships, between now and the time we hopefully get the CX, and between now and the time we enhance our strategic sealift with ships like the SL-7.

Q: What kind of shape are you in for overflight rights and refueling rights and all the sorts of things you're going to need to get your ammunition and people from here to there?

A: That's almost a day to day problem, Don. A number of countries don't want to give you long-standing overflight rights that are sort of in perpetuity. They like to hold the string out for the particular crisis. But let me say this, that I think at that stage of the game, when we're required to move massive forces into the Middle East/Persian Gulf, I just cannot personally anticipate that any country there will not see the threat to their security as clearly as we see it, and I just can't see that we would be denied the overflight rights.

Q: Is this something that you or State or somebody is working on?

A: It's a constant process, Don. It's not one that you go out to a particular country and you get a blanket clearance in perpetuity for overflight or basing rights. It's one of those things that happens on a case by case basis. And sovereign countries like to keep it that way.

Q: How does this outfit of yours fit into the Readiness Command?

A: Right now, Charlie, we're under the operational command of USCINCPAC.

Q: Well, is there any difference? I was just reading the Atlantic Command's assigned forces. I was just reading the Readiness Command's assigned forces, and I just heard yours. It seems to me they're all the same, except for the Atlantic Fleet. You haven't quite got that yet but I dare say you will.

A: We'll get a pretty healthy fan club. (laughter)

No, they're not. Readiness Command has some very distinct missions. It, of course, has the defense of North America, which is quite a large mission. It's got the reinforcement of NATO. It's got the Joint Deployment Agency, which is the new agency it picked up last year, and USCINCPAC wears two hats. He's now the Director of the Joint Deployment Agency. And that's the Agency that pulls together all of the transportation operating authorities and their capabilities — that's MAC, MIMC — the Military Transportation Management Command, and MSC, the Military Sealift Command. He works with those in developing the flow — and this is extremely important to us — in developing the flow that's necessary to get your forces in the area as rapidly as possible.

For instance, there's a cutoff line somewhere where it's more, when you can go more rapidly by going by ship, for instance, in a mechanized infantry division, right now. That by the time you could flow that in aircraft, your time would be extremely long and it might be easier to get the whole unit there at once by ship, by leaving early in the game and embarking aboard ship and disembarking in a port of debarkation.

Q: You work for the Readiness Commander, or is he the one you report to?

A: It's an interesting command arrangement. Yes, in terms of peacetime, we are a major subordinate command under the operational command of Readiness Command.

Q: General, Readiness Command is son of Strike Command. Strike Command was created in the early 1960's, partially, I think, for international political impact, and its charter included, it seemed to me, almost the identical things that you're supposed to be doing. You said yours was the first command set up to do these various

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things as well as to lead command forces in the field. Strike also had some command functions in the field. We used to call them MEAFSA.

A: No, that was a geographical area, Middle East South of the Sahara.

Q: Didn't they also have, in broad form and in specific area, all the functions that your task force —

A: First of all, Strike COM was always two Services — Army and Air Force. It never really had the Navy and the Marine Corps. That was LANTCOM. Now we've got four Services tied up under one headquarters. So that's a significant difference. Strike COM as Strike COM was not a deployable headquarters that was meant to actually deploy and employ forces in the field.

Q: General, you referred a couple of minutes ago to going in with the invitation of the host country. Would this always and invariably be the case, or might there be circumstances, for example, protecting the Iranian oil fields, where there wouldn't be an explicit invitation, in fact, there might not even be any desire on the part of the host country?

A: Well, the only answer, you know, you're getting into some military political questions. The only answer one can give to that is that we will go into any country under circumstances when it's at the direction of the President, by and with the consent of the Congress. I can't give you any better answer than that.

Q: How soon are your ships going to be ready, the ones that are at Wilmington?

A: They're sailing next month. July. They should be in the Indian Ocean, I think, by mid-July.

Q: Are you going to bring some Marines over to test out how quickly they could marry up?

A: We're working that problem right now, Don, in working a flow sequence, for the Marines. They're working it right now at Twenty-Nine Palms, to work up some training exercises where we can actually work the Marines with their ships.

Q: I wonder how you would get permission for a realistic scenario for them to do this in the Indian Ocean (inaudible)

A: It would depend on the port, obviously. If it's in a friendly port, where we can just use it as a routine training exercise, there's no problem. Did you have a specific question on it?

Q: Yes. Actually what I had in mind all along is the next step beyond placing seven prepositioned ships somewhere near Diego Garcia with the equipment for 12,000 Marines, and then the question in my mind, looking at the seemingly obvious reluctance of Oman and Somalis, and maybe even Kenya, to allowing anything more than quote "access," I was wondering how you would then in a practical sense, marry up your Marines flown from say the United States with that equipment in the near term? And I'm talking about (inaudible)

A: For a training exercise? Are you talking about for an operational? For operational you still have to have the invitation of that host nation to do that. For a training exercise, I can do it in any number of places. I can do it in Northern Australia. I can do it in Subic Bay. I can do it anywhere. But for an actual operation, this would have to be with the invitation of a host nation.

Q: And that seems to me an element that has not yet been addressed, at least as far as I'm aware, that we would at this point be assured that there's some place along that critical area where we could do that actual marrying up. You've got an island 2300 miles from the Straits of Hormuz.

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A: Again, it's funny how attitudes do change when people are put under tremendous duress, that they would more than welcome the opportunity to have a 12,000-Marine brigade.

Q: Can I get very straight, just before we leave it on this reserves? You figure you need 100,000 reserves to back up a sizable deployment of the RDF. Now, would those 100,000 be drill units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, be active Reserves, or are these going to be the IRR, so every guy in America doesn't call up the newspapers and say am I going to be called up? In other words, what units are you talking about and how long would they be kept on active duty? The current limitation is 90 days, I believe, isn't it?

A: George, the list is as long as your arm. Right. It's 90 days. And to say how long they would be called up, I can't even give you a decent answer on that one. We feel that we have identified a requirement for — this is primarily Reserve units, it's not IRR, primarily Reserve and National Guard Units that could approach a number approximating the 50,000 — i.e., it could approach roughly 100,000 people.

Q: And not any IRR? These will all be ready Reserve guys attached to drill units, right?

A: Well, as you well know, with the IRR, some people pulled out of the IRR to go into units. But primarily we're talking at the unit level and not at the individual level.

Q: In all four Services?

A: In all four Services.

Q: General, you've been talking here about the progress you've made since January or whatever. I remember an unnamed senior official standing where you are now, I think it was along about December or January, and you were sitting over where Milt is and gave us a rundown of what could be done then. Would you compare that with what you think you can do now, rather specifically, in areas of progress?

A: I'd rather not, to be very candid about it. I think we've come a significantly long way and I think that was his privilege in saying that. That would be much like you asking my Soviet counterpart if he was standing here, how long would it take to move his rapid deployment force, and you were a member of TASS, and I think you'd probably be locked up, but that's beside the point. The simple point is that I think now, to get into those kinds of numbers where we have come to this point, and to make them part of the public record, I think is manifestly wrong to our national strategy. I don't even think it's germane to the issue, frankly. You can speculate all you want, but I don't think it's germane.

Q: What then, is your biggest problem? I mean, you talk about hardware and communications, so forth. What is your biggest priority to fix? You talk about morale, too.

A: Our biggest problem comes in the mobility side. In other words, to make us more rapid, hopefully, you don't think we're not rapid. To make us more rapid, we do need all of those enhancements in the strategic mobility side, to include the prepositioning. That's the biggest problem. Morale, in the sense of —

Q: Well, you said it. Take my word for it. You said that morale was generally very good, but although you have some significant problems.

A: Well, no. I'm sorry. I'm glad you brought that up. Morale is very good. And then I had a period and I closed out that sentence and paragraph. Then I said, now we have some significant problems, which I went into.

Q: I don't understand how — you talk about a strategic projection force. How does that fit in with what you're doing?

A: You mean the SAC Strategic Projection Force?

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Q: Yes. You talked about the B-52 H's. Wouldn't they go in first and clear -- how does it work?

A: You could use the B-52 H's in a conventional mode, with iron bombs, and they can go in and attack any number of troops. They can attack billeting areas, they can attack runways, they can attack taxiways, airfields, any good area target. They can attack with devastating effectiveness.

Q: But then, if they do do this, and you're 48 hours behind, there seems to me there's a lag in there.

A: Well, what you're trying to do is to wrap into one scenario. I didn't mean to infer that we would be 48 hours behind. That would be part of the force that would be in the area. Certainly SAC can deploy very rapidly. So we would be in the area, and the Strategic Projection Force, which is a part of SAC, but a part that's designated now to support the RDJTF, would be in support.

Q: How many B-52's do you have?

A: That's classified.

Q: But why are they using H's rather than D's for this kind of job?

A: The H has a much better capability for low-level penetration, and what we hope to do is ultimately modify the bird to carry the large numbers of iron bombs.

Q: Do tactical nukes look attractive for deployment?

A: I wouldn't touch that with a ten-foot pole.

Q: Aren't those B-52's cruise missile-carrying airplanes, the B-52 H's? What happens if there's a big nuclear crisis going on and we need these airplanes for that job?

A: Then the priority of effort goes as the National Command Authority dictates. You know, that may sound like a flippant answer, but that's the way it goes.

Q: Are you looking at other parts of the world in drawing your plans, besides the Middle East now, are you drawing plans for --

A: While our primary focus, Don, is on the Middle East/Persian Gulf, we consider that to be probably the critical area, but that does not rule out the fact that we should and must look at other areas that we see as potential trouble spots or crisis areas.

Q: Have you done it yet or are you still (inaudible)?

A: Yes, we have.

Q: On your May Airborne Command and Control exercise, can you give us some more details on that and tell us how it related to the lessons you learned from the Iranian rescue thing? You said the communications, there were some good things to learn from that.

A: There was no relationship to that. I said the thing that we learned from the Iranian rescue operation is the availability of some very fine items of command and control hardware, particularly communications equipment. That had nothing to do with the communication exercise that we conducted in May, which was a communication exercise involving our advanced echelon of the RDJTF, which is that echelon that would go in initially to provide the command and control facilities for the RDJTF. That was an extensive exercise, using all types of aerial platforms that we know that are available, and was immensely successful.

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Q: You've talked about how large the Rapid Deployment Force might be. How small might it be before it drops back into a commando-type raid operation which you people wouldn't be involved in?

A: It can go anywhere from a battalion to a multi-corps. And an example of that is, if you have a battalion that is moving into a sensitive area, a crisis area, and you want to have follow-on or you think you may have requirement for follow-on forces, then I've got to have an advanced echelon in there to determine the requirements. So, therefore, it wouldn't be the full-blown RDTF Headquarters but it would be sufficient people to give me a command and control element.

Q: Is the Marine Division an assigned one or could it be any one of the three?

A: The Marine Amphibious Force, Charlie, can be any one of the three.

Q: These other areas that you're looking at, do they include — can you tell us what they are? Do they include the Caribbean, or Northeast Asia, or —

A: Don, they're worldwide.

Q: Why did you switch from the 4th Division to the 24th?

A: Geographical location, primarily. The 24th is going to be near a port.

Q: You just ran an exercise with them.

A: 24th? Yes. Ship-loading exercise.

Q: How did that go?

A: Very successful. Lots of problems. You know, we lose our expertise over the years just in loading ships — chalking and tie downs and all those things, but the problems are identified and I think it was an immense success.

Q: You called the 24th a mechanized division. Is it?

A: Yes. It is now.

Q: How long has that been —

A: It's just converting, Charlie. And it won't be converted until 1 October. Fully converted.

Q: I want to pursue this Marine Amphibious Force, because if it's any one of the Marine Divisions — if you don't mind putting your Marine Corps hat on for a moment — the Marine Corps has got Scandinavian missions or would like to think it has Central European missions, it's got Southern Flank missions. And I don't see how you could have a MAF assigned or earmarked for your operation, unless you know which one it is. Suppose you wind up with one that's got all the cold weather gear?

A: But you know, they're not standing in the barracks with their cold weather gear on. What we're saying is that for each contingency plan, Charlie, that we will have forces, Marine forces assigned to support that contingency plan. Now, example, the Marine amphibious unit that deploys periodically into the Indian Ocean, that may in one time come from the East Coast, another time come from Okinawa, and another time even come from the West Coast. That's what we are saying. We won't know until the time of actual commitment, the actual flag that will be a part of the RDTF.

Q: But any given time there will be an assigned MAF?

A: Yes. Absolutely. There's one MAF available to me for planning purposes.

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Q: General, did I understand you to say that you would have a problem in what you would need in the way of Reserves for any rapid deployment?

A: Well, the problem is we would like to up the ante in the Reserve callup and go from 50,000 to roughly 100,000.

Q: You don't anticipate a problem in raising them, since there is a shortfall of Reservists?

A: There will be obvious shortfalls of capabilities that each unit will have, but I don't anticipate a major shortfall.

Q: Is the Reserve where the correction of the tooth to tail imbalance comes in, is that what you're thinking of?

A: The Reserves can provide us with a tremendous capability to help us correct that.

Q: General, is the concept of having a kind of a grab-bag of forces that could be assigned to the unified and specified commanders in various parts of the world where they have something, some need to use them, has that been changed so that instead your headquarters would actually employ these forces, and not the, say the Commander in the Pacific or the Commander in Europe?

A: That would almost certainly depend upon the situation. Needless to say, there are areas in the world that we will operate that belong to another unified commander. Has to be. Now, whether or not that will be carved out and given directly to the Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force or whether or not that will be still part of that unified commander's responsibility, remains to be seen, depending upon the particular circumstances in the geographical location. It's a fuzzy answer, but that's the answer.

Q: What are you all doing about the water situation? One of the seven ships is loaded with nine million gallons of it, and you said the Services were moving ahead on curing this problem. What is it desalinization?

A: They're working on every aspect that you can conceivably think of. They have now a Water Action Group. Not a study group. A water Action Group.

Q: A WAG?

A: A WAG, thank you. (Laughter)

Q: That used to have another meaning.

A: Thank you, Charlie. They're looking at desalinization. They're looking at well digging. They're looking at the reverse osmosis machine, which is --

Q: I don't even want to know what that is. (Laughter.)

A: It's probably the most revolutionary of all.

Q: Oh, really?

A: And they're looking at every conceivable way that we can provide that essential water to the troops.

Q: You save yourself one freighter then, is what it amounts to, if you do get the (inaudible).

A: Well, we're making presumption that there's no water -- first of all, how much water do you have, you have to tell me where we are, and you're making a presumption that's not available.

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Q: Well, let's say for the 1800-man Marine Amphibious Group. How long can they last on the water that you have?

A: For the 12,000-man MAB, take roughly 10 gallons per man, per day and 12,000, you get nine million gallons aboard ships, and you can do the arithmetic.

Press: Thank you very much.

General Kelley: Thanks.

~~END~~

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APPENDIX E

Remarks Prepared for Delivery by
Lieutenant General Paul X. Kelley, USMC
Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
Before National Security Commission
The American Legion,
Boston, Massachusetts
August 16, 1980

On the edge of the Stony Brook Reservation, not too many miles from where we are right now, sits a magnificent playing field--football, baseball, track, soccer--day or night--it has it all. This field is named in honor of a great American, a man who had been a very active and well known legionnaire in this area until he died in the service of his country during World War II.

This great legionnaire had a profound impact on the lives of everyone with whom he came in contact. Personally, I would not be standing here today were it not for him! The field is named in the honor of Major (b)(6) Major (b)(6) a proud legionnaire, was my father.

So you see, my ties with the American Legion are deep and remain solid. For this reason, and the fact that I have unswerving respect for the basic ideals you represent, I was deeply honored at your invitation to be with you today.

When I was nominated last December to be the first Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, I had very mixed emotions. On the one hand, I have spent an abnormal number of years in assignments away from the Marine Corps--two tours with the Navy, one of which was with a Marine detachment aboard a heavy cruiser; a tour with the Army as the Senior Marine Corps Representative at the U.S. Army Infantry School; a tour with the Air Force as a student at the Air War College; a tour with the Royal Marines; and a tour with the Joint Chiefs of Staff just prior to my selection to Brigadier General. On the other hand, the challenge of organizing such a force for the first time in the history of our country was overwhelming. I can say, in all honesty, I have not experienced a dull moment since the 14th of January.

The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, or RDJTF as we call it, provides a new and vital dimension to the capabilities of our general purpose forces.

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In my view, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force transmits a strong and powerful signal:

--To the Soviets it says that we will not tolerate military adventurism. Such threats to our friends and allies may constitute an assault on the vital interests of the United States, and when they do, we have a military capability to respond.

--To our friends and allies, it says we are indeed a nation to be reckoned with. We are not a "paper tiger."

--To our young men and women in our Armed Forces, it says that we have confidence in your ability under any and all circumstances to do the job.

--And, finally, to the American public it says that we, as a nation, have not forgotten our friends and allies, and that we have recognized the importance to the United States of the developing regions of the world.

As you well know, since the end of World War II the United States has undertaken extraordinary measures to bolster the European alliance. In my judgment, this has been the proper course, even though we might argue and debate on "how much is enough."

During the last decade and a half, however, we have seen the Soviets developing a more global perspective in their military capabilities, especially in Africa and Southwest Asia. In simple language, then, the RDJTF is intended to counterbalance these capabilities--in other words, to deter Soviet aggression and to promote stability in these developing regions of the world.

As you well know, Soviet intervention, through proxies in Angola and Ethiopia, or directly in the case of Afghanistan, has emerged as a new and disturbing threat. We, as a nation, cannot ignore the new Soviet overseas military capabilities, or the string of Soviet bases and forces to the north of Turkey, Iran and (now) Pakistan. They call for new and effective U.S. responses, and the Rapid Deployment Force is one such response.

I should pause here for a moment, however, to emphasize that the concept of a Rapid Deployment Force is not so new. It had, as its genesis, a study conducted in 1977. This study highlighted the need for a four-Service force which could deploy rapidly for contingencies outside NATO and Korea. With the emphasis at the time being focused primarily on bolstering NATO, the creation of such a force was placed logically on the "back burner." There is no doubt that events last year in the Middle East "energized the system," and, consequently, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was activated on March first of this year.

There are many misconceptions of the RDJTF, so let me, as the Commander, put some of it in proper perspective.

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First, basically we are a global force designed to cope with contingencies outside NATO and Korea. Due to events in the Middle East and the critical importance of the Persian Gulf, however, it is quite natural that this region captures much of our attention.

The President in his State of the Union speech made clear the United States' determination to respond to threats on our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region. He said that any attempt by outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and that any such assault will be repelled by any means necessary--including military force.

The United States is heavily dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf area. 13 percent of the oil consumed in the United States comes from the Persian Gulf.

Our allies depend even more heavily on it. Germany, for example, gets 45 percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf. Japan and France both import three-fourths of their oil from the region.

If that oil were not available, the effect on the economies of Western Nations and Japan would be catastrophic.

Even if we could find a way to eliminate our dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf, ~~our security problems wouldn't be solved~~. Our security is tied directly and irrevocably to that of our allies and friends. As long as they are dependent, so are we.

Furthermore, we are strongly concerned with the security of our friends in the region regardless of oil. We are vitally interested in the independence of sovereign states and their freedom from Soviet domination. They are principally responsible for stability and security in the region. But they cannot singularly or together stand up to a Soviet threat. Only the United States can play this role.

There are a number of threats to the security of the Persian Gulf. But the most serious of them is the Soviet Union's military power--and the will the Soviet Union has shown to use that power as an aggressive instrument of national power.

The best defense against Soviet aggression in the Persian Gulf is a network of strong, independent and stable nations. Collective security, in other words. That is the responsibility of the nations of the region, but it is one the United States is prepared to assist in--diplomatically, economically, and, if necessary, militarily.

The RDJTF can buttress collective security, although I want you to know that our military effort is but a part of a broader effort which includes a range of important diplomatic and economic initiatives. In the aggregate, these are designed to protect the

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vital interests of the United States, its friends and its allies in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

With that said, it becomes obvious that the RDJTF is uniquely dependent on strategic mobility means, both airlift and sealift, and the cooperation of our friends in the region--both for facilities and diplomatic support.

Unlike the Soviets, we do not have--nor do we seek--a permanent base structure near the Middle East. Navy and Marine forces can be forward deployed in time of crisis without a requirement for en route basing, overflight rights, or forward operating bases. But all other forces, together with their supplies and equipment, must now move by air or ship. And I need not remind you that the distance from the United States to the Persian Gulf is 7000 air miles, or that it takes 3-4 weeks for a ship to move from the East Coast to the region.

But let me not give you the wrong impression. The task is difficult but not impossible. The only alternative to the Rapid Deployment Force is nothing--and nothing is a "gilt-edged" invitation to the Soviet Union for further excursions like Afghanistan. Frankly, I don't like that alternative!

We have available to the RDJTF right now a balanced force which can, in a relative sense, deploy quite rapidly.

--We have carrier battle groups, two of which are deployed right now in the Indian Ocean.

--We have a Marine Amphibious Force--together with the necessary amphibious shipping to move this 50,000 man integrated air-ground team--which could commence movement when early warnings are received...and could be positioned off-shore independent of bases--to act as a strong deterrent or to move ashore when and where needed.

--We have seven maritime prepositioning ships already on station in the Indian Ocean. These ships are loaded with the heavy equipment and supplies needed to support a 12,000-man Marine Amphibious Brigade during an initial period of operations.

--We have 70 C-5, 234 C-141, and 490 C-130 aircraft for both inter- and intra-theater movement of a multi-division force from the U.S. Army. This includes a combination of airborne, air-assault, mechanized, armor, ranger, and special forces capabilities. These same aircraft will assist in the movement of an extensive U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Force--to include F-111's, A-7's, A-10's, F-15's, F-4's, F-16's--not to mention a conventional strategic projection force of B-52's from the Strategic Air Command.

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My bottom line is never underestimate the capabilities of our military. That's not to say, however, that I believe we have enough. To do the job better we need more, particularly amphibious shipping and strategic airlift and sealift.

Now that I've told you how we would get there, it may be proper to tell you what we do after we arrive.

The Rapid Deployment Force is designed for flexibility. In other words, we organize around the building block principle, which means we could respond to minor as well as major contingencies.

Basically, however, we are preeminently a force to deter... and, if deterrence fails, to repel overt Soviet military aggression. We are not a force designed to intrude on the sovereign rights of any nation! Quite to the contrary, we are designed to insure that these same sovereign rights are maintained and protected.

Let me give you an example. Suppose the Soviets, or any other aggressor for that matter, seriously threatens the security of country "X", and United States' assistance is requested. Obviously, our first reaction will be an attempt to solve the problem through diplomatic means.

Should diplomacy fail we are then faced with two options:

--The first is to fall back and do nothing. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf that could be catastrophic to our future well-being.

--The other is to deploy rapidly and upon invitation a credible force--the RDJTF--as a deterrent. For lack of a better phrase, I refer to this as "circumspect presence." This "circumspect presence" transmits a signal to the Soviet Union that any further movements on their part could result in direct confrontation with the United States. This, needless to say, has two by-products. First, it changes the whole calculus of the crisis for the Soviets, and, second, it demonstrates to our friends and allies that we are willing to use force if necessary. In short, the Rapid Deployment Force puts sharp and lethal teeth in the United States' foreign policy for the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

How rapid is the Rapid Deployment Force? If the United States is invited, how fast can we get forces into the Persian Gulf region?

--We can put the first tactical air there in a matter of hours, some of it land-based and some of it from the carriers offshore.

--We can put the first battalion of the 82d Airborne there inside 48 hours, with the entire division following in less than two weeks.

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--And if you give me the same amount of time to deploy my force that you give the Soviet Union to build up their undermanned and under-equipped divisions and then move them into the area, I can give you a very significant force in the area.

With the foregoing as a foundation, let me be a bit more specific about the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

As I implied at the outset, it is unique in our history. It is the first time that a permanent, fully manned Joint Task Force Headquarters has been organized in peacetime with designated forces from all four services.

Our mission is to plan for, jointly train and exercise, and be prepared to deploy and employ combat forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

We have a truly integrated four-service staff headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, and a four-Service RDJTF Liaison Office with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. This essential office provides us with the Washington level interface so essential for effective crisis management. Our deputy commander is an Air Force Major General, and our chief of staff an Army brigadier general. So, no matter how you look at us you see nothing but "purple," the color we in the military use to identify joint activities.

While we have been officially established for less than six months, you wouldn't know it by what we've accomplished.

Since then we have conducted a major command post employment exercise involving all four major service components; participated in a very extensive JCS worldwide crisis management exercise, operationally tested our complex deployment communications capabilities, and conducted a major, simulated JCS-directed deployment exercise. Additionally, I have visited all of the major commanders involved with the RDJTF, senior and subordinate alike, in Europe, the Pacific, and the United States.

My conclusion is simply this: Even though we have recognized shortcomings in our military establishment, we have hundreds of thousands of superb young Americans in uniform today who have the patriotism, guts, determination, and professionalism you had when you were wearing those uniforms. I can't afford the luxury of sitting about hawking over what we need in the future. Even though I support and applaud those who do, I must make do with what I have been given here and now--and the best way to do this is through the harmonization of the many combat capabilities we have extant in all four services. My association with the Rapid Deployment Force--and an intimate association it's been--has convinced me that this is the most innovative and essential military venture I have experienced in over 30 years of active service to my country.

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I don't want to paint an overly optimistic picture of the capabilities of the RDJTF. It is not the "do all, be all." Like any military organization, it has its own capabilities and limitations, and as the Commander I am acutely aware of "both sides of the coin." But quite frankly, I am fed-up with the "gloom and doom" prophets who have every Soviet soldier leaning forward in his foxhole---and every American fighting man (or woman) sitting on his or her backside not giving a damn. I have nothing but the utmost respect and admiration for the young men and women in the Armed Forces today. Despite the obvious hardships which they endure almost daily, somehow or other their dedication and patriotism shines through. God bless them. They deserve the very best this country can give them!

As you may have gathered by now, I am by my very nature a positive thinker. But so were a few gutsy fellow Americans who stood by a bridge not far from here over 200 years ago--against a superior force which was better equipped and trained. They fired a shot heard "round the world," a shot which resulted in the birth of our nation.

I sometimes wonder where we would be today if the "gloom and doom" experts had been around during the revolutionary war--World War I--or World War II.

If the modern day analysts had looked at places like Tarawa, Iwo and Normandy, they would tell us that the "force asymmetries are such that you can't do it." Well, we did it, you did it, and we were successful.

The only alternative I see to a positive, yet realistic, approach is for me to hunker down and say that the job is impossible. Well, the job isn't impossible--not when you've got well over 200,000 people behind you who are willing, eager, and capable.

In closing, from the viewpoint of an old infantryman who has spent many nights of his life in a foxhole, I would like to ask that this commission undertake an examination of more and better ways to improve the quality of life for our enlisted men and women and junior officers. Of all my concerns for the military establishment of the future, this one stands head and shoulders above all.

I must admit to some very strong emotions, today. Standing before this very prestigious group merely serves as a reminder that it has been a long road since a young 14 year old saw your fellow legionnaires implant the emblem of the American Legion over the newly closed grave of his father. But our country has been kind--thanks, in no small measure, to the superb contributions of this commission. I hope that it is enough to say a humble but very sincere--THANK YOU!

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APPENDIX F

WLO PERSONNEL ROSTER

CPAG MEMBERS

Colonel	(b)(6)	USAF
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USA
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USA
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USA
Lt Col	b 6	USAF
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USAF
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USA
LCDR	(b)(6)	USN

CRG MEMBERS

Colonel	(b)(6)	USAF
Colonel	(b)(6)	USA
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USA
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USA
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USAF
Mr.	(b)(6)	Civilian
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USA

WLO MEMBERS

NAME/RANK/COMPONENT

DOA

DUTY TITLE

(b)(6)	CAPT, USN	14 Jul 80	Chief, Contingency Plans Div.
(b)(6)	LT COL, USAF	20 Jun 80	Airlift Officer
(b)(6)	MAJ, USAF	19 Jun 80	Intelligence Officer
(b)(6)	LTC, USA	21 Jul 80	Africa Staff Officer
(b)(6)	Jr., SFC, USA	2 May 80	Intelligence NCO
(b)(6)	COL, USAF	15 May 80	Chief, POL-MIL Div.
(b)(6)	LTC, USA	1 Jul 80	MidEast Staff Officer
(b)(6)	LT COL, USMC	23 Jun 80	Marine Corps Plans Officer
(b)(6)	LT COL, USMC	14 Jul 80	SW Asia Staff Officer
(b)(6)	LTC, USA	25 Jun 80	Army Plans/Spec Ops Officer
(b)(6)	SSGT, USAF	13 May 80	Admin Technician
(b)(6)	LT COL, USAF	25 Jun 80	Air Force Plans Officer
(b)(6)	LTC, USA	24 Jul 80	SW Asia Staff Officer
(b)(6)	COL, USA	25 Aug 80	Deputy Director
(b)(6)	YNC, USN	18 Aug 80	Admin Supervisor
(b)(6)	LCDR, USN	25 Jul 80	Sealift Officer
VESSER, Dale A., BG, USA		25 Mar 80	Director
(b)(6)	LT COL, USAF	25 Mar 80	MidEast Staff Officer
(b)(6)	CDR, USN	15 Feb 81	Navy Planner

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Correct FOIA # 04-0031

As of 31Dec80

HEADQUARTERS, RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE

STAFF SECTION	RANK	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MILITARY		US CIVILIAN		TOTAL	
		AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD
RDCC	OFF			1	1	1	2			2	3				
	ENL	2	1				2	1		3	3				
	TOT	2	1	1	1	1	4	1		5	6	1	1	6	7
RDDC	OFF							2	2	2	2				
	ENL							2	2	2	2	1	1	3	3
	TOT							2	2	2	2	1	1	3	3
RDCS	OFF	2	1			1	1	1	1	4	3				
	ENL	1		1				1		3	0				
	TOT	3	1	1		1	1	2	1	7	3			7	3
RDSJS	OFF		1								1				
	ENL		2		1				2		5				
	TOT		3		1				2		6				6
RDJ1	OFF	1	1	1	1		1	2	2	4	5				
	ENL	1	1	1	1			2	2	4	4				
	TOT	2	2	2	2		1	4	4	8	9			8	9
RDJ2	OFF	8	8	4	4	2	2	8	10	22	24				
	ENL	9	9	4	6	5	5	13	12	31	32				
	TOT	17	17	8	10	7	7	21	22	53	56			53	56
RDJ3	OFF	20	19	12	10	7	8	14	13	53	50				
	ENL	10	10	2	1	3	3	7	7	22	21				
	TOT	30	29	14	11	10	11	21	20	75	71			75	71
RDJ4	OFF	6	6	3	3	1	1	4	4	14	14				
	ENL	1	1			1	1	2	2	4	4				
	TOT	7	7	3	3	2	2	6	6	18	18			18	18
RDJ5	OFF	3	5	3	4	2	2	4	3	12	14				
	ENL	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	5	5				
	TOT	4	6	4	5	3	3	6	5	17	19			17	19

APPENDIX G

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HEADQUARTERS, RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE

STAFF SECTION	RANK	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MILITARY		US CIVILIAN		TOTAL	
		AUTH	ASCD	AUTH	ASCD	AUTH	ASCD	AUTH	ASCD	AUTH	ASCD	AUTH	ASCD	AUTH	ASCD
RDJ6	OFF	3	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	7	7				
	ENL	3	3	1	1	1	1	3	3	8	8				
	TOT	6	6	2	2	2	2	5	5	15	15			15	15
RDHC	OFF	1	2			1	1			2	3				
	ENL	11	12	2	2	4	5	3	3	20	22				
	TOT	12	14	2	2	5	6	3	3	22	25			22	25
RDDA	OFF	1	1							1	1				
	ENL	1	1					1	1	2	2				
	TOT	2	2					1	1	3	3			3	3
RDAG	OFF	1	1							1	1				
	ENL	1		2	2	2	1	4	5	9	8				
	TOT	2	1	2	2	2	1	4	5	10	9			10	9
RDLA	OFF	1	1							1	1				
	ENL							1	1	1	1				
	TOT	1	1					1	1	2	2			2	2
RDCO	OFF	1	2							1	2				
	ENL														
	TOT	1	2							1	2			1	2
RDPA	OFF			1	1					1	1				
	ENL							1	1	1	1				
	TOT			1	1			1	1	2	2			2	2
RDPM	OFF	1	1							1	1				
	ENL														
	TOT	1	1							1	1			1	1
RDMS	OFF	1	1							1	1				
	ENL														
	TOT	1	1							1	1			1	1

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HEADQUARTERS, RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE

STAFF SECTION	GRADE	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MILITARY		US CIVILIAN		TOTAL	
		AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD
RDWL	OFF	6	6	3	2	2	2	5	5	16	15				
	ENL	1	1	1	1			1	1	3	3				
	TOT	7	7	4	3	2	2	6	6	19	18			19	18
CCAG	OFF		1		1				2		4				
	ENL				1						1				
	TOT		1		2				2		5				5
HQ TOTAL	OFF	56	60	29	28	18	21	42	44	145	153				
	ENL	42	42	15	17	17	19	42	42	116	120				
	TOT	98	102	44	45	35	40	84	86	261	273	1	1	263	275
	OFF														
	ENL														
	TOT														
	OFF														
	ENL														
	TOT														
	OFF														
	ENL														
	TOT														
	OFF														
	ENL														
	TOT														
	OFF														
	ENL														
	TOT														
	OFF														
	ENL														
	TOT														

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Correct FOIA # 04-0031

USCENTCOM FOIA 04-001

Closed 09/15/2009

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AGENCY / FUNCTION	MACDILL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		STAND ALONE			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
COMMAND ELEMENT	7	6		13			7	6		13			10	15	3	28	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES																	
(PROTOCOL SHOWN AS SEPERATE SPECIAL STAFF)																	
TOTAL	7	6		13	13		7	6		13	13		10	15	3	28	28
WASHINGTON LIASION OFFICE (WLHO)																	
OFFICE OF CHIEF	2	1		3			2	1		3			2	1		3	
NIJ PLAN DIV	7	1		8			7	1		8			7	1		8	
CONTINGENCY PL DIV	7	1		8			7	1		8			7	1		8	
DEPLOYMENT SEC													5	1		6	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES																	
TOTAL	16	3		19	19		16	3		19	19		21	4		25	25
J-1 PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE	1			1			1						2	2		4	
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL														4	9	13	
PERSONNEL SERVICES	1	3		4			1	3		4			3	22		25	
PLANS/POLICY	2	1		3			2	1		3			9	8		17	
SERVICES													7	15		22	
MORALE, WELFARE , REC													6	26		32	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1	3		4							

APPENDIX H

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PAGE 1

Incl 1

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AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		STAND ALONE			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
TOTAL	4	4		8	8		5	7		12	12		27	77	9	113	113
J-2 INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR	1	3		4			1	3		4			1	4		5	
PLANS/PROGRAMS/SSO	6	9		15			6	9		15			11	20		31	
OPERATIONS	11	14		25			11	14		25			18	12		30	
CRYPTO													3	1		4	
FUSION CENTER													12	24		36	
I&W CENTER													2	14		16	
COLLECTION MCT	2	3		5			2	3		5			2	4		6	
SYSTEMS BRANCH													5	2		7	
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE	2	2		4			2	2		4							
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							7			7			7	6		13	
TOTAL	22	31		53	53		29	31		60	60		61	87		148	148
J-3 OPERATIONS DIRECTOR	1	2		3			1	2		3			4	4		8	
CURRENT OPS DIV	20	14		34			20	14		34			41	24		65	
SPECIAL OPS	9	2		11			9	2		11			9	2		11	
EXERCISE DIV	20	4		24			20	4		24			15	5		20	
COMMAND & CONTROL													16	11		27	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1			1							

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AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		STAND ALONE			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES							1			1							
TOTAL	50	22		72	72		52	22		74	74		85	46		131	131
J-4 LOGISTICS DIRECTOR	2	3		5			2	3		5			6	1		7	
MIL ENGINEER/FACIL	6			6			6			6			4	4		8	
JOINT OFFICE	6	1		7			6	1		7			46	55		101	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES																	
TOTAL	14	4		18	18		14	4		18	18		56	60		116	116
J-5 PLANS/POLICY DIRECTOR	1	5		6			1	5		6			3	3	1	7	
PLANS	10			10			10			10			14	8		22	
POLICY	1			1			1			1			15	5		20	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES																	
TOTAL	12	5		17	17		12	5		17	17		32	16	1	44	49

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AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		STAND ALONE			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
J-6 COMM ELECTRONICS DIRECTOR	1	1		2			1	1		2			2	2		4	
OPERATIONS	3	5		8			3	5		8			12	13		25	
ENGINEERING	3	2		5			3	2		5			8	15		23	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							2			2							
TOTAL	7	8		15	15		9	8		17	17		22	30		52	52
ADJ GENERAL																	
AG	1	9		10			1	9		10			1	2		3	
ADMIN SERVICES													2	21		23	
PUBLICATIONS													1	13		14	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES								3		3							
TOTAL	1	9		10	10		1	12		13	13		4	36		40	40
DATA AUTOMATION	1	2		3			1	2		3			2	11		13	
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES								4		4							
TOTAL	1	2		3	3		1	6		7	7		2	11		13	13
PROTOCOL	1			1	1		1			1	1		3	2		5	5
PROVOST MARSHAL	1			1	1		1			1	1		6	3		9	9

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AGENCY/FUNCTION	HACDILL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		STAND ALONE			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
MEDICAL SERVICES	1			1			1			1			12	11		23	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1			1							
TOTAL	1			1	1		2			2	2		12	11		23	23
INSPECTOR GENERAL (ADDITIONAL DUTY TO J 6)													3	2	1	6	6
LEGAL ADVISOR	1	1		2			1	1		2			6	6		12	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							2			2							
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES								1		1							
TOTAL	1	1		2	2		3	2		5	5		6	6		12	12
COMPTROLLER	1			1			1			1			2	3		5	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1	1		2							
TOTAL	1			1	1		2	1		3	3		2	3		5	5
PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR	1	1		2			1	1		2			2	1		3	
PLANS/POLICY													2	2		4	
MEDIA OPS & SUPPORT													6	7		13	
PHOTO													1	5		6	
INTERNAL INFO													4	5		9	

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AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACRILL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		STAND ALONE			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1	1		2							
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES							1	7		8							
TOTAL	1	1		2	2		3	9		12	12		15	20		35	35
WEATHER (MAC)							6	12		18	18						
HQ CMDT																	
HQ STAFF	2	9		11			2	9		11			5	41		46	
INTERNAL SECURITY		11		11				11		11				26		26	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							3	34		37							
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES																	
TOTAL	2	20		22	22		5	54		59	59		5	67		72	72
HQ RDJTF TOTAL	142	116		258	258		169	182			351		372	496	14		882
HQ CMDT SUPPORT																	
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES								62		62	62		2	113		115	
TOTAL								62		62	62		2	113		115	115

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AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACELL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		STAND ALONE			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
HQ CMT SUPPORT																	
TEAM AUGMENTEES																	
EXTERNAL SECURITY							4	172		176			4	172		176	
WATER PURIFICATION								3		3				3		3	
WATER TRANSPORT								5		5				5		5	
BATH DETACHMENT								3		3				3		3	
PETRO BULK STORAGE								9		9				9		9	
PETRO BULK DISTRIBUTION								18		18				18		18	
MEDICAL DETACHMENT							1	9		10			1	9		10	
LAUNDRY								7		7				7		7	
TOTAL							5	226		231	231		5	226		231	231
SUPPORT TOTAL	0												7	339			
TOTAL PERSONNEL REQ	142	116	0	258	258		174	470			644		379	835	14	1228	1228

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AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTED			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
COMMAND ELEMENT	7	6		13			7	6		13			9	13	3	25	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES																	
(PROTOCOL SHOWN AS SEPARATE SPECIAL STAFF)																	
TOTAL	7	6		13	13		7	6		13	13		9	13	3	25	25
WASHINGTON LIAISON OFFICE (WLNO)																	
OFFICE OF CHIEF	2	1		3			2	1		3			2	1		3	
MIL. PLAN DIV	7	1		8			7	1		8			7	1		8	
CONTINGENCY PL DIV	7	1		8			7	1		8			7	1		8	
DEPLOYMENT SEC													5	1		6	
TOTAL	16	3		19	19		16	3		19	19		21	4		25	25
J-1 PERSONNEL																	
DIRECTORATE	1			1			1			1			2	2		4	
PERSONNEL SERVICES	1	3		4			1	3		4							
PLANS/POLICY	2	1		3			2	1		3			9	6		15	
SERVICES													7	11		18	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1	3		4							
TOTAL	4	4		8	8		5	7		12	12		18	19		37	37
J-2 INTELLIGENCE																	
DIRECTOR	1	3		4			1	3		4			2	0		2	
ADMIN OFFICE													2	4		6	
PLANS/PROCRAMS/SSO	6	9		15			6	9		15			4	2		6	
SECURITY													3	19		22	
OPERATIONS	11	14		25			11	14		25			2	4		6	

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AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTED			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
FUSION CENTER													17	29		46	
COLLECTION MGT	2	3		5			2	3		5							
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE	2	2		4			2	2		4							
CRYPTO GROUP													3	3		6	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							7			7			7	0		7	
TOTAL	22	31		53	53		29	31		60	60		40	61		101	101
J-3 OPERATIONS																	
DIRECTOR	1	2		3			1	2		3			4	4		8	
CURRENT OPS DIV	20	14		34			20	14		34			36	19		55	
SPECIAL OPS	9	2		11			9	2		11			9	2		11	
EXERCISE DIV	20	4		24			20	4		24			11	5		16	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1			1							
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES							1			1							
TOTAL	50	22		72	72		52	22		74	74		60	30		90	90
J-4 LOGISTICS																	
DIRECTOR	2	3		5			2	3		5			20	5			
MIL ENGINEER/FAC													4	4			
LOG SUPPORT				6			6			6							
TRANS SUPPORT	6	1		7			6	1		7							
REDCOM AUGMENTEES																	
TOTAL	14	4		18	18		14	4		18	18		24	9		33	33
J-5 PLANS/POLICY																	
DIRECTOR	1	5		6			1	5		6			3	4		7	
PLANS	10			10			10			10			14	8		22	
POLICY	1			1			1			1			15	5		20	

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AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTED			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
REDCOM AUGMENTEES																	
TOTAL	12	5		17	17		12	5		17	17		32	17		49	49
J-6 COMINT ELECTRONICS																	
DIRECTOR	1	1		2			1	1		2			2	2		4	
OPERATIONS	3	5		8			3	5		8			10	8		18	
ENGINEERING	3	2		5			3	2		5			8	13		21	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							2			2							
TOTAL	7	8		15	15		9	8		17	17		20	23		43	43
ADJ GENERAL																	
AG	1	9		10			1	9		10			1	2		3	
ADMIN SERVICES													2	21		23	
PUBLICATIONS													1	13		14	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES								3		3							
TOTAL	1	9		10	10		1	12		13	13		4	36		40	40
DATA AUTOMATION	1	2		3			1	2		3			2	11		13	
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES								4		4							
TOTAL	1	2		3	3		1	6		7	7		2	11		13	13
PROTOCOL	1			1	1		1			1	1		3	2		5	5
PROVOST MARSHAL	1			1	1		1			1	1		3	2		5	5

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AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTED			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
MEDICAL SERVICES	1			1			1			1			4	2		6	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1			1							
TOTAL	1			1	1		2			2	2		4	2		6	6
LEGAL ADVISOR	1	1		2			1	1		2			5	4		9	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							2			2							
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES								1		1							
TOTAL	1	1		2	2		3	2		5	5		5	4		9	9
COMPTROLLER	1			1			1			1			2	3		5	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1	1		2							
TOTAL	1			1	1		2	1		3	3		2	3		5	5
PUBLIC AFFAIRS																	
DIRECTOR	1	1		2			1	1		2			1	1		2	
PLANS/POLICY													2	2		4	
MEDIA OPS & SUPPORT													6	7		13	
PHOTO													1	5		6	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1	1		2							
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES							1	7		8							
TOTAL	1	1		2	2		3	9		12	12		10	15		25	25
WEATHER (MAC)							6	12		18	18						
HQ CNDT																	
HQ STAFF	2	9		11			2	9		11			3	38		41	
INTERNAL SECURITY		11		11				11		11				26		26	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							3	34		37							
TOTAL	2	20		22	22		5	54		59	59		3	64		67	67

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AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTED			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
HQ RDJTF TOTAL	142	116		258	258		169	182			351		260	315	3	578	578
HQ CMDT SUPPORT																	
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES								62		62	62		2	97		99	
TOTAL								62		62	62		2	97		99	99
HQ CMDT SUPPORT																	
TEAM AUGMENTEES																	
EXTERNAL SECURITY							4	172		176			4	172		176	
WATER PURIFICATION								3		3				3		3	
WATER TRANSPORT								5		5				5		5	
BATH DETACHMENT								3		3				3		3	
PETRO BULK STORAGE								9		9				9		9	
PETRO BULK DISTRIBUTION								18		18				18		18	
MEDICAL DETACHMENT							1	9		10			1	9		10	
LAUNDRY								7		7				7		7	
TOTAL							5	226		231	231		5	226		231	231
SUPPORT TOTAL	0						5	288		293	293		7	323		330	330
TOTAL PERSONNEL REQ	142	116	0	258	258		174	470		644	644		267	638	3	908	908

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RC AUGMENTEES

<u>DIRECTORATE</u>	<u>PERA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>SVC</u>	<u>MOS/ AFSC</u>
J1	05	06	Personnel Officer	05	AF	7316
	05	11	Personnel Tech	E6	AF	73270
	05	12	Personnel Tech	E6	AF	73250
	05	13	Personnel Rcds Spec	E5	A	75D20
J2	06	18	Elec Warfare Off	04	AF	2275Y
	06	19	Intel Stf Off	04	A	35B54
	06	33	Collection Officer	04	A	35B54
	06	34	Intel Stf Off	04	MC	0202
	06	42	Intel Stf Off	04	AF	8076
	06	43	Intel Stf Off	04	A	9640
	06	44	Intel Stf Off	04	A	35B54
J3	07	35	NUC/EA Stf Off	04	A	52A13
J6	10	13	C-E Stf Off	05	A	25A27
HQ CMDT	11	01	HQ CMT/CDR USAE	05	A	11A00
	11	02	Dp CMT/CDR USAFE	04	AF	7016
	11	05	OPS BS SPT POL Off	04	A	54A11
	11	07	Admin Supv	E7	AF	70270C
	11	09	Admin Spec	E4	AF	70250B
	11	10	Inventory Mgmt Supv	E7	AF	64570
	11	11	Inventory Mgmt Supv	E6	AF	64570
	11	13	Mat Fac Sp	E5	AF	64551
	11	17	Veh & Bdg Mnt Supv	E6	AF	47273
	11	18	Veh Ops Supv	E6	AF	60370
	11	19	Gen Purpose Veh Rpm	E5	AF	47253
	11	20	Gen Purpose Veh Rpm	E5	AF	47253
	11	21	Site Develop Supt	E8	AF	55390
	11	22	Structural Tech	E6	AF	55271
	11	23	Elec Pwr Prdn Tech	E6	AF	54370
	11	27	Elec Pwr Prod Tech	E5	AF	54350
	11	28	Carpentry Spec	E4	AF	55250
	11	29	Food Service Supv	E7	AF	62270
	11	30	Food Service Supv	E6	AF	62270
	11	31	Cook	E5	AF	62250
	11	32	Cook	E5	AF	62250
	11	33	Cook	E5	AF	62250
	11	36	SP Supv	E7	AF	81170
	11	43	SP Specialist	E5	AF	81150
	11	44	SP Spec	E5	AF	81150
	11	45	SP Spec	E5	AF	81150
	11	47	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	48	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	49	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	50	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	51	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	52	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	53	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	54	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	55	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	56	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	57	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
AG	12	03	Admin Supv	E6	A	71630
	12	06	Admin Spec	E5	AF	70250A
	12	07	Admin Spec	E5	A	71620

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RC AUGMENTEES (CONT'D)

<u>DIRECTORATE</u>	<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>SVC</u>	<u>MOS/ AFSC</u>
Legal	13	02	Dep Legal Adv	05	AF	8815
	13	03	Asst Legal Adv	05	A	55A00
Public Af	14	03	PAO	04	A	46A00
	14	04	PA Supv	E8	A	84250
Med Svc Compt	15	01	Surgeon	06	A	60A67
	16	02	Finance Stf Off	04	A	45A44
		03	Budget Tech	E7	AF	62770
J6	10	06	Comm STF Off	05	AF	3016

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J-2

Correct FOIA # 04-0031

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RC AUGMENTEES (ADDITIONS/DELETIONS)

The following additions/deletions are requested:

<u>ACTION</u>	<u>SECTION</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>SVC</u>	<u>MOS/ AFSC</u>
Addition	J-1	Pers Plans Off	0-5	A	41A42
Addition	AG	Admin Supv	E-8	A	71L
Addition	AG	Admin Spec	E-4	A	71L10
Addition	J-4	Engr Staff Off (Div Chief)	0-6	A	2100
Addition	J-4	Engr Staff Off	0-5	A	2100
Addition	J-4	Engr Off	0-5	AF	5516
Addition	J-4	Engr Staff Off	0-5	USN	9390
Addition	J-4	Utilities Off	W-4	A	310A
Addition	J-4	Sr Engr Ops Spec	E-8	A	122
Addition	J-4	Admin Spec	E-6	A	71L
Addition	J-4	Engr Draftsman/ Topographic Illust Spec	E-6	A	81C

DELETIONS: None

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J-3

Correct FOIA # 04-0031

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AUGMENTATION TO RDJTF HQ

	MOS/AFSC	GR	SVC	NUMBER
SUPPLY				
Small Arms Rpmr	45B20	E4	A	1
Supply Clk/Driver	76Y10	E3	A	1
FOOD SERVICE				
First Cook	94B20	E5	A	3
Baker	94D20	E5	A	1
Cook	94B20	E4	A	10
TRANS/MAINT				
Wrecker Operator	63F20	E4	A	1
Lt Veh Driver ¼	64C20	E3	A	12
Lt Veh Driver 2½	64C20	E3	A	8
Wheeled Veh Rpmr	63B20	E4	A	1
ENGINEERING				
Duty Foreman	12B40	E7	A	1
Duty Sec Ldr	12B20	E5	A	3
Duty Soldiers	12B10	E3	A	20
LEGAL SERVICES				
Legal Clerk	2516	E7	N	1
OPERATIONS				
Cnl/En Staff Off	74A00	O3	A	1
PUBLIC AFFAIRS				
PAO	4302	O3	MC	1
PA Spec	J03200	E6	N	1
Journalist	71Q40	E6	A	1

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	MOS/AFSC	GR	SVC	NUMBER
PA Tech	79150	E5	AF	1
Press Info Spec	4312	E4	MC	1
Photo Journalist	71020J8	E5	A	1
Photo Journalist	231X2	E5	AF	1
Broadcast Spec	79151	E5	AF	1
DATA AUTOMATION				
CRT Operator	2500YH	E5	K	2
CRT Operator	0151	E5	MC	2
CRT Operator	71120	E5	A	2
CRT Operator	70250B	E5	AF	2

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COMPONENT AUGMENTEES (ADDITIONS/DELETIONS)

The following additions/deletions are requested:

<u>ACTION</u>	<u>SECTION</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>SVC</u>	<u>MOS/ AFSC</u>
Addition	Data Autom	CRT Operator	E-5	A	71L20
Addition	Data Autom	CRT Operator	E-5	A	71L20
Addition	Provost Mar	Opns Officer	O-4	A	31A
Addition	Provost Mar	Asst Opns NCO	E-5	A	95B
Addition	Protocol	Escort Officer	O-2	A	
Addition	Protocol	Escort Officer	O-2	A	
Addition	Protocol	Aviation Liaison	E-5	A	
Addition	Protocol	Admin Clerk	E-4	A	71L
Addition	Protocol	Vehicle Operator	E-3	A	64C
Addition	J-2	Signal Intel Off	O-3	AF	8035
Addition	J-2	Signal Intel Off	O-4	A	375M
Addition	J-2	Signal Intel Tech	W-3	A	981A
Addition	J-2	Elint Tech	W-3	A	982A
Addition	J-2	SSO Comm Optr	E-5	AF	291XX
Addition	J-2	SSO Comm Optr	E-5	AF	291XX
Addition	J-2	Targets Off	O-3	AF	8086
Addition	J-2	Targets NCO	E-6	AF	20671
Addition	J-2	SSO Comm Optr	E-5	AF	29150
Addition	J-2	SSO Comm Optr	E-5	AF	29150
Addition	J-4	Munitions Mat Mgt O	O-4	A	75A00
Addition	J-4	Log Clerk	E-5	USMC	0441
Addition	J-4	Engr Facilities Off	O-5	A	7010
Addition	J-4	Engr Facilities Off	O-4	A	7900

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<u>ACTION</u>	<u>SECTION</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>SVC</u>	<u>MOS/</u> <u>AFSC</u>
Addition	J-4	Engr Facilities Off	0-4	A	7010
Addition	J-4	Clerk Typist	E-5	A	71L
DELETIONS:		Data Autom CRT Operator	E-5	N	2500
		Data Autom CRT Operator	E-5	N	2500

Approved for Release

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RDJTF Support Element Augmentation Units

1. Under bare base conditions additional support functions for the RDJTF HQ will be provided to the Headquarters Commandant as augmentation units.
2. Augmentation units required for a specific contingency operation will be specified in the CPLAN. Units outlined below will be manned and equipped by USCINCARRED and attached to the RDJTF HQ Support Element:
 - a. External Security-Military Police Company.
 - (1) Mission. Provide external security to the RDJTF, JCSE Headquarters complex.
 - (2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 19-77H (176 personnel).
 - b. Water Purification Team.
 - (1) Mission. Provide purified water for use by RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the RDJTF Support Element.
 - (2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 5-520H, Team GG (3 personnel).
 - c. Water Transport Team.
 - (1) Mission. Transport water in bulk quantities from water supply points to the RDJTF/JCSE Headquarters complex.
 - (2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 5-520H, Team GJ (5 personnel).
 - d. Bath Detachment.
 - (1) Mission. Provide a shower facility for use by personnel assigned to RDJTF HQ, JCSE and RDJTF Support Element.
 - (2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 10-520H, Team FK (3 personnel).
 - e. Petroleum Bulk Storage and Issue Detachment.
 - (1) Mission. Provide POL bulk storage and issue for the RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the Support Element.
 - (2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 10-560H, Team JD (9 personnel).

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RDJTF Support Element Augmentation Units (continued)

f. Petroleum Bulk Distribution Detachment.

(1) Mission. Provide local delivery of bulk petroleum products for the RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 10-560H, Team JF (18 personnel).

g. Medical Detachment.

(1) Mission. Provide primary medical service to personnel assigned to the RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 8-620H, Team OA (10 personnel).

h. LAUNDRY SERVICE TEAM (approx ⁷/₁₀ personnel)

i. WEATHER TEAM (10 personnel)

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APPENDIX K RC AUGMENTEES

DIRECTORATE	PARA	LINE	TITLE	GR	SVC	MOS/ AFSC
J1	05	05	Personnel Officer	05	AF	7316
	05	10	Personnel Tech	E6	AF	73270
	05	11	Personnel Tech	E6	AF	73250
	05	12	Personnel Rcds Spec	E5	A	75D20
	XX	XX	Pers Plans Off	05	A	41A42
J2	06	17	Elec Warfare Off	04	AF	2275Y
	06	18	Intel Stf Off	04	A	35B54
	06	32	Collection Officer	04	A	35B54
	06	33	Intel Stf Off	04	MC	0202
	06	41	Intel Stf Off	04	AF	8076
	06	42	Intel Stf Off	04	N	9640
	06	43	Intel Stf Off	04	A	35B54
J3	07	34	NUC/EA NCO	E8	AF	27490
J4			Engr Staff Off (Div Chief)	06	A	2100
			Engr Staff Off	05	A	2100
			Engr Off	05	AF	5516
			Engr Staff Off	05	N	9390
			Utilities Off	W4	A	310A
			Sr Engr Ops Spec	E8	A	12Z
			Admin Spec	E6	A	71L
			Engr Draftsman/Topographic			
			Illust Spec	E6	A	81C
J6	10	05	Comm Stf Off	05	AF	3016
	10	12	C-e Stf Off	05	A	25A27
HO CMDT	11	05	Ops BS Spt POL Off	04	A	54A11
	11	07	Admin Supv	E7	AF	70270C
	11	09	Admin Spec	E4	AF	70250B
	11	10	Inventory Mgmt Supv	E7	AF	64570
	11	11	Inventory Mgmt Supv	E6	AF	64570
	11	13	Mat Fac Sp	E5	AF	64551
	11	17	Veh & Bldg Mnt Supv	E6	AF	47273
	11	18	Veh Ops Supv	E6	AF	60370
	11	19	Gen Purpose Veh Rpmn	E5	AF	47253
	11	20	Gen Purpose Veh Rpmn	E5	AF	47253
	11	21	Site Develop Supt	E8	AF	55390
	11	22	Structural Tech	E6	AF	55271
	11	23	Elec Pwr Prdn Tech	E6	AF	54370
	11	27	Elec Pwr Prod Tech	E5	AF	54350
	11	28	Carpentry Spec	E4	AF	55250
	11	29	Food Service Supv	E7	AF	62270
	11	30	Food Service Supv	E6	AF	62270
	11	31	Cook	E5	AF	62250
	11	32	Cook	E5	AF	62250
	11	33	Cook	E5	AF	62250
	11	36	SP Supv	E7	AF	81170
	11	43	SP Specialist	E5	AF	81150
	11	44	SP Spec	E5	AF	81150
	11	45	Sp Spec	E5	AF	81150

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<u>DIRECTORATE</u>	<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>SVC</u>	<u>MOS/ AFSC</u>
HQ CMDT	11	47	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	48	Sp Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	49	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	50	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	51	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	52	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	53	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	54	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	55	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	56	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	57	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
AG	12	03	Admin Supv	E6	A	71630
	12	06	Admin Spec	E5	AF	70250A
	12	07	Admin Spec	E5	A	71620
	XX	XX	Admin Supv	E8	AF	702X0
	XX	XX	Admin Supv	E4	N	2500
LEGAL	13	02	Dep Legal Adv	05	AF	8816
	13	03	Asst Legal Adv	05	A	55A00
PUBLIC AFF	14	02	PAO	04	A	46A00
	14	03	PA Supv	E8	A	84250
MED SVC	15	01	Surgeon	06	A	60A67
COMPT	16	02	Finance Stf Off	04	A	45A44
	16	03	Budget Tech	E7	AF	62770

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COMPONENT/SUPPORTING FORCE AUGMENTEES

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>SV</u>	<u>MOS/ AFSC</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
J2	Signal Intel Off	03	AF	8035	1
J2	Singal Intel Off	04	A	375M	1
J2	Singal Intel Off	W3	A	981A	1
J2	Elint Tech	W3	A	982A	1
J2	SSO Comm Optr	E5	AF	291XX	1
J2	SSO Comm Optr	E5	AF	291XX	1
J2	Targets Off	03	AF	8086	1
J2	Targets NCO	E6	AF	20671	1
J2	SSO Comm Optr	E5	AF	29150	1
J2	SSO Comm Optr	E5	AF	29150	1
J3	Spec Ops NCO	E8	A	11B5S	1
J3	CHEM/EA NCO	E8	A	54E	1
J3	EW Officer	03/4	MC	2600	1
J3	OOB Tech	WO	A	926A	1
J4	Munitions Mat Mgt Off	04	A	75A00	1
J4	Log Clerk	E5	MC	0441	1
J4	Engr Facilities Off	05	A	7010	1
J4	Engr Facilities Off	04	A	7900	1
J4	Engr Facilities Off	04	A	7010	1
J4	Clerk Typist	E5	A	71L	1
MS	Opns SGT/NCO	E7/8	A	91250	1
MS	Admin Soec	E5/6	AF	702X0	1
MS	Med Clerk	E4/5	A	64C20	1
MS	Med Off	04/5	A	60C00	1

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<u>SECTION</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>SV</u>	<u>MOS/ AFSC</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
HC	Supply Clk/Driver	E4	A	76410	1
HC	Supply Clk/Driver	E5	N	76Y10	1
HC	First Cook	E5	A	94B29	3
HC	Baker	E5	A	94D20	1
HC	Cook	E4	A	94B20	8
HC	Cook	E4	N		2
HC	Wrecker Operator	E4	A	63F20	1
HC	Lt Veh Driver ¼T	E3	A	64C20	6
HC	Lt Veh Driver ¼T	E3	AF		4
HC	Lt Veh Driver ¼T	E3	N		2
HC	Lt Veh Driver 2½T	E3	A	63C20	6
HC	Lt Veh Driver 2½T	E3	MC		2
HC	Wheeled Veh Rpmn	E4	A	63C20	1
Prot	Escort Officer	O2	N		1
Prot	Escort Officer	O2	MC		1
Prot	Aviation Liaison	E5	A		1
Prot	Admin Clerk	E4	AF	702X0	1
Prot	Vehicle Operator	E3	MC		1
LA	Legal Clerk	E7	N	2516	1
PA	PAO	O3	MC	4302	1
PA	PA Spec	E6	N	J03200	1
PA	Journalist	E6	A	71Q40	1
PA	PA Tech	E5	AF	79150	1
PA	Press Info Spec	E4	MC	4312	1
PA	Photo Journalist	E5	A	71120J8	1
PA	Photo Journalist	E5	AF	231X2	1
PA	Broadcast Spec	E5	AF	79151	1
DA	CRT Operator	E5	A	2500YN	2

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<u>SECTION</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>SV</u>	<u>MOS/ AFSC</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
DA	CRT Operator	E5	MC	0151	2
DA	CRT Operator	E5	A	71L20	2*
DA	CRT Operator	E5	AF	70250B	2**
PM	Opns Officer	04	A	31A	1
PM	Asst Opns NCO	E5	A	95B	1

* - Additional skill indicator required.

** - Special experience indicator required.

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COMPONENT/SUPPORTING FORCE UNIT AUGMENTEES

1. Under bare base conditions additional support functions for the RDJTF HQ will be provided to the Headquarters Commandant as augmentation units.

2. Augmentation units required for a specific contingency operation will be specified in the OPLAN. Units outlined below will be manned and equipped by USCINCARRED and attached to the RDJTF HQ Support Element:

a. External Security-Military Police Company (2 platoons).

(1) Mission. Provide external security to the RDJTF, JCSE Headquarters complex.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be ^{as} described in TOE 19-77H (120 personnel).

b. Petroleum Bulk Storage and Issue Detachment.

(1) Mission. Provide POL bulk storage and issue for the RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 10-560H, Team JD (9 personnel).

c. Petroleum Bulk Distribution Detachment.

(1) Mission. Provide local delivery of bulk petroleum products for the RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 10-560H, Team JF (18 personnel).

d. Water Purification Team.

(1) Mission. Provide purified water for use by RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the RDJTF Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by ARRED (3 personnel).

e. Water Transport Team.

(1) Mission. Transport water in bulk quantities from water supply points to the RDJTF/JCSE Headquarters complex.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by ARRED (5 personnel).

f. Bath Detachment.

(1) Mission. Provide a shower facility for use by personnel assigned to RDJTF HQ, JCSE and RDJTF Support Element.

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(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by ARRED (3 personnel).

g. Laundry Service Team (approx 7 personnel).

(1) Mission. Provide laundry service to RDJTF HQ, JCSE and Support Elements.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by ARRED (approx 7 personnel).

3. Units outlined below will be manned and equipped by providing service and attached to the RDJTF HQ Support Element.

a. USMC Combat Engineer Platoon.

(1) Mission. Provide engineer support to the RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by USMC (37 personnel).

b. Medical Detachment.

(1) Mission. Provide medical service to personnel assigned to the RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by AFRED (10 personnel).

c. Weather Unit.

(1) Mission. Provide current and projected weather information for use by personnel assigned to RDJTF HQ, JCSE and RDJTF Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by AFRED (18 personnel).

d. External Security-Military Police Flight.

(1) Same as 2a(1).

(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by AFRED (60 personnel).

(3) This unit will be part of the MP Co described in para 2a.

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JCSE COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT INCLOSURE

AGENCY	NUMBER	BY SERVICE				BY GRADE		
		AF	AR	N	MC	OFF	ENL	CIV*
<u>HQ RDJTF</u>								
OVERHEAD	27	16	11	0	0	7	18	2
LOGISTICS	39	35	4	0	0	0	27	12
MAINTENANCE	268	160	101	0	7	3	259	6
OPERATIONS	232	79	140	11	2	6	226	0
SUB TOTAL	566	290	256	11	9	16	530	20
<u>ARFOR</u>								
OVERHEAD	2	0	2	0	0	1	1	0
OPERATIONS	28	13	15	0	0	0	28	0
SUB TOTAL	30	13	17	0	0	1	29	0
<u>AFFOR</u>								
OVERHEAD	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
OPERATIONS	28	12	16	0	0	0	28	0
SUB TOTAL	30	13	17	0	0	1	29	0
<u>MARFOR</u>								
OVERHEAD	2	0	0	0	2	1	1	0
OPERATIONS	28	12	10	2	4	0	28	0
SUB TOTAL	30	12	10	2	6	1	29	0
<u>JUWTF</u>								
OVERHEAD	4	0	4	0	0	2	2	0
OPERATIONS	78	33	35	10	0	0	78	0
MAINTENANCE	42	21	21	0	0	0	42	0
SUB TOTAL	124	54	60	10	0	2	122	0
TOTAL	780	382	360	23	15	21	739	20

*CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WILL NOT DEPLOY

APPENDIX 1

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APPENDIX M

-1-

Terms of Reference for the RDJTF

Combat Capabilities and Analysis Group

1. General

a. These terms of reference (TOR) identify the mission, staff relationships, tasks/responsibilities and support requirements of the Combat Capabilities and Analysis Group (CCAG).

b. The CCAG is a special staff element of the RDJTF reporting directly to the Chief of Staff (RDCS).

c. The CCAG is established to provide the immediate capability to analyze areas of concern and current issues from an operational viewpoint. The total structure of the CCAG will be fluid with a core of six permanently assigned officers and other officers to be assigned on a temporary basis from the other directorates and/or special staff offices for special projects as directed by the RDCS.

d. The permanently assigned CCAG officers required are identified and present source shown.

<u>LINE</u>	<u>DUTY POSITION</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
01	CH CCAG	O-6	AF	Presently O-6 overage
02	DEP CH CCAG	O-5	A	Presently O-6 overage
03	CH RED CAPABILITY BR	O-5	N	Presently from J-3
04	ASST CH RED CAPABILITY BR	O-4	AF	Vacant
05	CH BLUE CAPABILITY BR	O-5	MC	Vacant
06	ASST CH BLUE CAPABILITY BR	O-4	A	Vacant

2. Mission

The CCAG will analyze RDJTF areas of concern from an operational perspective to seek improvements in Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) combat capability.

3. Tasks and Responsibilities

a. The CCAG will develop expertise on areas of the world of primary concern to RDJTF. The initial analysis will focus on the Middle East area.

b. The CCAG will provide immediate feedback on all analysis actions to the commander and staff in the most appropriate format.

c. The CCAG will continue to perform sensitivity analysis on assumptions and critical factors involved in the current RDJTF areas of concern.

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d. Analysis results will receive RDJTF staff review before presentation to the Command Section and all areas of non-concurrence will be highlighted to the decision-making authority. The most appropriate staff agency will be tasked for implementing actions approved by the Command Section.

e. Methods and display formats will be devised to clearly present the analysis results to the commander and staff.

f. The CCAG will serve as the RDJTF "think tank" and will be unconstrained by present or past solutions. This is an attempt to develop new and innovative approaches to improve operational capability, readiness, mobility, sustainability, and command relationships.

g. The CCAG will function as the point of contact to determine appropriate study efforts that should be conducted for RDJTF by outside agencies and commercial "think tanks".

h. The CCAG will be prepared to present the status of current activities and specific areas of study for high-level visitors, as directed by RDCS.

4. Staff Relationships

a. Direct coordination with all elements of HQ RDJTF authorized.

b. Direct coordination with all Service CHECKMATE/gaming type activities authorized.

c. Direct coordination with RDJTF/WLO authorized.

d. Tasking of AFFOR, ARFOR, MARFOR and NAVFOR will be approved by RDCS.

5. Support Requirements

a. The Chief, CCAG, will identify funding requirements to the RDCO.

b. The Chief of Staff will provide administrative support to the CCAG until such time as internal CCAG administrative requirements are identified and sourced.

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APPENDIX N
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

HEADQUARTERS, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

AND

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES READINESS COMMAND

AND

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE

1. PURPOSE: This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Commanders in Chief, Strategic Air Command (SAC), United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM), and Commander, United States Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (USRDJTF), affirms the policies and principles relative to SAC participation in the RDJTF and establishment of an Operating Location (OL). This document records those policies and principles agreed to by each agency.

2. OBJECTIVE: The objective of this agreement is to establish liaison and continuity between Headquarters SAC and the RDJTF. This liaison element will provide responsive support to the RDJTF for the inclusion of SAC capabilities into the concept of operations for the Rapid Deployment Force.

3. PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION:

a. The stated objective will be accomplished by placing SAC personnel in full-time residence with the RDJTF support staff or applicable function.

b. The SAC representative(s) will:

(1) Provide timely information and coordination regarding SAC policies, procedures, concepts and philosophies with respect to RDJTF development, employment and accompanying logistical management.

(2) Be responsible for keeping Headquarters SAC agencies apprised of RDJTF activity.

(3) Coordinate SAC activity with USREDCOM and Joint Deployment Agency (JDA). Insure easy access for SAC and USREDCOM for planning and assistance during exercise activities.

(4) Represent SAC during the planning phase for USREDCOM, RDJTF, JDA, command post and field training exercises.

(5) Be responsible to the RDJTF Functional Staff counterparts for taskings other than those directly involving SAC operations, to aid in the accomplishment of the overall RDJTF mission.

(6) Review and expedite coordination of all OPLANS/CONPLANS and other matters involving mutual interest or resources.

c. The Commander, RDJTF will provide collocated SAC personnel with the opportunity to participate in the RDJTF on the same basis and within the same constraints as RDJTF personnel.

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Attachment #1

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d. The liaison office will periodically brief the SAC Consolidated Contingency Steering Group (COSG) and concerned staff offices on the status of SAC participation in RDJTF activity. Similar briefings will be presented to Commander, RDJTF, or his designated representative as required.

4. SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION:

a. SACOS/XO is the Headquarters SAC deputate primarily responsible for supporting contingency plans through the administrative direction of the SAC XO, Director of Combat Operations. The SACOS/XO will provide three Officers (Colonel, AFSC 0035, Major, AFSC 1435C, Major, AFSC 2265Y) and one administration supervisor (TSgt, AFSC 70270B) to serve as the SAC Liaison Element to RDJTF. Headquarters SAC Director of Contingency Logistics will provide one officer (Lt Col, AFSC 6616) to support SAC Logistics Liaison to the RDJTF. These individuals will occupy SAC Special Intelligence (SI) and Special Activity Office (SAO) billets. The official designation for the liaison office is operating location MD (OL-MD), MacDill AFB, FL.

b. The normal duty location of the liaison office, OL-MD, is at the RDJTF, MacDill AFB, FL.

c. All leaves and TDY's requested by the SAC liaison CC must be coordinated with Headquarters SAC/XO and the RDJTF. The Liaison CC will coordinate and approve leaves and TDY'S of remaining liaison element personnel. SAC personnel assigned at the RDJTF may be placed on TDY to accomplish collateral training, personnel reviews and other personnel actions at times mutually agreeable to the RDJTF and the cognizant SAC agency. TDY directed by RDJTF will be funded from RDJTF resources. TDY directed by SAC will be funded by SAC.

d. SAC will maintain strength accountability of the SAC personnel assigned to the liaison element.

e. Files will be maintained by the liaison office in accordance with applicable directives. RDJTF will furnish appropriate office space, furnishings and safe filing provisions for proper administrative and secure file maintenance.

f. Required Security Clearances will be forwarded to RDJTF by Headquarters SAC and appropriate security badges will be provided by RDJTF.

g. Administrative support will be provided by RDJTF as necessary. It is anticipated that this support will be minimal and will not impose an undue burden and will include:

(1) Telephone communications, including at least one class A telephone line for AUTOVON and outside contact, and at least one class C telephone line for on-base and inter-office calls.

(2) Standard office furniture and equipment to include desks, tables, chairs, filing cabinets, safes, bookcases and typewriters.

(3) Such necessary expendable office supplies which are not within the capability of the liaison office to provide.

(4) Specialized support services, to include microfiche document reproduction, audiovisual equipment loan, photographic and/or graphic arts assistance, classified materials packaging and handling, security indoctrination and debriefing of assigned personnel, and administrative (classified and unclassified distribution).

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h. SAC personnel will be provided an opportunity to attend and participate in internal and external conferences/reviews relative to SAC activity and/or related programs. All visits to RDJTF activities by SAC personnel will be coordinated and monitored by the liaison office.

i. The Commander of the RDJTF may expect that all SAC inputs provided by the liaison office represent a fully coordinated and agreed upon SAC position, policy, concept or philosophy. He may also expect that SAC personnel assigned to the liaison office will be of the highest caliber, and their conduct and support will reflect the spirit of cooperation contained in this document.


(1) The Commander of the RDJTF will submit to Headquarters SAC/XOO a Letter of Evaluation (LOE) on the Senior SAC Liaison Officer to support the preparation of his OER.


(2) The Senior Liaison Officer or his designated representative will be authorized to sign all correspondence pertaining to their respective activities.

j. The Commander of the RDJTF will provide Headquarters SAC with reasonable and proper notification of any changes in directives, operating procedures, or philosophy that would substantially alter the present relationship.

k. This Memorandum of Agreement may be terminated by any signatory agency after providing reasonable and proper notification to all participating agencies. It is effective 1 July 1980, and will be reviewed annually by RDJTF/J5 and SACOS/XOO.


R. H. ELLIS
General, USAF
CINCSAC


VOLNEY F. WARNER
General, USA
USCINCRD


P. X. KELLEY
Lieutenant General, USMC
Commander, RDJTF

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APPENDIX O

RDJTF INTERVIEWS

1980

June 2 - Phil Budahn, Newport News Daily Press, Maj Gen Taylor
June 18 - Briefing for Pentagon press corps, LtGen Kelley
June 20 - Rick Bernard, Defense Week, Maj Gen Taylor
June 25 - Steve Strasser, Newsweek, LtGen Kelley
July 14 - Walter Guzzardi, Fortune Magazine, LtGen Kelley
July 14 - Richard Halloran, New York Times, LtGen Kelley
July 25 - Bernard Ullman, L'Express, Maj Gen Taylor
July 28 - Ian Mather, London Observer, Maj Gen Taylor
July 31 - Jon Dietz, Sarasota Herald, CDR (b)(6)
August 5 - Richard Halloran, New York Times, LtGen Kelley and others
Sept. 3 - Phil Smith, Newhouse News Service, LtGen Kelley
Sept. 25 - Al Slagle, New York Daily News, Maj Gen Taylor
Sept. 29 - Robert Toth, Los Angeles Times, LtGen Kelley (telephone)
Sept. 30 - Robert Dudley, U.S. News & World Report, LtGen Kelley
Oct. 7 - George Wilson, Washington Post, LtGen Kelley, BG Stiner,
and principal staff members
Oct. 8 - Bill Currie, Chicago Tribune, LtGen Kelley
Oct. 24 - Robert Toth, Los Angeles Times, LtGen Kelley
Oct. 29 - Jim West, WTVT Television, LtGen Kelley
Dec. 2 - Editorial Board, New York Times, LtGen Kelley
Dec. 17 - Phillip Clarke, American Legion Magazine, LtGen Kelley

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APPENDIX P

DISTINGUISHED VISITORS TO HEADQUARTERS, RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE 1980

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31 MR (b)(6)
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs

APRIL

24-25 BRIGADIER GENERAL WELDON F. HONEYCUTT
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, FORSCOM

29-30 ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR
CINCSOUTH (Designee)

MAY

1 MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT A. SULLIVAN
Chief of Public Affairs, OSA

6 MAJOR GENERAL JOHN W. HUDACHEK
Commanding General, US Army Computer Systems Command

12 BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD D. BROWN
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, MAC

15 REAR ADMIRAL PETER R. BROWN
Commander, Reserve Naval Construction Force,
Naval Reserve Center

21 MR (b)(6)
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs

21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARNOLD W. BRASWELL
Commander, 9th Air Force

22 MR (b)(6)
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Planning
Office of the Secretary of Defense

22 BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES I. GRANGER
Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs,
J5, OJCS

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27 GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND (Ret)
27 CAPTAIN (b)(6) RAN
Commandant, Australian Joint Warfare Establishment
27-28 MAJOR GENERAL HENRY H. HARPER
Director, J4/J7, USEUCOM
29 BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT F. MCCARTHY
Vice Commander, Air Force Communications Command
28-29 MR (b)(6)
Chief, Office of Support to Military Operations, NSA
29-31 BRIGADIER GENERAL PAUL P. BURNS
Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Finance & Accounting Center

JUNE

2 MAJOR GENERAL BO VAN ENIUS
Chief of the Naval Staff, Swedish Coastal Artillery
3-4 BRIGADIER GENERAL HENNING RAMON VON ONDARZA
Defense Attache, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
5 BRIGADIER GENERAL VINCENT M. RUSSO
Director of Plans, Readiness and Systems, Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, HQ DA
12 MAJOR GENERAL JOHN N. BRANDENBURG,
Director of Operations, USREDCOM (Designee)
19 MR (b)(6)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs
20 MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD E. CAREY
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Policy, Joint Exercises,
CINCLANT
20 BRIGADIER GENERAL ALBERT J. KAEHN, JR
Commander, Air Weather Service, MAC
21 ADMIRAL SIR TERRENCE LEWIN
Chief of Defense Staff, United Kingdom

JULY

9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL HAROLD F. HARDIN, JR
DCG, Materiel Readiness, DARCOM
10 BRIGADIER GENERAL DOUGLAS B. SMITH
Dep Dir for Operations, National Military Command Center
(NMCC)

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11 BRIGADIER GENERAL DALE A. VESSER
Chief, Washington Liaison Office, RDJTF

15-16 GENERAL ROBERT C. MATHIAS
Vice Chief of Staff, USAF

16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL EDWARD J. MILLER
Commanding General, FMFLANT

21 MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM E. READ
Assistant Chief of Engineers, HQ DA

25 MAJOR GENERAL GERALD E. COOKE
Commandant, Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)

28 BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD O. ALDRIDGE
Deputy Director, Plans and Requirements, Defense
Mapping Agency

29 LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS M. RYAN
Vice CINCMAC

29-30 BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSEPH C. LUTZ
Commander, John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance

30 REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. SMITH
Director, Naval Communications Division

30 MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES C. IRIONS
Deputy Director Logistics, J4, OJCS

31 HONORABLE W. GRAHAM CLAYTOR, JR
Deputy Secretary of Defense

AUGUST

4-5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL PHILIP C. GAST
Director of Operations, J3, OJCS

5 BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS B. MCHUGH
Deputy Director of Operations, NMCC

8 BRIGADIER GENERAL GERALD L. PRATHER
Director, J6, USREDCOM (Designee)

18 MR (b)(6)
Staff Member, Defense Coordination and Planning Division,
Bureau Japanese Defense Agency

20 BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVIS C. ROHR
Chief of of Military Cooperation, Egypt

21 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE TAMPA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

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21-22 AMBASSADOR ROBERT H. PELLETREAU
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs

29 RESERVE NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE MOBILIZATION CONFERENCE

SEPTEMBER

4 MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE A. EDWARDS JR
Director, Plans and Policy, USREDCOM (Designee)

7-8 BRIGADIER GENERAL PAUL H. HODGES
Deputy Director for Operations, Reconnaissance and
Electronic Warfare, J3, OJCS

10-12 REAR ADMIRAL FRED W. JOHNSTON, JR
Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs,
J5, OJCS

12 GENERAL LEW ALLEN, JR
Chief of Staff, USAF

16-17 COLONEL (b)(6)
CJCS Staff Group

19 MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES P. GRAHAM
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, FORSCOM

23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL GERALD J. POST
Director, Defense Logistics Agency

23-24 BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT D. HAMMOND
Chief, Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency OJCS

23-24 COLONEL (b)(6)
Deputy Director, Washington Liaison Office

24 LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES M. GAVIN, (Ret)
Arthur D. Little Co.

24-25 MR (b)(6)
Director of Procurement, Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller)

25 BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD A. VOGT
Military Assistant to Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
for Strategic & Space Systems, OSD

29-30 MR. (b)(6)
Special Assistant to the Director of Intelligence, HQMC

29-30 CAPTAIN (b)(6)
Commander, Naval Oceanographic Command

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OCTOBER

6 MAJOR GENERAL HAROLD A. HATCH
Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations
and Logistics, HQMC

BRIGADIER GENERAL MANNON A. JOHNSON, JR
Director, Materiel, HQMC

7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL WINFIELD W. SCOTT, JR
Commander, Alaskan Air Command

7 MR (b)(6)
Professional Staff Member, Senate Armed Services Committee

7-8 MR (b)(6)
Deputy Director, DIA

8-9 REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT P. MCKENZIE
Commander, Caribbean Contingency JTF

8-9 PROUD SPIRIT EVALUATION TEAM

8-9 BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN A. SHAUD
Commander, 57th Air Division

9-10 (b)(6)
Senate Armed Services Committee

9-10 HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE MEMBERS

16 STAFF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

21 GENERAL JOHN R. GUTHRIE
Commanding General, DARCOM

21 BRIGADIER GENERAL BENJAMIN L. REGISTER, JR
Director, Materiel Management, DARCOM

21 BRIGADIER GENERAL ARTHUR HOLMES, JR
Director, Readiness, DARCOM

NOVEMBER

1-3 MAJOR GENERAL PATRICK J. HALLORAN
Deputy Director, Strategic Command, Control and
Communications Systems, OJCS

2-3 MAJOR GENERAL JAMES M. ROCKWELL
Director, Command, Control Communications Systems,
CINCPAC (Designee)

2-3 MAJOR GENERAL JOHN W. SEIGLE
Assistant DCS, Operations and Plans, Joint Affairs,
HQ DA

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4-6 MAJOR GENERAL ERIC W. BARTON, MBE
Director of Military Survey, Ministry of Defence (UK)

5-6 MR (b)(6)
Chief, Operations Support Group

6-8 SENIOR FOREIGN MILITARY ATTACHES

12 VADM WILLIAM J. COWHILL
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Logistics

12 MAJOR GENERAL ALTON H. HARVEY
Judge Advocate General, USA

13 BRIGADIER GENERAL HARRY H. BENDORF
Deputy Director for Force Development & Strategic Plans
JS, JCS

13-14 BRIGADIER GENERAL LLYLE J. BARKER, JR
Deputy Chief of Public Affairs, USA

24 GENERAL BRYCE POE II
Commander, Air Force Logistics Command

24 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BILLY M. MINTER
DCS/Logistics & Engineering, HQ USAF

24 BRIGADIER GENERAL THEODORE D. BROADWATER
Director, Logistics Plans & Programs, HQ USAF

24 BRIGADIER GENERAL CLIFTON D. WRIGHT
Deputy Director, Engineering Services, HQ USAF

24 BRIGADIER GENERAL LEO MARQUEZ
DCS/Plans & Programs, AFLC

24 MAJOR GENERAL JACK W. WATERS
DCS/Logistics Operations, AFLC

DECEMBER

3-5 DR (b)(6)
Director of Special Regional Studies, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Programs, Analysis, and
Evaluation

4 AIR WAR COLLEGE STUDENTS AND FACULTY

11-12 MR (b)(6)
Senior Transportation Officer to Commander, MTMC

14-15 BRIGADIER GENERAL DUANE H. ERICKSON
Commander, US Forces Azores/ Commander 1605 ABW, MAC

15 NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE CLASS OF 1981

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16 CONGRESSMAN IKE SKELTON (D-MO)
House Armed Services Committee

16 MR (b)(6)
Consultant, USDR&E

16-17 MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES L. DONNELLY, JR
Chief, US Military Training Mission, Saudi Arabia

17-18 MR (b)(6)
Deputy for Mobilization and Analysis, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve
Affairs)

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1982 COMMAND HISTORY

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UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33608

6 April 1984

SUBJECT: RDJTF 1982 Command History

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RDJTF 1982
Cmd History

Robert C. Kingston
ROBERT C. KINGSTON
Lieutenant General, USA
Commander in Chief

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PREFACE

(U) This is the last of the three annual histories which constitute the official command chronology of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). At the end of 1982, the calendar year covered by this history, the RDJTF was inactivated and replaced by the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) which was activated on 1 January 1983. This history tells the story of the last year of the RDJTF and its transition into USCENTCOM. It is submitted in accordance with Joint Chiefs of Staff SM-481-82, "Preparation of Histories of Joint and Combined Headquarters," dated 2 August 1982, with additional guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Office of History.



COMMANDER
ROBERT C. KINGSTON
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA



DEPUTY COMMANDER
ROBERT C. TAYLOR
MAJOR GENERAL, USAF



CHIEF OF STAFF
JAMES R. VAN DEN ELZEN
BRIGADIER GENERAL, USMC

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CHAPTER I
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

(U) The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was established on 1 March 1980 as a command subordinate to the United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM), at MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), Florida. During the next few years, the RDJTF evolved from a force designed to be deployed virtually anywhere in the world into a regional unified command representing American interests in the Middle East. As the first step in this evolution, the RDJTF became a separate joint task force on 1 October 1981. At the same time, it ceased to be subordinate to USREDCOM. The RDJTF's evolution culminated in its inactivation on 31 December 1982 and in the establishment of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) on 1 January 1983.

(U) During the 1,036 days of the RDJTF's existence, it focused its primary interest on the region of the world then considered most likely to require the rapid deployment of American forces: Southwest Asia and Northeast Africa. This area of responsibility (AOR) consisted, at various times, of four to six African nations and of 12 or 13 Asian countries on the Arabian peninsula and off the Persian Gulf. Taking into account the often complex relations between these 16 to 19 countries in the AOR and their neighbors, the RDJTF's focus of interest ranged, in the words of one briefer, from "Marrakech to Bangladesh."

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(U) Before the establishment of USCENTCOM, the RDJTF's geographical area of interest straddled two existing US unified commands: the United States European Command (USEUCOM) and the Pacific Command (PACOM). These commands, which had been in existence since World War II, represented American military interests in the European and Pacific theaters from their headquarters (HQ) in Stuttgart and Honolulu, respectively. The boundary between the two commands ran just west of Pakistan, with USEUCOM responsible for the countries of the Middle East, northeast Africa, and the Arabian peninsula, while PACOM was responsible for Pakistan and points east.

(U) This arrangement of American unified commands, which had appeared reasonable at the end of World War II, began to need rethinking by the 1980s in view of geopolitical changes which had taken place since the war. Traditionally, western interests in the Middle East had been looked after by forces of the British Empire, which, though moribund, was still intact at the end of World War II. With the independence of India from the British raj in 1948 and the removal of British forces from east of Suez in the late 1960s, United States (US) involvement in the area gradually began to increase in the postwar period. Iran, under the Shah, was then the principal US ally maintaining stability in the area.

~~(U) Late in 1979, however, two events occurred which~~
fundamentally changed the balance of power in the region. In Iran,

the Shah was replaced by the fanatical theocrat Ayatollah Khomeini, and Afghanistan was invaded and conquered by Soviet forces. Both of these events deeply affected the thinking of President Jimmy Carter, and the RDJTF was established on 1 March 1980. With the Shah gone, Iran was no longer a stabilizing force in the Persian Gulf, and the United States moved to shore up its other allies in the region. The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force constituted the military part of that American foreign policy, and it took steps to establish itself as a credible force in 1980 and 1981.

(U) During 1982, the RDJTF presided over its own self-destruction as it made the transition to USCENTCOM. Throughout the year, its official mission remained the same as it had been since 1 October 1981. Effective on that date and continuing throughout the remaining life of the RDJTF, the commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was responsible for planning, joint training, exercising, and being prepared to deploy designated forces to the Southwest Asia area of responsibility. Originally, the Southwest Asia region was defined as all states on the Arabian Peninsula south of the northern borders of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; the countries of Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan on the Middle East landmass; Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya on the Horn of Africa; and the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and adjacent waters. Later, on 1 October 1981, the African nations of Egypt and the Sudan were added to the RDJTF's area of responsibility while the "adjacent waters" of the Persian Gulf were deleted. On 7 December 1982, just before the

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


Figure 1. Southwest Asia and Northeast Africa

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activation of USCENTCOM, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) specified the general area of responsibility by enumerating 19 countries: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen Arab Republic, plus the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. This was the first time that Jordan had been on the list, giving the nascent USCENTCOM responsibility for 19 nations altogether.¹ For a map of the RDJTF's area of responsibility, see Figure 1 on the facing page.

(U) 1. Msg ~~(S/OADR)~~, JCS to CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC, and Commander Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, subj: Establishment of US Central Command, 071359Z Dec 82. Info used is (U).

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MISSION

U ~~(S)~~ The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force reported directly to the National Command Authorities (NCA) through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to the responsibilities outlined above, the commander of the RDJTF was also expected to coordinate exercises directly with appropriate commanders and with the JCS, to employ forces as directed by the National Command Authorities through the JCS, and to manage the transition of the RDJTF to a unified command in accordance with JCS policy and direction. Managing this transition was the central issue facing the RDJTF during 1982.²

U ~~(C)~~ Effective 1 October 1981 and continuing through the end of 1982, the RDJTF was under the direction of the National Command Authorities through the JCS. The commander of the RDJTF was specifically authorized to communicate with four categories of people: (1) the chiefs of the military services on uni-service matters as he deemed appropriate, (2) the commanders of unified and specified commands, (3) the Joint Chiefs of Staff on other matters including the preparation of strategic and logistical plans, strategic and operational direction of forces, conduct of combat operations, and other necessary functions of command required to accomplish the mission, and (4) the Secretary of Defense, to the same extent as granted the commanders of unified and specified

(U) 2. JCS SM-661-81 (~~S/DECL 18 Jun 87~~), 23 Sep 81, "Terms of Reference for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force," 23 Sep 81.

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commands. Also, all command agreement arrangements (CAA) and memoranda of understanding (MOU) between the RDJTF commander and commanders of unified and specified commands were to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval. This included CAAs and MOUs which were required for administrative and logistic support provided by headquarters USREDCOM to the RDJTF.³

U ~~(c)~~ The RDJTF had three component headquarters assigned to it: Rapid Deployment Army Forces (RDARFOR), XVIII Airborne Corps, headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Headquarters Rapid Deployment Naval Forces (RDNAVFOR), at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and Headquarters, Rapid Deployment Air Force Forces (RDAFFOR), at Shaw AFB, South Carolina. Designated forces of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force were under the operational control of the RDJTF commander through the appropriate component headquarters. In addition, other forces were made available for planning and identified in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). For exercises and employment, forces were identified in applicable JCS directives.⁴

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. See also Historical Review (U), FY 82, XVIII Airborne Corps & Fort Bragg.

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ORGANIZATION

(U) In order to carry out its mission of planning, training, exercising, and being prepared to deploy forces, the RDJTF headquarters was organized into six directorates and a number of special staff agencies. The directorates were organized along the functional lines of the Army's "G" system, an organizational pattern going back to the creation of the General Staff in 1921 by General of the Armies John J. Pershing. As with other joint commands, "J" replaced "G" in the RDJTF's nomenclature, and the directorates were numbered J-1 through J-6. Each directorate will be discussed in more detail below.

(U) The Personnel Directorate, or J-1, was primarily responsible for the adequacy of RDJTF staff manning. It also insured the deployability and sustainability of the HQ RDJTF staff, carried out personnel planning for contingency and operations plans and orders, and developed personnel policy. The J-1 monitored morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs within the command and conducted the RDJTF safety program. It insured accomplishment of records management, personnel requisitioning and actions, processing of effectiveness reports, awards management, Congressional correspondence, and Red Cross liaison. The directorate also provided manpower control and organization management.

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(U) The commander of the RDJTF received intelligence information from his J-2, or Intelligence Directorate. It was responsible for all intelligence and counterintelligence matters pertinent to missions assigned to the commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. In broadest terms, the J-2 was responsible for the collection, production, and dissemination of the intelligence needed to support the command's mission.

(U) Operational matters were the province of the J-3, or Operations Directorate. It was responsible for the operational aspects of missions, tasks, and responsibilities assigned to the commander of the RDJTF. The J-3 advised the commander on all matters pertaining to the strategic and operational direction of assigned forces, the conduct of combat operations, and other command functions required to accomplish the assigned mission. He monitored the operational status of subordinate elements and identified requirements for the host nation support needed to conduct operations in the RDJTF's assigned area of responsibility. When deployed, the J-3 coordinated joint force combat operations involving air, ground, and naval forces. In addition, the operations directorate provided staff supervision over all aspects of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and planning.

(U) The J-4, or Logistics Directorate, was charged with ~~implementing the RDJTF commander's authority within the command~~ logistics arena. The director of logistics was charged with ensuring

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the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of operations by providing materiel and facilities when needed. The J-4 was also expected to eliminate unnecessary duplication of facilities and to prevent overlapping of functions among the service components of the command. Finally, he provided staff support to the command in all aspects of logistics, security assistance, military construction, weapons planning, and operations, while coordinating among the components, military services, host nations, and other commands.

(U) The Plans, Policy, and Programs Directorate (J-5) was assigned a wide-ranging variety of tasks. It was responsible for the preparation and maintenance of operations orders (OPORD) and plans, including concept plans (CONPLAN). To support a variety of war plans, it prepared, reviewed, and coordinated time phased force deployment data (TPFDD). The J-5 also advised the commander on matters relating to command policy, missions, and functions which concerned the joint deployment, employment, and redeployment of forces. He provided a staff focal point for reviewing, analyzing, and recommending courses of action concerning deployments and evaluated tasking documents pertaining to policy, command relationships, and long-range planning. The plans directorate prepared the RDJTF input to the Department of Defense (DOD) planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS). In addition, it had primary staff responsibility for the deployment, coordination, and implementation of civil affairs policy and supervised the implementation of civil-military cooperation functions within the

command. The J-5 also advised the RDJTF commander, the JCS, and unified and specified commands on matters relating to RDJTF policy, mission, functions, requirements, and the development of doctrine and techniques for the joint deployment and employment of forces.

(U) Communications were provided by the Command and Control, Communications and Computer Systems (C⁴S) Directorate, known as "J-6" for short. It was responsible for the development of communications-electronics and automatic data processing (ADP) policies, plans, budgets, and programs for the commander of the RDJTF. The J-6 ensured command, control, and communications (C³) support for the command. He also supervised the development, acquisition, and operation of communications and ADP facilities and equipment. The J-6 was the RDJTF focal point for the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) and was responsible for coordination with the JCS, the Defense Communications Agency (DCA), and the NSA on technical matters during peacetime and for implementing these agencies' management policies during contingencies or war.

(U) In addition to these six directorates, the RDJTF had a number of other staff agencies to assist the commander in carrying out his assigned functions. Chief among these was the Washington Liaison Office (WLO), which as its name implied, maintained liaison in the nation's capital. The WLO dealt with the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), with the Services' headquarters, with the National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and other DOD and non-DOD agencies. In general, it was responsible for keeping abreast of all ongoing actions which affected the command's mission and for representing the command's interests in Washington.

(U) Back in Florida, the RDJTF had several other specialized agencies to help it accomplish its mission. The adjutant general developed and instituted plans, policies, and precedence systems, while maintaining a budget to support the commander and headquarters staff. The legal advisor was responsible for providing legal advice to the RDJTF commander. He also interacted with US and foreign government agencies, reviewing country law studies and advising the commander on the need for country-to-country agreements, drafting and assisting in their negotiation and conclusion. He provided support in legislative liaison and coordinated the Congressional testimony of the commander and staff of the RDJTF. The legal advisor also provided legal assistance to members and dependents of the RDJTF. In addition, he developed exercise and real-world plans in support of all operations, negotiating fly-over rights, staging rights, basing rights, status of forces agreements, and procurement of local goods and labor, while taking into account host country laws and procedures.

(U) The public affairs officer advised the commander and his staff on public information matters. He generated public affairs policy recommendations and directives, drafted public affairs

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annexes to operation plans (OPLAN) and orders, provided public affairs policy guidance to component commands and assigned forces, arranged media briefings and interviews, and provided public affairs services during combat operations. His wartime responsibilities included providing cleared daily summaries, security reviews, and audiovisual coverage of combat operations. He served as the cognizant staff officer for community relations and command information and handled public affairs audiovisual matters. In general, he oversaw public affairs activities within the RDJTF's area of responsibility.

(U) In the area of law enforcement and security, the provost marshal maintained law and order within the command. To this end, he provided analysis of police statistical data, made recommendations about the confinement of US personnel, and coordinated with local national police forces. He also developed plans and policies concerning enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees. The RDJTF provost marshal provided staff supervision over the functions of the Army's 22d Prisoner of War Internee Information Center (PWIIC). Finally, he maintained liaison with the Air Force Office of Special Investigation (OSI), with the Naval Investigative Service (NIS), and with the Army Criminal Investigative Division (CID).

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(U) The comptroller was responsible for advising the commander and his staff on resource management, fiscal and budgetary matters, resource structure, and the creation and maintenance of a financial management system. He executed the approved operating budget, joint readiness exercise budget, and foreign military sales (FMS) programs. He also developed comptroller annexes for war plans, and for operational, emergency, contingency, and evacuation plans. He insured, through the component commanders, that appropriate provisions were made for the pay of US military and civilian personnel, local national civilian personnel, and prisoners of war, as well as arranging for banking, savings, and remittance services for US personnel. In garrison, the comptroller provided military pay and related finance service support to people assigned to RDJTF headquarters.

(U) Within the RDJTF's garrison at MacDill, as well as when deployed, one of the more important staff members was the headquarters commandant. He provided base support to the RDJTF headquarters during deployments, redeployments, and while at home station, including internal physical security, food service, transportation, maintenance, engineering, and supply. He functioned as troop commander and provided an orderly room to support the headquarters. The commandant's office monitored the services' required training programs and maintained necessary records, while managing service school requirements, including allocating quotas for schools.

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(U) Other staff members included the surgeon and the chaplain. The command surgeon exercised staff supervision on all medical matters, developed and coordinated medical plans, and advised the commander on the overall health of the command. The command chaplain assisted and advised the commander and staff on all religious activities within the command. The chaplain was also the staff expert on the religious beliefs, policies, procedures, and laws of the countries within the RDJTF's area of responsibility. This knowledge was particularly useful in view of the widely varying religious practices found in the Middle East, which ranged from Christianity to several mutually antipathetical varieties of Islam.

(U) Finally, the Combat Capabilities Analysis Group researched and analyzed questions which affected the combat capabilities of the RDJTF and those of potentially hostile military forces. It made an effort to test the validity of assumptions contained in command plans, and tried to analyze the RDJTF's strategies, logistics, and operations. Generally, it performed as an in-house "think tank" for the RDJTF.

(U) In addition to the six directorates and several special staff agencies discussed above, there were a number of liaison offices attached to the RDJTF. Two specified commands, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Military Airlift Command (MAC), were represented by liaison officers at MacDill, as were two other

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
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unified commands, USEUCOM and PACOM. There was also a Defense Communications Agency field office and a National Security Agency representative assigned to the staff. The organization of the RDJTF headquarters as of October 1982 was as shown in Figure 2 on page 17:

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Figure 2. RDJTF Organization (As of October 1982)



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KEY PERSONNEL

(U) Throughout 1982, the commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was Lieutenant General (LTG) Robert C. Kingston, US Army. Born on [REDACTED] (b)(6) in Brookline, Massachusetts, General Kingston enlisted in the Army in November 1948. On 20 December 1949, he received a commission as a second lieutenant of infantry following Officer Candidate School at Fort Riley, Kansas. During two tours in Korea between 1950 and 1954, General Kingston served with the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry as platoon leader, executive officer, company commander, and, during his second tour, as the commanding officer of the Far East Command Special Mission Group.

(U) In 1954 and 1955, then-Captain Kingston served as the executive officer of the Ranger Mountain Camp at Dahlonega, Georgia. Afterwards, he served with the 82d Airborne Division from 1956 to 1959, as an airborne infantry company commander and as assistant division G-2. In 1960, he completed the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1960 and 1961, Major Kingston sojourned in England as the exchange airborne officer with the 16th Independent Parachute Group, including a nine-month tour as commander of C Company, 3d Battalion. Continuing to serve in Europe, General Kingston moved to the Special Planning Staff Branch of the Operations Division at HQ, United States Army Europe (USAREUR) in August 1961. He returned to the United States in June 1963 to the Army Airmobile Test Unit

at Fort Benning, Georgia. From August 1964 to July 1965, then Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Kingston attended the University of Omaha, receiving a bachelor's degree in general education. College graduation was followed by attendance at the Armed Forces Staff College, from which he graduated in January 1966.

(U) During his first tour in Vietnam, from February 1966 through September 1967, then-Colonel Kingston served as the senior US advisor to the Vietnamese Ranger High Command, as commander of the 1st Battalion 35th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, and as a member of the Studies and Observation Group, HQ Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Returning to the United States in October 1967, he served as the chief of the General Planning Branch, Plans and Programs Directorate, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, HQ Department of the Army, until August 1968, when he began a one-year class at the National War College in Washington, DC. After graduating from the National War College and receiving a master's degree in foreign relations from George Washington University, Colonel Kingston moved to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and assumed command of the 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces. He returned to Vietnam in November 1969 as Commanding Officer, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). After commanding this brigade for six months, he assumed command of the division's 1st Brigade for an additional three months.

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(U) Returning to the United States, Colonel Kingston became Deputy Secretary of the General Staff in the Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army. Following attendance at the University of Pittsburgh's Advanced Management Program for Executives, Colonel Kingston returned to Vietnam in June of 1972, where he served as Deputy Commanding General, Second Regional Assistance Command and as Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps and Military Region 2. He was promoted to brigadier general on 29 December 1972 and assumed command of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, on 23 January 1973.

(U) Returning to Fort Riley, General Kingston became assistant division commander of the 1st Infantry Division on 4 February 1974. On 1 September 1975, he was promoted to major general, backdated to 1 June 1973. General Kingston assumed command of the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance and the US Army Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg on 1 October 1975. Beginning his third tour in Korea on 20 June 1977, General Kingston assumed duties as assistant chief of staff, J-3, United Nations Command, United States Forces Korea, Eighth US Army, in Seoul. On 28 July 1977, General Kingston became the chief of staff of the Tri-Headquarters, and on 1 June 1979, he assumed command of the 2d Infantry Division at Camp Casey, Korea. General Kingston was promoted to lieutenant general on his 53rd birthday, 16 July 1981, and assumed command of the RDJTF the following day, succeeding Lieutenant General (LtGen)

Paul X. Kelley, United States Marine Corps (USMC), who had commanded the RDJTF since its activation on 1 March 1980.

(U) The deputy commander of the RDJTF throughout 1982 was Major General (Maj Gen) Robert C. Taylor, United States Air Force (USAF). General Taylor was an RDJTF "plankholder," a term which meant that he had been assigned to the command since its activation in March of 1980. Born in (b)(6) in Danforth, Illinois, General Taylor was a command pilot who had flown more than 4,300 hours in fighters, including the F-86, F-89, F-102, and F-4. Following 17 years of assignments to fighter squadrons around the world, General Taylor graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1970. While assigned to the Directorate of Plans, HQ USAF, from 1970 to 1972, he was selected for duty as Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Melvin E. Laird. He later served in the same capacity for the next two Secretaries of Defense, Mr. Elliot L. Richardson and Dr. James R. Schlesinger. In 1974, General Taylor became Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) for Plans, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), becoming DCS for Plans in 1975. He became the commander of the 314th Air Division in Korea in 1977, then Director of Operations and Readiness, HQ USAF, in August 1978. General Taylor became RDJTF deputy commander in March 1980.

(U) At the beginning of 1982, the chief of staff of the RDJTF was Brigadier General (BG) Carl W. Stiner, US Army. On 30 May, he was succeeded by Brigadier General (BGen) James R. Van Den Elzen,

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USMC, who had been director of the RDJTF Washington Liaison Office since 23 July 1981. General Van Den Elzen was replaced at the WLO by Captain (later Commodore) Paul D. Butcher, US Navy, who remained director of the WLO through the end of the year.

(U) The four general officers assigned to the RDJTF at the beginning of 1982 were joined by four others during the year, making a total of eight flag-grade officers by the end of 1982. In addition to LTG Kingston, Maj Gen Taylor, and BGen Van Den Elzen, at the close of 1982 the inspector general and four directors on the RDJTF staff were of flag rank.

(U) Only one of these men was at MacDill at the beginning of the year. Colonel (COL) Richard E. Stephenson, US Army, who had been at MacDill since 13 February 1980, was promoted to brigadier general on 2 July 1982. BG Stephenson had been the "plankholder" director of logistics with the establishment of the RDJTF on 1 March 1980 and continued to serve as J-4 through the end of 1982.

(U) The other four flag officers arrived at MacDill to join the RDJTF during the summer. First to come was BGen Ray "M" Franklin, USMC, who acquired three titles during 1982: inspector general, commander of the Forward Headquarters Element (FHE) when established, and director of the transition from RDJTF to USCENTCOM. As mentioned earlier, this transition was the central issue facing the RDJTF during 1982. A Marine Corps aviator, General Franklin's

previous assignment had been as the air officer for the 3d Marine Division on Okinawa.

(U) The first RDJTF directorate to be headed by a general officer was J-3, when Brigadier General (Brig Gen) Michael P. C. Carns, USAF, became director of operations on 25 June 1982, succeeding COL (later BG) Walter J. Bickston, US Army. A member of the Air Force Academy's first graduating class in 1959, General Carns also graduated with distinction from Harvard University in 1967 with a master's degree in business administration. Before moving to the RDJTF, General Carns had been commander of the 57th Fighter Weapons Wing at Nellis AFB, Nevada, since 14 October 1980. Prior to that assignment, General Carns had been commander of the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing at Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina.

(U) Commodore James Mac Gleim, US Navy, was the second flag officer to take over an RDJTF directorate. On 8 July 1982, he became Director of Plans, Policy, and Programs (J-5). Raised in a farming community in central Nebraska, Commodore Gleim entered the Navy as an aviation cadet and was commissioned as an ensign in 1955. He deployed to Lebanon in 1958 with an A-4 squadron aboard the USS Saratoga. During the Vietnam War, he served as flight deck officer and later as executive officer of the USS Coral Sea. Before coming to the RDJTF at MacDill, Commodore Gleim had been commander of Naval Air Station Lemoore, California.

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(U) The last director of flag rank to become a director during 1982 was BG Dudley J. Gordon, US Army, who took over J-2 on 7 September. Following graduation from infantry officer candidate school in March 1956, General Gordon was assigned to the Army Security Agency Field Station in Warrenton, Virginia. He then served with the Army Security Agency in Shemya and Fort Richardson, Alaska; at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia; Korea; Fort Devons, Massachusetts; and Fort Hood, Texas. During 1969, General Gordon served a tour in Vietnam as Special Security Officer, IV Corps Detachment, followed by attendance at the Armed Forces College in Norfolk, Virginia. Later, General Gordon graduated from the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and was then assigned as chief of the Collection Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, HQ USAREUR. In July 1980, he was reassigned to Munich as commander of the 66th Military Intelligence Group, Intelligence and Security, which was his position prior to becoming RDJTF J-2.

(U) Another plankholder at RDJTF headquarters was the senior enlisted man on the commander's staff, Command Sergeant Major (b)(6)

(b)(6) Born (b)(6) in Norman Park, Georgia, Sergeant (b)(6) served in the Army for two years from 1946 to 1948, attended college for two years, then reentered the Army in 1951. A veteran of tours in Korea, Germany, and Vietnam, he spent most of his career in airborne billets, having jumped some 5,400 times by the end of 1982.

CHAPTER II

JOINT PLANNING, OPERATIONS, AND TRAINING


(U) The joint staff of the RDJTF increased significantly during 1982, growing from 328 people assigned at the end of 1981 to 843 a year later. Divided among six directorates and a number of special staff agencies, these people worked during the year to plan, conduct operations, and train the forces needed to fight in the command's assigned area of responsibility. The central issue facing all members of the staff during 1982 was the transition from the RDJTF to USCENTCOM.

PERSONNEL

(U) During 1982, the Personnel Directorate grew in line with the increase in the size of the RDJTF headquarters. The two divisions, plans and personnel services, grew to three: plans/manpower, personnel services, and policy/personnel support. The detailed organization of the J-1 was as shown in Figure 3 on the following page. Col [REDACTED] (b)(6) USAF, had been the RDJTF director of personnel since 25 April 1980 and continued in that capacity throughout 1982. As the "plankholder" J-1, Colonel [REDACTED] (b)(6) had been responsible for personnel matters since the beginning of the RDJTF.

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Figure 3. J-1 Organization



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(U) In March 1982, JCS approved the RDJTF Joint Manpower Program (JMP) which had been submitted in September 1981, allocating 967 billets as the final strength for the Headquarters, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Figure 4 on page 28 shows these 967 officer, civilian, and enlisted authorizations, broken out by branch of service. These 967 billets represented the best estimate of the manning required to run the command once the full transition of the RDJTF to a unified command was completed. When the JCS approved the JMP, the RDJTF was still in the transition process. Also included in these 967 billets were 21 spaces for the Washington Liaison Office and 41 spaces for a forward headquarters element in the RDJTF area of responsibility. These 41 spaces were to remain unfilled--and would only be filled when an FHE was established.

(U) In September 1982, the JCS announced an Enhanced Manpower Management Program for joint activities. They tasked each joint activity to identify 3 percent of their authorized billets which could be used as billet compensation for other activities. These billets were to be regarded as those with the lowest priority in the headquarters. Following the JCS guidance, HQ RDJTF identified 31 billets to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As of the end of 1982, JCS had not withdrawn any of them.

Figure 4. RDJTF Headquarters Personnel

HEADQUARTERS, RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE
(967 AUTHORIZED)

	ARMY		NAVY		USAF		USMC		TOTAL MILITARY		US CIVILIAN		TOTAL	
RANK	AUTH ASGN		AUTH ASGD		AUTH ASGD		AUTH ASGD		AUTH ASGD		AUTH ASGD		AUTH ASGD	
OFF	163	159	81	61	154	141	74	64	472	425			472	425
ENL	154	145	73	66	160	148	57	49	444	408			444	408
TOT	317	304	154	127	314	289	131	113	916	833	10	10	926	843
													+41	(FHE)
													967	

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(U) In October 1982, at the direction of the JCS, the RDJTF submitted its JMP for fiscal years 1983 and 1984, again totalling 967 billets, as shown in Figure 4 on the facing page. Regarding the preparation of this JMP, the commander's guidance established explicit constraints: There was to be no growth in authorizations, 967 billets was the absolute ceiling, and any new requirements would have to be compensated from within that ceiling. Also, in the interest of continuity, a limited number of conversions of military to civilian spaces would be considered where it was clearly in the best interest of the command. The fiscal year 1983/1984 JMP was submitted to JCS for approval in October 1982.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The personnel directorate also monitored strength figures during both those field training exercises held within the continental United States (CONUS) and those held outside of the continental United States (OCONUS). Figures for Gallant Knight 82, Gallant Eagle 82, and Jade Tiger 83 are as shown below.

GALLANT KNIGHT 82

	<u>Scenario</u>	<u>Real-world</u>
RDJTF	1,016	357
ARFOR	88,540	5,225
AFFOR	29,904	1,381
NAVFOR	41,695*	27
MARFOR	50,562	699
JUWTF	<u>2,670</u>	<u>286</u>
TOTAL	214,387	7,975

* Includes 6th Marine Amphibious Brigade (10,954)

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GALLANT EAGLE 82

	<u>Scenario</u>	<u>Real-world</u>
RDJTF	1,016	403*
ARFOR	90,409	6,692
AFFOR	31,229	7,878
NAVFOR	12,448	1,134
MARFOR	37,817	9,020
JUWTF	<u>2,659</u>	<u>99</u>
TOTAL	175,578	25,226
		(OPFOR - 11,132)
		(SUPPORT - 6,430)

* Includes RDJTF Headquarters Commandant with augmentees

	JADE TIGER 83 (Real-world only)		
	<u>Oman</u>	<u>Sudan</u>	<u>Somalia</u>
RDJTF	86	3	0
AFFOR	501	12	75
NAVFOR	2*	0	0
JCSE	40	5	6
MAC ALCE	38	0	7
JFK	0	16	0
OTHER	<u>9**</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	665 (26 Nov 82)	36 (26 Nov 82)	88 (7 Dec 82)

*2 (7 Dec 82)

**8 Embassy Liaison Team (Muscat) and 1 at Thumrait

INTELLIGENCE


(U) The Director of Intelligence had staff responsibility for all intelligence and counterintelligence matters pertinent to missions assigned the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. He had overall responsibility for the collection, production and dissemination of intelligence necessary to support the command's mission and represented the commander to all appropriate national intelligence agencies and military services to insure intelligence support of collection objectives. The RDJTF J-2 coordinated with senior military intelligence officials of cooperating foreign governments and forces and prepared intelligence planning inputs for concept and operation plans and developed appropriate intelligence recommendations regarding joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for the joint employment of forces.¹

(U) On 1 April 1982, the JCS approved the Joint Table of Distribution for HQ RDJTF, which increased the Intelligence Directorate's personnel strength from 53 to 162.² This increase reflected the added intelligence support needed to bring the command to unified status. To better utilize the increased numbers, the directorate revised the organizational structure of the J-2 as shown in Figure 5 on the following page.

1. Joint Manpower Program, Part I-III, HQ RDJTF UIC-DJ7200, dated 1 Apr 82.

2. Joint Table of Distribution, Part II JMP, HQ RDJTF UIC-DJ7200, dated 1 Apr 82.

Figure 5. J-2 Organization



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U ~~(S)~~ The J-2 consisted of four divisions: Intelligence Operations, Resource Management, Targets, and Collection Management. There were in turn four branches in the Intelligence Operations Division. The Intelligence Analysis Branch provided detailed analyses of military capabilities and regional threat assessments on Southwest Asia countries. The Special Support Branch provided graphic and presentation support in the form of the commander's daily intelligence briefing and numerous other special intelligence presentations. It also performed the production management function and oversaw all J-2 exercise-related operations within the command. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) analyses provided support to the Intelligence Division in the form of traffic analysis, explanation of radar capabilities, and analysis of high-technology equipment. The Indications and Warning Branch was responsible for providing the DOD with strategic warning in the command's area of responsibility.

(U) The Resource Management Division had three branches. The Plans and Policy Branch was responsible for coordinating and directing the writing of intelligence portions of operation plans, concept plans, and standard operating procedures. It reviewed all joint strategic planning system documents and coordinated and submitted J-2 inputs. This branch coordinated and submitted manning and fiscal documents, including the Joint Manning Program, Program Objective Memorandum (POM), General Defense Intelligence Plan (GDIP), funding, and local budget data. Plans and policy functions also

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included coordinating J-2 inputs on facilities issues, Congressional and DOD-level presentations, forward basing, memoranda of understanding, the Unified Command Plan, and the military reserve program.

(U) The Systems Development Branch evaluated present and future intelligence processing and dissemination systems, including reviewing studies and system proposals, tracking service and component intelligence capabilities and planned enhancements, conducting concept demonstrations, developing and exercising prototype systems, identifying and articulating RDJTF requirements for enhanced intelligence systems support to include preparation of required operational capabilities (ROC), data automation requests and inputs to the POM, GDIP, Tactical Cryptologic Program and the Consolidated Cryptologic Program. This branch also managed contractor studies addressing RDJTF intelligence systems support, refined and published RDJTF intelligence system architecture, and served as RDJTF system coordinator for the operational Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS).

(U) The Counterintelligence and Security Branch provided for the detection and neutralization of sabotage, espionage, treason, sedition, and subversion. It insured that counterintelligence measures were adequate to protect the headquarters during deployments. This branch coordinated its counterintelligence activities with the RDJTF's components and with higher headquarters.

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(U) The Targets Division had two branches. The Targets Development Branch provided overall management of RDJTF targeting programs to ensure that coordinated target analysis programs and attack methodologies were employed by its component and supporting forces. This included command coordination for target nomination, target analysis, and validation of target production requirements. The target support branch was responsible for the compilation of production requirements for command-wide aeronautical, topographic and hydrographic products, tactical target materials, and terrain analysis products, including the validation of special purpose requirements.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Another division, Collection Management, provided a centralized collection management authority in support of the headquarters, components, and supporting forces to insure that optimum use was made of intelligence collection resources and to insure that all collection requirements were satisfied in a timely manner. All intelligence disciplines -- signal intelligence, human intelligence, and imagery intelligence -- were utilized to insure that the most up-do-date information was provided for the command.

(U) The Special Security Office (SSO) provided local management of national-level compartmented security programs. It provided protection and control of access to special compartmented information (SCI) and operated a secure communications facility to support the headquarters and provide privacy communications for the commander and

U ~~(C)~~ Another agency, the Cryptologic Support Group (CSG), provided the RDJTF Directorate of Intelligence with time-sensitive signal intelligence support. The CSG operated as an extension of the National Security Agency (NSA) National Signal Intelligence Operations Center. In the absence of the NSA Central Security Service representative to the RDJTF, the chief of the CSG became the senior NSA representative to the command.

(U) The J-2 directorate had three liaison offices. A DIA representative was assigned to ensure effective and responsive defense intelligence support to the command group and staff of the RDJTF, and to serve as the principal defense intelligence adviser to the commander and the director of intelligence, both in garrison and in the field.

U ~~(C)~~ Secondly, the National Security Agency Central Security Service representative to the RDJTF provided the commander and each of his directorates and special staffs with signal intelligence and communications security (COMSEC) advice and assistance, and provided effective liaison with all NSA organizations. The NSA representative served as the personal representative of the NSA director to the RDJTF commander.

(U) The Central Intelligence Agency representative acted as the focal point for central intelligence support to the command. As the

personal representative of the Director, Central Intelligence, the CIA representative provided an interface with the entire intelligence community.

(U) A number of significant activities took place in the J-2 directorate during 1982. The Analysis Branch of the Intelligence Analysis and Operations Division provided intelligence support to OPLANs 1003 and 1004 and prepared planning factors for OPLAN 1002.³ The Analysis Branch also prepared threat analysis for CONPLAN 1005 (Annex B)⁴ which was submitted to JCS for approval. Six fact books⁵ for the future USCENTCOM were created with an expected completion date of April 1983. A generic concept of operations for 1989 was prepared, along with four country briefs. Also prepared were several threat briefings for Congressional testimony, for Congressional staff visits, and for the Defense Science Review Board.⁶

(U) The Signal Intelligence Branch provided full support to the directorate for all deployments. The major change during 1982 was its upgrade to a separate branch within the Intelligence Operations Division. Formerly, signal intelligence was one section of the

3. COMRDJTF OPLAN 1002-82, 30 Jul 82. COMRDJTF OPLAN 1003-82, 30 Jul 82. COMRDJTF OPLAN 1004-82, 30 Nov 82.

4. COMRDJTF CONPLAN 1005-83, 30 Jul 82.

5. USCENTCOM Fact Books, Subj: Oman, Bahrain, Jordan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Kenya, Sudan, undated.

6. Intelligence Briefing, Defense Science Review Board and Congressional Staff Visit, undated.

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Intelligence Analysis Branch. When activated on 1 January 1983, USCENTCOM would become the only unified command with a branch-level element dedicated to signal intelligence analysis.

(U) The Special Support Branch (Exercises) planned and developed major exercise scenarios for four command requirements during 1982. Two exercises, Gallant Knight held in January, and Gallant Eagle held in March, required a full contingent of intelligence support, approximately 115 personnel, to be deployed to the two major exercise sites at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and George AFB, California, respectively. All major intelligence functions (analysis, collections, targets, reporting) and use of the Mobile Cryptologic Support Facility and Tactical Special Security Office vans were performed by J-2 personnel and the augmentees who made up approximately 30 percent of their strength.

(U) Exercise Blue Flag 83-3 was held in June 1982. The RDJTF J-2 provided two officers, an Air Force major and a Navy lieutenant, to support the 13-man RDJTF headquarters staff during Blue Flag, which was conducted at Hurlburt Field, Florida. This eight-day exercise utilized one of RDJTF's major OPLAN scenarios in what was primarily an Air Force and Army headquarters environment. This was the second Blue Flag exercise in which the RDJTF participated.

(U) In another exercise, known as the McClintock Theater Model Feasibility Demonstration, one RDJTF officer, an Air Force major,

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took part. This USREDCOM-sponsored demonstration was held at the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, for three and a half weeks. The objective of the demonstration was to test the feasibility of using the McClintock computer model to exercise RDJTF OPLAN scenarios. Because of considerable computer "downtime," the demonstration met few of its intended objectives.

(U) Jade Tiger 83 was an OCONUS exercise held during November and December 1982. It was supported by a minimal RDJTF J-2 staff because of airlift constraints and personnel limits imposed by the host nation. Only twelve J-2 personnel deployed on Jade Tiger. They provided analytical and briefing support as well as SSO, mobile cryptologic support facility, and cooperative indications and warning intelligence assistance to both the RDJTF and RDAFFOR headquarters. Jade Tiger was considered highly successful and provided a number of positive lessons learned for future intelligence operations in OCONUS exercises and operations.

(U) ~~(S/NF)~~ The first lesson learned during Jade Tiger concerned the adequacy and timeliness of national-level intelligence support. Support provided by NSA via the mobile cryptologic support facility was timely and effective; it proved essential to the full support of the RDJTF staff and its components. Pre-deployment support from the DIA, on the other hand, was adequate but not as substantive or responsive as that provided for Bright Star 82. Many DIA Defense

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Intelligence Notices were received which were not relevant to the theater of operations. Additional effort in developing intelligence products would be needed for future OCONUS exercises.

(U) ~~(S/NF)~~ In the area of map support, the Jade Tiger exercise map (118045) was poor both for land and air navigation. A chart was produced at 1:50,000 scale on a quick-response basis from existing smaller scales, but it was not as accurate as standard Defense Mapping Agency products. While this problem was inherent in quick-response graphics, it highlighted the continuing problem that there was inadequate 1:50,000 scale coverage for Southwest Asia as a whole.

(b)(1), (a)

(U) ~~(S)~~ During 1982, the indications and warning branch evolved from a "monitor only" facility to that of an active center in the DOD indications and warning network. As a member of this network

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and as an active participant in the Worldwide Warning Indications Monitoring System, the RDJTF J-2 would, when it completed the transition to USCENTCOM, assume the development, monitoring, and reporting responsibilities for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and Southwest Asia standing warning problem. The indications and warning center also implemented three temporary warning problems to monitor activities in the Persian Gulf region, the Horn of Africa, and Sudan.

(U) The Plans Branch of the Resource Management Division revised and published changes to RDJTF OPLANs 1002, 1003, 1004 and to CONPLANS 1005 and 1100 by providing threat analyses and other current updates from J-2 staff sections. Two major changes were submitted for the fiscal year 1982 JMP which contained the J-2 manning requirements and organizational changes needed for the RDJTF to make the transition to a unified command. At the end of the year, the new USCENTCOM JMP had been submitted to JCS. When approved, it would become the fiscal year 1983 JMP.⁷ Two Memoranda of Understanding were developed which outlined the intelligence working relations that were envisioned between USCENTCOM and both USEUCOM⁸ and PACOM.⁹ Both of these MOUs were submitted to the

7. Joint Manpower Program, Part I-III, USCENTCOM UIC-DJ1000 FY 83/84, 15 Mar 83.

8. Intelligence Support, USCENTCOM/USCINCEUR Memorandum of Understanding, undated.

9. Intelligence Support, USCENTCOM/USCINCPAC Memorandum of Understanding, undated.

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representative commanders in chief (CINC) for final signature. For the first time, the J-2 implemented a reserve augmentation program with all four services that would provide mobilization augmentees to meet wartime needs. By the end of the year, the first Army, Air Force, and Navy intelligence personnel were being identified as USCENTCOM-dedicated mobilization augmentees.

(U) The Policy Branch participated in the fiscal year 1985-1989 Program Objective Memorandum¹⁰ and General Defense Intelligence Program,¹¹ which were both part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program managed by the Director, Central Intelligence. Between the two programs, a total of five critically needed initiatives was forwarded. This branch also coordinated inputs to a variety of DOD-level documents, including the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis¹² and the Defense Guidance, which resulted in a successful re-prioritization and re-evaluation of future USCENTCOM requirements. Preparations for presentations to the House Appropriations Committee and for a visit by Senate staffers were also accomplished. In addition, the Policy Branch contributed extensively to the preparations for the Defense Resources Board (DRB) and the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM).¹³

10. HQ USAF, Program Objective Memorandum, FY 84-88, 12 Apr 82.

11. DIA, General Defense Intelligence Guidance, FY 84-88, 12 Apr 82.

12. JCS, Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis, FY 85-92, 15 Mar 82.

13. JCS, Joint Program Assessment Memorandum, FY 85-91, 14 May 82.

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The Policy Branch also developed the J-2's personal response to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency regarding command intelligence shortfalls and drafted the command's response to the DIA-sponsored ad hoc panel on intelligence.

~~U (C)~~ During 1982, the Systems Development Branch expanded to its full authorized strength of six systems development officers, a branch chief, and an administrative clerk/typist. The major developments and accomplishments of the branch during the year included coordination with USREDCOM, Air Force Systems Command, Headquarters USAF, and the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide the RDJTF and later USCENTCOM with automated intelligence via the Intelligence Data Handling System.¹⁴ An operational IDHS system was provided to command intelligence analysts as they moved into the new headquarters building in November 1982. The Systems Branch worked closely with USREDCOM, which owned and maintained the host computer, to define the required support, build the necessary message handling protocols and profiles, and determine the required number of terminals and printers. Ten IDHS terminals provided analysts with automated message-handling, on-line message generation, and word processing capabilities to support internal product generation. They also provided individual work files for storage of incoming and outgoing messages and for access to the national intelligence data base. The Systems Branch also coordinated the inclusion of

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electrical wiring requirements into the architectural design of the new RDJTF headquarters building and supervised the actual installation of wiring and terminals into Building 540 at MacDill AFB.

(U) In October 1982, the Rome Air Development Center, in conjunction with the Radio Corporation of America and the Planning Research Corporation, delivered a Deployable Intelligence Data Handling System (DIDHS) van to the RDJTF. Acquisition of this van was the culmination of two years of intense effort by the J-2 Systems Branch to acquire a mobile system which would provide automated message handling and an electronic data base in support of intelligence operations for the deployed future USCENTCOM. The acquisition of this prototype system marked the first time since the initial establishment of the RDJTF in March 1980 that deployed intelligence analysts had automated support. The RDJTF commander requested DIA and Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) support of accelerated procurement of a second DIDHS van to complete the prototype, provide needed hardware redundancy, and aid in the evolution of a fully operational system.

~~U (c)~~ In November 1982 during exercise Jade Tiger, the Systems Branch coordinated and conducted a demonstration to provide automated intelligence support to the RDJTF commander and his battle staff while en route to an OCONUS location in an EC-135 airborne

14. Document, IDHS Proposed Scope of Work, 1 Apr 82.

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command post aircraft. The SAC aircraft used by the RDJTF commander for his airborne command post had an ROLM 1666 mini-computer aboard which was used by SAC for Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) planning. It was determined that this computer could provide limited support to the RDJTF J-2 by allowing him to access and maintain a static installations and order of battle data base while en route to a contingency area. The results of this demonstration were to be used for requirements definition and provision of en route ADP support on board the USCINCCENT command and control (C²) aircraft when it was acquired.

(U) Two major contractor studies conducted on behalf of J-2 were delivered in 1982. The first, conducted by BETAC Corporation, was an effort to produce an "RDJTF Intelligence Architecture and Planning Guide."¹⁵ Its purpose was to rationalize the development of a near-term operational capability for the USCENTCOM intelligence structure and to establish broad continuing goals for future development. Volumes I and II of the study were delivered in September and Volume III in late December 1982. The study contained more than 120 specific recommendations, assumptions, and issues which would be the object of future study as J-2 continued to develop its concept of operations. The second study was completed by Rockwell-Collins International with assistance from BETAC and was

15. Document, RDJTF Intelligence System Architecture and Planning Guide, Vol I and II, 30 Sep 82.

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titled "Study and Analysis of SIGINT Communications Support to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force." Delivered in August 1982, this study was a top-level investigation and analysis of the communications systems, facilities, and networks used in the transmission of SIGINT-derived data in support of tactical USCENTCOM operations. It attempted to identify and quantify the available support, strengths, weaknesses, bottlenecks, and possible solutions where needed. It was funded by the National Security Agency and was a part of NSA's effort to provide improved SIGINT support to tactical commands.

U ~~(C)~~ Systems Branch assumed the leading role in the Threadway Working Group.¹⁶ Threadway was a concept and requirements demonstration to assist NSA and USCENTCOM in the building of an automated SIGINT dissemination system. Threadway was designed to link NSA, USCENTCOM, USCENAF, and the XVIII Airborne Corps. During 1982, Systems Branch and other working group members developed the system specifications and wrote and coordinated the concept of operations for the actual Threadway demonstration which was scheduled to be conducted during the summer of 1983.

U ~~(C)~~ Marblewood¹⁷ was a project to obtain a dedicated, secure, high-volume, multi-media intelligence communications support network

16. Minutes, Threadway Working Group Meeting, 12 Jun 82.

17. Document, NSA/CSS concept of SIGINT Support and Telecommunications Support to RDJTF, 28 Jul 81.

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to link the Washington intelligence community, Headquarters USCENTCOM, and component headquarters. During 1982, funds were obtained for a Washington-to-MacDill link which was to be installed during the summer of 1983. Additionally, J-2 was successful in getting the program managers' guidance memorandum to include direction for the services to fund Marblewood links to their USCENTCOM component headquarters.

~~U (c)~~ A program decision package for a tactical electronic intelligence (ELINT) processor user's terminal¹⁸ was prepared and submitted as a portion of the J-2's Program Objective Memorandum for fiscal years 1985-1988. The intention was to satellite the user's terminal off either the USCENAF or USARCENT tactical ELINT processor and provide near real time ELINT support to Headquarters USCENTCOM both in garrison and when deployed.

~~U (c)~~ The RDJTF Imagery Transmission System (RITS),¹⁹ later called the USCENTCOM Imagery Transmission System (CITS), continued its development during 1982. CITS was to link HQ USCENTCOM, DIA, MAC, USARCENT (Third United States Army), USCENAF (Ninth Air Force), USNAVCENT, and First Marine Amphibious Force garrison headquarters with prototype commercial facsimile devices (Litton produced FASTAX 2000s). A CITS concept of operations was produced during the year. Additionally, site surveys were conducted at each

18. Document, USCENTCOM Program Decision Package, 18 Jan 83.

19. USCENTCOM J2-RS Form 14, Subj: Status of USCENTCOM Imagery Transmission System, 10 Mar 83.

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node, an operator maintenance training program was developed and an installation schedule was drawn up leading to an initial operating capability of February or March 1984. A decision was made to withdraw from a program decision package on the Intelligence Imagery Transmission System (IITS) after a survey revealed that each component and HQ USCENTCOM were already scheduled to receive IITS terminals under the US Joint Tactical Communications Program. The USCENTCOM IITS program decision package was redundant and was therefore withdrawn.

(U) On-Site USCENTCOM Mitre Corporation support began in early fiscal year 1983 under the auspices of the DIA validation and verification program for the Planning Research Corporation "RDF On-Site Software Enhancement" contract.²⁰ The following specific technical tasks were supported by this Mitre effort: verification, validation, project management assistance, and technical evaluation.

(U) The Counterintelligence Branch prepared for the transition to unified command status by publishing the following command directives: RDJTF (USCENTCOM) Supplement 1 to DOD 5200.1-R, "Command Security Procedures"; RDJTF (USCENTCOM) Regulation 604-1, "Personnel Security Clearances"; an RDJTF (USCENTCOM) instruction booklet for preparation of security forms for background

20. Document, CCJ2-RS Background Paper on Mitre Support, 18 Jan 83.

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investigations; and RDJTF (USCENTCOM) Regulation 380-2, Special Category (SPECAT) Procedures. During construction and the move to the new headquarters building, this branch conducted numerous security surveys to determine if the building and rooms met security standards.

U ~~(c)~~ In the J-2 Targets Division, the Targets Development Branch accomplished several milestones. It developed special operations intelligence requirements which led to a new generation of unconventional warfare support products, known as "detailed installation analysis." This branch also procured a Wang 2200-MVP microprocessor, enabling the command to perform automated weaponeering calculations for air-to-surface and surface-to-surface weapons systems. In addition, it initiated four of the five objectives in support of operational commanders in the current target intelligence production plan.²¹ Targets Development conducted joint target coordination boards, both deployed and in garrison, bringing together operational-level and national-level intelligence and operations personnel to resolve issues of both target intelligence operations and procedures. It also became a driving force in the joint technical coordinating group for munitions effectiveness²² for the development of vulnerability and weaponeering calculations for man-delivered munitions.²¹ Document, Target Intelligence Production Plan for Fiscal year 1983, DIA, Oct 83.

22. Message, USAMSAA DTG 071530Z Feb 83, Subj: Unconventional Warfare Target Vulnerability/Weaponeering Meeting.

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U ~~(c)~~ The Targets Support Branch accomplished an in-depth review of mapping, charting, and geodesy requirements for the RDJTF area of responsibility. This resulted in the creation of the largest collection and production effort ever undertaken by the Defense Mapping Agency and the Naval Oceanographic Office. It conducted a thorough analysis of the requirements for forward prepositioning of component force mapping, charting, and geodesy products, and established the need for a branch office of the Defense Mapping Agency at MacDill AFB to support headquarters map and chart requirements. This branch also conducted various map and chart product reviews and validated the requirement for a combined joint operations graphic (JOG) to replace the JOG-Air and JOG-Ground.

U ~~(c)~~ During 1982, the Collection Branch was upgraded and became the Collection Management Division. The division participated in three major exercises during the year, Gallant Knight, Gallant Eagle, and Jade Tiger. During Gallant Knight 82, the SIGINT Branch exercised SIGINT operational tasking authority and coordinated real-world national and tactical reconnaissance assets. During OCONUS exercise Jade Tiger 82, the Collection Management Division developed intelligence requirements for peacetime aerial reconnaissance program tracks and monitored real-world collection assets in support of deployed RDJTF units. The Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) Branch increased imagery targets in the RDJTF area of responsibility from 1,300 to 3,500. The Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Branch established

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a liaison program with defense attaches scheduled to be assigned to embassies within the RDJTF area of responsibility. In addition, a continuing intelligence requirement concerning unconventional warfare was developed and validated for collection.

(U) The Special Security Office occupied itself in upgrading facilities and expanding its services during the year. In May 1982, the SSO communications facility was upgraded and direct interface was established with the Defense Special Security Communications System. In June, the SSO communications facility was upgraded from a part-time (8 hours per day) to a full-time (24 hours per day) operation. In November 1982, the SSO moved into Building 540 and approval was received from DIA to close the old Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) in Bldg 1105 and open the new SCIF in Building 540.²³ As the year closed, work was well underway to replace the existing Tactical Special Security Office equipment with a new computer-driven model.

U (~~S~~) During 1982, the RDJTF received cryptologic support from the USREDCOM Cryptologic Support Group. The CSG, with analytic and technical augmentation from NSA, deployed the Mobile Cryptologic Support Facility to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in support of exercise Gallant Knight 82. The Mobile Cryptologic Support Facility and the CSG were later deployed to George AFB, California, for

23. Message, SSO DIA, DTG 221930Z Nov 82, Subj: 90 Day Temporary Facility Accreditation, RDJTF, Bldg 540, MacDill AFB, FL.

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exercise Gallant Eagle 82. On Exercise Jade Tiger, the only OCONUS deployment in 1982, the Mobile Cryptologic Support Facility once again demonstrated its capability to provide timely SIGINT support and real-world threat warnings. The combination of high-speed data exchange, secure voice, and reliability enabled the CSG to keep the commander informed of items of intelligence and potential threats to US and friendly forces.

(U) The position of Defense Intelligence Agency Representative to the new United States Central Command was established in keeping with the policy of the DIA director to provide increased defense intelligence support to the unified and specified commands. The DIA representative at MacDill AFB was accredited to both USCENCOM and USREDCOM. The position was officially established at MacDill on 23 August 1982 when LTC (b)(6) US Army, reported for duty as the first DIA representative.


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OPERATIONS

(U) The organization of the Operations Directorate was changed considerably during 1982 to accommodate a dynamic operating environment and the projected evolution of the RDJTF into a unified command. At the end of the year, the J-3 directorate was composed of six divisions as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6.

J-3 ORGANIZATION



(U) The following five branches reported to the Chief of the Current Operations Division: the Command, Control and Communications Countermeasures (C3CM)/Electronic Warfare Branch, the Air Defense Operations Branch, the Ground Operations Branch, the Naval Operations Branch, and the Air Operations Branch. Three branches reported to the Chief of the Special Operations Division: the Operations/Intelligence Branch, the Special Operations Branch, and the Special Operations Support Branch.

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(U) Continuing the detailed J-3 organizational breakdown, the branches of the Command and Control Division were: the Command, Control and Communications Systems (C3S) Plans Branch, the Readiness Branch, the Command Briefing Branch, the Command Center Branch, and the Joint Reconnaissance Center Branch. The Exercise Division was subdivided into three branches: the Programs Branch, the CONUS Exercise Branch, and the OCONUS Exercise Branch. Four branches comprised the NBC Division: the Chemical Branch, the Operations Branch, the Plans Branch, and the Administration Branch. Finally the Weather Division had two branches: the Staff Support Branch and the Administration Branch.

(U) In the command and control area, the nucleus Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) concept was completed during 1982. It provided for daily planning of unconventional warfare and special operations activities prior to the activation and deployment of the JUWTF. Selected members of the Special Operations Division were responsible for those daily planning actions and when the JUWTF was activated, they would become key members to provide continuity in the transition from the planning phase to actual execution of unconventional warfare activity.

(U) In March 1982, the Command and Control Division added the Joint Reconnaissance Center Branch. In June, the Briefing Team Branch was activated, and in July, the Command, Control, and

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Communications Systems Branch began functioning. In September, the Readiness Branch was transferred from the Exercise Division to the Command and Control Division.

(U) The Joint Reconnaissance Center Branch immediately established liaison with NSA, JCS, DIA, USEUCOM, the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), SAC, and the RDJTF J-2 Intelligence Directorate in support of peacetime aerial reconnaissance program activity in the RDJTF area of responsibility. Guidance from these commands and agencies provided initial guidance and related source materials to assist in developing the Joint Reconnaissance Center. The Joint Reconnaissance Center Watch was established in the J-2 Indications and Warning Facility to monitor selected worldwide reconnaissance activity.

(U) During 1982, the Emergency Action Branch of the Current Operations Division evolved into the NBC Defense Division. The reorganization was a result of the decision to focus NBC matters and responsibilities in one command staff agency.

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U ~~(S)~~ Preparations for the transition of the RDJTF into a unified command were initiated during 1982. The objective was for the RDJTF to assume full responsibility for its own geographic area of

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responsibility including service components, forces, intelligence, communications, logistics, and other support facilities. During the RDJTF's relatively short existence, considerable progress was made in improving the US strategic posture in Southwest Asia. This included detailed joint contingency planning, identification of forces and support requirements, conduct of four joint and combined exercises within an actual or simulated AOR environment, and pre-positioning of specific equipment to support any US force projection and deployments.

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Pages 74 through 75 redacted for the following reasons:

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(U) In accordance with the 1982 JCSP and the terms of reference, readiness data for all service forces assigned for planning purposes to the RDJTF were provided to RDJTF headquarters through the established chain of command, as required by JCS Publication 6, Volume II, Part 2, Chapter 1, known as "UNITREP." Army and Air Force RDJTF units provided their UNITREP status to US Readiness Command, and in turn, USREDCOM provided the information to HQ RDJTF. Identification and status of operationally controlled units, from 1 January 1982 to 31 December 1982, were as shown in Figure 9.

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Figure 9. Readiness Status

		STATUS AS OF	STATUS AS OF
		1 Jan 82	31 Dec 82
<u>Army</u>			
24th	Infantry Division (Mech)	C2	C3*
82d	Airborne Division	C2	C2**
101st	Airborne Division (Assault)	C3	C3**
6th	Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)	C3	C3*
5th	Special Forces Battalion	C3	C3*
1/75	Ranger Battalion	C1	C1*
2/75	Ranger Battalion	C1	C1*
<u>AIR FORCE</u>			
563	Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-4G) 37th TFW	C1	C1**
390	Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-111A) 366 TFW	C2	Inactivated 1 October 82
522	Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-111D) 27 TFW	C1	C1**
353	Tactical Fighter Squadron (A-10) 354 TFW	C1	C1**
355	Tactical Fighter Squadron (A-10) 354 TFW	C1	C1**

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68	Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-4E)	C1	C3**
	357 TFW		
70	Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-4E)	C2	C2**
	347 TFW		
339	Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-4E)	C2	C1**
	347 TFW		
27	Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-15)	C1	C2**
	1 TFW		
71	Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-15)	C1	C1**
	1 TFW		
94	Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-15)	C3	C1**
166	Tactical Fighter Squadron (A-7)	C1	C1***
	121 TFW		
188	Tactical Fighter Squadron (A-7)	C1	C1***
	150 TFG		
106	Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron	C1	C1**
	(RF-4C) 117 TRW		
179	Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron	C1	C1**
	(RF-4C) 148 TRG		
8	Special Operations Squadron	C2	C2*
	(MC-130) 1 SOW		
20	Special Operations Squadron	C2	C2*
	(HH-53/UH-1N) 1 SOW		
16	Special Operations Squadron	C3	C2*
	(AC-130) 1 SOW		

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552	Airborne Warning and Control Wing C2 (E-3A)	C2*
7	Airborne Battlefield Command & Control Center (EC-130) C1	C2*
193	Tactical Electronic Combat Group C4 (EC-130)	C4*+

Notes

- * Assigned for Planning
- ** Operational Control
- + Air National Guard Units

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~~U (S)~~ The readiness of Army units assigned to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was primarily degraded by a shortage of senior noncommissioned officers (NCO) and shortages in equipment caused by increased requirements. Air Force forces continued to be downgraded by shortages in their War Reserve Spares Kits.

~~U (c)~~ The naval forces available for RDJTF planning consisted of forward-deployed and CONUS-ready naval forces assigned to CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, or CINCPAC. The RDJTF naval force could be drawn from appropriate unified commands, depending on contingency location. Since the RDJTF's planning throughout 1982 was focused on Southwest Asia, the RDJTF concentrated on monitoring, through the JCS, the location and status of naval forces forward-deployed in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. During most of the year, one carrier battle group was forward-deployed in the Indian Ocean. This group was in addition to the naval forces attached to the Commander, Middle East Force (COMIDEASTFOR), which were forward-deployed in the Persian Gulf. The major factor degrading Navy readiness was a shortage of personnel.

~~U (S)~~ Marine forces available for COMRDJTF planning were available from elements of the three Marine Amphibious Forces (MAF) under the operational command of LANTCOM and PACOM. The three Marine Divisions from which the Marine ground forces would be drawn remained C-2 throughout the year. The Marine Corps' major readiness deficiency was shortage of personnel. Further, during this period a

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Figure 10. Gallant Knight 82

<u>Phase</u>	<u>Purpose</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>C-Dates</u>
I	Deployment CPX	11-15 January	Home Stations	C to C+4
II	Deployment and Employment CPX	26-28 January	Fort Bragg, North Carolina	C+40 to C+42
III	Employment CPX	30 January- 2 February	Fort Bragg, North Carolina	C+55 to C+58

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Marine Amphibious Unit was periodically forward-deployed to the Indian Ocean aboard amphibious shipping. All forward-deployed Marine amphibious units reported C-1 throughout the year.

U ~~(S)~~ The RDJTF conducted four exercises during 1982. Gallant Knight 82 was a joint readiness exercise (JRX) sponsored by the US Readiness Command and coordinated by the JCS. It was designed to exercise and train the RDJTF, its components, supporting forces, and the deployment community in a Central area scenario. Gallant Knight 82 consisted of both deployment and employment command post exercises (CPX), and was conducted in three phases, as shown in Figure 10 on the facing page.

U ~~(S)~~ Phase I of the deployment CPX was conducted 11-15 January at home station. In addition to RDJTF participation, selected elements of the deployment community down to the installation and depot level played on a 24-hour-per-day basis. This phase involved initial force deployment from C-Day (Deployment Day) to C+4. This portion of the deployment window was selected so that actions involving transition from peacetime to wartime deployment could be identified and exercised.

U ~~(S)~~ Phase II consisted of a deployment and employment CPX at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from 26 to 28 January. It covered the period C+40 to C+42 which permitted the examination of several

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critical exercise objectives. The deployment portion of this phase was concerned with troop and materiel movement to the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Simultaneously, the employment portion exercised interdiction concepts and the reception and throughput capabilities of aerial ports and of seaports from debarkation to the battle areas.

U (~~S~~) Phase III of Gallant Knight emphasized tactical operations. It was conducted from 30 January to 2 February. It focused specifically on employment of combat units and force sustainability during the period C+55 to C+58, when it was projected that all major air, naval, and ground forces would be present in the JOA.

(U) There were many specific objectives of the Gallant Knight exercise. Primarily it was held to examine command relationships between the JCS, the RDJTF, and its component commands, and to examine rules of engagement established in the RDJTF area of responsibility. More specifically, it was designed to examine the integrated joint and combined air defense system, to exercise common air tasking procedures, to review and exercise interdiction and employment concepts, to examine force sustainability and the overall concept of logistic support for the RDJTF, to examine deployment procedures and concepts, to exercise a tactical RDJTF communications system reflecting the communications support anticipated in an undeveloped area of the world, to examine intelligence support

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procedures and capabilities, and to exercise commanders in their ability to influence the battle.

(U) Exercise Gallant Eagle 82 was a JCS-directed, USREDCOM-sponsored joint readiness exercise conducted for the RDJTF as both a command post exercise and field training exercise (FTX). The exercise was conducted from 30 March to 6 April 1982 at Fort Irwin and Twentynine Palms, California, with additional air war functions performed at various training sites, including Naval Weapons Center China Lake, California, and Nellis AFB, Nevada. The FTX provided active combat training in a desert environment.

~~U (S)~~ The CPX conducted at George AFB, California, was a continuation of the Central area scenario begun in Gallant Knight 82 involving a contingency response to the Soviet invasion of Iran. Phase I, 30-31 March, simulated the forced entry of airborne forces into the vicinity of Esfahan. Airborne troops and heavy equipment were delivered by C-141 and C-130 aircraft to five drop zones at Fort Irwin. Phase II, 1-6 April, concentrated most FTX ground and air activity at Fort Irwin and Twentynine Palms. Additional airspace was used over the China Lake and Nellis ranges. The CPX scenario covered the simulation period C+56 through C+61.

(U) The exercise objectives were to examine RDJTF command and control procedures, to evaluate the various RDJTF communications

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support systems and their susceptibility to jamming, to exercise and evaluate joint suppression of enemy air defense, including campaign development and localized operations, to examine and evaluate deep interdiction and joint attack of the second echelon joint tasking procedures, to exercise electronic warfare in support of C³CM, and to evaluate the command, control and communications systems and procedures of joint movement control centers and support, including movement of exercise participants, petroleum, and ammunition resupply.

(U) Exercise Proud Saber 83 was a selected procedural command post exercise sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was the third in a series of major biennial exercises designed by JCS to examine mobilization on a national level. Proud Saber 83 was conducted in conjunction with a civil exercise, Rex - 82 Bravo. The RDJTF participated in the 12-day exercise held from 25 October to 5 November 1982, while remaining at its home station.

~~U-(S)~~ The purpose of Exercise Proud Saber 83 was to allow the JCS to prioritize the allocation of resources for mobilization and deployment while implementing multiple OPLANs within a multi-threat scenario. The exercise was designed to exercise OJCS, the Services, participating federal agencies, and unified and specified commands.

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(U) The objectives of Proud Saber 83 were to examine the adequacy of the 100,000 call-up under a global scenario, to monitor the flow of personnel to determine personnel shortfalls, to examine adequacy of the Services' ability to provide filler personnel in a timely manner, and to evaluate national intelligence support to the tactical level. Other exercise objectives were to exercise the prioritization procedures for deployment of unconventional warfare assets in the face of multi-theater demand for limited assets, to exercise the procedures and systems for resupplying employed unconventional warfare forces and the extraction of those forces at the same time that conventional forces were being deployed, to exercise procedures for replacement of attrited forces and equipment during the early phases of the conflict, to exercise and evaluate the logistics coordination center, to monitor and evaluate the information provided by the Joint Deployment Agency, MAC, and the Military Sealift Command concerning aircraft and ship flow data, to evaluate the capability to mobilize medical personnel and units designated to support RDJTF forces, to test the flexibility of the joint deployment system to react to changes in programmed flow and to assess the impact of that reaction, to exercise the crisis action team (CAT), and to exercise and evaluate reporting procedures.

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(U) The exercise objectives were to conduct combined operations and training with host nation forces, to establish combined US-host nation air defense operations centers, to exercise combined airspace management and air defense procedures, to exercise the communications required to integrate US and host nation assets, to

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demonstrate the deployability, mobility, and readiness of a US joint task force, to exercise and refine inter- and intra-theater logistical procedures, to refine RDJTF standing operating procedures, and to familiarize personnel with Central area environmental and operational characteristics.

(U) Following formal staffing with the components and supporting forces, RDJTF M525-1 was revised and a third edition published 28 October 1982. This standing operating procedure focused on the management of the expanding capabilities of the headquarters. Key changes to the basic contents include reporting requirements and formats, update of references, and modifications to support on-going planning efforts. Formatted in accordance with the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) to the degree practicable, M525-1 was published in an unclassified form to facilitate its use. The directive provided instructions, policies, and procedures for RDJTF components and supporting forces when involved in combat operations under the command and control of the RDJTF. Since this document was unclassified, all information requested for various exercises and contingency operations was not contained in it, but was promulgated separately in specific OPLANs and OPORDs.

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(U) On 12 July 1982, the RDJTF and USREDCOM jointly completed a Memorandum of Agreement regarding USREDCOM assistance in joint exercises sponsored by the RDJTF. Specifically, the MOA established the framework for, firstly, RDJTF and USREDCOM cooperation to identify exercise objectives of mutual interest for inclusion in RDJTF joint readiness exercises and, secondly, USREDCOM assistance to RDJTF in evaluating selected joint aspects of RDJTF-sponsored exercises, including tactics, techniques, and procedures.

(U) On 20 July 1982, the RDJTF commander and the USREDCOM commander in chief jointly signed a memorandum summarizing an agreement pertaining to those portions of the Joint Exercise Program that would be the responsibility of the respective commands after

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the transition of the RDJTF to a unified command. Subjects included in the memorandum were funding, personnel, future cooperation between the two commands, and changes to be made in the designation of the scheduling command of certain exercises in the five-year Joint Exercise Program. USCENTCOM Regulation R525-4, "Military Operations Exercise Programs and Scheduling," was drafted to provide information concerning scheduling, planning, evaluating, and reporting of exercises. The regulation would be applicable to HQ USCENTCOM, component headquarters, and forces under the operational command of USCINCCENT and would become effective 1 January 1983.

(b)(1)1.4e

(b)(1)1.4a

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(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

U ~~(S)~~ Common air tasking procedures had to be refined to meet the needs of a unified command. The daily common air tasking cycle was examined during 1982 in Gallant Knight 82, Gallant Eagle 82 and Blue Flag 82-3. Both component and supporting commands examined this cycle and found it to be very effective in handling excess common

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air sorties. The finalized common air tasking procedures were then incorporated into standing operating procedures.

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LOGISTICS

(U) During 1982, the Logistics Directorate (J-4) expanded from a nucleus of 37 personnel to a new authorization of 136. A major influx of personnel occurred during July and August. At year's end, 90 percent of these authorizations were filled. During the summer influx, two divisions were established, bringing the directorate's total to five. The Security Assistance Division was programmed to assume direct responsibility for security assistance program activities in the 19 countries in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. The Resource Management Division was a multifaceted organization involved in acquisition management, planning, programming, and budgeting, Congressional affairs, financial management, and war reserve management. In addition, previously established divisions were expanded to take care of the expanding missions of a maturing command. Specific growth occurred in the areas of plans, exercises, logistical operations, and logistical systems.

~~(S)~~(U) One of the major activities undertaken by J-4 during 1982 was its participation in a DOD sealift study. The logistics staff, with a lead effort by the Washington Liaison Office, took part in this study which had been directed by the Defense Resources Board to determine sealift and prepositioning requirements. Papers and products of the nine individual working groups established to

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support the study were made available to the RDJTF staff for review and comment and subsequent input back to the appropriate working group either in writing or in actual attendance at the working group meeting. General Stephenson, the RDJTF J-4, was designated a member of the Steering Group Committee. The study was initiated during July 1982 and was still in progress at the end of the year, with a projected completion date of spring 1983.

(S) (U) The RDJTF continued to be a leading advocate of prepositioning supplies and equipment in the area of operations to off-set mobility lift shortfalls and to insure sustainability of the deployed forces until closure of the sea lines of communication. Based on the USCENCOM concept of operations with no forces stationed in the AOR, US objectives could be achieved only by maximizing the limited lift capability and by prepositioning equipment and supplies. In addition, the presence of prepositioned equipment in the AOR would physically demonstrate American resolve and commitment to the region.

(S) (U) Prepositioning of equipment by the Air Force continued to make significant strides. The USAF programmed to meet Southwest Asia requirements in the area of bare base equipment and facilities, vehicles, aircraft load, recovery, launch equipment, and medical

(b)1.4(d)

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Army was also identifying selected items of equipment to facilitate its logistics-over-the-shore program.

(~~S~~) (U) Chief among the RDJTF's problems was that its area of operations lacked a logistical infrastructure to sustain deployed troops. In other words, "if you don't bring it with you, you have to do without." This was a significant obstacle for military logisticians who had to find some way of ensuring service support. One of the most successful concepts was afloat prepositioning.

(b)1.4(a)

in fiscal year 1984.

(b)1.4(d)

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(S)(U) A draft civil engineering support plan (CESP) for OPLAN 1004 was developed and prepared for submission to the JCS for review and approval along with the entire plan in December 1982. This was the first occasion that a complete CESP was submitted to the JCS at the same time as the OPLAN was submitted. Also, the 416th Engineer Command initiated action-officer-level meetings to begin preparation of the CESP for OPLAN 1002, scheduled for distribution as a coordinating draft in February 1983.

(S)(U) The RDJTF had 92 ground water overlays on hand and another 93 on order at the end of the year. These and future overlays would eventually cover most of the AOR and would depict proven surface sources and the probable presence and numerous characteristics of subsurface water sources. Once this data base was complete, the information presented in them would significantly reduce water sourcing as a constraining factor in rapid deployment planning to Southwest Asia.

(S)(U) The RDJTF headquarters and its component staffs continued to develop and monitor the Military Construction (MILCON) program for Southwest Asia. Construction progressed well on programs funded in fiscal years 1981 and 1982 for Oman, Kenya, Somalia, and Diego Garcia, with some projects being completed in Oman and Somalia. Contractor bid response was excellent and little construction slippage occurred. The fiscal year 1983 Congressional hearings resulted in MILCON appropriations for further programs in

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Oman, Kenya, Somalia, Diego Garcia and the initial phase of Ras Banas development. Congress deleted Army funding for Ras Banas; this would delay development of the initial staging facility. The existing MILCON program was also refined to include results of JCS studies relating to future year requirements.

(~~S~~) (U) Host Nation Contingency Support (HNCS) was a major deployment and sustainability multiplier that could greatly reduce strategic airlift and force closure time. Efforts to secure HNCS agreements were intensified in 1982. Using the Southwest Asia Working Group under the OSD umbrella, several initiatives were taken to establish HNCS dialogue with countries in the RDJTF area of responsibility. HNCS requirements were presented to representatives of the (b)1.4(d) in May but were stalled by the Lebanon invasion. J-4 developed an (b)1.4(d) operations concept briefing which was presented in December by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and opened the door for host nation support planning with the (b)1.4(d) in 1983. Additionally, HNCS dialogue was established with officials of (b)1.4(d). HNCS requirements for (b)1.4(d) were reworked by components and updated. An additional project to develop HNCS capability profiles of countries within the AOR was initiated under the purview of the Southwest Asia Working Group. A prioritized list of essential logistical elements of information was also presented to the working group in order realistically to focus data collection efforts. The

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fluid, ever-changing political situation in countries within the AOR was the major limiting factor in establishing firm HNCS agreements.

(S)(U) During 1982, DOD decided to delay transition of USCENTCOM's security assistance responsibility to 1 October 1983. This would align the new function with the fiscal year and the budgetary cycle. The security assistance staff grew in 1982 from one officer to a staff of twenty-three, nineteen officers and four administrative personnel. Col [REDACTED] (b)(6) USAF, assumed leadership and management of the division on 6 October 1982. During the year, the division greatly expanded its information base, accomplished extensive coordination with key organizations in Washington, DC, and with USEUCOM, PACOM, and dedicated agencies. A transition plan was developed, basic policy was established and contacts were made. In 1982, an additional country, Jordan, was added to the command's AOR and contacts were established with the existing security assistance organization in Jordan. Basic concept plans were developed for the evaluation of potential FMS sales to the AOR (Security Assistance Review Board) and personnel support (Quality of Life Committee) to improve the command's ability to respond to security assistance initiatives in both functional areas. The delay in the transition of security assistance responsibilities for USCENTCOM was expected to provide ample time to effect a thorough and smooth transition of this critical function.

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(S)(U)The RDJTF did not sponsor a Joint Movement Center (JMC) in 1982. However, lessons learned during Gallant Knight and Gallant Eagle 82 were expected to provide valuable information for JMC activation during Gallant Knight 83. The JMC would continue to be modified and refined to meet USCENTCOM intratheater movement needs.

(S)(U)In the military cuisine department, a "B" ration traypack was tested during Jade Tiger 83. A ration cycle of B-C-B with supplements was also tested. This system of feeding was found to be very successful and was recommended for use during future OCONUS FTXs to the extent possible.

(S)(U)The concept of operations for water support of the RDJTF was further refined during exercise Jade Tiger 83. Although the DOD joint planning factor for water was 20 gallons per man per day, the actual water consumption during Jade Tiger 83 was 7.1 gallons per man per day. This water was provided by a reverse osmosis water purification unit. Water requirements for each OCONUS exercise within the AOR had to be analyzed separately, taking account of the location, climate, and overall scenario. USCENTCOM would continue to monitor water consumption on OCONUS FTXs to accumulate data for comparison against existing planning consumption factors.

(S)(U)Aircraft fuel (commercial jet A-1) procured by the Defense Fuel Supply Center was used to support Jade Tiger 83. This fuel was

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purchased from Shell (Oman) and delivered into R-14 air transportable hydrant system fuel bladders. Fuel additives were only blended in the R-14 systems that were designated to service tactical fighters. Approximately 1.2 million US gallons of Jet A-1 were used. Jade Tiger 83 was a successful test of petroleum logistics and the lessons learned would be used on future OCONUS FTXs. In addition, petroleum requirements for OPLANs 1002 and 1004 were further refined and analyzed. Numerous initiatives were undertaken to enhance supportability. Examples were: identification of barge and tug sets needed for shallow draft ports in Iran (1983 lease), a tanker mooring system for logistics-over-the-shore use in the shallow draft beach gradient areas found in the Persian Gulf (1983-1984 design), out-year procurement requirements for portable tankage (bolted steel), and a portable land pipeline in fiscal years 1985-1989.

(S)(U)The logistics directorate continued to spearhead efforts to develop the capability to deploy and sustain forces in Southwest Asia. Efforts were exerted during the service POM process and at the Defense Resources Board to ensure that RDJTF shortfalls were adequately stated and that programs were developed to enhance lift capability. Efforts resulted in sustaining the base programs of the C-5B, KC-10, and maritime prepositioned ship programs. A Program Decision Memorandum, issued by the DRB, directed financing of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Program, multi-year funding of KC-10

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procurement, and Navy support of the civilian auxiliary lighterage ship program. In support of the fiscal year 1982 budget process, testimony to select Congressional committees resulted in maintaining support for critical programs. The SL-7 conversion effort for the remaining four ships was slipped to fiscal year 1984, but funds were provided to procure long-lead-time items. Pending the results of the DOD sealift study, and in light of significant programming efforts currently projected, the RDJTF was still faced with considerable shortfalls in strategic sealift. Efforts in 1983 would be directed towards reducing the difference between requirements and capability.

(S)(U) Concurrent with a rapid increase in the number of personnel assigned and in place, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was heavily involved in transitioning from a joint task force to a new unified command. The J-4 Plans Branch was directly responsible for ensuring that the Directorate of Logistics published necessary operating directives for the new command, developed a directorate organizations and functions manual, relocated from the temporary trailer office complex to Building 1105, and monitored the actions of components' assumption of duties and responsibilities for those countries previously within EUCOM's and PACOM's areas of responsibility.

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(U)(~~S~~) During 1982, J-4 participated in two command post exercises, Gallant Knight 82 and Proud Saber. It also took part in an OCONUS field training exercise in Oman and Somalia (Jade Tiger 82) and in a combined FTX and CPX (Gallant Eagle 82).

(U)(~~S~~) The RDJTF Logistics Committee held two conferences in 1982. The first conference (2-3 March) was hosted by the US Army's Development and Research Command. The second conference (8-10 September) was hosted by the RDJTF. The logistics committee continued to provide a forum for dialogue concerning problems and solutions for the logistics needs of the RDJTF. The logistics committee meetings were originally scheduled on a quarterly basis, but further meetings would be called as required, based upon commodity area of interest.

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PLANS

U ~~(S)~~ During 1982, the primary focus of the J-5 directorate was to ensure completion of the actions necessary for the transition from the RDJTF to the United States Central Command. This activation of the new command was to take place on 1 January 1983. Such a transition had been directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 September 1981 when they published the terms of reference for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. The activation directive²⁴ established USCENTCOM's geographic area of responsibility as follows: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic, plus the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. During 1982, the directorate was reorganized to provide the capabilities required of a unified command. This reorganization and other actions taken to support the transition to USCENTCOM are addressed below.

(U) Since the activation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force on 1 March 1980, the J-5 directorate underwent significant changes. The billet for the director was upgraded to flag rank and a commodore was appointed during 1982. Previously, the director's billet was for a Navy captain. Manning in the J-5 increased from 41 to 74 billets. Many billets were unfilled during 1982 pending personnel assignment action by the Services.

(U) 24. Msg ~~(S/OADR)~~, JCS to CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC, and Commander RDJTF, Subj: Establishment of US Central Command (USCENTCOM), 071359Z

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These shortages often required individuals to wear "more than one hat." Full authorized strength was obtained in December 1982. A comparison between the 1981 RDJTF manning level and 1982 staff upgrading accomplished in response to the transition to USCENTCOM was as shown in Figure 11.

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Figure 11. J-5 Organization

	<u>Manning</u>	
	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
(1) Plans, Policy and Programs Directorate	(2-Off)	(3-Off/3-Enl)
- Administrative Office	(6-Enl)	(7-Enl)
(2) Plans Division	(1-Off)	(1-Off)
- Administrative Office	(3-Enl)	
- Contingency Plans Branch	(6-Off)	(6-Off)
- Long Range Plans Branch	(6-Off)	(6-Off)
- Time Phased Force Deployment Data Development Branch	(2-Off/1-Enl)	(3-Off/2-Enl)
(3) Political/Military Division	(4-Off/1-Enl)	(1-Off)
- Administrative Office		(3-Enl)
- Near East Branch		(8-Off)
- Africa Branch		(3-Off)
- South Asia Branch		(3-Off)
- Civil Affairs Branch		(1-Off)*

* Billet gained from J-3 which is in addition to authorized strength. Will be reflected in next published Distribution Table.

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(4) (U) Policy/Strategy Division	(5-Off)	(1-Off)
- Administrative Office	(1-Enl)	(2-Enl)
- Policy Branch		(3-Off)
- Strategy		(3-Off)
(5) (U) Programs and Legislative Liaison Division	(1-Off)	(1-Off)
- Planning, Programming and Budgeting Branch	(2-Off)	(3-Off)
- Legislative and Joint Service School Liaison Branch		(1-Off)
(6) U (~~S~~) Special Operations Division	(5-Off)	(5-Off)**
- Administrative Office	<u>(1-Enl)</u>	<u>(2-Enl)</u>
TOTAL:	47	71

** April 1982; these positions were never filled in J-5 due to personnel shortages and were transferred to J-3 in July 1982.

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(U) A listing of individuals assigned to either the J-5 Directorate or as division chiefs during 1982 follows:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>TENURE</u>
Captain (b)(6) (USN)	Director, Plans, Policy and Programs (RCJ5)	Jan-Aug
Commodore J. M. Gleim		Aug-Dec
Colonel (b)(6)	Deputy Director	Jan-Jul
Colonel (b)(6)		Jul-Aug
Colonel (b)(6)	Chief of Plans	Jan-Jul
Colonel (b)(6)		Jul-Dec
Lieutenant Colonel (b)(6)	Chief of Political/Military Division	Jan-Jul
Colonel (b)(6)		Jul-Dec
Captain (b)(6) (USN)	Chief of Policy/Strategy Division	Jan-Jun
Lieutenant Colonel (b)(6)		Jun-Jul
Colonel (b)(6)		Jul-Dec
Colonel (b)(6)	Chief of Programs	Jan-Dec

* Colonel (b)(6) was both the Deputy Director and the Chief of Plans during this time frame.

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(U) The Plans, Policy and Programs Directorate was composed of four divisions: plans; policy/strategy; political/military; and planning, programming, and budgeting. During 1982, the Plans Division expanded with the addition of the Long-range Plans Branch. Newly authorized positions were rapidly filled by the Services and the division had reached full strength by August 1982. This division was responsible for preparing, coordinating, and maintaining operations and concept plans in accordance with the Joint Operations Planning System. It also developed strategies and concepts of operations to support operational planning. The Plans Division was further divided into three branches.

(U) The Contingency Plans Branch prepared operational plans and concept plans, assisted in the preparation of operation orders as required, reviewed supporting plans written by component commands, supporting commands, and other agencies, and provided liaison to components and support of headquarters when deployed. The Long-range Plans Branch prepared operation plans and concept plans, monitored the joint exercise program to insure that exercises were consistent with OPLANs and developed techniques, and with appropriate strategy and concepts of operations for joint deployment, employment, and redeployment of forces. The Time Phased Force Deployment Data Development Branch prepared, reviewed, and coordinated joint time phased force deployment data to support OPLANs. It reviewed component deployment data, developed force flow projections, and structured forces for deployment, support, and

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redeployment. It also coordinated with the Joint Deployment Agency on TPFDD development and refinement.

(U) As the RDJTF received greater visibility in the international arena during its transition to a unified command, contacts between the command and foreign governments and their military officials increased. Likewise, activities of the RDJTF often had an impact upon international relations, and these had to be monitored closely during day-to-day operations. The J-5 Political-Military Division was activated in July 1982 as the focal point for interaction between the Department of State and the Department of Defense concerning friendly foreign countries in the RDJTF's area of responsibility. To provide the commander with timely and sound political-military assessments and better fulfill its responsibilities for the preparation of command visits to overseas areas, the Political-Military Division was organized into functional branches in which officers with area expertise closely monitored developments within defined geographical areas. In its role of monitoring the international relations aspects of command policies and actions, the division worked to insure that the headquarters was aware of political sensitivities and appreciated the importance of a prudent, measured approach to those actions which could have an impact in the international arena. The "Pol-Mil" division also assumed responsibility for civil affairs planning. This was accomplished by periodic augmentation by US Army

reservists from the 352d Civil Affairs Command, located in Riverdale, Maryland.

(U) The Political-Military Division was divided into four branches. The Near East Branch prepared political-military assessments of Near East countries in the RDJTF's geographic area of responsibility. The Africa Branch prepared political-military assessment of African countries in the RDJTF area of responsibility, while the South Asia branch prepared political-military assessments of South Asia countries. Finally, the Civil Affairs Branch was responsible for plans and policy relating to the conduct of civil affairs operations in support of future US Central Command operational plans.

(U) The Policy/Strategy Division was responsible for matters relating to command policy, missions, functions, responsibilities, requirements, and doctrine development, including crisis planning and assessment of the actions of the National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff pertaining to Southwest Asia. This division provided the RDJTF commander with trip preparation, policy review, and all other matters relating to J-5 functions.

(U) The Policy Branch advised the commander on policy matters and acted as point of contact for development of terms of reference. It prepared, reviewed, and coordinated selected reports relating to

national policy and to US policy for Southwest Asia as it applied to the commander. It reviewed and commented on policy guidance for contingency planning and policy issues in the Defense Planning Guide and prepared the commander's inputs to the JSCP, Volumes I and II.

(U) The Strategy Branch advised the commander and served as the point of contact for command strategy matters. It prepared, reviewed, and coordinated selected reports relative to national and US military strategy for Southwest Asia and developed command arrangement agreements, memoranda of agreement, and memoranda of understanding with other unified and specified commands. It was responsible for the development and monitoring of command relationships. It developed rules of engagement for the USCENTCOM area of responsibility and prepared the commander's quarterly report to the Secretary of Defense.

(U) A Programs Division was established in early 1982 to monitor and coordinate the planning and programming actions of the DOD planning, programming, and budgeting system for USCENTCOM. Additionally, the division coordinated matters pertaining to legislative liaison, with special emphasis on the budget as it flowed through various Congressional committees. When activated, USCENTCOM would be the only unified command with a division whose primary focus was on the PPBS system. This exemplified the increasing involvement of unified commands in the DOD fiscal management system.

(U) The Programs Branch prepared all planning and programming inputs for the command and coordinated with the JCS, the Services, and components on all matters relating to PPBS. Pertinent actions included preparing the commander for presentations to the Defense Resources Board, the highest-level executive decision-making body for the Secretary of Defense; coordinating RDJTF interaction in the program objective memorandum cycle by providing guidance for program development, prioritization, and submission to the Air Staff, followed by leading command efforts in justifying USCENTCOM programs to the Air Staff board structure; and providing command inputs to the Joint Strategic Planning Document, Defense Guidance, Joint Program Assessment Memorandum, Program Decision Memorandum, and the OSD Program Issue Books.

(U) The Legislative Liaison Branch prepared the commander and other flag officers for Congressional testimony and monitored RDJTF budget-related initiatives as they passed through the various Congressional committees. The major orientation of the branch was to accept service submissions in POM format, monitor their conversion into the President's budget, and then take the necessary action to insure requested testimony regarding specific problems in the budget was coordinated within the staff and with the RDJTF's component commands. Once these actions were accomplished, the branch prepared the individual selected to provide the command's position to the respective committees or subcommittees of Congress.

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Throughout this process, the branch developed and provided information relative to specific programs contained in the budget as they progressed through Congressional committees. By accomplishing this specific program monitoring, the RDJTF was able to respond quickly to developing problem areas and insured that programs critical to mission accomplishment were funded at the necessary levels.

U ~~(S)~~ One of J-5's most important tasks was developing RDJTF operation plans. Upon receipt of JCS planning guidance concerning OPLAN 1002, an initial planning conference with components was held at Camp Pendleton, California, in April. After resolution of issues and discussions with the JCS, components were provided further planning guidance and a revised concept of operations. A second planning conference was held in May. The service operational deputies were briefed on the revised concept of operations in July, and a draft plan was submitted on 30 July. The Phase I TPFDD Conference for 1002-82 was held in August. In September, the JCS approved the concept of operations for further planning.

U ~~(S)~~ Concerning OPLAN 1003-82, the second Phase II TPFDD refinement conference was held from 4 to 8 January 1982. The transportation operating agencies presented the results of their flow analysis, which was generally acceptable except for the late force closures of some units. Therefore, the conference devoted the majority of its effort to correcting these problems. The agencies

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were then asked to submit new movement tables before 12 March. When the new tables were received, some key units still faced a closure problem, so the 31 May submission of the plan was slipped and efforts were devoted to correcting the problem. After analysis, actions were taken to adjust the MAC flow generator, "fine tune" the TPFDD, and revalidate the original threat assumptions. These actions were briefed at the May planning conference. The results were forwarded to the RDJTF components on 3 June for their comments. On 15 June, all components reported that if the corrective actions were accomplished, the plan would be feasible as written and the concept would not have to be revised. The plan was changed to incorporate the above actions and forwarded to the JCS for approval on 30 July 1982. At the end of the year, OPLAN 1003 was still under review by the JCS.

~~U (S)~~ Based on JCS guidance, the RDJTF continued planning efforts for OPLAN 1004-82. The Phase I TPFDD conference was held from 8 to 19 March 1982. In the JCS memorandum granting concept approval (SM-258-82), substantive comments were included to be used in further refinement of 1004-82. The Phase II TPFDD conference was conducted from 16 to 20 August. In addition, the plan was rewritten to include those substantive comments provided by the JCS. The plan was reprinted in November and submitted to the JCS on 30 November for formal review and approval. As of the end of the year, OPLAN 1004 was awaiting review by the JCS.

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U ~~(S)~~ The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for 1983 (JSCP 83), Volume I, dated 25 February 1982, tasked the RDJTF commander to prepare CONPLAN 1005-83. A 10 March JCS guidance message (100153Z Mar 82) provided planning guidance for the development of the CONPLAN. In coordination with components and supporting commanders, the CONPLAN was developed and submitted to the JCS for review and approval on 30 July. As of 31 December 1982, CONPLAN 1005 was awaiting review by JCS.

U ~~(S)~~ Volume I of JSCP 83 tasked the RDJTF commander to prepare plans to protect or evacuate US citizens and foreign nationals within his assigned area of responsibility. Based on this guidance, the concept and mission statement for CONPLAN (b)1.4(a) was drafted on 12 August 1982. It was briefed to the RDJTF commander on 31 August and approved on 7 September. Following the commander's approval, a guidance message was dispatched to components and a planning conference held with them on 13 and 14 October. Planning, component, and staff submissions of annexes continued in November until a draft plan was completed in December. The plan was forwarded to JCS for approval on 3 January 1983.

U ~~(S)~~ USCENTCOM CONPLAN 0300 was drafted during October and November 1982. After obtaining the RDJTF commander's concept approval, appropriate MOUs and CAAs were developed between the affected commanders. The plan was submitted to JCS in early January 1983.

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U ~~(S)~~ In March 1982, J-5 initiated action to transfer joint strategic capabilities plan tasks applicable to the anticipated USCENTCOM area of responsibility from the Pacific and European Commands to USCENTCOM, effective 1 January 1983. Applicable plans were identified and, after coordination among the commands, a position was formally presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May. Ongoing plan development by the RDJTF was accelerated and new plans were initiated so that all missions could be assumed by USCENTCOM on or before 1 January 1983. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were advised on 3 September that the RDJTF could assume responsibility for applicable plans for the region on the USCENTCOM activation date of 1 January 1983. On 30 September 1982, JCS authorized the transfer of responsibility to take effect as scheduled. However, the JCS stated that, if required, OPLANS (b)(1)1.4a would be effective for execution on 1 October 1982.

(U) In October 1982, at the request of J-4, J-5 took the lead in developing a generic concept of operations. A methodology for the concept was approved by the RDJTF Chief of Staff on 12 October. J-5's responsibilities included developing a strategy, command objectives, and a range of scenarios. This was accomplished prior to the end of the year. Actions remaining included the development of a concept of operations from which unconstrained requirements for 1989 could be derived, application of force and resource constraints to the strategy and concept of operations, and derivation of a prudent risk strategy.

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U ~~(S)~~ An RDJTF-led delegation met with French senior military officers in Paris from 7 to 9 September for an exchange of briefings and discussions on rapid deployment force concepts and techniques. There were also official command visits to Bahrain, Oman, Somalia and Egypt during the period of the Jade Tiger exercise in November and December.

U ~~(S)~~ In the Civil Affairs Branch of the Political-Military Division, the most significant development was the assignment of executive agent responsibilities to Third US Army concurrent with its activation as Rapid Deployment Army Forces on 1 December 1982.

(U) The Policy Branch of the Policy/Strategy Division compiled and collated the staff input utilized in the RDJTF component commanders' conferences held on 10 and 11 March and 12 November 1982. Attendees at the March conference included: Lt Gen Larry D. Welch, Commander, Ninth Air Force, who was also the Commander, Rapid Deployment Air Force Forces (COMRDAFFOR); LTG Jack V. Mackmull, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, who was also the Commander, Rapid Deployment Army Forces (COMRDARFOR); Rear Admiral (RADM) Stanley R. Arthur, CINCPACFLT N-5, who was also Commander, Rapid Deployment Naval Forces (COMRDNAVFOR); MajGen James L. Day, Commanding General, 1st Marine Amphibious Force, who was also the Commander, Rapid Deployment Marine Forces (COMRDMARFOR), when designated or directed; MG James J. Lindsay, Commanding General, 82d

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Airborne Division; MG Charles W. Bagnal, Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division; MG George E. Marine, Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division; BG Joseph C. Lutz, Commanding General, John F. Kennedy Center for Materiel Assistance, who was also Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (COMRDJUWTF); and BGen Joseph B. Knotts, Commanding General, Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center/Combined Arms Command/7th Marine Amphibious Brigade. Attendees at the November conference included: Lt Gen John L. Piotrowski, COMRDAFFOR; LTG Jack V. Mackmull, COMRDARFOR; MajGen Ernest C. Cheatham Jr., COMRDMARFOR; BGen Joseph C. Lutz, COMRDJUWTF; LTG Marion C. Ross, Commander, Third Army; and RADM Stanley R. Arthur, COMRDNAVFOR.

~~U (S)~~ In the J-5 Strategy Branch, overall operational readiness was enhanced with the promulgation of command arrangement agreements and memoranda of understanding, both in draft and completed stages, which delineated responsibilities and relationships among the unified commands. A USCINCRED-USCINCCENT CAA was submitted to USCINCRED for approval in December, and agreement was signed on 17 January 1983. At the end of 1982, the following documents were in final draft awaiting comments from respective CINCs: An MOU between CINCPAC and USCINCCENT, an MOU between USCINCEUR and USCINCCENT, a CAA between USCINCEUR and USCINCCENT, and a CAA between CINCPAC and USCINCCENT. The Strategy Branch was instrumental in the development of the name "United States Central Command" and was the command point of contact for the designation of the USCINCCENT components.

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(U) The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Division was established in an effort to provide the command a viable interface with the DOD PPBS system. Although the RDJTF had, since its inception, been very much involved in the defense budgeting system because of the uniqueness of its mission and the expense of fielding a rapid deployment force, the character of this involvement changed as the RDJTF transitioned to a unified command. In January and February, briefings were developed and given to the program review board structures of the three Services outlining the program needs of the RDJTF and the yet-to-be-established USCENCOM. During May and June, the division made preparations for General Kingston's testimony before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. In June and early July, it coordinated inputs to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, made extensive efforts in preparation for the commander's first appearance before the OSD Defense Resources Board, and for his discussion and critique of the Services' budgetary program. In August, actions were coordinated which culminated in a comprehensive message to OSD in early September providing RDJTF comments which were used to develop the draft fiscal year 1985 to 1989 defense guidance. During this same period, actions began to develop the command's first submission of program development packages to the Air Staff for inclusion in the Air Force POM. This action continued through December and included briefings to Ninth Air Force, Tactical Air Command, and the Air Staff. In early October, the draft fiscal year 1985-1989 defense guidance was

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
received and commented on. In October and early November the commander's presentation to the DRB concerning the defense guidance was developed and given on 9 November. In mid-November the draft Section V of the fiscal year 1985-1989 defense guidance entitled "Fiscal Guidance" was received and commented on. These were the kinds of actions that were normally accomplished by unified and specified commands and would be continued and expanded on when the RDJTF became USCENTCOM. Legislative liaison was an integral part of the division's action throughout the year and provided a great deal of support to the staff and command group.

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(U) The J-6 directorate had overall staff responsibility for the development of communications-electronics and automatic data processing policies, plans, budgets, and programs for the RDJTF. The directorate ensured C³ support for the command; supervised the development, acquisition, and operation of communications and ADP facilities and equipment; served as the RDJTF focal point concerning the Worldwide Military Command and Control System; and was responsible for coordination with JCS, DCA, and NCA for technical matters during peacetime and for supervision and implementation of those agencies' management policies during contingencies. Internally, the directorate was organized into three divisions as shown below.



(U) The April 1982 Joint Manpower Program gave J-6 a staff of 46 officers and 86 enlisted personnel. This total of 132 people was reduced to 46 officers and 73 enlisted personnel as a result of a JCS-directed manpower reduction. The decrease in personnel was

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greatest in the Computer Systems Division and affected the directorate's ability to provide computer support to staff users.

(U) The Command and Control Division was responsible for the development of communications policies, OPORD and OPLAN annexes, and systems concept plans and programs. These plans and programs concerned the integration, operation, and enhancement of theater command and control systems, networks, and facilities. The division reviewed OPORDs and OPLANs proposed by components for their sufficiency and applicability for deployment within the theater; initiated corrective measures for the maintenance of minimum essential telecommunications systems; and exercised system-level configuration control of joint tactical and strategic command and control communications systems. The division also identified theater-unique requirements for integration into worldwide C³ architecture, reviewed and coordinated C³ program studies and analyses of headquarters and service components; and identified, analyzed, and presented command and control communications systems issues to the commander with recommended approaches, solutions, and a theater position. The Command and Control Division was the office of primary responsibility for development of the commander's position regarding WWMCCS, joint tactical plans, and other C² plans and was responsible for COMSEC, COMSEC surveillance and TEMPEST matters. The Command and Control Division was divided into five branches. These were operations, plans, COMSEC management, exercise, and administrative support.

(U) The Resources and Technical Requirements Division was renamed from the Telecommunications Division to reflect its functions more accurately. It was responsible for managing the frequency spectrum, managing telecommunications services, and developing programs and budgets. Based on JCS direction, the division formulated frequency support with host nations and reviewed OPORDs and OPLANs for sufficiency of frequency management implementation. The division also validated and managed requirements for connectivity with defense and commercial communications systems. Further, the division provided policy guidance concerning requirements definition, planning, programming, and funding. Fiscal responsibilities included monitoring military department and agency POMs and budget estimates, as well as managing funds for C² initiatives. The Resources and Technical Requirements Division consisted of four branches. These were the Frequency Management Branch, the Programs and Fiscal Management Branch, the Technical Requirements Management Branch, and the Administrative Support Branch.

(U) The Data Automation Division was reorganized as the Computer Systems Division on 1 October 1982. The new computer systems division directed, monitored, and controlled the ADP program. It formulated and directed the implementation of policies, concepts, and procedures to insure effective and efficient use of command ADP resources. The division was responsible for the planning, programming, budgeting, acquisition, systems engineering,

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cost effectiveness, interoperability, tactical architecture, security, and integration of RDJTF fixed and tactical command, control, intelligence, and special purpose automatic data processing systems. It directed the establishment and managed the development and implementation of approved ADP programs and projects; directed the installation, testing, evaluation, operation, and maintenance of ADP systems; developed, reviewed, and justified command ADP budget estimates; advised the commander and staff to insure effective planning, implementation, and operation of ADP systems; and served as the representative to the official designated approving authority (as directed by DOD Directive 5100.40) which could approve ADP systems for the processing, use, storage, and production of classified material. The division also provided career progression counselling for all assigned ADP personnel; managed and initiated necessary changes to joint manning documents relative to data automation; and managed ADP training for the RDJTF. The Computer Systems Division consisted of four branches. These were the Plans and Programs Branch, the Applications Branch, the Operations Management Branch, and the Administrative Support Branch.

U ~~(S)~~ The C⁴S directorate took part in five exercises during the year. Exercise Gallant Knight 82 was a command post exercise sponsored by USREDCOM and coordinated by the JCS. It was designed to practice contingency operations in Southwest Asia in response to a hypothetical Soviet invasion of Iran. Gallant Knight was conducted at home station, from 11 to 15 January 1982, and at Fort

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Bragg, North Carolina, from 26 January to 2 February 1982. During deployment operations, the permanent communications of the Defense Communications System available at home stations were exercised. During employment operations at Fort Bragg, a tactical communications system, typical of the communications support expected in the undeveloped areas of Southwest Asia, was installed in support of the RDJTF and its components. A second deployment of the Level 6 remote computer was made using a S73 shelter borrowed from the Alabama National Guard. Military personnel assigned to the J-6 provided analyst and maintenance functions previously provided by a Honeywell contract. The Level 6 was simultaneously linked to the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network over tactical satellite through both the National Military Command Center and USREDCOM's H6000 computer facilities.

U ~~(S)~~ Two communications "firsts" were achieved in this exercise: The J-6 had a separate part of the exercise scenario devoted to degrading Blue force command and control systems based on actual tactical play. The newly developed Tri-Tactical Communications System tactical automatic switchboards were used for the first time.

U ~~(S)~~ Significant findings which resulted from Gallant Knight 82 included the fact that movement of message traffic to exercise tactical headquarters continued to be a problem. Although each major headquarters had an AUTODIN entry, and high-speed transmissions between major headquarters were made, preparation time

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on slow, manual tape-cutting machines was labor-intensive and could not expeditiously handle the volume of traffic required. Also, interface problems were experienced with the AN/TCC-39 tactical switchboard which required software changes to the switch program. The vulnerability of command and control communications to jamming of SHF and UHF satellites was again demonstrated. The existing high frequency Defense Communications System entry systems and links to components would not have been capable of handling the increased traffic load, nor was heavy tropospheric scatter communications equipment available in sufficient quantities to meet requirements. Additional multichannel entry stations and high frequency paths to components needed to be established. These high frequency links also needed the increased reliability provided by Chirpsounders and special modems. Jam-resistant satellites were needed as soon as possible to solve these problems.

U ~~(S)~~ The Parkhill instruments and wire line adapters needed by the RDJTF components to install secure voice communications, which were required by the scenario, were not available. Extensive reliance on secure voice communications provided by a "closed loop system" to conduct the exercise caused concern. This concern stemmed from the nonavailability of this system both in future exercises, where the forces were deployed over realistic distances, and in real operations. A more extensive secure voice communications system such as Vinson or Harris modems, needed to be obtained to overcome this difficulty.

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U ~~(S)~~ Exercise Gallant Eagle 82, sponsored by USREDCOM, was a joint readiness exercise conducted as both a command post and field training exercise. The exercise was conducted from 30 March through 6 April 1982 at Fort Irwin and Twentynine Palms, California, with additional air war functions performed in various training areas including China Lake, California, and Nellis AFB, Nevada. The FTX provided active combat training in a desert environment. The CPX was a continuation of the Southwest Asia scenario begun in Gallant Knight 82. Among the exercise objectives was to evaluate the various RDJTF communications support systems and their susceptibility to jamming. The exercise was also designed to evaluate the command, control, and communications systems and procedures of joint movement control centers and other support, including movement of exercise participants, petroleum, and ammunition resupply. The exercise provided participants with an excellent vehicle for exercising C³ in a joint arena by taxing baseline system capacities in an austere environment. Communications services in support of Gallant Eagle 82 were similar in type and quantity to those that would be available in a contingency operation. A third deployment of the Level 6 remote computer was made. An S280 shelter with mobilizer specifically designed to house and transport the Level 6 was field tested during this exercise.

U ~~(C)~~ Several systems were exercised and evaluated for the first time by the RDJTF during Gallant Eagle 82. High speed AUTODIN

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service over two consecutive SHF satellite systems into the Defense Communications Systems, WWMCCS service with a component headquarters to provide near real time top secret command and control data, and secure facsimile transmission over an SHF satellite system were among these first-time uses.

~~U (S)~~ Significant findings included the observation that the existing intra-theater low speed teletype network could not adequately support the current volume and precedence of message traffic generated by operational elements. Moreover, the JCS concept of providing communications support to the RDJTF was less than optimal and required revision. The JCS communications concept of support for the RDJTF set forth in the 24 June 1980 Redstripe divided responsibilities between the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) and the RDJTF's components. Tactical HF radio systems in military inventories were not designed to overcome limiting factors inherent in Southwest Asia operations, so RDJTF forces were required to place extensive reliance on satellite communications. These satellite systems could be disrupted with only a minimal jamming effort by the enemy; secure voice service between the RDJTF and its components was austere due to limited quantities of secure voice equipment; and the feasibility of RDJTF component access into the WWMCCS was proved with the successful operation of the RDAFFOR remote terminal. A double satellite hop connection was attained from the RDMARFOR to the RDJTF Level 6 and then to the USREDCOM H6000 computer.

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U ~~(S)~~ Exercise Proud Saber 83 was a JCS-sponsored command post exercise designed to exercise mobilization and deployment plans and procedures of the Services, DOD agencies and offices, and the JCS in support of selected operation plans of the commanders of unified and specified commands. The exercise was conducted from home stations during the period from 25 October to 5 November 1982; the scenario simulated was as described in RDJTF OPLAN 1003. The RDJTF Crisis Action Team operated from the temporary command center in Building 1105. Garrison communications and ADP systems were utilized to support the CAT, and additional administrative telephones and a visual information processor were installed in the CAT area. The exercise served as an excellent training vehicle, especially for the many people newly assigned to the headquarters.

U ~~(C)~~ Several significant findings were encountered during Proud Saber 83. The play of communications-electronics and the ADP Master Scenario Events List did not effectively contribute to the participation of the RDJTF communications staff; communications security discipline was inadequate; eliminating or withholding key communications-electronics equipment highlighted the vulnerabilities of single-thread communications systems; and approximately 30 programs were rewritten for Ninth Air Force, giving the RDJTF components significant Joint Deployment System capabilities. Training of RDJTF users had to be increased to gain experience.

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(U) The RDJTF Honeywell Level 6 remote network processor provided connectivity to the USREDCOM host 97.9 percent of the total available time; 2.1 percent downtime was experienced for crypto changes, line outages, and reinitializing the Level 6; however, from a user viewpoint, performance of the total WWMCCS was marginal. While users were usually able to log onto and use the USREDCOM host computer, the WWMCCS intercomputer network connections were less reliable. Because of network outages at either USREDCOM or the other host desired by the user, WWMCCS intercomputer network availability was less than 90 percent of the time. During "prime time" (between 0700 hours to 1700 hours daily when most users were on), system saturation caused the system's response time to be noticeably slow.

U ~~(S)~~ Exercise Jade Tiger 83 was an RDJTF-sponsored joint and combined air-defense-oriented field training exercise conducted in Oman, Somalia, Sudan, and adjacent waters during the period 29 November through 9 December 1982. The purpose of the exercise was to conduct a combined US and host nation air defense exercise; to exercise the RDJTF headquarters; and to demonstrate the rapid deployability, mobility, and combat readiness of a selected task force. Command and control communications were specifically configured to support the exercise and, because of airlift constraints, had to be austere. Communications capabilities (nonsecure/secure voice, record, and facsimile services) were established over SHF/UHF satellite and HF radio systems. Resources

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provided by the JCSE, the 5th Combat Communications Group and the 507th Tactical Air Control Wing were shared to the maximum extent possible.

(U) Problems encountered while establishing high frequency connectivities in support of RDJTF FTXs highlighted the requirement for a regularly scheduled training program for the JCSE and component forces communications units. J-6 proposed a series of training exercises to increase levels of expertise in high frequency communications. The proposal was agreed to by JCS, USREDCOM, JCSE, and the components. The first exercise was conducted from 21 to 25 June 1982 with JCSE, 3d Combat Communications Group (USAF), 9th Communications Battalion (USMC), and 50th Signal Battalion (US Army) as the participants. A second training exercise was held from 20 to 22 September 1982 and the players were the JCSE, the 5th Combat Communications Group, the 9th Communications Battalion, and the 50th Signal Battalion. The third 1982 exercise was conducted from 1 to 5 November. JCSE and the 9th Communications Battalion were the only participants. These exercises served to test equipment capabilities and identify equipment and system shortfalls, evaluate equipment interoperability, evaluate joint communications procedures, and provide a realistic atmosphere in which to orient and train communications operators and maintenance personnel.

~~U (C)~~ In communications planning, Annex K to RDJTF OPLAN 1002-82 was written in August 1982 and submitted with the basic OPLAN to the

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JCS. Substantive comments from the JCS were received in December 1982 and were under review at the end of the year. Annex K to RDJTF OPLAN 1003-82 was reviewed and resubmitted in June 1982. Changes were incorporated as necessitated by the relocation or addition of units, modification of user communications requirements, and the replacement of several pieces of older communications equipment with newer equipment. A thorough review of Annex K to RDJTF OPLAN 1004-82 was completed in December 1982. Necessary changes were incorporated. Annex K to COMRDJTF CONPLAN 1005-83 was written in July 1982 and submitted to the JCS for review.

U ~~(FOUO)~~ The communications concept, previously published in the Hurricane Relocation Plan, was refined in August 1982 to include the provision to utilize existing post, camp, and station fixed communications to the maximum extent possible and allow JCSE augmentation to remain available for immediate deployment to the RDJTF area of operations, if needed.

U ~~(C)~~ Annex K to CONPLAN (b)1.4(a) to support the air or sea evacuation of noncombatants from the area of operations was developed during 1982. The plan was submitted to the commander of the RDJTF for approval in November, prior to forwarding to JCS for review.

U ~~(C)~~ Throughout the year, the Plans Branch prepared and presented a number of briefings to various high-level civilian and

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general officers, both US and foreign. These briefings concerned contingency communications support to this headquarters and the issues and shortfalls entailed in providing this support. Included in the various briefing audiences were members of the Defense Science Board; Mr. (b)(6), Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering; Dr. (b)(6), Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology; LTG Hilsman, Director of the Defense Communications Agency; Maj Gen McCarthy, Commander of the Air Force Communications Command; MG Schumacher, Commanding General, Fort Gordon, Georgia; Maj-Gen Birtwistle, Chief Signal Officer, British Armed Forces; and various high-ranking civilian and military leaders of France and Egypt.

(U) The Institute of Defense Analysis completed a study entitled "Development of a Joint Command and Control Framework to Support the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force." This study was used as a basis for ongoing projects to establish an integrated C⁴I System for Southwest Asia.

(U) During this year, a sound security education program was initiated for all personnel assigned to the RDJTF headquarters. A newcomers' indoctrination briefing was completed in September and the COMSEC branch obtained a 10-minute period in the command's monthly newcomers' briefing. Proper use of the non-secure telephone was stressed at all briefings. COMSEC monitoring of the conventional telephones on MacDill AFB was conducted quarterly. The

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support was provided by the 6906th Electronic Security Squadron and the US Army Intelligence and Security Command. This monitoring effort gave the command a valuable means of determining the kind of information that was being passed over nonsecure telephones.

(U) COMSEC monitoring of both radio telephone and conventional telephones was conducted during 1982 exercises. Daily and post exercise reports of these monitoring efforts were provided to the headquarters and subordinate service components. The number of security infractions being committed on non-secure telephones declined significantly from the beginning of each exercise to the end. These decreases in violations were a direct result of the increase in COMSEC education and of the monitoring reports which were provided throughout the headquarters daily.

(U) In September 1982, a TEMPEST briefing was given to all personnel in the headquarters who work with equipment which processed classified material. The briefing was well received and provided the users of this type of equipment with the reasons why it had to be installed in a certain way. For example, telephones could not be placed within 6 feet of such equipment.

(U) During the last two quarters of 1982, the COMSEC Branch insured that the TEMPEST and engineering standards were being met during the construction of the new RDJTF headquarters facility, Building 540. These inspections addressed the installation of power

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lines and power filters, insured that sufficient distance was being maintained between black and red power lines, and monitored the construction of the shielded inclosure for the computer room.

(U) During the period from 16 to 19 November 1982, DIA representatives and the RDJTF TEMPEST officer performed a pre-inspection of Building 540. The inspection was conducted to insure compliance with TEMPEST and red/black engineering standards. Some minor discrepancies were found and there were a few items that DIA recommended be changed, such as wiring and the capping of unused conduit runs. These findings and recommendations were turned over to the facility manager of the RDJTF in December 1982. By the end of the year, TEMPEST office engineering standards were being met and maintained.

(U) As part of the transition of the RDJTF to a unified command, the following required operational capabilities were submitted to JCS for validation:

<u>ROC</u>	<u>Date Submitted</u>	<u>Title</u>
1-82	Dec 81	Command Center Communications
2-82	May 82	Anti-Jam UHF Satellite Capability
3-82	Jun 82	Southwest Asia Theater Communications Infrastructure Capability
4-82	Aug 82	Worldwide Military Command Communications Capability
5-82	Jul 82	Southwest Asia Theater Interim Communications Capability
6-82	Jul 82	Southwest Asia Forward Headquarters Element Communications Capability
7-82	Sep 82	Tactical Communications Capability

(U) J-6 participated in two transition conferences that were attended by representatives from RDAFFOR, RDARFOR, RDNVFOR, and HQ Tactical Air Command. The purpose of the conference was to discuss memoranda of understanding and transition items of concern in the RDJTF's area of operations. Topics included frequency coordination, commercial leasing, funding of US communications support, and communications support for the defense attaches and offices of military cooperation. Problem areas were identified and coordinated efforts were initiated to insure their resolution.

(U) Several communications directives were published during 1982. Among them was "Policy and Guidance for Coordination of Southwest Asia Frequency Requirements (JCS C35-M-469 82)." In response to JCS tasking, USEUCOM developed this document in coordination with PACOM, USREDCOM, and the RDJTF. This document was implemented by the JCS on 22 June. The frequency management regulation (USCENTCOM Regulation 105-1) was drafted and coordinated with the component commands during September and October, and approved for implementation on 1 January 1983. The telecommunications services regulation (USCENTCOM Regulation 105-3) was prepared in coordination with the component commands during October and approved for implementation on 1 January 1983. It controlled the preparation and processing of requests for leased and defense communications system circuits throughout the theater.

(U) Emphasis was placed on integrating communications planning into the Southwest Asia military construction program. A J-6 representative accompanied representatives from J-3 and J-4 to Ras Banas, Egypt to review facilities and MILCON plans. Potential shortfalls were identified and, where appropriate, RDJTF Southwest Asia theater communications infrastructure requirements were incorporated into the military construction proposals.

(U) On 12 July, Mr. (b)(6), OSD Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for C³I, directed DCA to prepare a RDJTF C³ System Improvement Program (SIP) to help resolve RDJTF C³ shortfalls. SIP actions were to include immediate improvements, product improvements, and longer term programs. The SIP was divided into two phases. Phase I SIP was finished in December 1982 and would be used to influence 1983 funds reprogramming and the fiscal year 1984 budget. The Phase II SIP was to be available on 15 April 1983 and would be used to effect the 1985 POM process.

(U) Several issues were involved in establishing communications for the new RDJTF headquarters building. On 18 December 1981, RDJTF ROC 1-82 was submitted for a command and control system. That ROC outlined the functions that had to be present in a command center and the minimum essential communications systems required by 1 January 1983 to support the new United States Central Command. Program Management Directive X-K 2052 (1), "Communications Support for HQ RDJTF at MacDill AFB," was issued by Headquarters United

States Air Force as the executive agent and identified the Air Force Communications Command as the program management office with overall responsibility for supporting ROC 1-82.

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that the Secretary of Defense had assigned a force/activity designator I to the RDJTF command center communications requirements on 30 April 1982. Headquarters USAF assigned an Air Force precedence rating of 1-6. In early July 1982, personnel from the Air Force Communications Command's Engineering Installation Center arrived to install the C² communication equipment for the new RDJTF headquarters building. During the installation phase an average of 45 to 50 Air Force personnel were involved in the work at any one time. The 1928th Communications Group installed the administrative telephone system in the new building and individual direct lines ("Hot Lines") between various activities and the Emergency Action Cell 240-line telephone console. The Defense Communications Agency (DCA), under a MOA with the Air Staff, installed the audio-visual capabilities and other supporting equipment for the command center. On 20 November 1982, LTG Robert C. Kingston activated the new headquarters building.

(U) The RDJTF Command Information System (RDCIS) was composed of the facilities, equipment, procedures, personnel, and communications essential to the commander for planning, directing, and controlling forces assigned to, and in support of, the RDJTF. The RDCIS had to be compatible with WWMCCS and with the command and control systems of the component forces. RDJTF Regulation 525-1 prescribed the management organization, procedures, and

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responsibilities for the RDCIS. The RDCIS Executive Committee was the management focal point; it was established in August and held its first meeting on 23 September. The RDCIS Committee consisted of the RDJTF Chief of Staff as chairman, the J-6 as the executive assistant, the RDJTF directors, the combat capability and analysis group, the comptroller, and the adjutant general. The RDCIS Executive Committee established several working groups composed of middle managers and action officers to resolve and study special issues. Requirements for improved and new RDCIS capabilities were systematically reviewed, approved, and incorporated into required operational capability statements, financial programs, and other documents.

(U) In the area of computer systems plans and programs, upgrades to command WWMCCS ADP hardware and software were proposed to provide more effective support to RDJTF ADP users. These proposed upgrades were submitted via system development notifications (SDN) through the Air Force Data Systems Design Center and HQ USAF Directorate of Computer Resources to JCS for validation. The objective of SDN RED-069, submitted on 5 January, was to give RDJTF users of the Honeywell Level 6 minicomputer a teleconferencing capability. This proposal was at the Command and Control Technical Center for implementation. A requirement for a secure operating system for the Honeywell Level 6 minicomputer was identified in SDN RED-068 submitted on 23 February. This feature was needed to safeguard classified data on the Level 6 and host computer at

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USREDCOM. This action progressed through normal SDN processing and was at the Command and Control Technical Center for development at the end of 1982. The acquisition of additional automated data processing equipment was proposed on 8 March in SDN RED-070. This hardware upgrade enhanced existing capabilities to meet the increased command and control responsibilities and operational planning requirements inherent in transitioning from a joint task force to a unified command. The SDN was approved and the final ADP equipment arrived on 4 November.

(U) The objective of SDN RED-071, submitted on 8 March 1982, was the development of a file transfer capability between the Level 6 and the H6000. This would facilitate the on-line update of locally stored data base information. This action was programmed through normal SDN processing and was at the Command and Control Technical Center for development at the end of the year.

(U) Since it was more cost effective to purchase the Level 6 minicomputer than to continue its lease, its purchase was advocated in SDN RED-074, dated 25 May. The purchase was aided with the use of accrued lease purchase credits. The effective date of purchase was 30 September.

(U) The objective of SDN RED-075, dated 16 June, was support of ADP users in Phase I of the RDJTF move to the new facility. The SDN

proposed the purchase and lease of additional terminal equipment and printers. The OJCS was evaluating this SDN at the end of the year.

(U) The purchase of a second level 6 was proposed in SDN RED-076, dated 18 August. The second level 6 would facilitate deployment at two locations simultaneously and would provide back-up during single location deployment. Additionally, it would provide a capability for off-line software development when in garrison. At the end of 1982, this SDN was at the Air Force Data Systems Design Center for evaluation.

(U) The objective of SDN RED-078, dated 18 August, was to ensure the support of Command and Control Technical Center level 6 software. This SDN proposed that the level 6 software be acquired via the WWMCCS contract instead of a contract with the General Services Administration. The SDN was at JCS awaiting approval at the end of the year.

(U) Purchase of a single WWMCCS Standard Graphics Terminal and hard copy device was proposed in SDN RED-077, dated 25 October. This equipment was needed by the RDJTF staff to meet near-term requirements to display and analyze data.

(U) When deployed, the RDJTF required WWMCCS host sponsors. To meet this requirement SDN RED-080 was developed. The SDN proposed that USEUCOM, USREDCOM, and National Military Command Center WWMCCS

sites be designated as host sponsors. This SDN was being coordinated with the proposed sites prior to submission to JCS for evaluation and approval.

(U) A technical library (e.g. Data Pro, and ADP-related publications) was established to keep current publications on the latest developments in the ADP field.

(U) An updated WWMCCS required operational capability was submitted to JCS on 4 August. This document specified a Rapid Deployment C² Computer System consisting of microcomputer-based local area networks interconnected with a larger capacity common user processing facility such as the Honeywell Level 6 minicomputer. It defined an integrated ADP architecture which established broad, continuing goals which would lend direction to future programmatic and system development activities. The capabilities defined were critical to effective command and control of designated forces and to command responsiveness to the National Command Authorities and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(U) There were several computer systems applications developments during 1982. In June, the Computer Systems Division acquired an Apple II Plus computer for training and evaluation purposes. Training was primarily conducted using the Pascal language, although some familiarization with Basic was gained.

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(U) In October 1982, the Application Branch of the Computer Systems Division formed a new microcomputer programming section. The primary responsibility of this section was to research microcomputer programming languages in preparation for programming support for the RDJTF microcomputer system.

(U) On 1 October 1982, Radio Corporation of America in Burlington, Massachusetts, and Planning Research Corporation, McLean, Virginia, delivered a Deployable Intelligence Data Handling System to HQ RDJTF. This system was designed to meet the RDJTF's threat assessment needs. The equipment, housed in an eight-by-twelve-foot shelter, provided an automated intelligence data processing capability that interfaced with existing and planned intelligence communications networks. This brought a real-time intelligence data base, order of battle files, installation files, and message processing functions to any deployed headquarters operation. Twelve computer terminals could be remoted within the headquarters to support intelligence analysis and battle management decisionmaking, allowing the direction of strategic and tactical airborne and ground operations within the RDJTF's areas of influence. At the end of the year, the Applications Branch was in the process of accepting the DIDHS from the vendors. The first deployable test was scheduled to take place during Gallant Knight 83.

(U) During July 1980 the requirement for an airborne "En route Intelligence Data System" was defined. Early in 1982, J-6 Computer

Systems Division personnel went on several trips to HQ SAC, Offutt AFB, Nebraska, to obtain SAC's version of the en route intelligence data system. There, work began to adapt and test this system to meet RDJTF requirements. A concept demonstration was performed en route to exercise Jade Tiger in November 1982. This system, developed for a ROLM 1666 computer onboard an airborne command post, would keep the RDJTF staff informed of the intelligence situation while en route to a crisis area. The en route intelligence data system was being co-developed by the RDJTF J-6 Applications Branch and SAC.

(U) In the area of computer systems operations, two S280 shelters were delivered in February 1982 for the deployment of the level 6 computer. One was operationally tested during Gallant Eagle 82, while the other one was to be tested during Gallant Knight 83. During 1982, additional equipment to support WWMCCS was purchased and delivered. This equipment included nine terminals, two multiple interface units, a tape drive, and six modems. On 19 November 1982, the Operations Management Branch moved into its designated area within Phase I of the new RDJTF headquarters complex in Building 540. Communications were established with USREDCOM and the WWMCCS became operational in the headquarters on 21 November.

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CHAPTER III
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES


(U) While a great deal of the work of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was done in its six directorates, there was also a number of special staff agencies which supported the RDJTF headquarters and its unique mission. These agencies included the traditional professions of the ministry, law, and medicine, and also included the Adjutant General, the Comptroller, and the Provost Marshal. In addition, there were specialists in public affairs, facilities, and combat capabilities analysis among the special staff, as well as liaison officers from two specified commands, SAC and MAC, from two unified commands, USEUCOM and PACOM, and from several other organizations.

(U) The Adjutant General's office manning grew during the year from 12 to 32. In October 1982, the Adjutant General's office was reorganized to provide better control of resources and personnel. The revised organization was as depicted in Figure 12 on the following page.

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Figure 12

Adjutant General Organization



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(U) During 1982, the Adjutant General's staff took part in four major exercises, two held in CONUS and two OCONUS. Those exercises were: Gallant Knight in January, Gallant Eagle in April, Proud Saber in October and November, and Jade Tiger in November and December.

(U) In the publications section of the Publications/Graphics Division there were three personnel at the beginning of the year. The publications section added two additional personnel during 1982, one officer as section chief and one enlisted person. In 1982, publications undertook the added functions of forms distribution and established a complete master library for the headquarters. This section was dependent upon USREDCOM and the base for various administrative publications support; however, by mid-year it had progressed, by initiating its own pin-point distribution accounts with the four Services' distribution centers, to the point where it had established and could maintain its own independent publications and distribution operations. Also during this period, administrative local forms for the headquarters grew from approximately 15 to a total of 46. The number of local administrative publications grew from 18 to 146 during the year. Publications inaugurated full editorial services for the headquarters, and in conjunction with the J-1 staff, took over from USREDCOM the function of complete orders processing, including editing, authenticating, and maintaining the record order files. During 1982, this section

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devised means for the command group to promulgate command policy and procedures by initiating command policy letters. Also, in January 1982 it began publishing the RDJTF weekly bulletin of official and unofficial information. Before and during the command build-up, the publications division provided the command with complete publications and records management services, including informal records management inspections. In October, the graphics section was placed under the administrative supervision of the chief of publications. The year began with the graphics section being manned by one person; five people were onboard by the end of the year. Graphics personnel completed more than 540 work orders during 1982, including approximately 100 overhead transparencies and slide briefings with more than 1,000 transparencies, more than 180 name tags for visitors, 60 charts of varying sizes, form layouts, and various modifications. The graphics section advanced during 1982 from a one-room, one-table shop to a three-room, fully-equipped operation with the very latest in modern equipment, including an AM Bruning Model 8700 ozalid machine and an AM Varitype Text Composer/Editor, Model 5810 with image previewer. This graphic arts word processor had a capability which surpassed all other Air Force graphics sections. Graphics also designed the new USCENTCOM logo and designed and standardized the command briefing slides during the year.

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(U) In 1982, the Resources Management Division assumed responsibility for rental and purchase of all advanced office equipment for the entire RDJTF headquarters. Throughout the year, the continued growth of the headquarters called for extensive expansion in office automation. The Resources Division acquired over 40 Xerox 860 word processing stations in 1982. It ensured that proper planning was utilized to budget for continued growth and future increases in office system requirements. Such foresight insured that USCENTCOM would not fall behind in its administrative mission.

(U) In addition to controlling the headquarters administrative system, the Resources Division of the Adjutant General also controlled the entire headquarters' copying and duplicating requirements. This included budgeting for all copying equipment, including supplies and maintenance. This program resulted in the RDJTF having reliable copying equipment in garrison and on deployments. The Savin model 775 office copiers were acquired to meet this requirement. These copiers proved to be excellent choices. For "at home" reproduction requirements the resources division procured a Xerox 8200 copier to reproduce all message traffic for required routing. This machine produced approximately 270,000 copies per month. For all other headquarters reproduction services, the Resources Division procured a Xerox 9500 copying machine. This machine was one of the largest, fastest, and most

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sophisticated duplicating machines on the market and produced approximately 250,000 copies per month. Additionally, Savin models 870 and 800 were procured to assist the various directorates and staff agencies in their everyday requirements for economical reproduction of drafts, plans, programs, etc., in the coordination and finalization stages of their work. The Resource Management Division of the Adjutant General's office budgeted and procured additional equipment as needed to insure that the headquarters kept abreast of its ever-changing mission.

(U) In the Services Division, personnel strength was increased by seven enlisted people to one officer and 17 enlisted troops by the end of 1982. The increase was a result of the changes in the JMP associated with the evolution of the RDJTF into a unified command. During September 1982, the workload of the division became so heavy that a five-and-a-half-day work week could not meet the demands of the command, so the Message and Distribution Branch went to a 24-hours-per-day, 7-days-a-week operation. In October, a classified document destruction site was established for the RDJTF when the command purchased a disintegrator.

(U) On 19 November, the Services Division began to move to the new command headquarters in Building 540. Part of the division's operations remained in Building 1105 (a message and distribution element, and the Reproduction Branch) to support the part of the

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command that was not scheduled to move in the first phase. As a result of the "split," the requirement for a courier service became apparent, and, on 19 December, a shuttle run began between Buildings 1105 and 540, as well as to USREDCOM headquarters and the base communications center.

(U) A request was submitted to the command on 22 November for the establishment of parachute jump billets within the Adjutant General's office. This would provide an airborne administrative capability during deployments and in time of war. The request was approved in February 1983.

(U) With the command's growth and the increase in printing requests, the requirement for a printing regulation became apparent and in November 1982 the first regulation on printing was published (RDJTF Regulation 310-3). Additionally, coordination was made at that time with the Eglin AFB Field Printing Plant to assist the RDJTF in the reproduction of various regulations, plans, and standing operating procedures. During 1982, the Eglin printing plant reproduced over one million impressions for the command.

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LEGAL ADVISOR

(U) The RDJTF Legal Advisor during 1982 was COL (b)(6)
 (b)(6) US Army. The organization of the office of the Legal
 Advisor was as follows:

Command Legal
 Advisor

Administrative
 Law Division

Legal Assistance/
 Claims Division

Military Justice
 Procurement Division

International Law/
 Legislative Liaison
 Division

(U) In 1982 the Legal Advisor's office had four officers and four
 enlisted personnel. The representation by service was:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
Air Force/Civilian	1	1
Army	2	2
Marine	1	1

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(U) During 1982, the main activities of the RDJTF Legal Advisor involved support of exercises, Congressional testimony, input to various MOUs, advice on rules of engagement, and promulgation of the regulations of the RDJTF Legal Advisor's office. The legal staff participated in two exercises, Gallant Knight 82 and Jade Tiger 83. During the first of these exercises, COL [REDACTED] (b)(6) of the 352d Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserve, served as Legal Advisor. He coordinated and controlled all legal activities during the exercise and provided technical supervision over judge advocates of the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Army components. In Jade Tiger 83, LTC [REDACTED] (b)(6) performed liaison duty at the American Embassy in Muscat, Oman.

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS

(U) Nineteen eighty-two was a year of transition as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force prepared to become the sixth US unified command. The public affairs office was active throughout the transition period, even though the external public affairs posture was "low key" for much of the year. Public affairs activity was geared mainly toward the internal transition functions of organizing, manning, and planning, and with the other taskings associated with evolution to unified command status.

(U) Public interest in the command was less than it had been in earlier years, but during the transition the command's public affairs posture remained one of not actively seeking coverage. Nevertheless, international and national news media rarely covered the Persian Gulf without mentioning the role and impact of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Moreover, there was considerable propaganda by the USSR and Soviet client states citing the "imperialist" rapid deployment force.

(U) One of the most significant transition items for the public affairs office was increased manning authorizations. The authorizations had been approved in mid-1981 and the Services began providing public affairs and administrative personnel in 1982. What had been a two-person public affairs office at the beginning of 1982 had expanded to a total of 14 by year's end.

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(U) Early arrivals in 1982 were a plans and policy officer and a media operations officer who were tasked with setting up their respective divisions. Seven people reported during June, July, and August, augmenting the divisions and carrying out administrative functions. Reporting during the last two months of 1982 were another administrator and the public affairs plans officer, leaving only the chief of the Operations Branch still to report for duty.

(U) Because the 1982 transition period required a low key public affairs profile, it provided much needed time for the organization, design, and implementation of necessary functions, regulations, and plans for the establishment of USCENTCOM.

(U) The Operations Division focused on media relations, audiovisual documentation, exercises, and community relations during 1982. In general, the RDJTF's media relations posture was responsive but low key. In the early part of the year the command was several months away from its transition to a unified command and was scheduled to participate in a major CONUS exercise. This situation, combined with residual media interest from 1981, resulted in a lower profile but open posture. Requests for interviews were generally not discouraged and were even sought if a particular point was to be made. As the year progressed, however, the RDJTF's public affairs posture was gradually reduced to the point that most requests for interviews were declined. This approach was designed

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to draw attention from the about-to-be-inactivated RDJTF and to shift the focus to the new unified command.

(U) The Secretary of Defense, Mr. Caspar Weinberger, visited RDJTF headquarters on 15 September. The public affairs office was the office of primary responsibility for this visit. Weinberger participated in tours and briefings at USREDCOM, RDJTF, and the 56th Tactical Training Wing. He held a planeside news conference before leaving the base, but covered no new ground.

(U) On 8 December, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Mr. Francis W. West, and the JCS J-5, Vice Admiral Thomas Bigley, conducted a press background briefing at the Pentagon to discuss the establishment of the United States Central Command which had been announced the same day. The backgrounder was attributable to "Senior Defense Officials," according to ground rules established for the media. The RDJTF command group and senior staff listened to the background session by remote hookup in General Kingston's office. To further disseminate information to headquarters personnel, a summary of the key points of the background session was printed and distributed. The public affairs office was a key player in developing the wording of the USCENTCOM establishment announcement and providing material to prepare the senior DOD officials for the background session.¹ The

1. News Release (U), "Formation of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Announced," Dec 82.

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Deputy RDJTF Commander, General Taylor, briefed local media in the absence of General Kingston and participated in on-camera interviews held in conjunction with the DOD announcement.

(U) One of the key media events which resulted was an interview with General Kingston and a follow-on story by Richard Halloran which appeared on page 1 of the New York Times. The story described the RDJTF and role of the proposed unified command. There were many other stories about the command in the press, but most were published on the writers' own initiative and without the assistance of the command public affairs office.

(U) An important public affairs function performed throughout the year was keeping the commander and staff informed of news about the command and the region. This basically involved receiving the Current News "Early Bird edition" by facsimile from the Washington Liaison Office each morning and routing it to the command group and key staff. A daily review of Associated Press and Reuters wires, as well as about 13 periodicals, also revealed articles of interest that were subsequently routed to all concerned. Late in the year the Associated Press and Reuters wires were transferred to the J-2 indications and warning center.

(U) Another important project was the continuation of a warm relationship with the United States Information Agency (USIA).

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Mr. Brian Bell, a USIA career officer with the equivalent rank of brigadier general, was assigned to the command. The public affairs office carried the staff action to have the USIA advisor's position established and was the central point of contact to facilitate his incorporation into the staff.

(U) A major event initiated with USIA even before Mr. Bell's arrival was the planning for a videotape about the United States Central Command. After personal correspondence between General Kingston and Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6) of USIA, the project was initiated and a draft treatment written. At year's end, the project was on "hold" pending approval from Washington of public affairs themes for the new command.

(U) Audiovisual documentation was another important part of the public affairs effort during the year. Projects covered the spectrum of photography from documentation of promotion and award ceremonies through a joint service effort to document an important OCONUS exercise. The entire documentation effort was managed for much of the year with only one enlisted person assigned and for the remainder of the year with him and a captain. The key to success was detailed coordination with supporting audiovisual agencies of the services, particularly the Air Force's Aerospace Audiovisual Service. Also important was the establishment of two photo contracts with local civilian firms to expedite the completion of ceremony photography.

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(U) The RDJTF participated in two exercises which generated significant media interest during the year. The first, Gallant Eagle 82, was a USREDCOM-sponsored exercise which was held in the California desert in March and April. The Readiness Command conducted a pre-site survey a month before the exercise and briefed local media at that time. Because of this preliminary briefing and the RDJTF's participation, there was quite a bit of interest in the exercise on the part of the local and national media. Unfortunately, six deaths and more than 150 injuries occurred when the 82d Airborne Division conducted the airborne landing phase of Gallant Eagle 82. This presented a considerable challenge to the USREDCOM and RDJTF public affairs staffs.

(U) During the remainder of the exercise, the media were given facts and information as quickly as they became available. General Kingston briefed the press shortly after the incident and his personal presence as the command spokesman was a positive factor in limiting a negative story. Coverage of Gallant Eagle by the press quickly centered on the deaths and injuries. Rapid access by the media to detailed information helped limit the stories to factual accounts of an unfortunate tragedy instead of allowing the kind of uninformed speculation which would have only compounded the problem. After the exercise, several concerned citizens wrote to General Kingston to express their concern about remarks attributed to him by the media. His response proved to be a classic case of positive

public relations; in almost every instance his reply resulted in a return letter expressing support for the command. A key lesson learned was the need for clearly delineated command responsibilities and authority in regard to exercise events. A clear understanding of responsibilities, release authority, and other command matters formed the cornerstone of an effective joint public affairs effort.

(U) The second exercise, Jade Tiger 82, was conducted in Oman, Sudan, and Somalia during November and December. This exercise was the subject of media interest, but no official statements were made about it in either the planning or execution phase. The low-key public affairs posture desired by the Sultanate of Oman resulted in no stories. In Somalia, the government sanctioned articles in the local press. Key public affairs items of interest included the stationing of one public affairs officer and one photographer at the main operating location at Thumrait, Oman, documentation of Navy and Marine Corps operations by a Navy audiovisual team, and provision of the European edition of The Stars and Stripes to exercise participants on the basis of one copy per five individuals.

(U) Jade Tiger was the last exercise held by the RDJTF. Although there was limited publicity and confusion of some factual information by unnamed sources, the basic thrust of those stories was correct, portraying to the American people (and to potential adversaries) the readiness of the force. The major stories were

division focused heavily on updating and refining operation plans, concept of operation plans, command arrangement agreements, and memoranda of understanding with other unified commands and components. One useful project was the preparation and publication of a manual to delineate the public affairs functions which would be performed in various circumstances ranging from normal peacetime operations to war.

(U) The division's major accomplishment of the year was guiding the preparation of six public affairs regulations to take effect when the RDJTF achieved unified command status. Pertinent regulations were assigned to each division to assure a smooth transition and provide necessary guidance to components. The regulations produced were:

- R360-1 Public Affairs Organization and Policy (Plans/Policy Branch)
- R360-2 Use of Military Carriers for Public Affairs Purposes (Operations-Media Branch)
- R360-3 Clearance of Department of Defense Information (Operations-Media Branch)
- R360-5 Community Relations (Operations-Community Relations Branch)
- R360-6 Mini Television (Operations-Audiovisual Branch)
- R360-7 Audiovisual Policy (Operations-Audiovisual Branch)

(U) These regulations were completed in late December and were coordinated through the Department of Defense, each service public affairs directorate, and the RDJTF components. Internal coordination was also accomplished throughout the directorates and special staff offices.

(U) The issue of host nation sensitivities was another transition item addressed within the public affairs office. The Plans and Policy Division created country files for each nation in the RDJTF area of responsibility. These files were geared to provide specific information regarding public affairs matters and sensitivities within each country, and were intended for internal use by the public affairs staff and for briefing individuals being assigned to various positions in the RDJTF's area of responsibility. It was envisioned that the sources for this information would be public affairs points of contact within the countries concerned, classified and unclassified messages dealing with media operations, and general sources, such as news articles and messages that provided insights to national sensitivities.

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PROVOST MARSHAL

(U) When the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was formed in March 1980, the Provost Marshal's office was manned by LTC [REDACTED] (b)(6) US Army, acting as a branch chief within the Personnel Directorate (J-1). The mission statement at that time dealt with collection of police statistical data, plans and policies regarding enemy prisoners of war, confinement of US personnel, and coordination with other law enforcement agencies.

(U) The DOD decision to create a unified command resulted in several changes in preparation for the new responsibilities. The Provost Marshal's office was moved out of the J-1 directorate in 1982 and made a special staff office under the Chief of Staff. An Army major, an Air Force major, and a Marine staff sergeant were added to the manning document.

(U) Before any of the newly authorized personnel arrived, LTC Demetrovich retired from the Army. The first member of the newly created special staff, Capt [REDACTED] (b)(6) USAF, arrived during June 1982; the Provost Marshal, LTC [REDACTED] (b)(6) US Army, arrived in August, SSgt [REDACTED] (b)(6) USMC (Provost Sergeant) and MAJ [REDACTED] (b)(6) US Army, were on board by October 1982.

(U) The provost marshal and his staff reviewed the organization's functions and set about reorganizing the rank

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structure, redefining the provost marshal's responsibilities, and rewriting the mission statement. By the close of 1982, the entire office had been reorganized. The authorized billets were increased as follows:

US Army 0-6 - Provost Marshal

US Army 0-5 - Plans/Policy Officer

US Air Force 0-4 - Host Nation Liaison Officer

US Marine Corps E-8 - Provost Sergeant

US Navy E-5 - Administration Chief

(U) In addition to the above manning increases, the mission statement was rewritten as follows: Exercise staff supervision on all Military/Security Police matters. Serve as the focal point for plans, policies, coordination of lines of communications, personal security, physical security, air base ground defense, port security, and enemy prisoner of war/civilian internees. Assist in development of plans and policies for antiterrorism, rear area protection and rear area combat operations. Coordinate and insure that customs support was provided to all US personnel in the command's area of responsibility. Prepare plans and policies for law enforcement and criminal investigations support in the area of responsibility. Coordinate with host nation, US local and federal policy and security agencies for required support. Establish and coordinate crime prevention programs.

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(U) Issues worked during 1982 were primarily involved with redefining the Provost Marshal's mission, establishing the office functionally to handle those responsibilities, and setting up customs coordination. Significant areas identified during 1982 which would require attention in 1983 were the personal protection of the commander, deputy commander, and other VIPs, staff supervision for antiterrorism in the AOR, physical security for prepositioned assets, publication of the necessary regulations and guidance to components, and updating operations and contingency plans.

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COMPTROLLER

(U) Calendar year 1982 saw the office of the comptroller grow from a three-member operation to an almost fully staffed activity with 15 people, including 2 lieutenant colonels, 3 majors, 2 company grade officers, 7 enlisted personnel, and a Department of the Air Force civilian, GM-13. Correspondingly, the range and depth of services provided by the office increased markedly. For instance, the comptroller was able to provide finance liaison service for assigned members of all four uniformed Services, including pay inquiry resolution, paycheck and leave and earning statement distribution, and in- and out-processing. The Plans and Management Division conducted management studies and cost analyses in the areas of temporary duty fund usage, establishment of a forward headquarters element in various configurations, office furniture and equipment procurement, and local transportation support. These actions focused the attention of top-level decisionmakers on ways to make the most efficient and effective use of scarce assets. During 1982, the Plans and Management Division contributed to the Joint Operational Planning System through recommended changes in the operations plan format, i.e., by adding to the personnel annex the requirement for funding and cost data. Inclusion of these items would enable the Department of Defense to better justify requests for additional funds and to capture costs resulting from implementation of operation plans and orders. The addition of a civilian budget division chief along with an Air Force operations

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and maintenance (O&M) budget officer and two budget technicians brought over 60 years of Air Force budget experience to that division. Since the Air Force funded the MacDill headquarters of the RDJTF, this experience helped to promote a smoother budget operation and flow of policy information. Internal financial management reports were revised and streamlined to provide more meaningful and timely information. The Financial Working Group was transformed from an ad hoc committee into a regular and active financial management body, able to effect a staff consensus regarding key financial decisions for the command. The closeout of fiscal year 1982 bore evidence of this--a number of previously unfunded mission items were financed through reprogramming at year's end, and a 100 percent obligation rate was achieved. Arrival of a security assistance budget officer brought the command closer to the assumption of security assistance for the RDJTF area of responsibility. The security assistance budget officer traveled extensively and acquired the knowledge necessary to transfer security assistance financial program management responsibilities from USEUCOM and PACOM on 1 October 1983.

(U) The comptroller administered a Joint Readiness Exercise program within the RDJTF budget. In fiscal year 1982, the RDJTF participated in three major exercises (Gallant Knight, Gallant Eagle, and Bright Star) and had observers or conducted site surveys for several others. Listed in Figure 13 on the next page were the

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obligations for each exercise by quarter from 1 October 1981 through 31 December 1982.

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Figure 13. Exercise Obligations

EXERCISE	FY 82 (Cumulative)				FY 83
	1st QTR	2nd QTR	3rd QTR	4th QTR	1st QTR
Ellipse Delta 82	\$.4	\$.4	\$.4	\$.4	\$.0
Bold Eagle 82	4.6	3.0	3.0	3.0	.0
Gallant Knight 82	28.4	45.5	40.7	38.1	.0
Gallant Eagle 82	8.0	147.9	150.9	129.0	.0
Bright Star 82	260.0	295.4	286.9	255.3	.0
Proud Saber 83	.0	.0	4.1	3.4	.6
Jade Tiger 83	.0	.0	18.9	40.6	188.7
Freedom Pennant 83	.0	.0	.0	6.6	.0
Gallant Knight 83	.0	.0	.0	3.6	6.1
Bright Star 83	.0	.0	.0	.0	.4
Wintex 83	.0	.0	.0	.0	5.3
	\$ 301.4	\$ 492.2	\$ 504.9	\$ 480.0	\$ 201.1

NOTE: Decreases in cumulative obligations are due to actuals being less than estimates.

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(U) Depicted in Figure 14 below are cumulative quarterly obligations of the 1982 RDJTF operating budget showing all four quarters of fiscal year 1982 and the first quarter of fiscal year 1983 (October 1981 through December 1982). Joint Readiness Exercise expenses were included.

Figure 14. Operating programs (in thousands)

<u>DIRECTORATE</u>	<u>----- 1st QTR</u>	<u>FY 82 (Cumulative) 2nd QTR</u>	<u>3rd QTR</u>	<u>4th QTR</u>	<u>FY 83 1st QT</u>
Personnel, J-1	\$ 4.1	\$ 11.8	\$ 41.0	\$ 73.5	\$ 21.
Intelligence, J-2	33.2	76.5	164.8	279.1	129.
Operations, J-3	22.0	111.6	182.0	347.3	124.
Log & Security Assistance, J-4	15.6	39.5	138.9	254.9	161.
Plans, Pol & Prog, J-5	14.8	36.2	79.9	151.4	58.
C ³ & Computers Sys, J-6	9.0	53.1	93.5	207.7	196.
HQ Commandant	92.4	315.2	493.6	1118.4	254.
Adjutant General	232.0	249.6	486.6	672.1	206.
Command Group	41.1	63.8	73.01	130.8	30.
Comptroller	.5	4.6	11.9	27.1	8.
Legal Advisor	1.1	4.5	7.6	12.9	16.
Wash Liaison	17.2	49.0	58.1	59.2	27.
Public Affairs	20.2	25.1	41.5	62.3	12.
Cbt Cap Anal Gp	3.1	5.2	9.8	21.6	7.
Surgeon*	.0	.0	7.9	27.9	15.
Provost Marshal**	.0	.0	.0	.0	1.
Inspector General	.0	.0	.0	.0	3.
Det 1, SACOS	.0	.4	2.8	5.0	3.
TOTAL	\$ 506.3	\$1046.1	\$1892.9	\$3451.2	\$1278.

* Included with J-4 for 1st and 2nd quarters of FY 82

** Included with J-1 for FY 82

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(U) The following table shows operating program by element of expense:

<u>Element of Expense</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>
TDY	\$ 136.2	\$ 324.6	\$ 515.2	\$ 840.8	\$ 423.1
Rental Vehicle	.5	1.2	1.5	1.1	.0
Trans of Things	.2	2.5	2.5	2.1	12.8
Facilities Rental	32.6	140.5	143.9	244.7	55.1
Equipment Rental	63.7	74.2	213.3	170.3	104.8
Communications	14.1	16.6	17.4	16.0	53.0
Printing & Repro	.2	.3	2.4	3.2	2.4
Facilities Projects	.0	.0	.0	.0	16.4
Custodial Services	.0	.0	.0	.0	80.7
Purch Maintenance	3.9	5.8	22.8	25.1	68.8
Other Purch Svcs	.0	32.1	35.3	36.3	92.5
Supplies	250.2	425.0	698.5	1289.3	322.5
Equipment	<u>4.7</u>	<u>23.3</u>	<u>240.1</u>	<u>822.3</u>	<u>46.5</u>
TOTAL	\$ 506.3	\$1046.1	\$1892.9	\$3451.2	\$1278.6

(U) The fiscal year 1983 operating budget was prepared during December 1982 and submitted to Headquarters US Air Force. Operating requirements, excluding JCS Exercises and a forward headquarters element, were estimated at approximately \$6.0 million. This represents almost \$1.2 million more than the 1983 operating budget, reflecting the increased responsibilities of a unified command responsible for an area located halfway around the world.

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HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

(U) The functions of the headquarters commandant were to plan and coordinate base support and management of the headquarters complex under bare base conditions and to provide a nucleus of expertise to take care of food service, supply, billeting, power, transportation, and security of the headquarters. For purposes of military justice and discipline, each of the four Services assigned to the RDJTF had an element commander and a deputy. Three of the deputy commanders were assigned to the office of the Headquarters Commandant: LTC (b)(6) Deputy Commander, US Army Element; Maj (b)(6) Deputy Commander, US Marine Corps Detachment; and Maj (b)(6) Deputy Commander, US Air Force Element. The US Army Administrative Detachment was activated in December and the Headquarters Commandant, LTC (b)(6) was appointed commander by General Kingston. First Sergeant (b)(6) was the HQ RDJTF First Sergeant for all members of the command and functioned as such for each of the element detachment commanders and their deputy commanders.

(U) The Headquarters Commandant Training Division was created during 1982 and its responsibility was expanded to accomplish general military and professional training for the four branches of the Service. Marksmanship, NBC tests, and physical training examinations were consolidated to accomplish training.

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(U) The headquarters commandant validated equipment requirements for a bare base deployed headquarters, utilizing the various increments established in the readiness standing operating procedures. These requirements were forwarded to the Air Staff for funding.

(U) On 7 December, a car pool parking plan was established for the RDJTF. A shuttle bus was established on 22 November which provided transportation between Building 1105 and Building 540, a distance of 5 miles. The headquarters commandant established the following positions for the fiscal year 1983-1984: a facilities manager, two administrative specialists, an operations NCO (separate from the first sergeant's billet), a training NCO, and a maintenance control NCO.

(U) The headquarters commandant was tasked to develop a schedule for movement of personnel, furniture, and equipment from Building 1105 to Building 540. The move was accomplished without major problems during October. The headquarters commandant section participated in two major exercises during 1982. Gallant Eagle was a CONUS exercise in which the 500-man headquarters was supported using the bare base concept. Additionally, a small contingency provided base support for exercise Jade Tiger. Support was entirely bare base with most base support services provided by the Air Force.

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(U) The RDJTF Support Facility was opened in November. The following sections moved to the support facility: deputy commandant, motor pool, supply, carpentry shop, NBC/chemical, armorer, engineering, and food service. The support facility was capable of performing vehicle maintenance and engineering support; it also allowed for the storage of the palletized equipment and supplies necessary to support the headquarters under bare base conditions.

(U) In July, the headquarters commandant assumed responsibility for male and female dormitories from the host base. He initiated a complete dormitory management program to manage three separate buildings.

(U) Another responsibility of the headquarters commandant was internal security of the new headquarters building, which the internal security division assumed in November. The MacDill AFB Chief of Security Police agreed to assume security responsibilities for Building 1105 and the trailer compound until Phase II of the Building 540 project was complete in 1983.

SURGEON

(U) During 1982, the RDJTF surgeon's office underwent a period of significant changes and major challenges. The most important change was the assignment of a full-time command surgeon, COL (b)(3),(b)(6) US Army, and action officers from each service to form a separate surgeon's office reporting directly to the Chief of Staff. Previously, US Army COL (b)(3),(b)(6), the USREDCOM Surgeon, functioned as an augmentee to the medical services section of J-4 and one action officer, MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6), US Army, was responsible for all medical planning. Major (b)(3),(b)(6) was also tasked with the development of the Joint Manning Document for the surgeon's office. The approved JMD allowed for the following authorizations:

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
Surgeon	O-6	USA
Plans & Opns Officer (Army)	O-5	USA
Med Log Officer	O-5	USA
Plans/Opns Officer (Navy/Marine)	O-4	USN
Plans/Opns Officer (AF)	O-4	USAF
Opns NCO	E-9	USA
Admin Supervisor	E-6	USN

(U) The Services took action to fill the authorizations and by August 1982 they were all filled. Two additional authorizations were filled without slots: deputy surgeon and assistant operations NCO.

(U) Two important problem areas were identified: The approved JMD did not provide adequate administrative support nor did it allow for a preventive medicine physician. Action was being taken to resolve these problems, and several alternatives were being examined at year's end.

(U) Transition to a unified command from a joint task force required that a memorandum of understanding be developed between USCINCEUR and the RDJTF. To develop the MOU, representatives of the RDJTF surgeon's office visited USEUCOM to establish the bases for the medical portion of the MOU. In October 1982, the following recommendations were developed for inclusion in the MOU:

- (U) USCINCEUR would continue aeromedical evacuation support in accordance with existing directives.

- U (C) USCINCEUR would continue this support in accordance with existing supplement care, open allotment, and CHAMPUS programs, etc.

- U (C) USCINCEUR would provide required medical care and hospitalization when authorized individuals were evacuated to USCINCEUR's area of responsibility.

- U (C) Reimbursement for these services would continue in accordance with existing directives.

- U (C) With regard to medical supply (Class VIII) support for military assistance advisory groups, missions, US embassies, and operations in the region:

- U (C) The U.S. Army Medical Material Center, Europe in accordance with current Department of the Army directives would continue to provide this service.

- U (C) The United States Air Forces in Europe would support Air Force operations.

-- ~~U(C)~~ Reimbursement for this materiel would continue in accordance with existing support agreements.

- ~~U(C)~~ With regard to veterinary services within the region:

-- ~~U(C)~~ USCINCEUR would continue to provide veterinary services until 1 October 1983.

-- ~~U(C)~~ USCINCEUR would provide the necessary workload and budgetary information relating to this support for USCINCCENT evaluation of this mission no later than 30 June 1983.

-- ~~U(C)~~ USCINCCENT will determine, prior to 1 October 1983, when the components can assume this mission and arrange the appropriate procedures for continuation of this mission after 1 October 1983 if required.

- ~~U(C)~~ With regard to preventive medicine services within the region:

-- ~~U(C)~~ USCINCEUR would continue to provide preventive medicine services until 1 October 1983.

-- ~~U(C)~~ USCINCEUR would provide the necessary workload and budgetary information relating to this support for USCINCCENT evaluation of this mission not later than 30 June 1983.

-- ~~U(C)~~ The USCINCCENT command surgeon would determine prior to 1 October 1983 when the components can assume this mission and initiate the appropriate agreements for continuation of this mission after 1 October 1983 if required.

- ~~U(C)~~ With regard to blood products requests within the region:

-- ~~U(C)~~ USCINCEUR would honor all requests for blood products within its capability.

-- ~~U(C)~~ USCINCEUR would forward all requests for blood products beyond its capability to the DOD Military Blood Program Office, Washington, DC.

- ~~U(C)~~ With regard to all other health services support not identified in the annex:

-- ~~U(C)~~ USCINCEUR would continue to provide all medical services support until 1 October 1983.

-- ~~U(C)~~ USCINCEUR would identify to USCINCCENT all medical services not covered by this annex at the time service is provided for evaluation of assumption of this service.

--~~U(c)~~ USCINCCENT would determine, prior to 1 October 1983, when the component can assume the services and arrange the appropriate procedures for continuation of the identified medical services after 1 October 1983 if required.

--~~U(c)~~ USCINCEUR would continue to provide undocumented medical services after 1 October 1983 on a case-by-case basis to assure uninterrupted medical services support and identify all such requests to USCINCCENT, as they occur, for evaluation and assumption of the medical services provided.

--~~U(s)~~ With regard to USCINCEUR medical support of USCINCCENT OPLANS: Medical support requirements during combat operations which require USCINCEUR support and coordination, are as defined in applicable USCINCCENT OPLANS. At year's end, the MOU was still in the coordination process.

(B)(1)1.4d

U ~~(S)~~ There were four medical objectives of Jade Tiger. Firstly, the exercise was organized to identify and define the medical responsibilities of HQ RDJTF and its component forces. Secondly, it would ensure that medical tasks, functions, and responsibilities were clearly delineated and assigned to Service components. In the third place, it would establish general policies applicable to medical support of operations in the exercise area. Finally, Jade Tiger would involve the conduct of humanitarian assistance in the form of a medical civil affairs program in Oman.

U ~~(S)~~ There were four medical problem areas discovered during Jade Tiger. First, the medical support accompanying the deployed forces was austere, though it proved to be adequate. Heavy reliance was planned on the host nation for hospitalization and, consequently, little medical training was completed. Secondly, communications between the medical civil affairs program teams in the AOA and HQ RDJTF at Thumrait proved difficult and unrealistic. In the third place, host nation medical support at Thumrait was austere. Few medical resources were available to support deployed forces. Finally, heavy reliance on aeromedical evacuation was necessary, because of the paucity of medical support deployed with the exercise forces. Overall, the medical objectives of Jade Tiger 83 were accomplished. The medical civil affairs program proved particularly successful.

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(U) Gallant Eagle 82 was a combined command post and field training exercise conducted from 27 March to 7 April at George AFB, Fort Irwin, and Twentynine Palms, California. The RDJTF surgeon's office was collocated with RDJTF headquarters at George AFB. Eight augmentees provided support to the Joint Medical Regulating Office (JMRO) and Joint Military Blood Program Office (JMBPO).

(U) The medical objectives of the exercise were first to identify and define the medical responsibilities of each component and supporting command; second, to ensure that tasks, functions, and responsibilities identified were properly assigned to the component or supporting command most capable of accomplishing them; and third, to establish uniform medical policies and procedures applicable to medical operations in support of joint training exercises.

U ~~(S)~~ There were several medical lessons learned during Gallant

(B)(1)1.4a

Participation in Gallant Eagle 82 did not include several key players; aeromedical evacuation play was very limited, introducing an artificiality that hampered exercise play. There was considerable disparity in casualty losses reported by J-1 and hospital admissions reported by the surgeon. Permanent augmentees needed to be identified for the JMRO and JMBPO to permit continuity

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of operations. Overall, Gallant Eagle 82 provided the opportunity to test, evaluate, and develop procedures key to the operations of the surgeon's office. Additionally, real-world medical capabilities were used during the FTX portion of the exercise when the 82d Airborne Division conducted its air drop and sustained serious casualties.

U ~~(S)~~ Gallant Knight 82 was a joint readiness exercise sponsored by the US Readiness Command and coordinated by the JCS. It was designed to exercise and train the RDJTF, its components, supporting forces, and the deployment community in a Southwest Asia scenario. The exercise involved deployment, employment and command post exercises and was conducted in three phases:

<u>Phase</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
I	Deployment CPX
II	Deployment and Employment CPX
III	Employment CPX

U ~~(S)~~ The Phase I deployment CPX was conducted from 11 to 15 January at home station. In addition to RDJTF participation, selected elements of the deployment community down to the installation and depot level played on a 24-hour basis. This phase involved initial force deployment from C-Day (Deployment Day) to C+4. This portion of the deployment window was selected so that

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actions involving transition from peacetime to wartime deployment could be identified and exercised.

~~U (S)~~ Phase II consisted of a deployment and employment CPX at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from 26 to 28 January. It covered the period C+40 to C+42, permitting the examination of several critical exercise objectives. The deployment of this phase was concerned with troop and material movement to the Joint Operational Area. Simultaneously, the employment portion exercised interdiction concepts and the reception and throughput capabilities from aerial ports and seaports of debarkation to battle areas.

~~U (S)~~ Phase III of Gallant Knight emphasized tactical operations and was conducted from 30 January to 2 February. It focused specifically on employment of combat units and force sustainability during the period C+55 to C+58, when it was projected that all major air, naval, and ground forces would be present in the JOA.

(U) Medical objectives for Gallant Knight 82 were: to evaluate capabilities to provide hospitalization for the deployed force, to activate and train the Joint Medical Regulating Office in medical regulating of patients, and to conduct training for medical staffs at all levels of participation.

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(b)1.4(a)

(U) Some of the components did not have a clear understanding of the functions of the Joint Medical Regulating Office. The JMRO, operating under the supervision of the RDJTF surgeon's office, was responsible for regulating all patients out of and within the JOA when transportation assets beyond the capabilities of the components were required. The component representatives had an understanding of the concept, but they appeared not to follow the mechanics of the office. For an effective medical exercise in which maximum training took place, there had to be medical representation by all components, services, and supporting commands and forces in support of them.

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U ~~(S)~~ The effectiveness of any exercise required planning and participation by all involved. When players in the chain were missing, their role had to be deleted or simulated, losing the benefit of training the entire team. Because everyone did not participate, confusion was created and the maximum possible benefit was not obtained from the exercise.

U ~~(S)~~ In conclusion, command post exercise Gallant Knight 82 provided excellent training for medical commanders and medical staffs at all levels. The fact that medical staffs were dealing with real-world factors and contingencies produced valuable insights and lessons learned, leaving a number of issues that still required resolution. Gallant Knight 82 revealed that there were still many things that had to be done internally to improve procedures. It also revealed that there were many issues that components had to pursue through Service channels and highlighted the key joint issues that had to be worked through the RDJTF headquarters to the JCS. Efforts were made to initiate appropriate corrective action on a timely basis.

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CHAPLAIN

(U) It was not until March of 1982 that a chaplain's billet was first authorized in the joint manpower program for the RDJTF. Because the RDJTF was a joint Service headquarters, it was decided that the chaplain position would be rotated among the Navy, Air Force, and Army. In May, Chaplain [REDACTED] (b)(6) Captain, US Navy, reported for duty as the first Command Chaplain. He set up his office in temporary Trailer "C" along with the protocol office which provided his clerical support until the arrival of MSgt [REDACTED] (b)(3),(b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3),(b)(6), USAF, in September 1982. The personnel directorate approved the authorized grade of E-7 for the chapel management technician position, and the USAF agreed to provide the enlisted person on a continuing basis, since the RDJTF used the Air Force's supply and documentation management systems.

U ~~(S)~~ In September, the first RDJTF component chaplains' conference was conducted at MacDill AFB. The conference objectives were: to acquaint chaplains with RDJTF issues affecting the ministries in the AOR, to produce for the RDJTF commander a readiness reporting system, a summary of chaplain replacement procedures, options for ministry to the forward headquarters element and a summary of logistics for ministry in the AOR. The first objective was met by briefings by personnel from command, plans, and logistics. Also, roundtable discussions were held on ministries to the forward

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headquarters element and on ministries in a contaminated environment.

(U) The second objective was met with an agreement by the chaplains on a reporting system. Beginning on 1 January 1983, chaplain's names, units, and denominations and enlisted specialists' names and units would be submitted to the chaplain's office via message or mail. Changes would be reported as necessary. The chaplain prepared a regulation which specified the format in December 1982. Replacement procedures for chaplain personnel were clarified with both components and parent Service chiefs of chaplains' offices. Several options for the delivery of ministries to the FHE were discussed including: chaplains in, or adjacent to, the AOR making periodic visits; training and providing lay leaders among FHE personnel; and arranging for staff assistance visits from USEUCOM and CONUS chaplains. Regarding logistics for ministries in the AOR, it was agreed that chaplains, upon deployment, would take a 30- to 45-day supply of material for all faiths. Each parent Service would provide supplies and funds for its own chaplains.

(U) Chaplain (b)(3),(b)(6) deployed on exercise Jade Tiger with two USAF chaplains (a Protestant and a Catholic) and one USAF chapel manager. Sixteen worship services, a joint Thanksgiving service, and three baptisms were conducted by the chaplains during the exercise. Also, five educational films were shown and 41 people received counselling.

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(U) The RDJTF chaplain's ministry provided for spiritual needs among headquarters personnel and dependents. The chaplain averaged one counselling case per day, visited the sick in the hospital each week, taught a weekly Bible class, led worship while in the field, and visited headquarters work centers two to three hours per day. The RDJTF chaplain provided ministries in response to area requests from the 800 US Coast Guard personnel in the Tampa area, 300 other US Navy and Marine Corps personnel stationed at MacDill, and 1,700 Navy and Marine Corps dependents, to whom he was available when needed.

COMBAT CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS GROUP

(U) On 1 July 1982, the Combat Capabilities Analysis Group observed the occasion of its second full year of activity as a special staff section of the RDJTF. Throughout 1982, it continued to report to the Chief of Staff.

(U) The following personnel changes and additions occurred in 1982: Col [REDACTED] (b)(6) USAF, retired in October. He was replaced by Col [REDACTED] (b)(6) USAF, formerly head of USAF's Project Checkmate at the Pentagon. COL [REDACTED] (b)(6) US Army, the deputy director, was reassigned as the Vice Chief of Staff for Exercise Gallant Eagle and retired later in the year. His replacement, LTC [REDACTED] (b)(6) USA, former commander of the Institute Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, arrived in September to assume his duties as deputy director. Other personnel retiring included Lieutenant Commander [REDACTED] (b)(6) USN, in October and MSgt [REDACTED] (b)(6) USAF, in November.

(U) Personnel additions more than offset losses during 1982. In June Lt Col [REDACTED] (b)(6) USAF, former Commander of an A-10 squadron in England, arrived and assumed the duties of air analyst. In September, MAJ [REDACTED] (b)(6) US Army, formerly the executive officer of a Reserve Officer Training Corps detachment, arrived and assumed the duties of ground forces analyst. In October LtCol [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) USMC, formerly Assistant Director of Manpower, Cherry

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Point Marine Corps Air Station, arrived and assumed the duties of analyst. Finally, TSgt (b)(6) USAF, formerly an administrative specialist at RAF Mildenhall, England, arrived to assume his duties as administrative NCO. By the end of 1982, all authorized billets, with the exception of the naval analyst, had been filled.

(U) During 1982, the Combat Capabilities Analysis Group became more involved in coordination and liaison with academic and defense research analysis centers and with private contractors involved in studies relevant to the RDJTF's area of operations. Its officers performed several trips to various DOD agencies and senior Service schools for conferences, wargame research, and briefings to acquire and share information and study efforts.

(U) The group continued to publish monographs, internal studies, and oral briefings to assist the commander and staff of the RDJTF. These products concerned strategic studies, war-gaming, planning, logistical analysis, and issues raised by higher and subordinate headquarters, various directorates, and the RDJTF commander. These studies normally involved a wide range of areas encompassing more than one staff section.

(U) ~~(C)~~ In January, two analysts participated in Exercise Gallant Knight 82 held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. One member served as the deputy Chief of Staff; the other was involved with air

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interdiction and air operations. In March and April, two analysts participated in Exercise Gallant Eagle 82 held at Fort Irwin, California, once again filling the vital position of deputy Chief of Staff and participating in planning air operations for the exercise. In July, the director and an analyst were sent to the US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, to evaluate the McClintock theater model computer game and its applicability to RDJTF planning. In September and October, a briefing team travelled to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to present the air interdiction briefing to the staffs of component combat divisions. This briefing was well received and was used in the formulation of operational plans.

(U) ~~(C)~~ A major effort was made during the year to acquire expertise outside of the headquarters to produce studies that would be of use to the RDJTF as well as to the Combat Capabilities Analysis Group. These experts included personnel from US government agencies such as CIA and senior military Service schools. A number of those studies were initiated in 1982 with completion dates in 1983.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The group was assigned to analyze the JCS's total force capability assessment to determine its applicability to RDJTF plans and to prepare a briefing comparing the differences between the gaming of this assessment and future USCENTCOM planning. This study involved a major effort in April and May. The resulting briefing

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was presented at the RDJTF commander's conference and to various dignitaries visiting the headquarters.

(U) To summarize, during 1982 the Combat Capabilities Analysis Group produced, encouraged, reviewed and coordinated defense research and analysis in direct support of the RDJTF commander and component commanders' missions, plans and operations. That research produced the following published studies:

- . Soviet Assessment of the RDJTF (11 March).
- . Naval Forces of Naval Ocean Operating Area: Rationale (28 April).
- . Soviet Oil Policy. Inferring a Reserve (17 May).
- . Comparison of US and USSR Time Lines for Strategic Force Projection in Southwest Asia (9 July).
- . Research and Analysis in Support of RDJTF: A Guide to Research Topics (3 August).
- . The Problem of Water in a Soviet Invasion of Iran: A Supplement (24 August).
- . Electronic Warfare in Year 2000 (22 September).

(U) Research and analysis was also conducted on the following themes, problems, and issues: regional air defense in Southwest Asia, interdiction operations, language skills of the RDJTF headquarters, the danger of Moslem fundamentalism in the area of responsibility, boundary disputes in the AOR, total forces capability assessment and OPLAN comparison, and Soviet air and ground force capabilities.

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(U) The major problem which faced the Combat Capabilities Analysis Group at the end of 1982 was personnel loss. The reduction of authorized personnel from eight to five was expected to have a considerable impact upon the quantity of material processed and published by the group. These losses included two analysts and one administrative NCO.

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DISTINGUISHED VISITORS TO HEADQUARTERS, RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE

1982

JANUARY

- 4 Admiral George E. R. Kinnear, II
Representative to NATO Military Committee
- 5 Colonel (b)(6) USA
G-4 of the Sinai Peace Keeping Force
- 6 Major General John D. Bruen, USA
Commander, Military Traffic Management Command
- 8 Major General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC
Director Plans Division/Asst Dep Chief of Staff HQMC
- Rear Admiral Warren C. Hamm, Jr.
Deputy Commander Military Sealift Command
- 11 General Robert M. Shoemaker, USA
Commanding General, FORSCOM
- 11-12 Lieutenant General Abdel Raab El-Naby Hafez
Chief of Staff, Egyptian Armed Forces
- 12 Mr. (b)(6)
Professional Staff Member of the Subcommittee on Defense
Appropriations, United States Senate
- Brigadier General Daniel B. Geran, USAF
Deputy Director of Budget, HQ USAF
- Dr. (b)(6)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security/Economic/Energy Affairs
- 12-13 Mr. (b)(6)
Mr. (b)(6)
Ms. (b)(6)
Installation and Facilities Subcommittee, House Armed
Services Committee

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- 14 Representative C. W. Young
Republican, Florida
House Appropriations Committee
- 14-15 Vice Admiral J. H. Lyons, Jr.
Commander Second Fleet
- 15 General Edward C. Meyer, USA
Chief of Staff, United States Army
- 18 Major General William J. Campbell, USAF
Director of Programs, HQ USAF
- 20 Vice Admiral Kent J. Carroll
Commander Military Sealift Command
- Honorable James R. Ambrose
Undersecretary of the Army
- Rear Admiral Kleber S. Masterson, Jr.
Chief, Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency, OJCS
- 22 Mr. [REDACTED]
Mr. [REDACTED]
National Security and International Affairs Division
Congressional Budget Office

FEBRUARY

- 7-8 Lieutenant-Colonel [REDACTED]
British Defence Staff, Washington
- 8 Mr. [REDACTED]
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics
- 11 Lieutenant General John S. Pustay, USAF
President, National Defense University
- 12 Major General Clay Buckingham, USA
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
Operations & Plans, C4, HQ DA
- Dr. [REDACTED]
Member of the Council for Economic Priorities

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- 22 Major General Leonard V. Johnson
Commandant of the Canadian Defense College
- Mr. Frank C. Carlucci III
Deputy Secretary of Defense
- 23 Mr. (b)(6)
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Shipbuilding and Logistics
- Mr. (b)(6)
Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy, Sealift and
Maritime Affairs
- 26 Major General Robert A. Sullivan, USA
Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC, HQ TRADOC
- Major General John B. Marks, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, HQ USAF

MARCH

- 1 Major-General Thomas A. Boam
Defence Attache, United Kingdom
- 3-5 Sergeant Major (b)(6)
Sergeant Major of the Army
- 5 Brigadier General Duncan W. Campbell, USAF
Commander, Tactical Communications Division, HQ TCA
- Lieutenant General Charles Belzille
Commander, Forces Mobile Command Canada
- 8 Rear Admiral Robert P. McKenzie
Commander, Caribbean Contingency JTF
- 9 Major General Donald E. Evans, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Data Systems, HQ SAC
Joint Program Manager, WWMCCS Information Systems, OJCS
- 10 Major General Albert G. Rogers, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, HQ TAC
- 12 Rear Admiral William J. Ryan
Commander, Defense Fuel Support Center

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- 15 Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Mr. [REDACTED]
Surveys and Investigations Staff, House Appropriations
Committee
- 18 Lieutenant-General Sir Robin Carnegie
Director General of Army Training, United Kingdom
- 18 Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Mr. [REDACTED]
Mission Analysis and Systems Acquisition Division,
General Accounting Office
- 19 Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Rand Corporation
- 20-22 Dr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Principal Scientist, Operations Research Division, SHAPE
- 21-23 Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Gallant Eagle Political Advisor
- 22 Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Deputy Director, Planning and Systems Integration
Defense Communications Agency
- 24 General Sir Timothy Creasey
Minister of Defence, Oman
- 26 Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Deputy Comptroller of the Air Force
- 26 Brigadier General Nathan C. Vail, USA
Commander, 172D Infantry Brigade

APRIL

- 11-13 Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
House of Commons United Kingdom
- 14-15 Brigadier General Allen K. Rachel, USAF
Deputy Director, Defense Mapping Agency
- 16 Brigadier General Clifton C. Capp, USA
Commanding General, 416th Engineering Command

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- 19 Lieutenant General Lynwood E. Clark, USAF
Commander, Joint Task Force, Alaska
- 22-23 Lieutenant General Richard H. Thompson, USA
Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, HQ DA
- 27 Institute for Defense Analysis
- 29 Major General John V. Cox, USMC
Commanding General, 3D Marine Aircraft Wing
- 30 Rear Admiral Wayne E. Caldwell
Chief, Marine Environment and Systems, US Coast Guard
- Rear Admiral Donald C. Thompson
Chief, Office of Operations, US Coast Guard
- Rear Admiral Norman C. Venzke
Commander, 2nd Coast Guard District
US Coast Guard
- Major General Robert J. Donahue, USA
Director, Joint Tactical Communications Office, TRI-TAC

MAY

- 7 Rear Admiral Joseph S. Donnell III
Deputy Director for Current Operations, J3, OJCS
- 11 Brigadier General Archibald Durham, USAF
Vice Commander, Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)
- Brigadier General James Piner, Jr, USA
Commanding General, Eastern Area, MTMC
- Major General Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr, USMC
Commanding General, I MAF/CG 1st MarDiv FMF
- 20 Mr. (b)(6)
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
- 26 Admiral Robert L. J. Long
Commander in Chief, Pacific

JUNE

- 2-3 Defense Science Board
- 3 General John W. Vessey, Jr.
Vice Chief of Staff, USA
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Designate
- 4 Major General Gerald L. Prather, USAF
Director of Command, Control and Telecommunications
HQ USAF
- 7 Portuguese National Defense Institute
- 8 Brigadier General Houston P. Houser III, USA
Chief of Staff Designate, Third Army
- 9 Lieutenant General William J. Livsey, Jr, USA
Commanding General, VII Corps, USAREUR
- 11 Dr. (b)(6)
Director, Mobility Planning Requirements
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower,
Reserve Affairs and Logistics

Captain (b)(6) USN
COMIDEASTFOR Chief of Staff
- 15 Mr. (b)(6)
Director, Military Construction and Special Programs
Division, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Manpower,
Reserve Affairs and Logistics
- 17-18 Mr. (b)(6)
Deputy Chief of Mission, Saudi Arabia
- 22 Mr. (b)(6)
Minister of Defense, Norway
- 29 Colonel (b)(6) USA
Chief (Designate) of the Office of Military Cooperation,
Khartoum

JULY

6 General Robert H. Barrow, USMC
Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Lieutenant General William R. Maloney, USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff, HQ USMC

6 Captain [REDACTED] (b)(6) USN
Defense Attache, Egypt

8 Major General Robert F. McCarthy, USAF
Commander, Air Force Communications Command

12 Brigadier General Albert J. Kaehn, Jr, USAF
Commander, Air Weather Service

15 Honorable Harry N. Walters
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower,
Reserve Affairs and Logistics

Lieutenant General William J. Hilsman
Director, Defense Communications Agency

16 Representative Sam M. Gibbons
Democrat, Florida
Ways and Means Committee, US House of Representatives

20-21 Major General Robert L. Schweitzer
Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations, HQ DA

23 Honorable Russell D. Hale
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Financial Management

26-27 Colonel [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Deputy Director, Nuclear and Chemical Directorate,
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

27 Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Assistant Deputy Director (Plans and Policy),
Directorate for Intelligence and External Affairs, DIA

AUGUST

- 2 Mr. (b)(6)
Director, Mobilization Concepts Development Center
National Defense University
- Dr. (b)(6)
Deputy Director, Mobilization Concepts Development Center
National Defense University
- 2-3 Mr. (b)(6)
Director, North African, Near Eastern, and South Asian
Affairs, United States International Communications
Agency (ICA)
- 5-6 General Saiyud Kerdphol
Supreme Commander, Royal Thai Armed Forces
- 6 Brigadier General John C. Scheidt, Jr, USAF
Deputy Director, Directorate of Operations, USREDCOM
- 9 Admiral George E.P. Kinnear II
US Representative to the NATO Military Committee
- 11 General Richard G. Stilwell (Ret)
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP)
- Rear Admiral Robert W. Schmitt
Director for Intelligence Policy, USDP
- Mr. (b)(6)
Director for Command and Control, USDP
- 13 Brigadier General George R. Robertson, USA
Commander, Mediterranean Division (Designate)
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
- 18 Dr. (b)(6)
Director, Programs, Analysis and Evaluation
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
- 18 Rear Admiral Kleber S. Masterson, Jr.
Chief, Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency, OJCS
- 19 Honorable John R. Countryman
Ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman

- 19 Mr. (b)(6)
Oman Desk Officer, Department of State
- Brigadier General Robert O. Petty, USAF
Director, Defense Communications Systems Organization
Defense Communications Agency
- 23-24 Rear Admiral Charles F. Horne III
Commander, Mine Warfare Command
- 26 Brigadier General Houston P. Houser III
Chief of Staff, HQ FORSCOM

SEPTEMBER

- 1 Captain (b)(6) USN
Navy Chaplain Detailer
- 2 Major General James M. Rockwell
Director, Command, Control, Communications and Computer
Systems, HQ DA
- Colonel (b)(6) USAF
Director of Contingency Logistics, HQ SAC
- 3 Colonel (b)(6)
Assistant Director of Movements and Transportation
Australian Armed Forces
- Major General John A. Hemphill, USA
Director of Operations, HQ USREDCOM
- 8-9 Colonel (b)(6) USAF
Director, Combat Operations, HQ SAC
- 13 Colonel (b)(6) USAF
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
Ninth Air Force
- Major General Davis C. Rohr, USAF
Director of Plans and Policy, USEUCOM
- 14 Lieutenant-General Sir Paul Travers
Quartermaster General, British Army

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- 14 Major General Henry J. Schumacher, USA
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Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

GLOSSARY

ADP	automatic data processing
AFB	Air Force Base
AOA	amphibious operations area
AOR	area of responsibility
BG	brigadier general (US Army)
BGen	brigadier general (USMC)
Brig Gen	brigadier general (USAF)
CAA	command agreement arrangement
CAT	Crisis Action Team
C ²	command and control
C ³	command, control and communications
C ³ CM	command, control, and communications countermeasures
C ³ S	Command, Control, and Communications Systems
C ⁴ S	Command and Control, Communications and Computer Systems
CESP	civil engineering support plan
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	Criminal Investigative Division
CINC	commander in chief
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet
CITS	USCENTCOM Imagery Transmission System
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
Col	colonel (USAF)
COL	colonel (US Army)
COMIDEASTFOR	Commander, Middle East Force

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MOU	memorandum of understanding
MWR	morale, welfare, and recreation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NIS	Naval Investigative Service
NSA	National Security Agency
NTPF	near term prepositioning fleet
OCONUS	outside of the continental United States
OJCS	Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
O&M	operations and maintenance
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OSD	Office of Secretary of Defense
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACOM	Pacific Command
POM	program objective memorandum
PPBS	planning, programming, and budgeting system
PWIIC	Prisoner of War Internee Information Center
RADM	rear admiral
RDAFFOR	Rapid Deployment Air Force Forces
RDARFOR	Rapid Deployment Army Forces
RDCIS	RDJTF Command Information System
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
RDJUWTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force

RDNAVFOR	Rapid Deployment Naval Forces
RITS	RDJTF Imagery Transmission System
ROC	required operational capabilities
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SCI	special compartmented information
SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SDN	system development notification
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
SIP	System Improvement Program
SPECAT	special category
SSO	Special Security Office
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TRI-TAC	Tri-Tactical Communications System
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USAREUR	United States Army Europe
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USIA	United States Information Agency
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USMTM	US Military Training Mission
USREDCOM	United States Readiness Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WLO	Washington Liaison Office
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command & Control System

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1983 COMMAND HISTORY

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UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
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PREFACE

(U) This is the first annual history of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). It tells the story of the first year of the nation's newest unified command and provides a detailed narrative account of United States military concerns in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. Taken together with the three annual histories of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), USCENTCOM's predecessor, this first history of the Central Command constitutes the official record of the evolution of recent American military involvement with the nations of southwest Asia, northeast Africa, and the Arabian peninsula.

(U) As the second commander of the RDJTF and the first USCINCCENT, I am extremely proud to have been associated with both of these joint commands. The RDJTF and USCENTCOM have been at the forefront of extensive planning efforts and have conducted numerous operational deployments to ensure that United States national objectives are met in a vital area of the world.

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CHAPTER I

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

(U) The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) officially came into existence at 0001 hours Greenwich Mean Time on 1 January 1983. Immediately before, at midnight on 31 December 1982, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) had been inactivated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). There was theoretically no connection between the no longer existent RDJTF and the newly created USCENTCOM, but in most important respects the latter can be said to have succeeded the former. At the moment of transition, the second Commander of the RDJTF, Lieutenant General (LTG) Robert C. Kingston, United States Army, became the first Commander in Chief, United States Central Command (USCINCCENT). Likewise, the staff of the old RDJTF became the staff of the new USCENTCOM, which also acquired all of the assets and resources that had belonged to the RDJTF, including its headquarters (HQ) at MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), Florida.¹

1. Msg (U), JCS to Commander Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, Subj: "Activation of US Central Command," 301614Z Dec 82.

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(U) Unlike the RDJTF, USCENTCOM was a unified command. This meant that it had a broad, continuing mission under a single commander, that it was composed of significant assigned components of two or more services, and that it had been established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the JCS. The primary purpose of a unified command was to provide for the optimum effectiveness of United States (US) military forces in combat operations for the projection of US military power, as required to support and advance national policies. As USCINCCENT, General Kingston was responsible to the National Command Authorities (NCA), through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for such military missions as might be assigned to him.²

(U) At the time of Central Command's activation, there were already five unified commands in existence. Four of these had originally been conceived in the first Unified Command Plan, which was approved by President Harry S. Truman on 14 December 1946.³ Activated in 1947, each of these commands was responsible for a specific geographical area of the world. The oldest, Pacific Command (PACOM), had been established

2. JCS Pub 1, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," 1 Jun 79, p 362; JCS Memo SM-729-83, "Unified Command Plan," 28 Oct 83.

3. JCS Special Historical Study (C/RE VW 27 Jun 95), "History of the Unified Command Plan," 20 Dec 77. Information used is (U).

on 1 January 1947, and, from its headquarters at Camp H. M. Smith, Oahu, Hawaii, was responsible for United States military activities in East Asia and the Pacific basin. Dating from 15 March 1947, the United States European Command (USEUCOM) managed US military affairs in Europe from its headquarters at Patch Barracks, in Stuttgart, West Germany. The next oldest unified command was the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), headquartered at Quarry Heights, Panama. This command had been established as Caribbean Command on 1 November 1947, but its name was changed to USSOUTHCOM on 6 June 1963. Finally, the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), with its headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia, had been established on 1 December 1947. Its name remained unchanged until 11 October 1983, when it became the United States Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM). At the same time, PACOM was redesignated the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM).⁴

(U) Each of these four unified commands was responsible for a specific portion of the earth's surface. To establish USCENTCOM, portions of territory were taken away from existing unified commands and amalgamated to create the new unified command. In particular, Afghanistan and Pakistan were

4. Msg (U), JCS to CSA, CNO, CSAF, USCINCCENT, et. al., subj: "Redesignation of CINCPAC, PACOM, CINCLANT, and LANTCOM," 112122Z Oct 83.

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reassigned from PACOM to USCENTCOM, while the other countries in the new command's area of responsibility were either reassigned from USEUCOM's jurisdiction or had not previously been assigned to any unified command. Although not formally assigned to any unified command before transferring to USCENTCOM on 1 January 1983, these "unassigned" countries had become the responsibility of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force between 1980 and 1982.

(U) There was one other unified command in existence at the time of the activation of USCENTCOM. The United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM) was established as the United States Strike Command at MacDill AFB on 1 January 1962 and was redesignated as USREDCOM exactly ten years later. It had no overseas geographical responsibilities, but was charged with providing forces to the other unified commands as necessary and was responsible for the land defense of the continental United States (CONUS). When the RDJTF was activated at MacDill AFB on 1 March 1980, it was originally a subordinate unit of USREDCOM and its first Commander, Lieutenant General (LtGen) Paul X. Kelley, United States Marine Corps (USMC), reported directly to the Commander in Chief, United States Readiness Command (USCINCRD). At the time, the USCINCRD was General Volney F. Warner, US Army. On 1 October 1981, the RDJTF became a separate joint task force and ceased to be subordinate to

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USREDCOM. This was the first step in the evolution of the RDJTF into USCENCOM.⁵


U ~~(C)~~ With the activation of USCENCOM on 1 January 1983 and the revision of the Unified Command Plan in October 1983, the six unified commands divided up the world as shown in Figure 1 on the following page. Except for USREDCOM, all of these commands had specific geographical areas of responsibility (AORs) outside of the continental United States, but not all of the globe was covered by the six unified commands. In the most significant case, the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was not assigned to any one unified command, but remained under the cognizance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under the 1983 version of the Unified Command Plan signed by President Ronald Reagan on 21 September 1983, Alaska and Antarctica were also not assigned, nor were the United States' two closest neighbors, Canada and Mexico, although security assistance activities in the latter country were the responsibility of USSOUTHCOM.⁶

5. History, RDJTF, 1982, p 1. U

6. Unified Command Plan ~~(C)~~, JCS SM-729-83, 28 Oct 83; memorandum ~~(C/OADR)~~, CCJ5 to Distribution, "Unified Command Plan," 15 Nov 83. U

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Figure 1. United States Unified Commands



(U) The area of responsibility assigned to USCENTCOM consisted of 19 countries. Before the establishment of Central Command, two of these, Afghanistan and Pakistan, had belonged to PACOM, while 12 had belonged to USEUCOM and five had not been assigned to any unified command. In the latter category were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and the Sudan. Countries previously assigned to USEUCOM were Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). In addition, USEUCOM had been responsible for security assistance in Kenya and Somalia, countries which were not formally part of its area of responsibility. Despite the petroleum resources in the Persian Gulf, all 19 countries in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility were considered by the United Nations to be "developing countries," with six of them (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and both Yemens) in the especially impoverished category of "least developed."⁷


(U) The 19 countries assigned to USCENTCOM were as shown in Figure 2 on the following page. Not coincidentally, these same 19 countries had also been the responsibility of the

7. Atlas of US Foreign Relations, Development Assistance, U.S. Department of State Bulletin, June 1983.

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Figure 2. USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility



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RDJTF at the time of its inactivation. Three years earlier, when the [REDACTED], it had been charged with pre-deployment planning for "Southwest Asia," a term which was then defined to mean "all states on the Arabian Peninsula south of the northern borders of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; the countries of Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan on the Middle East land mass; Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya on the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and adjacent waters."⁸ On 1 October 1981, the African nations of Egypt and the Sudan were included within this definition of "Southwest Asia," while the "adjacent waters" of the Persian Gulf were deleted. Of these two new countries, Egypt had previously been assigned to USEUCOM while the Sudan had not been assigned to any unified command. Another USEUCOM-assigned country, Jordan, had been added to the RDJTF's area of responsibility on 7 December 1982, and was incorporated into USCENTCOM's area of responsibility on 1 January 1983. The addition of Jordan brought the total number of countries in the command's AOR to the 19 shown in Figure 2 on the facing page.

(U) Thus USCENTCOM became the first new unified command to be activated in 21 years. Its establishment indicated a more active US policy toward the Middle East, expressing the fact

8. Hist RDJTF 1980, p III-1.

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that the United States military community no longer looked upon this "central" area of the world merely as an extension of either Europe or the Pacific basin. Instead of being divided between two different unified commands oriented toward the potential central European battlefield and East Asia, the central area was now the focus of a single United States military command. Focusing the efforts of a new unified command on Southwest Asia and Northeast Africa emphasized the importance of this area to American interests and underscored the fact that the United States was ready to take military action to defend those interests, if necessary.

MISSION

(U) The mission of the United States Central Command was to achieve US policy objectives in its area of responsibility. These national policy objectives included the following basic goals: assuring Western access to adequate supplies of oil, deterring Soviet aggression, preserving regional stability, and halting the spread of Soviet influence, reversing it wherever possible.⁹

9. USCINCENT Policy and Strategy Book (U), Vol I, 1984.

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(U) There were two primary threats to the key resources located in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility and to the sea lines of communication needed for US forces to get there: local instability and the Soviet Union. Except for invading and occupying Afghanistan, the USSR had not become militarily involved in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility since World War II, but additional involvement could never be ruled out. Instead of using direct military intervention, the Soviets preferred to exploit local conflicts and instability. They were often involved in coups, revolutions, civil wars, insurgencies, rebellions, and external attacks by other countries. Within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility, the Soviet military presence, its ability to exercise overt military options, and its general influence had increased during recent years.

(U) Foremost among the United States' peacetime strategic objectives was to prevent wars. The primary emphasis in this regard was on reducing the causes of local conflict. What was required to meet this objective were specific political-military and military-economic initiatives to strengthen the countries in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. By making them stronger militarily, economically, and politically, they would become more stable and less likely to become involved in local conflicts. In addition, USCENTCOM sought to lend its

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cooperation and assistance to other US government agencies responsible for American diplomatic and economic initiatives throughout the region. Such assistance offered opportunities for the United States to counter Soviet military involvement in the region by taking advantage of US economic, technological, and managerial strengths. Further, political and economic relationships between the US and other nations often led to military cooperation.

(U) Deterrence was another peacetime objective which involved the same issues as preventing wars. To aid in achieving this strategic goal, the United States needed to be able to exercise military options, such as making a show of force, providing protection, and interposition. In some cases, the local forces of the countries in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility were strong enough to exercise their own deterrent effect, inhibiting Soviet intervention or coercion. In addition, a coalition of strong local forces, capable and confident of operating jointly with USCENTCOM forces, could act as a force multiplier. Such US-local coalitions could assist in the successful prosecution of both peacetime and wartime strategies. Successful deterrence would stop not only overt Soviet military action in USCENTCOM's AOR, but would also prevent Soviet fostering of internal instability by adjacent states and radical groups.

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(U) Wartime strategies considered by USCENTCOM derived from two basic scenarios. The first scenario envisioned a local conflict without Soviet involvement, ranging from a low-intensity insurgency to a mid-intensity confrontation involving an indigenous force. The second scenario assumed a medium-to high-intensity direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. Strong, stable local countries could help the United States fight a war of this type against Soviet forces. This help could be critical, regardless of the location of the war on the conflict spectrum, whether involving counter-insurgency or coalition partnership. In the former case, they could constitute a stabilizing force; in the latter, they could be a useful force multiplier.

(U) The revised 1983 version of the Unified Command Plan listed seven specific responsibilities common to all unified commands. As commander of a unified command, USCINCCENT was to (1) maintain the security of the command and protect the United States, its possessions, and bases against attack or hostile incursion and to (2) carry out assigned missions, tasks, and responsibilities. More specifically, he was to (3) assign tasks to, and direct coordination among, USCENTCOM's subordinate commands to insure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his assigned mission. To accomplish this, USCINCCENT was authorized to (4) communicate with three

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categories of people: The chiefs of the military services on uni-service matters as he deemed appropriate; the Joint Chiefs of Staff on other matters, including the preparation of strategic and logistic plans, strategic and operational direction of USCENTCOM's assigned forces, conduct of combat operations, and other necessary functions of command required to accomplish the missions; and the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with applicable directives. In addition, USCINCENT was required to (5) carry out planning and implementing responsibilities for the evacuation of US noncombatant and certain non-US persons abroad in accordance with the provisions of "State-Defense Policies and Procedures for the protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens Abroad in Time of Emergency."¹⁰

~~U (C)~~ In time of war or emergency, USCINCENT was to (6) assume operational command of security assistance organizations within his general geographic area of responsibility or as directed by competent authority. The assumption of such operational command was to take due cognizance of the responsibility of the security assistance organizations for implementation of portions of the evacuation plans for their respective chiefs of US diplomatic missions. Finally, USCINCENT was to (7) provide for US military

10. DOD Directive 5100.51, 11 Oct 66.

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representation, within USCINCCENT's general geographic area of responsibility, where required, to all supranational, international, and US national agencies and furnish US military representation, advice, and assistance to chiefs of US diplomatic missions for negotiation of rights, authorizations, security assistance responsibilities, and facility arrangements, except as otherwise directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

U ~~(C)~~ Normal operations for USCENTCOM included planning for and executing operations in contingencies, limited war, and general war. Planning and conduct of operations other than hostilities was also considered part of USCINCCENT's normal operations, as was planning for and administering the military aspects of security assistance. In addition, USCENTCOM had to maintain the relationships and exercise the directive and coordinating authority prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(U) When U [REDACTED], it was assigned components from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Headquarters for these three components had already existed for the RDJTF, and it was not difficult to redesignate these forces for the new US Central Command. In the case of the Army, a special unit, Third United States Army, had already been reactivated at Fort McPherson, Georgia, on 1 December 1982 to

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take over from the XVIII Airborne Corps as the Army component of the RDJTF, so that when the transition to unified status was made a month later on 1 January, Third Army acquired the role of United States Army Forces Central Command (USARCENT).¹¹ The Navy component, United States Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT), was headquartered at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, as its RDJTF predecessor had been. Likewise, Ninth Air Force, at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, which had doubled as the Air Force component of the RDJTF, became the United States Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF).¹²

~~U (S)~~ At the moment of transition, each of these three components assumed operational control of US forces already within USCENCOM's area of responsibility. Effective 0001 hours Greenwich Mean Time, 1 January 1983, the Third US Army assumed operational control of the US contingent to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) who were in the Sinai continuing to monitor the 1978 Camp David accord between Egypt and Israel. At the same time, USCENTAF assumed operational control of Elf One, Elf Sentry, and Site Mike in Egypt

11. Activation Plan (U), Third United States Army (TUSA), 17 Sep 81.

12. The acronym USCENTAF was chosen in preference to the more consistent USAFCENT because of the possibility of confusion with AFCENT, the abbreviation for Allied Forces Central Europe.

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and Saudi Arabia. Likewise, the Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR), a flotilla of five ships that had been sailing in the Persian Gulf since 1949, came under the operational control of USNAVCENT on the first of the year.¹³

U 13. Msg (~~S/OPDR~~), Commander RDJTF to JCS, USCINCEUR, et al., subj: Assumption of Operational Command (OPCOM) of Forces in USCINCCENT Area of Responsibility, 312235Z Dec 82.

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ORGANIZATION

(U) To carry out its mission as a unified command, USCENTCOM was organized into six directorates and a number of special staff agencies. The directorates were organized along traditional functional lines and numbered J-1 through J-6, the "J" referring to the joint nature of the unified command. Each directorate will be discussed in more detail below.

(U) The Personnel Directorate, or J-1, was primarily responsible for the adequacy of USCENTCOM staff manning. It also insured the deployability and sustainability of the HQ USCENTCOM staff, carried out personnel planning for contingency and operations plans and orders, and developed personnel policy.

(U) The Director of Personnel was responsible for formulating policies and supervising the execution of command arrangements pertaining to the individual members of the command, giving full consideration to the established policies of the military departments to which USCENTCOM personnel belonged, i.e., the Departments of the Army, Navy (including the Marine Corps), or Air Force. He also exercised staff responsibility for morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs within the command and conducted the USCENTCOM safety program.

(U) The J-1 also insured accomplishment of records management, personnel requisitioning and actions, processing of effectiveness reports, awards management, Congressional correspondence, and Red Cross liaison. In general, the directorate also provided manpower control and organization management.

(U) General Kingston received intelligence information from his J-2, or Intelligence Directorate. The USCENTCOM Director of Intelligence had staff responsibility for all intelligence and counterintelligence matters pertinent to the command's mission and had overall responsibility for the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence necessary to support the various tasks assigned to USCENTCOM. The J-2 was also responsible for the management of all intelligence resources assigned to the command.

(U) Operational matters were the province of the J-3, or Operations Directorate. The Director of Operations planned, organized, coordinated, directed, and controlled USCENTCOM operational and exercise activities. The J-3 advised the USCINCCENT on all matters pertaining to the strategic and operational direction of assigned forces, the conduct of combat operations, the planning and conduct of exercises involving USCENTCOM forces, and other command functions required to

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accomplish the assigned mission. He monitored the operational status of subordinate elements and identified requirements for the host nation support needed to conduct operations and exercises in USCENTCOM's assigned area of responsibility. When deployed, the J-3 coordinated joint force combat operations involving air, ground, and naval forces. In addition, the Operations Directorate provided staff supervision over all aspects of operations security; command, control, and communications countermeasures (C³CM); and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and planning.

(U) Logistical affairs were the responsibility of the J-4, or Logistics Directorate. The Director of Logistics was charged with ensuring the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of operations by providing materiel and facilities when needed. The J-4 was also expected to eliminate unnecessary duplication of facilities and to prevent overlapping of functions among the service components of the command. Finally, he provided staff support to the command in all aspects of logistics, security assistance, military construction, weapons planning, and operations, while coordinating among the components, military services, host nations, and other commands.

(U) On 1 October, USCENTCOM assumed responsibility for security assistance matters in the countries with security

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assistance programs within its AOR. A security assistance directorate in a joint staff would ordinarily be designated J-7, but in USCENTCOM (as in USEUCOM and USPACOM) security assistance was a division within the Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate, which was redesignated J-4/7 on 1 October to reflect its dual responsibilities.

(U) The Plans, Policy, and Programs Directorate (J-5) was assigned a wide-ranging variety of tasks. It was responsible for the preparation and maintenance of operations orders (OPORDs) and plans, including concept plans (CONPLANS). To support a variety of war plans, it prepared, reviewed, and coordinated time phased force deployment data (TPFDD). The J-5 also advised USCINCCENT on matters relating to command policy, missions, and functions which concerned the joint deployment, employment, and redeployment of forces. The directorate provided a staff focal point for reviewing, analyzing, and recommending courses of action concerning deployments and evaluating tasking documents pertaining to policy, command relationships, and long-range planning. Additionally, the directorate prepared USCENTCOM's input to the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) of the Department of Defense (DOD). J-5 had primary staff responsibility for the coordination and implementation of civil affairs policy and supervised the implementation of civil-military cooperation functions within the command. It also advised the JCS and

other unified and specified commands on matters relating to USCENTCOM policy, mission, functions, requirements, and the development of doctrine and techniques for the joint deployment and employment of forces.

(U) Communications were provided by the Command and Control, Communications and Computer Systems (C⁴S) Directorate, known as "J-6" for short. It was responsible for the development of communications-electronics and automatic data processing (ADP) policies, plans, budgets, and programs for USCENTCOM. The J-6 ensured command, control, and communications (C³) support for the command. He also supervised the development, acquisition, and operation of communications and ADP facilities and equipment. The C⁴S Directorate was the USCENTCOM focal point for the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) and was responsible for coordination with the JCS, the Defense Communications Agency (DCA), and the NCA on technical matters during peacetime and for implementing these agencies' management policies during contingencies or war.

(U) In addition to these six directorates, USCENTCOM headquarters had several other staff agencies to assist the USCINCCENT in carrying out his assigned functions. The Adjutant General provided administrative service and support to the USCENTCOM staff in a number of important areas, including

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correspondence management, forms and records management, and graphics. He also developed and instituted plans, policies, and precedence systems, while maintaining a budget to support the commander and headquarters staff. The Legal Advisor was responsible for providing legal advice to the USCINCCENT. He also interacted with US and foreign government agencies, reviewing country law studies and advising USCINCCENT on the need for country-to-country agreements, drafting such agreements, and assisting in their negotiation and conclusion. He provided support in legislative liaison and coordinated the Congressional testimony of USCINCCENT and the USCENTCOM staff. The Legal Advisor also provided legal assistance to members of the command and their dependents. In addition, he developed exercise and real-world plans in support of all operations, negotiating fly-over rights, staging rights, basing rights, status of forces agreements, and procurement of local goods and labor, while taking into account host country laws and procedures.

(U) The Public Affairs Officer advised USCINCCENT and his staff on public information matters. He generated public affairs policy recommendations and directives, drafted public affairs annexes to operations plans (OPLAN) and orders, provided public affairs policy guidance to component commands and assigned forces, arranged media briefings and interviews, and provided public affairs services during combat operations.

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His wartime responsibilities included providing cleared daily summaries, security reviews, and audiovisual coverage of combat operations. He served as the cognizant staff officer for community relations and command information and handled public affairs audiovisual matters. In general, he oversaw public affairs activities within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

(U) In the field of law enforcement and security, the Provost Marshal maintained law and order within the command. To this end, he provided analysis of police statistical data, made recommendations about the confinement of US personnel, and coordinated with local national police forces. He also coordinated all matters concerning traffic control, entry procedures, and weapons systems security and developed plans and policies concerning enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees. Finally, he maintained liaison with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), with the Naval Investigative Service (NIS), and with the Army Criminal Investigative Division (CID).

(U) The Comptroller was responsible for advising USCINCCENT and his staff on resources management, fiscal and budgetary matters, resource structure, and the creation and maintenance of a financial management system. He executed the approved operating budget, joint readiness exercise budget, and foreign military sales (FMS) programs. He also developed

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Comptroller annexes for war plans and for operational, emergency, contingency, and evacuation plans. He ensured, through the component commanders, that appropriate provisions were made for the pay of US military and civilian personnel, local national civilian personnel, and prisoners of war, as well as arranging for banking, savings, and remittance services for US personnel. In garrison, the Comptroller provided military pay and related finance service support to people assigned to USCENTCOM headquarters.

(U) Within USCENTCOM's garrison at MacDill, as well as when deployed, one of the more important staff members was the Headquarters Commandant. He provided base support to USCENTCOM headquarters during deployments, redeployments, and while at home station, including internal physical security, food service, transportation, maintenance, engineering, and supply. He functioned as troop commander and provided an orderly room to support the headquarters. The commandant's office monitored the Services' required training programs and maintained necessary records, while managing Service school requirements, including allocating quotas for schools.

(U) Other staff members included the surgeon and the chaplain. The Command Surgeon exercised staff supervision on all medical matters, developed and coordinated medical plans,

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and advised USCINCCENT on the overall health of the command. The Command Chaplain assisted and advised USCINCCENT and staff on all religious activities within the command. The chaplain was also the staff expert on the religious beliefs, policies, procedures, and laws of the countries within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. This knowledge was particularly useful in view of the widely varying religious practices found in the Middle East, which ranged from Christianity to several mutually antipathetical varieties of Islam.

(U) Finally, the Combat Capabilities Analysis Group researched and analyzed questions which affected the combat capabilities of USCENTCOM and those of potentially hostile military forces. It made an effort to test the validity of assumptions contained in command plans, and tried to analyze USCENTCOM's strategies, logistics, and operations. Generally, it performed as an in-house "think-tank."

(U) In addition to the six directorates and several special staff agencies discussed above, there were a number of liaison offices attached to USCENTCOM. Two specified commands, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Military Airlift Command (MAC), were represented by liaison officers at MacDill, as were two other unified commands, USEUCOM and USPACOM. (The


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USPACOM liaison officer's billet was deleted on 1 October 1983.) There was also a Defense Communications Agency field office, as well as National Security Agency (NSA) and Defense Intelligence Agency representatives assigned to the staff. In addition to MAC, two other transportation operating agencies were represented by liaison offices: the Navy's Military Sealift Command and the Army's Military Traffic Management Command. Liaison officers to USCENCOM were also provided by the Air Force Logistics Command, the Defense Fuels Supply Center, and the United States Coast Guard (USCG). The organization of USCENCOM headquarters as of 31 December 1983 was as shown in Figure 3 on the following page.

(U) Not shown in Figure 3 was the Washington Liaison Office. This office had provided the RDJTF and USCENCOM with a force of as many as 16 officers, four enlisted personnel, and two civilian secretaries to conduct business in the nation's capital. The Washington Liaison Office gradually drew down its staff during 1983. Commodore Paul D. Butcher, the last flag-grade director of the office, departed Washington in May and the office closed on 30 September.

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KEY PERSONNEL

(U) The first USCINCCENT was LTG Robert C. Kingston, who was also the second and last Commander of the inactivated RDJTF. General Kingston served as USCINCCENT throughout 1983. (For complete biographical details on General Kingston, see pages 18-21 of the 1982 History of the RDJTF.)

(U) Deputy Commander in Chief throughout 1983 was Major General (Maj Gen) Robert C. Taylor, United States Air Force (USAF). General Taylor had also been the only deputy commander assigned during the nearly three years of the RDJTF's existence. He was thus an RDJTF "plankholder" (or "plankowner"), a term which meant that he had been assigned to the command since its activation in March of 1980. Born in (b)(6) in Danforth, Illinois, General Taylor was a command pilot who had flown more than 4,300 hours in fighters, including the F-86, F-89, F-102, and F-4. Following 17 years of assignments to fighter squadrons around the world, General Taylor graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1970. While assigned to the Directorate of Plans, HQ USAF, from 1970 to 1972, he was selected for duty as Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Melvin E. Laird. He later served in the same capacity for the next two Secretaries of Defense, Mr. Elliot L. Richardson and Dr. James R. Schlesinger. In 1974,

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General Taylor became Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) for Plans, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), becoming DCS for Plans in 1975. He became the Commander of the 314th Air Division in Korea in 1977, then Director of Operations and Readiness, HQ USAF, in August 1978. General Taylor became RDJTF Deputy Commander in March 1980, becoming Deputy USCINCCENT with the activation of USCENTCOM on 1 January 1983.

(U) At the beginning of 1983, the Chief of Staff of USCENTCOM was Brigadier General (BGen) James R. Van Den Elzen, USMC. General Van Den Elzen was succeeded on 29 August by Major General (MajGen) Jacob W. Moore, USMC. A native of Catawba, North Carolina, General Moore was commissioned in 1954 after completing naval aviation training. Since then, he had flown over 7,000 hours in many different aircraft, including the F-8 Crusader, the F-4 Phantom II, AV-8 Harrier, and F-18 Hornet. Following a career in Marine aviation which included three tours at Headquarters Marine Corps, General Moore was assigned as Commanding General, 1st Brigade, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, on 11 June 1982. He was promoted to major general on 29 July 1983 and joined USCENTCOM a month later.

(U) When the RDJTF was inactivated, it had a total of eight officers of flag rank assigned to it. In addition to the Commander, Deputy Commander, and Chief of Staff, the remaining

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five flag officers were the J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, and the Inspector General. These same five individuals became the first O-7 directors assigned to USCENCOM. Four of these five served throughout 1983.

(U) The only USCENCOM director to depart during 1983 was Brigadier General (BG) Richard E. Stephenson, US Army, who had been at MacDill since 13 February 1980. Then-Colonel Stephenson had been the "plankholder" Director of Logistics with the establishment of the RDJTF on 1 March 1980. He was promoted to brigadier general on 2 July 1982. On 15 June 1983, General Stephenson was succeeded by Major General (MG) David E. Watts, US Army, who had previously been serving as DCS Logistics for the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) since 1980.

(U) Brigadier General (Brig Gen) Michael P. C. Carns, USAF, served as USCENCOM J-3 throughout 1983, having served as Director of Operations for the RDJTF since 25 June 1982. A member of the Air Force Academy's first graduating class of 1959, General Carns also graduated with distinction from Harvard University in 1967 with a master's degree in business administration. Before moving to the RDJTF, General Carns had been commander of the 57th Fighter Weapons Wing at Nellis AFB,

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Nevada, since 14 October 1980. Prior to that assignment, General Carns had been commander of the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing at Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina.

(U) Another director of flag rank since 1982 was BG Dudley J. Gordon, US Army, who had been in charge of J-2 since 7 September of that year. Following graduation from Infantry Officer Candidate School in March 1956, General Gordon was assigned to the Army Security Field Station in Warrenton, Virginia. He then served with the Army Security Agency in Shemya and Fort Richardson, Alaska; at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia; Korea; Fort Devons, Massachusetts; and Fort Hood, Texas. During 1969, General Gordon served a tour in Vietnam as Special Security Officer, IV Corps Detachment, followed by attendance at the Armed Forces College in Norfolk, Virginia. Later, General Gordon graduated from the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and was then assigned as Chief of the Collection Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, HQ USAREUR. In July 1980, he was reassigned to Munich as Commander of the 66th Military Intelligence Group, Intelligence and Security, which was his position prior to becoming RDJTF and then USCENTCOM J-2.

(U) The only Navy flag officer assigned to USCENTCOM was Commodore James Mac Gleim, who had been RDJTF Director of

Plans, Policy, and Programs (J-5) since 8 July 1982. Raised in a farming community in central Nebraska, Commodore Gleim entered the Navy as an aviation cadet and was commissioned as an ensign in 1955. He deployed to Lebanon in 1958 with an A-4 squadron aboard the USS SARATOGA. During the Vietnam war, he served as flight deck officer and later as executive officer of the USS CORAL SEA. Before coming to the RDJTF and later USCENTCOM at MacDill, Commodore Gleim had been Commander of Naval Air Station Lemoore, California.

(U) In addition to the Chief of Staff, there was another USMC general officer on the USCENTCOM staff, BGen Ray "M" Franklin, who had been at MacDill since June of 1982. As a member of the RDJTF staff, General Franklin had had three titles: Inspector General (IG), Commander of the Forward Headquarters Element (FHE), which was established in December 1983, and Director of Transition from RDJTF to USCENTCOM. When this transition was completed on 1 January 1983, General Franklin concentrated his effort on establishing an FHE in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

(U) USCENTCOM acquired a ninth flag-grade officer in February 1983, when Brig Gen Samuel J. Greene, USAF, became Director of the Command and Control, Communications and Computer Systems Directorate (J-6). Born on (b)(6) in

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New York City, General Greene graduated from Manhattan College in 1958 with a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering and had served in the USAF since graduation. Before coming to USCENTCOM, General Greene had been Commander of the Pacific Communications Division from 1979 to 1981 and Vice Director to the Joint Tactical Communications Officer at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, from 1981 to February 1983.

CHAPTER II


JOINT PLANNING, OPERATIONS, AND TRAINING

(U) The joint staff of the United States Central Command numbered 843 people at its activation on 1 January 1983. It grew by 50 people to total 893 at the end of 1982. This relative stability in personnel strength was in marked contrast to the three-year history of the RDJTF, which grew rapidly from a small initial cadre to a strength of 263 people by the end of 1980, then to 328 at the end of 1981, and finally to 843 at the close of 1982 when it was inactivated. Divided among six directorates and a number of special staff agencies, these people worked during 1983 to plan, conduct operations, and train the forces needed to fight in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

PERSONNEL

(U) The new USCENTCOM Personnel Directorate retained essentially the same organization which it had as part of the inactivated RDJTF, as shown in Figure 4 on the following page.

Figure 4. J-1 Organization



The three divisions, plans/manpower, personnel services, and policy/personnel support, continued over from the RDJTF. The Plans/Manpower Division was divided into two branches during 1983: personnel plans and manpower management. In another minor organizational change, the Safety Branch was consolidated with the Policy Branch, eliminating safety as a separate branch of the Policy/Personnel Support Division.

(U) Colonel (Col) [REDACTED] (b)(6) USAF, had been the RDJTF Director of Personnel since 25 April 1980 and continued in that capacity throughout 1983. As the "plankholder" J-1, Colonel [REDACTED] (b)(6) had been responsible for personnel matters since the beginning of the RDJTF, and thus had the twin distinctions of being the only RDJTF J-1 and the first Director of Personnel for USCENTCOM.

(U) One of the personnel directorate's more important functions was to conduct manpower reviews as required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In January 1983, the JCS returned the proposed RDJTF Joint Manpower Program (JMP) for fiscal years 1983-1987. It had been submitted to the JCS in October 1982. The fiscal year 1983-1987 JMP for USCENTCOM was limited to 867 spaces and included the planned elimination of the command's Washington Liaison Office. This JMP had 100 fewer billets than

the 967-strong JMP which had earlier been approved by the JCS in March 1982. In late January 1983, USCENTCOM identified the 100-billet reduction to JCS, with the elimination of the Washington Liaison Office included as part of the total reduction.

(U) On 9 February 1983, JCS directed the identification of another 21 billets for reduction, but USCENTCOM was then exempted from this 3 percent "Enhanced Manpower Program" because it had already sustained a total manpower cut of 121 spaces. On 15 March 1983, a revision to the 4 February 1983 JMP was submitted to JCS. Containing a total of 846 billets, this document was identified as the JMP for fiscal years 1983 and 1984. In August, the JCS approved the USCENTCOM JMP for fiscal years 1983 and 1984 at 846 total billets. In September, the proposed JMP for fiscal years 1985-1989 was submitted to JCS. Also forwarded was the 3 percent Enhanced Manpower Program which identified 27 manpower spaces (14 officers, 12 enlisted and 1 civilian billet) in priority order, together with impact statements.

(U) The proposed fiscal year 1985 Headquarters USCENTCOM JMP contained 791 billets which had been previously approved. Fifty-five previously approved headquarters billets were transferred into a newly created Computer Systems Support

Element, while 21 additional authorizations to support new unprogrammed requirements were requested, making a total of 76 billets.

(U) An Intelligence Production Element supporting requirement as stated in Chapter V of the fiscal year 1984-1985 Defense Guidance was established separately. The 32 new authorizations to support this element were programmed in the fiscal year 1984 General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) and in the fiscal year 1985 Program Objective Memorandum (POM). Twenty-five of the billets to support this element would be attached to the Fleet Intelligence Center Europe and Atlantic (FICEURLANT) at Norfolk, Virginia, to assist in providing intelligence production to HQ USCENTCOM and its components. The remaining seven personnel would be stationed at MacDill AFB, Florida.

(U) The JMP for fiscal years 1985-1989 included USCENTCOM's first Joint Mobilization Augmentation submission; it contained 442 positions. Although submitted with the fiscal year 1985 JMP, these positions were also requested for 1984.

(U) On 1 October 1983, USCENTCOM assumed manpower responsibility for security assistance organizations in the USCENTCOM AOR. In December 1983, the USCENTCOM Special

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Figure 5. Personnel Strength, GALLANT KNIGHT 83

	<u>SCENARIO</u>	<u>REAL-WORLD</u>
USCENTCOM	1,650	816
USARCENT	109,274	8,350
USCENTAF	44,070	1,225
USMARCENT	56,487	512
USNAVCENT	2,039	16
Naval Elements in support		
- NAVY	52,206 (COMSUPNAVFOR)	35
- MARINES	14,833	-
USJUWTFCENT	2,406	248
 TOTAL	 287,965	 11,202

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Activities JMP for fiscal years 1984-1988 was submitted to the JCS. It contained a total of 29 billets.

(U) On 15 November 1983, USCENTCOM sent a manpower technician to the Offices of Military Cooperation in Sudan and Somalia to conduct a manpower review which was concluded on 30 November. Manpower levels of 13 billets each in Sudan and Somalia were validated.

(U) On 19 December 1983, the JCS directed revised procedures for submitting JMPs for security assistance organizations. The security assistance organizations in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility were informed of the new procedures and, by the end of the year, they had begun preparing the JMPs to comply with the revised procedures.

(U) Also, on 19 September 1983, the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve assigned a reserve affairs officer to the United States Central Command. Working within the Personnel Directorate, he established and continuously reviewed requirements for individual mobilization augmentees, projected reserve manpower needs, and established plans and policies concerning the assimilation of reserve personnel.

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Figure 6. Personnel Strength, BRIGHT STAR 83 (Real-World Only)

	<u>EGYPT</u>	<u>OMAN</u>	<u>SUDAN</u>	<u>SOMALIA</u>
USCENTCOM	218	2	2	9
JCSE	149	4	6	16
JUWTFCENT	628	82	156	39
USARCENT	2,757		157	7
USCENTAF	1,565	457		
PRIZED FALCON	329			
MAC	107			
USNAVCENT	12		1	1
USMARCENT				870
OTHER	22			
TOTAL *	5,787	545	322	942

* Totals are for the day that personnel statistics were the highest in each country.

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U ~~(S)~~ The personnel directorate also monitored strength figures during field training exercises (FTXs). This included FTXs held within the continental United States and those held outside the continental United States (OCONUS). Personnel statistics for GALLANT KNIGHT 83 were as shown in Figure 5 on page 40 while those for BRIGHT STAR 83 are shown in Figure 6 on the facing page.

(U) In 1983 the personnel directorate became the office responsible for monitoring travel requests to USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. From 1 October 1983, when USCENTCOM assumed security assistance responsibility for the AOR, until 31 December 1983, 312 travel requests were processed by the Personnel Services Division of J-1.

(U) On 1 October 1983, USCENTCOM assumed operational control of the Security Assistance Offices. The USCENTCOM Army military personnel officer effected the transfer of 53 personnel records for people assigned to these offices from USEUCOM. This did not include the personnel records for Army personnel assigned to Saudi Arabia. Navy and Marine Corps personnel records remained with their previous administrative detachments, while Air Force personnel records were retained at the 1141st Special Activities Squadron at Stuttgart, West Germany, on a one-year trial basis.

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Figure 7. USCENTCOM Headquarters Personnel (as of 31 December 1983)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
(846 Authorized)

Rank	Army		Navy		USAF		USMC		Total Military		US Civilian		Total	
	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn
OFFICER	155	155	70	63	144	146	69	68	438	432			438	432
UNLISTED	<u>139</u>	<u>162</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>137</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>391</u>	<u>448</u>			<u>391</u>	<u>448</u>
TOTAL	294	317	135	137	281	301	119	125	829	880	17	13	846	893

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(U) On 8 December 1983, the Marine Corps Administrative Detachment was visited by a Marine Corps inspector general team. No major deficiencies were noted.


(U) Overall strength figures for USCENTCOM headquarters were as shown in Figure 7 on the facing page. A total of 893 personnel were assigned to HQ USCENTCOM at the end of the year.



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Figure 8. J-2 Organization



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INTELLIGENCE

(U) The Director of Intelligence (J-2) was responsible for all intelligence and counterintelligence matters in support of USCENTCOM. He had overall responsibility for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of the intelligence necessary to support the command's mission. The J-2 was also responsible for the management of all assigned intelligence resources. As a result of JCS guidance to reduce USCENTCOM personnel, the intelligence directorate was reduced from 162 to 155.¹ An internal mission support evaluation was conducted within the J-2, and the directorate organizational structure was revised as shown in Figure 8 on the facing page. The Directorate of Intelligence consisted of four divisions: Intelligence Operations, Resources Management, Targets, and Collection Management. The Special Security Office and Cryptologic Support Group were special staff offices which supported the command and reported to the Director of Intelligence.

(U) The Intelligence Operations Division was responsible for indications and warning, analysis, exercise planning, signal intelligence (SIGINT) analysis, and the preparation and presentation of briefings. It provided near-real-time, all-

1. Msg, JCS, subj: "JMP HQ RDJTF," 10 Jan 83.

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source intelligence information, and ensured that intelligence support was provided to the National Command Authorities, as well as to USCINCCENT, USCENTCOM component commands, and the USCENTCOM staff. This division was responsible for the operation of the USCENTCOM Indications and Warning Center, provided mission support to the USCENTCOM Joint Reconnaissance Center, and prepared special intelligence products to support the command mission.

(U) The Analysis Branch performed analysis of political, social, economic, and military activities and events in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. It provided input to intelligence annexes for OPLANS and OPORDs, and conducted liaison with component and national-level intelligence agencies.

(U) The Special Support Branch managed the operation of the exercises in which J-2 was involved, managed the Presentations and Special Studies Sections, and coordinated the data base and publications requirements of the Intelligence Operations Division, J-3, and other directorates concerning deployment preparations, exercise planning, and operational readiness.

(U) Special operational intelligence support involving communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) information was the responsibility of the Signals Intelligence Branch.

(U) The Indications and Warning Branch operated the USCENTCOM Indications and Warning Center to support and direct the command mission in accordance with DOD directives. It also provided mission support to the USCENTCOM Joint Reconnaissance Center.

(U) Another division, Resource Management, managed directorate input to the PPBS, monitored intelligence planning to support USCENTCOM contingency operations, developed intelligence support systems and the Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) for the command, and provided counter-intelligence support for the USCINCCENT.

(U) The Plans and Policy Branch of the Resources Management division was responsible for coordinating and directing intelligence portions of operations plans, concept plans, and standing operating procedures. It reviewed all Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) documents and coordinated J-2 inputs to the Unified Command Plan and Service

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Reserve Programs. The branch developed and submitted manpower and fiscal documents for inclusion in the Joint Manning Program, in the Program Objective Memorandum the GDIP, the Commander in Chief (CINC) Command and Control (C²) Initiative Fund, the Intelligence Contingency Fund, and the local budget. Policy functions included developing J-2 inputs on facilities issues, Congressional and DOD-level presentations, forward basing, Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), Defense Guidance, and the Defense-Wide Intelligence Plan.

(U) The Systems Development Branch evaluated intelligence systems proposals. It tracked service intelligence capabilities and planned enhancements, conducted concept demonstrations, developed and exercised prototype systems, and identified, articulated, and presented USCENTCOM requirements for enhanced intelligence system support. This included preparation of Required Operational Capabilities (ROCs), data automation requests, and inputs to the POM and GDIP. Additionally, this branch managed contractor studies addressing USCENTCOM intelligence system support, developed intelligence system architecture, and served as USCENTCOM system coordinator for the IDHS.

(U) The Counterintelligence and Security Branch provided counterintelligence support to USCINCCENT, prepared

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counterintelligence annexes to OPLANS and OPORDs, coordinated with national intelligence and local law enforcement agencies, and monitored component counterintelligence assets to ensure full counterintelligence coverage of USCENTCOM's geographical area of responsibility. It also coordinated physical security matters, document control and accountability, created and ensured compliance with headquarters security procedures, and monitored component command procedures.

(U) Responsibility for the development, promulgation, and management of the command targets program was assigned to the Targets Division. Additional responsibilities of this division included target materials management, the mapping, charting, and geodesy program, and target development.

(U) The Targets Development Branch provided overall management of USCENTCOM targeting programs to ensure that coordinated target analysis programs and attack methodologies were employed by components and supporting forces. This included command coordination for target nomination, analysis, and validation of target production requirements.

(U) The Target Support Branch was responsible for the compilation of production requirements for command-wide

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aeronautical, topographic, and hydrographic products. It was also responsible for tactical target materials and terrain analysis products, including the validation of special purpose requirements.

(U) The Collection Management Division provided a centralized collection management authority in support of the headquarters and USCENTCOM components and supporting forces. Its job was to ensure that optimum use was made of intelligence collection resources and to ensure that all collection requirements were satisfied in a timely manner. The Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Branch served as the command's HUMINT requirement control authority. It prepared, maintained, validated, and levied all-source intelligence collection requirements on DOD, DIA, the Services, and non-DOD HUMINT resources. Additionally, it managed, monitored, and validated requests for HUMINT from national agencies, USCENTCOM components, and supporting forces. As the command's SIGINT requirements control office, the SIGINT Branch prepared, maintained, validated and levied all-source intelligence collection requirements on DOD, DIA, the Services, and non-DOD resources. It also managed, monitored and validated requests for SIGINT from national systems and platforms, USCENTCOM components, and supporting forces. The Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) Branch served as the command's IMINT requirements

control authority. As such, this branch prepared, maintained, validated and levied all-source intelligence collection requirements on DOD, DIA, the Services, and non-DOD resources. Additionally, it managed, monitored, and validated requests for aerial reconnaissance and surveillance from national systems and platforms, USCENCOM components, and supporting forces.

(U) The Special Security Office provided local management of national-level compartmented security programs. It provided protection and control of access to Sensitive Compartmented Information and operated a secure communications facility to support the headquarters and provide communications privacy for the USCINCCENT and key personnel.

(U) Another agency, the Cryptologic Support Group (CSG), provided SIGINT support during exercises, contingencies, and deployments. The CSG provided USCINCCENT with an interface which facilitated support to the command from the National Security Agency. Staffed by two officers and two noncommissioned officers (NCOs), the CSG was augmented as required by personnel from NSA.

(U) The J-2 directorate worked closely with three liaison offices. A representative from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was assigned to ensure effective and responsive defense

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intelligence support to the command group and staff of USCENTCOM. He served as the principal defense intelligence advisor to the USCINCCENT through the USCENTCOM Director of Intelligence.

U ~~(S)~~ Secondly, the National Security Agency Central Security Service representative to USCENTCOM provided the USCINCCENT and each of his directorates and special staffs with signal intelligence and communications security (COMSEC) advice and assistance, and provided effective liaison with all NSA organizations. The NSA representative served as the personal representative of the Director of the NSA to USCINCCENT.

(U) Thirdly, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative acted as the focal point for central intelligence support to the command. As the personal representative of the Director, Central Intelligence, the CIA representative provided USCENTCOM with an interface into the entire intelligence community.

U ~~(S)~~ A number of significant activities took place in the J-2 directorate during 1983. The Analysis Branch of Intelligence Operations Division continued a heavy commitment of intelligence support to all USCENTCOM OPLANs and CONPLANs by providing threat analysis, installation data, and other

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information to all major staff sections. The Analysis Branch also produced several country fact books on Southwest Asia in support of ongoing planning by all staff sections.²

(U) Several elements of the Special Support Branch had significant achievements during 1983. Requirements for intelligence production increased, particularly in the area of ad hoc requirements. Consequently, USCENTCOM established the requirement for a USCENTCOM production element³ to be manned by the end of fiscal year 1984 to support the command's immediate ad hoc imagery production needs. A longer term solution to USCENTCOM's need for intelligence production support was presented to the Director, DIA in the form of a briefing⁴ which proposed the establishment of a production facility at MacDill AFB. Following this briefing, a USCENTCOM-DIA working group was established to develop a solution to the command's long-term intelligence production needs.

U (~~S~~) The SIGINT Analysis Branch evaluated and integrated COMINT and ELINT with electronic warfare and C³CM requirements

2. USCENTCOM Fact Books, subj: Oman, 7 Jan 83; Sudan, 20 Jan 83; Saudi Arabia, 17 Aug 83; Kenya, 9 Sep 83.

3. USCENTCOM Production Element FY84 GDIP, Jan 83.

4. Briefing, USCENTCOM to DIA, 14 Dec 83.

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to support the command's planning efforts. From June through September 1983, the Intelligence Operations Division's SIGINT Analysis Branch, in coordination with the Resource Division's System Development Branch, tested Threadway, the prototype of a future automated SIGINT dissemination system. The Threadway system had been designed to link NSA, USCENTCOM, USCENTAF, and the XVIII Airborne Corps. The Threadway terminal, a modified AN/UYK-81(V) computer and graphic display system designed by Lockheed, was interconnected with similar terminals at the National SIGINT Operations Center, at Ninth Air Force, and at XVIII Airborne Corps. Real-world and scenario-derived SIGINT reports in various formats were automatically disseminated, correlated, and displayed on screens located within the indications and warning center in J-2 and the crisis action working areas in J-3. Evaluation of the scenario reporting was developed from previous GALLANT KNIGHT command post exercises (CPXs). It provided accurate information to improve initial design of the automated SIGINT dissemination system and implementation for wartime contingencies.

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~~U (S)~~ The J-2 tested its ability to perform its mission during several exercises held in 1983, both in the CONUS and OCONUS. WINTEX-CIMEX 83 was a worldwide procedural command post exercise sponsored by the JCS. It was conducted from 24 February through 9 March 1983. The J-2 participated as part of the USCENCOM crisis action team located at MacDill AFB. The J-2 mission was to provide the crisis action team with exercise indications and warning and threat intelligence.

~~U (S)~~ The J-2 also participated in GALLANT KNIGHT 83, a JCS-coordinated, USREDCOM-sponsored command post exercise held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. It was conducted from 18 through 22 March 1983. This CPX was designed to exercise the ability of USCENCOM and its component commands to (b)1.4(a)

(b)1.4(a) The scenario was generated with the assistance of the Tactical Simulation System (TACSIM) developed by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The exercise provided the J-2 with the opportunity to exercise and examine all-source tactical and national-level intelligence support to combat operations and to test improvements to intelligence operations provided by new support system capabilities such as the Deployable Intelligence Data Handling System (DIDHS), Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System (AIRES), and the Tactical Operations Planner Collection and Tasking System (TOPCAT).

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U The CSG from the National Security Agency provided for timely threat warning, while DIDHS enhanced the Joint Intelligence Center's analytical intelligence capability.

(U) BLUE FLAG 83-4 was a USCENTAF-sponsored command post exercise held from 22 to 29 September 1983. It was one of four such exercises conducted annually at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Each year, one of the four BLUE FLAG exercises used a scenario involving USCENTCOM's area of responsibility and USCENTCOM's headquarters staff. For BLUE FLAG 83-4, the USCENTCOM headquarters staff consisted of approximately 20 people, including two from J-2, and utilized the same scenario as GALLANT KNIGHT 84.

(U) In February 1983, a three-man element from the J-2 participated in a JCS-directed deployment to the Middle East.

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Operation EARLY CALL provided a unique opportunity for the exercise of various intelligence disciplines in support of a deployed headquarters. Operating in an isolated field environment, USCENTCOM intelligence officers became the focal point for input from several strategic collection systems. The integration of real-time, all-source intelligence into an extremely dynamic situation demonstrated J-2's capability to react on short notice and to provide the required support to the deployed commander. More generally, USCENTCOM also demonstrated the speed and flexibility to react effectively in support of national foreign policy objectives.

U ~~(S)~~ The Indications and Warning Branch grew and took on significant responsibilities with the designation of the branch as an indications and warning center on 19 May 1983. Representatives from the Indications and Warning Branch participated in the DOD Indication and Warning Policy meeting held on 18 and 19 May 1983 and in the DOD Indications and Warning Planning Group meeting, conducted from 18 to 20 October 1983. The DOD indications and warning system recognized two categories of intelligence problems: standing warning problems and temporary warning problems. At the end of 1983, the USCENTCOM Indications and Warning Branch was responsible for

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one standing and four temporary warning problems within the DOD system.

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~~U~~ (S) All branches of the Resources Management Division contributed to the mission accomplishment of the Directorate of Intelligence during 1983. The Plans Branch submitted two major changes to JMPs for fiscal years 1985 and 1986.⁵ These changes contained requirements for a special activities (production) element in 1985 and an upgraded production element for 1986. The J-2 was the only directorate authorized by the USCINCENT and his J-1 to show an increase to the JMP for fiscal year 1986. This was based on requirements already submitted as initiatives under the POM and GDIP processes. Both the fiscal year 1985 and fiscal year 1986 JMPs were forwarded to JCS for approval. The J-2 portion of USCENTCOM's "Strategic, Command Objectives, Representative Operational and Logistical

5. USCENTCOM Joint Manpower Program, FY 85, Part I, 30 Sep 83.

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Objectives, Representative Operational and Logistical Concepts"⁶ was developed as a tool for the command and its components to identify and quantify the unconstrained requirements to support the Defense Guidance force for fiscal years 1985 through 1989.

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this "Concept of Operations" for USCENTCOM on 28 October 1983. As an adjunct to the USCENTCOM generic concept of operations, the J-2 developed the Intelligence Master Programming List⁷ outlining command programing requirements for fiscal years 1986 through 1990. Component input was incorporated into the document and a draft submission for the JCS was completed on 21 February 1984. J-2 also submitted its reserve augmentation requirements⁸ to get the necessary mobilization augmentees to meet wartime needs.

U ~~(C)~~ During 1983, the J-2 Policy Branch submitted initiatives for the GDIP⁹ for fiscal years 1985-1989 and the Program Objective Memorandum¹⁰ for fiscal years 1986-1990.

6. USCENTCOM Strategy, Command Objectives, Representative Operational and Logistical Concept (1989), 7 Sep 83.

7. USCENTCOM Master Programming List (FY 86-90), 25 Feb 84.

8. USCENTCOM Joint Manpower Program FY 85, Part III, 30 Sep 83.

9. DIA General Defense Intelligence Plan, FY 85-89, 24 Nov 83.

10. HQ USAF Program Objective Memorandum, FY 86-90, undated.

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Requirements for these programs were included for both in-garrison and deployed systems as well as for the supporting manpower needed. This branch submitted five of the command's nine projects for funding in the USCINCENT Command and Control Initiative Fund¹¹ for fiscal year 1984, USCENTCOM's first such effort. The Policy Branch was assigned as the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for the newly established Intelligence Contingency Fund.¹² In March 1983, the J-2 input to the Command Financial Plan¹³ was submitted; J-2 requirements totalled \$650,000, \$579,000 of which was actually received. The operating budget¹⁴ for fiscal year 1986 was prepared in November; J-2 requested \$565,000. The Policy Section also played a significant role in preparing for the visit of the US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Paul Thayer, and the South Korean Minister of Defense, Mr. Yuon Sung Min. This section also helped to prepare presentations to the JCS and Congress. DIA's initial effort for the Defense-Wide Intelligence Plan,¹⁵

11. Msg, JCS, Subj: "Command and Control Initiative Fund," 262000Z Aug 83.

12. Msg, HQ USAF, Subj: "USCENTCOM Intelligence Contingency Fund," 061447Z Oct 83. Ltr, HQ USCENTCOM J-2, subj: Appointment of Intelligence Contingency Fund Officials," 1 Dec 83.

13. FY 84 Financial Plan, 9 May 83.

14. Speech, USCINCENT to Defense Resources Board, 13 Jul 83.

15. Msg, subj: "Defense Wide Intelligence Plan," 132305Z Oct 83.

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Defense Resources Board,¹⁶ and Joint Program Assessment Memo,¹⁷ were collated and developed for the J-2 by the Policy Branch. It also developed the J-2's personal response to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency regarding USCENTCOM intelligence shortfalls and drafted USCINCCENT's response to the ad hoc panel on intelligence sponsored by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

U (~~S~~) The major accomplishments of the Systems Development Branch during 1983 included a study of alternate and backup communications. USCENTCOM participated in the development of a DIA Intelligence Communications Architecture initiative which was designed to identify alternate and backup communications paths from USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. Sought were paths that could be used for critical intelligence communications to deployed forces in case the primary defense communications system (DCS) capabilities allocated to USCENTCOM were destroyed, denied, or otherwise unavailable. The study, which continued through the end of 1983, would provide a valuable survey of alternative methods for transmitting intelligence data into the USCENTCOM theater until such time as a full central area communications infrastructure was

16. Msg, subj: "Joint Program Assessment Memorandum," 170104Z May 83.

17. Msg, JCS, subj: "Retention of Threadway," 151911Z Nov 83.

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available. It would also prove useful in time of conflict, if that should come first.

(U) The Intelligence Directorate continued to receive additional capabilities over its in-garrison Intelligence Data Handling System, including remote access to the DIA On-Line System, the Community Intelligence Network, and the AIRES data bases, as well as mail service and the remote Indications Communications Network that provided informal analyst-to-analyst communications. Additionally, the System Development Branch worked to implement the data base subsystem software that was to provide IDHS users with access to USCENTCOM data bases.

~~(S)~~ U (S) A USCENTCOM IDHS Planning Conference was conducted from 6 to 8 April 1983. It identified the following major shortfalls: the absence of a command-wide USCENTCOM data base, the inability to share common intelligence data on the AOR, and the lack of a capability to flow intelligence data rapidly through in-garrison systems to deployable systems. These shortfalls were the focus for USCENTCOM IDHS planning and funding strategies in 1983. In September, USCENTCOM initiated a command-wide IDHS architecture study. It documented IDHS organization, mission, tasking, current capabilities and shortfalls. The purpose of the study was to engineer a

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command-wide network to resolve these deficiencies, to recommend specific communications and ADP architectures for the components, and to develop and justify funding packages for fiscal years 1986 through 1990.

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18. Msg, JCS, subj: "Retention of Threadway," 151911Z Nov 83.

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U ~~(S)~~ The USCENTCOM Imagery Transmission System (CITS) continued development in 1983. CITS would link HQ USCENTCOM, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Military Airlift Command, USARCENT, USCENAF, USNAVCENT, and I Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) with prototype commercial facsimile devices that would transmit magazine-quality imagery among these headquarters. USCENTCOM was scheduled to receive six Fastfax 2000 terminals in October 1983, but these were reassigned by the JCS to USSOUTHCOM.¹⁹ As a result, the CITS IOC date slipped to the second quarter of fiscal year 1985.

U ~~(S)~~ The Digital Imagery Transmission System (DITS) was to be USCENTCOM's near-term method of receiving low-volume photo-interpretable-quality imagery from the Defense Intelligence Agency while in garrison. In 1983, one DITS terminal was approved by Headquarters USCENTCOM for purchase through the USCINCCENT C² Fund.²⁰ Additionally, the DIA Intelligence Communications Architecture Group approved an Imagery Transmission Test and Evaluation among DIA, USCENTCOM and its components, USSOUTHCOM, MAC, the 513th Military Intelligence Group, and its subordinate imagery interpretation detachments.²¹

19. Msg, HQ USAF, subj: "JCS Request for Fastfax 2000 Terminals," 311314Z May 84.

20. HQ USCENTCOM Form 14, subj: "DIA Intelligence Communications Architecture Initiative," 9 Sep 83.

21. Point Paper, "Intelligence Systems Developments," Sep 83.

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(U) Mitre Corporation support for IDHS began early in 1983 under the auspices of the DIA Validation and Verification Program, specifically for the Planning Research Corporation "RDF on-site software enhancement" contract. Specific technical tasks to be supported included validation, verification, project management assistance, and technical evaluation.

U ~~(S)~~ In December, a Program Decision Package was submitted in the GDIP for fiscal years 1986 to 1990. This package was designed to obtain funding so that the command could receive near-real-time satellite imagery through the Defense Dissemination System.

U ~~(S)~~ In February and August 1983, the DIDHS was field-tested successfully at Fort Bragg during exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 83 and in Egypt during exercise BRIGHT STAR 83. The DIDHS was a prototype mobile system designed to provide automated message handling and an electronic data base to support deployed USCENTCOM operations. Funding for the operational DIDHS and the tactical ELINT processor user's terminal was approved by a program budget decision from the Secretary of Defense in October 1983.

(U) The Counterintelligence Branch produced the following command policies and directives during 1983: USCENTCOM

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Supplement 1 to DOD 5200.1-R, "Command Security Procedures;" USCENTCOM Regulation 604-1, "Personnel Security Clearances;" a USCENTCOM instruction booklet for preparation of security forms for background investigations; USCENTCOM Regulation 380-2, "Special Category (SPECAT) Procedures," and USCENTCOM Policy Letter Number 33, "Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations." During the Phase II construction of USCENTCOM's new headquarters, Building 540 at MacDill AFB, the Counterintelligence Branch conducted a number of security surveys to determine if the new building and its offices met security standards. This branch also initiated an annual counterintelligence officers conference, which was held in 1983 from 23 to 25 May. Discussions included the establishment of the counterintelligence battlebook, a counterintelligence data base, use of intelligence contingency funds, and cross-service counterintelligence support. The Counterintelligence Branch also assumed several additional responsibilities with the establishment of the Terrorist Analysis Section in December 1983. This branch staffed and coordinated an operational security survey program during exercise BLACK ROCK 84 for those units deploying OCONUS and completed counterintelligence threat assessments on 18 countries.

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(U) A Joint Targets List for OPLANs 1003 and 1004²³ was published and work continued on target network and system analyses to produce Joint Target Lists to support OPLAN 1002 and CONPLAN 1005. In addition to the support provided to conventional targeting efforts, the Targets Division spearheaded the initiation of a SOF working group within the joint technical community for the development of SOF-unique weapons effectiveness and target vulnerability studies.

U ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ During 1983, the Collection Management Division

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personnel deployed to USEUCOM to assist with imagery

22. Msg, USCENTCOM, subj: "UW Targeting," 212150Z Jan 83.

23. Joint Target List, OPLAN 1003/1004, 28 Jun 83.

24. After Action Report, Early Call, 14 Feb 84.

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interpretation and dissemination. During Exercise WINTEX - CIMEX 83, the first exercise of the calendar year, collection management personnel provided support to the Crisis Action Team by coordinating with national intelligence collectors to fill identified intelligence gaps.²⁵ During GALLANT KNIGHT 83, the Collection Management Division exercised SIGINT operational tasking authority and coordinated real-world national and tactical reconnaissance assets.²⁶ During this exercise, the SIGINT and IMINT branches participated in a special project, GRAINY HIDE, which examined alternate means of disseminating national-level intelligence and its subsequent use by lower level tactical commanders. BRIGHT STAR 83, an OCONUS exercise, provided collection management personnel with the opportunity to experience operations in USCENTCOM's AOR.²⁷ During this exercise, the division provided real-world collection support to deployed forces.²⁸ In addition, a Collection Management Division imagery officer assisted the 497th Reconnaissance Technical Group with imagery interpretation in support of the exercise. In September 1983, the division achieved connectivity of the Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System through the IDHS system. This further enhanced imagery collection support.

25. JTD, Gallant Knight 83, 1 Sep 83.

26. Msg, USCINCCENT, 15 Jan 83.

27. JTD, Bright Star 83, 15 May 83.

28. After Action Report, Bright Star 83, 9 Sep 83.

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U (~~C~~) Participating in contingencies and exercises were the major events in 1983 for the Special Security Office, which was involved in deployments for EARLY CALL, GALLANT KNIGHT 83, and BRIGHT STAR 83. The Special Security Office chain of control was established to run from LTG Kingston through BG Gordon. Special Compartmented Information billets totalled 449. Beginning on 1 January 1983, the United States Central Command received cryptologic support from its Cryptologic Support Group. Before the establishment of the CSG as a separate entity, cryptologic support was provided by the CSG of USREDCOM and the RDJTF.


U (~~S~~) Cryptologic support to exercises and deployments during 1983 included the following:

- (b)1.4(a) Two officers and one NCO plus NSA augmentation, deployed to Cairo West, Egypt.
- Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 83. Two officers and two NCOs plus NSA augmentation, to Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
- Exercise SOLID SHIELD. One officer and one NCO in support of USREDCOM's CSG.
- BRIGHT STAR 83. Two officers and one NCO plus NSA augmentation deployed to Cairo West, Egypt.
- In support of USCINCCENT's trip to Saana, Yemen Arab Republic, one officer and one NSA augmentee deployed to provide en route and location threat warning.
- Ahuas Tara II. Honduras, one officer in support of USREDCOM and USSOUTHCOM.

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Figure 9. J-3 Organization



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OPERATIONS

(U) The Operations Directorate was divided into six subordinate divisions. Each division was further subdivided into branches and sections. The major organizational structure was as shown in Figure 9 on the facing page.

(U) The Director of Operations during 1983 was Brig Gen Michael P. C. Carns, USAF. His deputy was Colonel (COL) (b)(6) (b)(6) US Army. The key directorate staff officers as of 31 December 1983 were: The Chief of Current Operations, Col (b)(6), USMC; the Chief of Special Operations, COL (b)(6) US Army; the Chief of Exercises, Col (b)(6) USAF; the Chief of Command and Control, Col (b)(6) USAF; the Chief of NBC Defense, Captain (b)(6) US Navy; and the Chief of Weather, Col (b)(6) USAF.

(U) The command's operational activities during 1983 fell into three major areas: command and control, exercises, and operations. The transition of the RDJTF to unified command

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status resulted in a significant increase in US military activity in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. Consequently, involvement in operational matters by the J-3 also increased.

(U) The USCINCCENT's operational commitments required a flexible, responsive command and control system. Efforts to maintain such a system continued throughout the year. During the first quarter of 1983, improvements were made to the communications systems of the USCENTCOM Emergency Action Center. The Joint Chiefs of Staff alerting network was also installed. It provided dedicated, nonsecure voice communications with the National Military Command Center (NMCC), the Alternate NMCC, the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP), and the Pentagon switch. Additionally, the directorate procured an AN/FSC-82 ultra high frequency (UHF) satellite terminal. This terminal allowed UHF and satellite communication interface with the nonsecure Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON) and with the secure Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) network. Finally, an interbase radio network was established. This nonsecure frequency modulation (FM) mobile network consisted of a base station and 15 hand-held portable radios capable of plain or encrypted digital operation. Access from the interbase radio network to commercial and AUTOVON telephone lines was

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possible through the JCS Alerting Network. All three systems (JCS Alerting Network, AN/FSC-82, and interbase radio) were fully tested after installation and were used operationally on a daily basis.

(U) The great distance between HQ USCENTCOM and its area of responsibility presented serious command and control difficulties, particularly during USCINCENT's travel to and from the AOR. During 1983, the Operations Directorate made significant progress toward providing enhanced en route command and control for USCINCENT. Early in the year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff validated the requirement for a C³ aircraft to be permanently assigned to USCENTCOM. In August the US Air Force transferred an NKC-135A aircraft from the Air Force Systems Command to Air Force Logistics Command for Phase I modification. When this modification was complete in early 1984, it would provide a basic airframe ready for Phase II modification of the electronic and communication systems. The modified aircraft, which would be redesignated an EC-135Y, would provide USCINCENT with a highly capable C³ platform.

(U) Exercising USCENTCOM headquarters, staffs, and assigned forces was one of the most important means of improving combat readiness. Vital areas such as command and

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control procedures, communications techniques, and the interoperability of the equipment of the four Services could be examined, evaluated, and modified as necessary.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The USCENTCOM exercise program was designed to accomplish several objectives. In a general sense, the program enhanced national security by improving US strategic posture in the command's area of responsibility. It also improved USCENTCOM's overall operational readiness, as well as of its component headquarters staffs and of selected units, by emphasizing OPLAN execution and C³I systems and by examining issues of logistical support and sustainability which were unique to USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. In this way, exercises helped to improve the readiness of selected forces for combat in the AOR while testing USCENTCOM OPLANs.

(U) During 1983, USCENTCOM became fully integrated into the JCS-directed and JCS-coordinated exercise program scheduling process. By the end of the year, a fully coordinated program was in place for fiscal years 1984 through 1990.

(U) USCENTCOM participated in two JCS-scheduled command post exercises during 1983: WINTEX-CIMEX 83 and PRESSURE

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POINT 84. Additionally, USCENTCOM conducted three of its own exercises during 1983: GALLANT KNIGHT 83, BRIGHT STAR 83, and BLACK ROCK 84-1.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Exercise WINTEX-CIMEX 83 was a JCS command post exercise conducted from home stations during the period 24 February through 9 March 1983. It was one in a series of JCS CPXs designed to exercise plans and procedures of participating military, federal, and civil agencies. It also evaluated the WWMCCS during full mobilization in support of conventional war plans for the reinforcement of Europe, for worldwide war at sea, and for a contingency in Southwest Asia.

(U) USCENTCOM participated in WINTEX-CIMEX 83 with a 24-hour-a-day Crisis Action Team from 24 February through 9 March 1983. All play was conducted from USCENTCOM's headquarters at Building 540, MacDill AFB, Florida. Play by USARCENT, USNAVCENT, and USCENTAF was simulated.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Exercise WINTEX-CIMEX 83 proved to be a valuable training tool. It afforded USCENTCOM's staff the opportunity to view several challenging issues concerning its ability to employ and sustain forces. WINTEX-CIMEX 83 also clearly demonstrated the need for reassessing US priorities and

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objectives during a global war originating in Europe by showing the impact of the resulting decisions on USCENTCOM. The USCENTCOM Crisis Action Team and Crisis Action System performed well.

(U) GALLANT KNIGHT 83 was an employment command post exercise conducted from 18 to 22 March 1983, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; at the Naval Ocean Systems Center in San Diego, California; and at Camp Pendleton, California.

(U) ~~(S)~~ GALLANT KNIGHT 83 was the fourth in a series of exercises that practiced responding to a contingency in USCENTCOM's area of operations. The general GALLANT KNIGHT scenario was a hypothetical (b)(1.4(a)) The specific 1983 scenario and forces for the exercise were as postulated in (b)(1)1.4a for the period from D+49 to D+53. This particular OPLAN timeframe was selected because all forces were then in their operational employment positions in a high-threat scenario, allowing a thorough examination of sustained combat operations. A deployment phase was originally planned for GALLANT KNIGHT 83, but was not exercised due to the non-availability of the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) and the transportation operating agencies.

Figure 10. Participants in GALLANT KNIGHT 83**HQ USCENTCOM****USARCENT Forces**

- Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps
- Headquarters, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
- Headquarters, 82d Airborne Division
- Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
- Headquarters, 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)
- Headquarters, 1st and 2d Battalions (Ranger), 75th Infantry
- Headquarters, 18th Field Artillery Brigade
- Headquarters, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade
- Headquarters, 20th Engineer Brigade
- Headquarters, 16th Military Police Brigade
- Headquarters, 35th Signal Brigade
- Headquarters, 1st Corps Support Command

Headquarters, United States Marine Forces, Central Command (USMARCENT) (1st Marine Amphibious Force, participating from Camp Pendleton, California).

Headquarters, United States Navy Forces, Central Command (USNAVCENT).

Headquarters, United States Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF).

Headquarters, Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF).

Commander, Supporting Naval Forces (participating from San Diego, California).

Advance Party, Strategic Air Command (SAC).

Commander, Airlift Forces, Military Airlift Command.

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(U) Actual participating personnel strengths for GALLANT KNIGHT 83 were as shown in the following table:

Personnel Strengths, GALLANT KNIGHT 83

Headquarters, USCENTCOM	939
USARCENT	8,192
USMARCENT	512
USNAVCENT	58
USCENTAF	1,470
JUWTF	<u>206</u>
TOTAL	11,377

(U) ~~(S)~~ Overall, GALLANT KNIGHT 83 was successful in accomplishing its main purpose of exercising HQ USCENTCOM, its components, and supporting commands in employment operations. Specific objectives in the general categories of joint operations, sustainment, special operations, and communications were also accomplished. GALLANT KNIGHT 83 was a timely and welcome training experience which generated data which provided insight into command, control, and procedural improvements.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Exercise PRESSURE POINT 84 was a JCS CPX conducted at home station from 16 to 22 November 1983. It exercised the plans and crisis management procedures of the participating

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military and civil departments and agencies while sustaining a

(b)1.4(a)

served as a vehicle for the Phase III test of the OPLAN and force module concept.

(U) HQ USCENTCOM participated with a response cell eight hours a day during the pre-exercise play from 14 to 15 November and with a Crisis Action Team 24 hours a day from 16 to 22 November. All play was conducted from Building 540, MacDill AFB, Florida. USARCENT, USNAVCENT, and USCENTAF took part in the exercise by operating response cells at their home stations.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Exercise PRESSURE POINT 84 provided an excellent training opportunity for the staff and components of USCENTCOM. While it produced some valuable insights and lessons learned, it also identified areas that required additional emphasis. The force module concept of developing an OPLAN proved to be a viable planning tool, but certain refinements were still thought to be necessary.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Exercise BRIGHT STAR 83 was a joint and combined exercise conducted during August and September 1983. BRIGHT

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STAR forces operated in Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman under the command and control of HQ USCENTCOM. USNAVCENT, USARCENT, USCENTAF, United States Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Central Command (USJUWTFCENT), and supporting naval forces trained and exercised in Egypt; USARCENT, USJUWTFCENT, and USCENTAF forces conducted training in Sudan; USCENTAF and USJUWTFCENT forces exercised in Oman; and USJUWTFCENT and supporting naval forces trained and operated in Somalia.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Since USCENTCOM forces had to move 7,000 to 12,000 miles to reach the AOR, most of the exercise cargo was shipped by sea. This saved several million dollars in airlift costs, but, in a sense, it also skewed the results of the exercise, since some of the equipment which moved early by sea would have had to be airlifted in an actual contingency. Lack of exercise funds for airlift caused this artificiality.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Deployment commenced during the third week of July with the onload of seaborne equipment at Beaumont, Texas; Wilmington, North Carolina; and Savannah, Georgia. BRIGHT STAR 83 movement involved a total of five ships. Two of the ships deployed equipment and supplies from CONUS, while an additional three ships transported cargo that had been previously pre-positioned near the USCENTCOM AOR. These ships made nine port stops, several of which were not directly associated with the exercise. For example, the SS TRANS COLUMBIA was used to

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deliver some foreign military sales cargo to North Yemen (the YAR) while en route to Oman. The ships delivered 312 military vans, 621 vehicles, and 42 helicopters to the exercise area. Total cargo weighed 30,000 metric tons, the rough equivalent of 750 C-141 sorties, which would have cost approximately \$213,000,000.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Some 6,000 exercise participants arrived in the AOR by air. These people departed from 27 different locations and were routed through one of several en route stops before arriving at six debarkation sites. In addition to passengers, 2,400 short tons of time-sensitive cargo were airlifted. The airlift deployment involved a total of 121 MAC missions.

(U) BRIGHT STAR 83 took place in four countries, and in the adjacent waters of the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. With the exception of limited joint and combined operations involving the forces of Egypt and Sudan, exercise activities were not operationally interconnected. The operations in Egypt were far more extensive than those in previous BRIGHT STAR exercises, and, for the first time, included major participation by US naval forces of the Sixth Fleet.

(U) In Egypt, air and air defense operations played a large role during BRIGHT STAR 83. The USAF forces involved in

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Egypt included two E-3As, three B-52s, four KC-10s, eight F-111s, and twelve F-16s. The latter aircraft were already in-country for a two-month PRIZED FALCON deployment. Naval air was represented by Carrier Air Wing Seven from the USS EISENHOWER, and consisted of A-6s, A-7s, F-14s, E-2s, and EA-6Bs. Most significantly, the Egyptians participated on a large scale and joined in with their F-4s, F-16s, MiG-15s, MiG-17s, MiG-21s, F-6, F-7, and Mirage aircraft. In all, 1,060 tactical air sorties were flown. The Egyptian Air Force completed 42 refuelings from KC-10 tankers; taking aboard 288,000 pounds of fuel.

(U) Conventional ground operations began using a building block approach. Individual training led to small unit training, then rapidly progressed into more complex, combined operations.

(U) Extensive airborne and air assault activities were also conducted. Ten paratroops were conducted by conventional forces with 1,788 Egyptian and US paratroopers taking part. On 22 August 1983, a combined force of over 200 troopers--half Egyptian and half US--jumped in at Wadi Seidna, Sudan, near the capital of Khartoum. A complex four-day combined field training exercise was held south of Gebel Hamza, Egypt, from 21 through 24 August 1983. In this maneuver, 2,000 troops

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took part in combined operations over several hundred square kilometers. Activities included integrated armor, mechanized and motorized maneuvers designed as linkup operations against ground objectives. Close air support was conducted by both Egyptian and US tactical fighters, including F-16s from both countries. Paratroop jumps took place on all four days. The activity was capped on 24 August when a combined Egyptian-US force, under the command of an Egyptian general officer, conducted a major assault against several objectives in the vicinity of Gebel Hamza.

(U) Naval surface operations were a first in the BRIGHT STAR series of exercises. A combined surface action group was formed with six Egyptian ships of the Ramadan and October class, sailing in company with three US ships. The ships participated in "war-at-sea" exercises in varied scenarios including formation steaming, communications connectivity, and surface warfare tactics.

(U) BRIGHT STAR 83 also marked the first time that electronic warfare activities were successfully integrated into a USCENTCOM OCONUS exercise. The major objectives of this part of BRIGHT STAR were to integrate electronic warfare in a joint and combined exercise, and to establish a baseline for cooperation in C³CM with Egyptian electronic warfare forces. PROUD FLAME, the JCS evaluation of electronic warfare, received

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its first test concurrently with the electronic warfare activities conducted during BRIGHT STAR 83. Combined electronic warfare activities were conducted in support of ground, air, and naval operations and consisted of two phases. Phase I of this test provided combined orientation and individual training for electronic warfare personnel. Phase II included air-to-air electronic countermeasures and a combined ground electronic warfare exercise. A major highlight of this aspect of the exercise was the opportunity to conduct electronic warfare operations against the realistic opposition force communication network set up by the Egyptian Signal Corps.

(U) The headquarters of the United States Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Central Command was established at Cairo West Air Base, with components located at Cairo West, Inshas Air Base, and Abu Qir. The US unconventional forces conducted a full array of low visibility special operations with elements of the Egyptian Ranger Command. Despite the low visibility of these operations, some of them were quite complex. Activities included day and night infiltration of combined special forces using MC-130 aircraft, heliborne insertion of combined ranger elements, small unit tactical operations supported by AC-130 gunships, and combined naval special warfare operations involving the use of helicopters in maritime operations.

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(U) One of the most innovative and potentially far-reaching developments of BRIGHT STAR 83 was the creation of an Egyptian-US Combined Staff, co-chaired by Brig Gen Carns, USCENTCOM J-3, and Brigadier General Samir of the Egyptian Army. The combined staff involved itself with a wide range of matters from scheduling the combined parachute drop in Sudan to resolving aircraft parking problems at Cairo East, the civilian airport serving the Egyptian capital. Throughout the exercise, the combined staff's deliberations were carried out in a spirit of mutual respect and cooperation. In future exercises, Egypt and the US would greatly benefit from an expanded combined staff composed of senior representatives who had the authority to resolve issues quickly and efficiently.

(U) ~~(S)~~ BRIGHT STAR 83 activities in (b)1.4(d) were conducted under the sub-exercise nickname NATURAL BOND. The (b)1.4(d) (b)1.4(d) did not possess the level of modernization and training necessary to conduct complex combined operations. Consequently, NATURAL BOND was a very limited exercise whose activities had to be tailored to the (b)1.4(d) available.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Initially, when NATURAL BOND was in the planning stages, the US was to provide an E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) for one day to familiarize selected

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(b)(1.4(d)) with basic intercept procedures. However, this portion of the training was deleted from the program. Air defense operations between US and (b)(1.4(d)) involved live fire of the Redeye missile against the ballistic aerial target system.

(u) ~~(S)~~ Ground operations in (b)(1)1.4d consisted of two airborne drops and subsequent tactical ground operations. A combined drop was conducted into (b)(1)1.4d near (b)(1)1.4d involving 322 US and (b)(1)1.4d personnel. Follow-up activities included weapons familiarization and prejump training with elements of US and (b)(1)1.4d forces. A second airborne operation, involving almost 200 US and (b)(1)1.4d paratroopers, took place at (b)(1)1.4d on 23 August.

(u) ~~(S)~~ Special operations also played a significant role in the exercise activities in (b)(1)1.4d Naval special warfare elements exercised at (b)(1)1.4d by conducting basic diving refresher and underwater demolition training with the (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d Army special forces exercised with a unit of the (b)(1)1.4d Army Parachute Brigade. Emphasis was placed on night small unit tactics, including land navigation and weapons and demolition procedures in support of raid and ambush operations. Special operations included a night strategic

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airborne assault by a US Ranger company. This mission originated in Fort Lewis, Washington. After stopping in Charleston, South Carolina, the aircraft proceeded nonstop to (b)(1)1.4d for a predawn airborne drop. After the drop, the Rangers and another unit of the (b)(1)1.4d Parachute Brigade conducted strike operations supported by AC-130 gunships.

(u) ~~(S)~~ Exercise activity in Somalia, code named EASTERN WIND, included unconventional warfare and amphibious assault operations. A small contingent of US Special Forces exercised in a combined capacity with the Somali 6th Commando Brigade at Balli Doggle. This small-scale exercise consisted of small unit tactics training, including patrolling, land navigation, and ambushes.

(u) ~~(S)~~ The major exercise activity in Somalia consisted of operations by US naval forces. A battalion-sized amphibious landing was conducted by the Seventh Fleet's 31st Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) on Bookeka Beach in the vicinity of Berbera. Battling high winds and heavy seas, the Marines came ashore under the cover of air support provided by the USS VINSON carrier battle group, 31st MAU AV-8As, and a USMC A-6 squadron which had deployed to Berbera from Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) El Toro, California. EASTERN WIND marked the

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first deployment of Marine Corps tactical air to this part of the world. Naval gunfire support was provided by TF-70 ships and ships of MIDEASTFOR. After the landing, Marine forces linked up with Somali ground elements and conducted tactical ground maneuver operations. The composite MAF concept was also exercised as headquarters elements of the 7th and 9th Marine Amphibious Battalions were sequentially formed into a composite MAF under the command of the Commanding General, I MAF.

U ~~(S)~~ Upon completion of air operations in (b)1.4(d) USCENTAF deployed the eight F-111s and two E-3A AWACS aircraft to (b)1.4(d) for sub-exercise INFERNO CREEK. During the course of a six-day air defense exercise, the F-111s, under control of the AWACS, conducted simulated high-speed attacks against (b)1.4(d) which was defended by Hunters and Jaguars of the (b)1.4(d) Air Force. Also deployed was the Tactical Air Command's prototype (b)1.4(e)

(b)1.4(e)

U ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Unconventional warfare operations in Oman consisted of both army special forces and naval special warfare

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activities. Special Forces exercised in a combined capacity with elements of the Omani Coastal Security Force at Afar. This training involved long-range vehicle patrols, with emphasis on desert survival. Naval special warfare elements exercised with the

(b)1.4(d)

This combined training included diving operations and tactical reconnaissance. The Naval Special Warfare Unit's participation included off-loading and on-loading naval special warfare equipment from the SS TRANS COLUMBIA which was lying to offshore.

~~U~~ ~~(S)~~ Exercise airlift was dovetailed with the REFORGER deployment of US forces to Germany so that the same aircraft could be used for BRIGHT STAR 83 redeployment. Advantage was also taken of the opportunity to use BRIGHT STAR 83 airlift to pre-position Air Force equipment in (b)1.4(d), avoiding considerable transportation costs. This pre-positioning amounted to 15 C-141 loads and included vehicles, materials handling equipment, and base operating support. Redeployment operations concluded with the off-loading of the SS ADM WILLIAM G. CALLAGHAN at Beaumont, Texas, on 8 October 1983.

(U) US Forces participating in BRIGHT STAR 83 by service and country in which the forces operated were as shown in the following list:

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(U) Army Forces

(U) Egypt

HQ USARCENT

HQ XVIII Airborne Corps

TF 24

CAT DET/96 CA

TF 82

2-325 INF (-)

TF CBAC

7-17 CAV (-)

TF ADA

4-1 ADA (-)

TF 101

2-503 INF (-)

CA DET/96 CA

TF ARTY

1-73 FA

TF BRIGHT STAR TROOPS

525 MI GP (-)

50 SIG CO (-)

116 MP CO

TF SPT CMD

1 COSCOM

548 ENG BN (-)

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44 MED BDE (-)

7 TRANS GP (-)

46 SPT CO (-)

CA DET/96 CA

ARMY TROOPS

563 MI GP (-)

4 PSYOP GP (-)

86 SIGN BN (-)

352 CA CMD

258 MP CO (-)

44 MW DET

49 PA DET

(U) Sudan

TF 82

2-325 IN (-)

(U) Air Force Forces

(U) Egypt

(U) Cairo West

HQ USCENTAF

27 TFW (8 F-111D)

552 AWACD (2 E-3A)

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7 ACCS (2 EC-130)

MAC (9 C-130)

28 BW (3 B-52)

CSE

1 SOW (2 AC-130), 2 MC-130)

COMM

(U) Cairo East

SAC (4 KC-10)

CSE

COMM

(U) Inshas

388 TFW (12 F-16)

CSE

COMM

(b)1.4(d)

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(U) Navy Forces

(U) Egypt

HQ USNAVCENT

(U) Mediterranean Sea

TF 60 CVBG

USS EISENHOWER plus 5 ships

(U) Gulf of Aden

TF 70 CVBG

USS CARL VINSON plus 5 ships

TG 76.3

USS TARAWA plus 4 ships

MIDEASTFOR (USS LASALLE and USS T.C. HART)

(U) Marine Force

(U) Somalia

31 MAU

HQ I MAF

9TH MAB

7TH MAB

3D MAW (6 A-6)

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~~SECRET~~(U) Unconventional Warfare/Special Operations Forces

(U) Egypt

HQ USJUWTFCENT

AFSOB

SOW (-)

SFOB

One OP Det C

Two OP Det A

A/2-75 INF (RGR)

NSWTG

SEAL PLT

HAL-5 Det

U ~~(S)~~ Sudan

NSWTU

SOC/MCT

SF OP Det B

Two OP Det A

A/2-75 INF (RGR)

(U) Somalia

SF OP Det B

Two OP Det A

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(b)1.4(d)

(U) Overall, exercise BRIGHT STAR 83 was a successful field training exercise for all concerned. Major exercise objectives were met and a maximum of training was obtained for a minimum of dollars. The exercise had a significant impact in the Central area by demonstrating American commitment to the region's security. It also promoted acceptance of US military presence in the region, facilitated joint coordination and planning for future operations, and helped cement relationships with the countries involved. In comparison to the 1982 BRIGHT STAR exercise, BRIGHT STAR 83 was several days longer, involved a third more troops, included fleet forces from both the Mediterranean and Pacific, and saw the level of tactical flying sorties increase threefold.

~~U (S/NOFORN)~~ Exercise BLACK ROCK 84-1 was a joint and combined special operations field training exercise conducted in Kenya during October and November 1983. The exercise was

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designed to provide training in Army Special Forces and Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) skills in coordination with US Air Force special operations forces. In addition, BLACK ROCK 84-1 permitted USCENTCOM to test its command and control of a deployed special operations force, familiarized US personnel with characteristics of the exercise area, evaluated USCENTCOM standard operating procedures for special operations forces, promoted rapport with host-nation personnel, and provided for the evaluation of operations security procedures.

~~U (S/NOFORN)~~ Deployment began on 31 October with the departure from CONUS of the advance party by MAC C-141. The main body arrived early on 5 November with a portion of the force conducting a night paradrop. Follow-on exercise activities included combined US and host-nation training in paradrop operations, small unit operations, demolition, navigation, and weapons firing. Army special forces and personnel of the host-nation parachute forces concluded their training with a four-day field training exercise which began with a parachute drop from two host nation transport aircraft. Navy SEAL and host nation naval personnel wrapped up their training with a combined airborne paradrop from a MAC C-141. On 29 November, all US personnel departed for the CONUS via MAC C-141.

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(U) The following US forces participated in BLACK ROCK 84-1:

U ~~(C)~~ HQ USCENTCOM
USCENTCOM HQ Element
JCSE

(b)1.4(d)

Operations Low Level aircrews

U ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Exercise BLACK ROCK 84-1 provided unparalleled opportunities for US forces to experience another culture, work with indigenous forces, and establish rapport with host-nation personnel. Such lessons could not have been learned from any CONUS exercise. Similar, small-scale, follow-on exercises could prove invaluable to both US and host-nation forces.

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(b)(1)1.4a, c, d

~~U (S/NOFORN)~~ American forces were charged with assisting the governments of [REDACTED] (b)1.4(d)

[REDACTED] (b)1.4(d) A primary US responsibility was to provide AWACS air surveillance coverage and an intercept control capability for [REDACTED] (b)1.4(d) [REDACTED] (b)1.4(d) fighters, in addition to KC-10 air refueling and RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. This support was provided to prevent Libya's Tu-22 "Blinder" aircraft from attacking the [REDACTED] (b)1.4(d) in support of the planned coup.

~~U (S/NOFORN)~~ On 5 February, the JCS notified HQ USCENTCOM of the impending mission and tasked it to provide an initial

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(b)1.4(a), (b)1.4(c)

(b)1.4(a), (b)1.4(c)

(b)1.4(a), (b)1.4(c)

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Page 118 redacted for the following reason:

(b)1.4(a), (b)1.4(c)

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(b)(1)1.4(a),(c)

LOGISTICS

(U) Major General David E. Watts, US Army, became the USCENTCOM Director of Logistics on 16 June, replacing BG Richard E. Stephenson who had been the "plankholder" J-4 of both the RDJTF and USCENTCOM. On 1 October, when USCENTCOM assumed security assistance responsibilities for its area of responsibility, J-4 was broadened to J-4/7 and General Watts became Director of Logistics and Security Assistance.

(U) During its first year as a unified command, personnel of the directorate strove to establish liaison with component commanders and to make contacts with military personnel and

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other officials throughout USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. General Watts viewed USCENTCOM's logistics as made up of a balanced, four-phased program of host nation support, military construction, pre-positioning, and security assistance, and these contacts helped initiate efforts to create a logistics infrastructure in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. Logistics objectives were also furthered by progress in operation and concept plan development, exercises, logistics operations, systems analysis, and service program review.

~~(S)~~ (U) During 1983, J-4/7 supported three USCENTCOM contingency operations in its AOR: (1) EARLY CALL in February 1983, involving Egypt and Sudan; (2) ARID FARMER in August 1983, conducted in the Sudan; and (3) RUBBER WALL, September 1983, involving Egypt and Lebanon. The directorate provided logistics planning on short notice for these contingencies. Directorate personnel were assigned to the Crisis Action Team in the headquarters and monitored logistics support until these contingencies were over.

(U) During 1983, J-4/7 participated in four command post exercises (WINTEX 83, GALLANT KNIGHT 83, BLUE FLAG 83, and PRESSURE POINT 84), and two OCONUS field training exercises (BRIGHT STAR 83 in Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman; and SHADOW

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HAWK 83 in Jordan). GALLANT KNIGHT 83 also saw a significant increase in USCENTCOM engineering staff participation, including augmentation for the first time from the Army's 416th Engineering Command. BRIGHT STAR 83 enabled the engineering staff to visit approximately nine base facilities and military construction projects in four countries in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

(U) The Facilities Engineering Division held a conference in December to discuss military construction in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. It resulted in the initiation of engineer planning data changes to meet construction requirements, realignment of engineering forces in OPLANS, coordination of military construction planning with the Services, and initiation of theater wartime construction management planning.

(U) Several environmental protection issues surfaced during the year. When it became a unified command in January 1983, USCENTCOM assumed responsibility for conducting environmental protection planning and for preparing the necessary documentation to comply with environmental laws. Previously, environmental issues which came up during RDJTF field training exercises had been the responsibility

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of USREDCOM. A USCENCOM environmental quality regulation was published in June 1983 which provided the basis for initiation of an environmental assessment for GALLANT EAGLE 84.

(b)1.4(a), (b)1.4(c)

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(b)1.4(a), (b)1.4(c)

(U) The Atlantic Division of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command established the position of "Resident Officer in Charge of Construction--Somalia" early in 1983. A contract for approximately \$45 million was awarded in April for facilities improvements at the Berbera airfield and harbor. A second contract for facilities improvements at the Mogadishu airfield was awarded in September for approximately five million dollars.

(U) The Resident Officer in Charge of Construction--Kenya awarded the last contracts in a three-year construction program at Mombasa. The \$41 million harbor improvement project funded in fiscal years 1981 and 1982 was completed during 1983.

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(U) In May, the Government of Egypt informed the United States that it could not approve the proposed American plan to construct facilities at Ras Banas because US funding was incompatible with Egyptian political, legal, and constitutional requirements. The Egyptians indicated, however, that they intended to develop Ras Banas following the guidelines of the US master plan, although on a lesser scale and according to a longer construction schedule. This was followed by a request to the United States for assistance in technical areas, such as petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) and desalinization. DOD deleted the fiscal year 1984 request for \$96.4 million, and Congress rescinded the \$91 million program for fiscal year 1983. Following several diplomatic initiatives, technical discussions were held in September in support of a joint US-Egyptian construction program. At the end of the talks, the US agreed to construct high-tech items such as POL, desalinization, and electrical equipment, using an Egyptian contractor. The Government of Egypt agreed to construct the runway, two aprons, and taxiways in accordance with US designs and specifications. In response to Presidential tasking, the DOD submitted a supplemental request to Congress for \$55 million. The Military Construction Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, traditionally the strongest opponent of construction at Ras Banas, considered the

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supplemental request. Following testimony by expert witnesses, including LTG Kingston, it recommended \$49 million. No further action had occurred by the end of the year because of the Congressional holiday recess.

(U) In the area of engineer intelligence, a combined effort of the whole logistics directorate identified a composite list of essential elements of information for logistics. The Defense Intelligence Agency produced a prototype which was reviewed by HQ USCENTCOM and its components. These products were scheduled to come on line in 1984 and would represent a quantum jump in available data about USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

~~(S)~~ (U) In 1983, HQ USCENTCOM J-4/7 hosted two table of allowance (TA) reviews. Attendees included key representatives from HQ USAF, the Air Force Logistics Command, the Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center, HQ USCENTCOM, and Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT). The purpose of these reviews was to establish deployable field headquarters base support equipment allowances for HQ USCENTCOM and SOCCENT. As a result of these TA reviews, deployable field headquarters equipment for HQ USCENTCOM and SOCCENT was authorized in TA-140, TA-158, and TA-010. In addition, necessary funding was

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identified to provide base support equipment, to provision spares, and to maintain, store, and ship pre-positioned assets to the AOR. The Air Staff included field headquarters funding in its defense packages for fiscal years 1985 to 1989. The total value of base support equipment for HQ USCENTCOM and SOCCENT was approximately \$26 million.

~~(S)~~(U) During calendar year 1983, the Host Nation Support Branch of the logistics directorate intensified its efforts to secure agreements for facility access, pre-positioning, and fleet support. While maintaining momentum on diplomatic negotiations for agreements, the branch continued to identify and refine USCENTCOM and component host nation support requirements for USCENTCOM OPLANs.

(b)1.4(c)

(b)1.4(c)

~~(S)~~(U) Even earlier, in April, the Department of State concluded a flexible access and pre-positioning technical agreement with the Government of Sudan. The agreement provided

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a substantial amount of pre-positioning with opportunities for expansion. Technical arrangements were made in May 1983, with the first shipment arriving at Port Sudan in October. A significant amount of cooperation and support was provided by the Sudanese Armed Forces, including providing armed guards at storage sites. Additional pre-positioning shipments were scheduled for 1984 and technical negotiations were continuing to expand the entire pre-positioning program.

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(b)1.4(a), (b)1.4(c)

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(S) (U) The logistics directorate saw several mobility enhancement programs come to fruition in 1983. The KC-10 cargo/tanker aircraft was successfully deployed in an operational capacity in support of USCENTCOM OCONUS exercises and contingencies. Both MAC and SAC continued to refine and coordinate the procedures for the use of this versatile aircraft, of which SAC had 20 at the end of 1983. As SAC built its force of KC-10s toward their projected end strength of 60 in September 1987, it would continue to increase the strategic deployment capability of USCENTCOM forces. The TAKR* (formerly SL-7) conversion program was on schedule with three ships scheduled for completion in June 1984 and a fourth in November of the same year. Adequate funds were allocated to complete the entire program in fiscal years 1985 and 1986 for a total of eight ships.

(b)1.4(a), (b)1.4(c)

*(U) A TAKR was a vehicle cargo ship (AKR) belonging to the Military Sealift Command (T).

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(b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4(a), (b),(c)

(b)(2)High

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(b)1.4(a), (b)1.4(c)

(U) During 1983, the logistics directorate was reduced from 137 billets to 123. At year's end, the strength of personnel present for duty was over 103 percent. The Security Assistance Division became fully operational when USCENTCOM assumed all security assistance functions in its area of responsibility on 1 October. As discussed below, the Joint Petroleum Office established a forward liaison position located within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. This officer was based with the administrative support unit of the Middle East Force at Bahrain. A technical analysis section was established

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in the Plans Branch. The section provided direct support to planners in developing plans within the Joint Operation Plans System. Emphasis on pre-positioning was maintained with the creation of a branch for pre-positioning in the Plans and Policy Division in October. The branch was given two billets. Acquisition functions were also placed within the pre-positioning branch and additional billets were provided. These billets were filled by officers with contracting expertise. The branch was primarily responsible for hosting three joint acquisition coordinating boards during the year and some progress was made toward developing a USCENTCOM acquisition policy. Other reorganizations occurred in September with the disestablishment of the Resource Management Division and the distribution of its billets and personnel in various positions throughout the directorate. The War Reserve Branch was also disestablished and its functions were absorbed by the Operations Division. Responsibility for the Defense Regional Interservice Support Program was also transferred to J-3. A Programs Branch was created and placed in the Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5). These reorganizations resulted from continuous reassessment and reprioritizing of J-4/7's functions as USCENTCOM defined its role and mission in its unique area of responsibility. An organizational survey was conducted late in the year, and plans began for a complete overhaul of the

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logistic directorate's organization to streamline tasking and reduce duplication of effort.

(S)(U) Effective January 1983, a forward operating location of the Joint Petroleum Office was established in Bahrain and maintained to provide fuels management within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. Manned on a rotational basis by members of the USCENTCOM Joint Petroleum Office, this element resolved major quality control problems at the fuel depots at Muscat, Oman and Mombassa, Kenya. Also, progress was made in the administrative and functional aspects of the War Reserve Materiel program in terms of both requirements and stockage. Significant improvements and progress were evident in other aspects of petroleum support, including exercise objectives, day-to-day operations, and various planning initiatives. A Defense Fuel Supply Center liaison billet was established during the year and an officer reported in June.³¹

(S)(U) With transition to unified command status, the USCENTCOM logistic planning process accelerated. Logistics

31. See Chapter III below for more detail on this liaison billet.

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sections for the following concept plans were developed during the year:

(b)(1)1.4(a),(c)

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(b)1.4(a), (b)1.4(c)

~~(S)~~ (U) In the area of pre-positioning, the fourth maintenance cycle for the the near-term pre-positioning fleet, which lasted from October 1982 to May 1983,

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permitted the first cargo maintenance to be performed on two LASH ships. The Marine Corps roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships left station and proceeded to Naha, Okinawa, for combat configuration and to distribute the cargo of the Seventh Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). In June, the Army-loaned, thousand-bed Rapidly Deployable Medical Facility (RDMF) was replaced by the four 250-bed Marine Corps field hospitals which constituted the Navy's RDMF. USCENTCOM efforts to make the Army's RDMF additive to the NTPF were not approved by JCS. To relieve the pressure on facilities at Subic Bay, Philippines, particularly those regarding munitions, USPACOM surveyed a number of sites in the Western Pacific capable of performing the necessary maintenance. Three sites in Japan were found acceptable: Tengan Pier, Okinawa; Naval Magazine Sasbeo; and Army Ammunition Depot Akizuki. USCENTCOM participated in a site survey of the potential to perform NTPF cargo offloads and limited cargo maintenance in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. To assist with cost-saving efforts on Army munition enhancements, USPACOM, USCENTCOM, the Department of the Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations agreed to consolidate the munitions on two breakbulks onto a single LASH ship at Subic Bay beginning in April 1984. A detailed inventory and cost worksheets were prepared for all materiel not afloat on the NTPF and MEDNTPS. The Pre-positioning Branch

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of J-4/7 conducted a major effort to collect and collate information concerning USCENTCOM's components' pre-positioning and initiated a Master Storage Plan. USCENTCOM logistics officers made a fact-finding trip to Europe to observe USAREUR's program, known as Pre-positioned Materiel Configured in Unit Sets (POMCUS). In addition to looking at the POMCUS program, USCENTCOM also examined USAREUR's overall war reserve

(b)1.4(a), (b)1.4(c)

(U) In programs, the responsible branch continued to increase its expertise and involvement in the DOD's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. During the year, the branch completed a full PPBS cycle. Based on completing numerous program reviews, as well as participating in the cycle from the beginning, the J-4/7 Programs Branch was able to provide timely and complete analysis of logistic capabilities specified in Service programming documents. In addition, the branch was able to provide detailed support for USCINCCENT's advocacy of logistics programs before the Defense Resources Board in July and again in November. Efforts continued to ensure that the strategy developed in the Joint Strategic Planning Document and USCENTCOM's concepts of operation were transferred into programs which would achieve the desired capability. This

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effort focused on maintaining a coordinated and consistent approach among the multiple documents which comprise the PPBS. To complete the programing effort, members of the branch participated in and conducted several studies such as the Mobility Program Integration Study, the development of the Master Programming List, and the Southwest Asia Programs Improvement Study. These efforts all helped to refine USCENTCOM's requirements and supported the command advocacy needed to achieve Service funding.

(U) In the area of services, use of the new unitized B ration at BRIGHT STAR 83 by Army and Air Force units showed conclusively that unitization was an efficient, labor-saving method of providing field subsistence support. Also during BRIGHT STAR 83, the Tactical Field Exchange, a new concept for field sundries support, was extensively used by Army and Air Force units. This use demonstrated that the Tactical Field Exchange was a valid concept of sundries support for OCONUS exercises and contingencies.

~~(S)~~(U) Several preparations were necessary for USCENTCOM to assume full responsibility for security assistance in its area of the world by 1 October as scheduled. These preparations included desk officer visits to the AOR; joint USCENTCOM-

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USEUCOM-USPACOM on-the-job transition of country actions to USCENTCOM action officers; physical movement of the active country files to USCENTCOM; and acceptance of security assistance responsibility on 1 October. The first Phase IV Training conference was held in Tampa, Florida, immediately following the assumption of security assistance responsibilities in October. Staff assistance visits were conducted throughout the AOR during August and December. These visits established a working relationship among the security assistance organizations and the USCENTCOM security assistance staff. As part of its unified command responsibilities, USCENTCOM submitted the first USCINCCENT Consolidated Data Report and Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance to the JCS. As a part of the command's increased involvement in its area of responsibility, USCENTCOM fielded a Tri-Service Logistic Assistance Team and a Medical Logistic Assistance Team to Somalia. USCENTCOM also established a monthly security assistance organization activity report which provided DOD and USCENTCOM with regular reports about actions and problems that had not been previously available.

(S)(U) The refinement of the Joint Movement Center concept was practiced and evaluated during GALLANT KNIGHT 83. Exercise BRIGHT STAR 83 provided the opportunity to test the operational

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techniques further in conjunction with the Airlift Control Center. The Joint Movement Center became the doctrinally accepted method of operation for the management of intratheater movement assets in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. This concept was also being formalized in USREDCOM Pamphlet 525-X, "Operational Concept for Joint Movement Center."

~~(S)~~ (U) One of USCENTCOM's most pressing logistical needs when operating in its area of responsibility was potable water. Much of USCENTCOM's theater of operations was desert. In some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, no surface water was to be found, so that US forces deploying to the area of responsibility had to supply their own water. The USCENTCOM concept of operations for water support was further refined as a new family of water support equipment was delivered and placed into operational project stocks in CONUS depots. BRIGHT STAR 83 provided successful field testing and evaluation of the 600 gallon-per-hour reverse osmosis water production unit (ROWPU), 40,000-gallon storage and distribution system, forward area water point supply system, semitrailer mounted fabric tank, and small mobile water chiller. A joint water data collection team collected consumption data which basically validated the DOD planning factor of 20 gallons per individual per day. Actual consumption ranged from 13.0 to 16.0 gallons

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per individual per day. The rest of the estimated 20 gallons per individual per day would have been consumed in wartime because of requirements for construction, graves registration, medical use, and aircraft washing. Following the combined efforts of USCENTCOM, the Army, and the Navy, an interim, 150,000-gallon-per-day LASH ROWPU barge was assembled and pre-positioned on the NTPF in December.

(S)(U) At the end of 1983, USCENTCOM had 94 water overlays on hand and another 153 on order for fiscal years 1984 and 1985. A new format which was to be compatible with the digital data base of the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) was coordinated with DMA and the Engineering Topographic Laboratory. The 153 water overlays already in the production cycle were to be put in the new format.

(S)(U) Requirements were established for a well drilling system to be procured for USCENTCOM. The system would consist of a well drilling truck, a tender vehicle, and one well completion kit. The total system was to be air transportable on either two C-130s or two C-141s. Approximately 50 additional well completion kits were to be purchased for this system. The logistics directorate assigned responsibility for developing a training program for the new equipment and scheduled a proposal for June 1985.

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Figure 11. J-5 Manning

1983

Plans, Policy, and Program Directorate	3 Officer/3-Enlisted
- Administrative Office	3-Enlisted
Plans Division	1-Officer
- Administrative Office	2-Enlisted
- Contingency Plans Branch	5-Officer
- Long Range Plans Branch	5-Officer
- Time Phased Force Deployment Data Development Branch	3-Officer/2-Enlisted
Politico-Military Division	1-Officer
- Administrative Office	2-Enlisted
- Near East Branch	3-Officer
- Africa Branch	3-Officer
- South Asia Branch	3-Officer *
- Civil Affairs Branch	1-Officer
Policy/Strategy Division	1-Officer
- Administrative Office	2-Enlisted
- Policy Branch	4-Officer
- Strategy Branch	3-Officer
Programs Division	1-Officer
- Administrative Office	2-Enlisted
- Programs Branch	<u>5-Officer</u>

Total: 58 42 Officer, 16 Enlisted

* One officer is permanently assigned to the POLAD.

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PLANS, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS

(U) During 1983, the primary focus of the J-5 was to provide the plans, policies, and programs required of a unified command. In the area of directorate manning, the approved Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) of 1 April 1982 provided 73 manpower spaces for J-5. The approved 16 August 1983 JTD for fiscal years 1985 and 1986 reduced J-5's manpower to 59. Additionally, J-5 transferred a billet to the Provost Marshal's office and another officer, while carried on the J-5 manning document, was permanently assigned to the command's Political Advisor (POLAD), a foreign service officer on loan from the State Department. The net result was a reduction of J-5 manning in 1983 by 22 percent.

(U) Another event which significantly affected J-5 manpower requirements was the disestablishment of the Washington Liaison Office on 30 September 1983. This office had provided coordination and liaison with OSD, JCS, and the military Services for the J-5 Policy and Strategy Division. It had concerned itself with matters of military posture, defense policy, the unified command plan and arrangements, joint strategic capabilities, and strategic studies and analysis.

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Figure 12. J-5 Key Personnel

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>TENURE</u>
Commodore J. M. Gleim, US Navy	Director, Plans, Policy and Programs (CCJ5)	Jan-Dec
Colonel (b)(6) US Air Force	Deputy Director	Jan-Dec
Colonel (b)(6) US Army	Chief of Plans	Jan-Nov
Colonel (b)(6) US Army	Chief of Plans	Dec
Colonel (b)(6) US Army	Chief of Politico- Military Division	Jan-Dec
Colonel (b)(6) US Marine Corps	Chief of Policy/ Strategy Division	Jan-Dec
Colonel (b)(6) US Air Force	Chief of Programs Division	Jan-Dec

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These functional activities had to be picked up by the J-5 with no compensatory manning. The manning level for the directorate remained at 58 billets, with full authorized strength accomplished at the beginning of unified command status. The personnel in each division were as shown in Figure 11 on page 126. J-5 key personnel were shown in Figure 12 on the facing page.

(U) The Plans, Policy, and Programs Directorate consisted of four divisions: Plans, Policy/Strategy, Political-Military, and Programs. A detailed description of each division and their tasks follows.

(U) The Plans Division was responsible for preparing, coordinating, and maintaining operations and concept plans in accordance with the Joint Operations Planning System. It also developed strategies and concepts of operations to support operational planning. The Plans Division was further divided into three branches. The Contingency Plans Branch prepared operational plans and concept plans, assisted in the preparation of operation orders, reviewed supporting plans written by components, supporting commands, and agencies, and provided liaison to components and supporting headquarters when deployed. The Long Range Plans/Analysis Branch prepared operation plans and concept plans, monitored the JCS Joint

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Exercise Program to ensure that exercises were consistent with OPLANs, and developed techniques, strategy, and concepts of operations for joint deployment, employment, and redeployment of forces. The TPFDD Development Branch prepared, reviewed, and coordinated TPFDD data to support OPLANs. It reviewed component deployment data, developed force flow projections, and structured forces for deployment, support, and redeployment. This branch also coordinated with the Joint Deployment Agency on TPFDD development and refinement.

(U) The J-5 Political-Military Division was the focal point for interaction with the Department of State through the Department of Defense, in dealing with friendly foreign countries. In order to provide the commander with timely and sound political-military assessments, the division was organized into functional branches in which officers with area expertise closely monitor developments within a defined geographical area. In its role of monitoring the international relations aspects of USCENTCOM policies and actions, the division continuously worked to ensure that the headquarters was educated on the political sensitivities of its area of responsibility. The division also was responsible for civil affairs planning. This was accomplished by periodic augmentation by US Army reservists from the 352d Civil Affairs

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Command, Riverdale, Maryland. This division was divided into four branches: The Near East Branch prepared political-military assessments of Near-East countries within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. The Africa Branch prepared political-military assessments of African countries in the AOR. The South Asia Branch prepared political-military assessments of South Asian countries in the AOR. The Civil Affairs Branch was responsible for plans and policy relating to the conduct of civil affairs operations in support of USCENTCOM's operational plans.

(U) The Policy/Strategy Division was responsible for matters relating to command policy, missions, functions, responsibilities, requirements, and doctrine development, including crisis planning and assessment of actions taken by the National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. The division provided the USCINCCENT with trip preparation books, policy review, and all other matters relating to J-5 functions.

(U) The Policy Branch advised the USCINCCENT on policy matters and acted as a point of contact for development of terms of reference. This branch prepared, reviewed, and coordinated selected reports relating to national policy for

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Southwest Asia as it applied to USCENTCOM. It reviewed and commented on policy guidance for contingency planning and policy issues in the Defense Planning Guide and prepared USCINCCENT's inputs to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

(U) The Strategy Branch advised the USCINCCENT and served as the point of contact for command strategy matters. This branch prepared, reviewed, and coordinated selected reports relative to national and US military strategy for Southwest Asia. It developed Command Arrangement Agreements, Memoranda of Agreement, and Memoranda of Understanding with other unified and specified commands. It was responsible for the development and monitoring of command relationships and rules of engagement for USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. It also prepared the USCINCCENT's quarterly report to the Secretary of Defense and speeches for command representatives as required.

(U) The Programs Division monitored and coordinated all aspects of the DOD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System for USCINCCENT and was integrally involved with the unified command PPBS system and all of USCENTCOM's programmatic requirements. The Programs Division coordinated and developed all PPBS planning and programming matters in support

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of USCINCCENT. Its major actions included: (1) preparing USCINCCENT for presentations to the Defense Resources Board (DRB); (2) coordinating USCENTCOM interaction in the POM cycle by providing guidance to components for program development and prioritization; (3) submitting USCENTCOM's POM to the Air Staff and advocating USCENTCOM programs in the Air Staff Board Structure; (4) providing command inputs to the Joint Strategic Planning Document and Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA), Defense Guidance, Joint Program Assessment Memorandum, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Program Issue Books; and (5) developing USCENTCOM Master Objectives and Master Programs Lists.

U ~~(C)~~ The Plans Division directed its efforts during the year toward an overall theater-level look at the command's area of responsibility and focused on anticipating possible threats. Plans were developed to improve the United States' ability to assist friendly regional states in their own defense. Also developed were plans to perform missions other than combat, such as noncombatant evacuation and humanitarian activities. A broader range of planning enhanced America's ability to respond to events and low-intensity conflicts in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. By improving US ability to respond to events,

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planning also increased US credibility in that part of the world. The thrust of USCENTCOM's planning continued to emphasize the prevention of conflict by deterrence and the provision of military assistance. USCENTCOM J-5 continued to work closely with USCENTCOM's components, Military Airlift Command, and the Military Sealift Command to refine its deployment and employment capabilities to respond to the spectrum of potential threats in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

U ~~(S)~~ During the year, J-5 worked on the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans for both fiscal years 1983 and 1984. Specific planning actions were discussed in the following paragraphs.

U ~~(S)~~ The Phase II TPFDD conference for OPLAN 1002-82 was held from 3 January to 4 February. The OPLAN was submitted to JCS for approval on 30 April, but an inordinate delay was caused by a Marine command relationship issue. The plan was approved on 10 November. This satisfied the JSCP tasking for fiscal year 1983 and the plan was to be updated in fiscal year 1984.

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~~U (S)~~ OPLAN 1003-82 was submitted to JCS on 30 July 1982; it was approved for continued planning on 23 June 1983. Change 1, incorporating JCS comments, was published on 1 September 1983.

~~U (S)~~ OPLAN 1004 was submitted to JCS for review in November 1982. On 15 March, JCS approved 1004-82 for continued planning because of several unresolved logistic issues. Work began immediately to update fiscal year 1984 tasking and to resolve the logistics issues. A pre-TPFDD conference was held at MacDill AFB on 19 August. The Phase I TPFDD conference was hosted by JDA from 5 to 16 December, while the Phase II TPFDD conference was scheduled for May 1984 with a target date of 31 August 1984 for resubmission of the plan to JCS.

~~U (S)~~ CONPLAN 1005 was submitted to JCS on 30 July 1982, and approved on 28 February 1983. JCS comments were incorporated in change 1, which was published in April 1983. Work continued through 1983 to update the plan to 1984 planning factors, with a tentative milestone of March 1984 for submission to JCS.

~~U (S)~~ A new planning task in Volume I of the fiscal year 1984 JSCP, CONPLAN 1006 was developed late in 1983. USCINCENT

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approved the plan in December; the expected submission date to JCS was 31 January 1984. The plan provided for assistance to Somalia to counter a regional threat which did not emanate from the Soviet Union.

U ~~(S)~~ Another new planning task in Volume I of the fiscal year 1984 JSCP, CONPLAN 1007, was similar in strategy and concept of operations to CONPLAN 1006. Parallel work on plan development in 1983 tracked with CONPLAN 1006; the tentative submission date to JCS was March 1984. This plan provided for

(b)1.4(a), (b)1.4(c)

U ~~(S)~~ CONPLAN 1010 was a new plan, tasked by the JSCP for fiscal year 1984. It was in the concept development phase of deliberate planning during the last three months of 1983 and provided for the redeployment of US forces within or from USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

U ~~(S)~~ Tasked as a new plan by the fiscal year 1984 JSCP,

(b)1.4(a), (b)1.4(c)

in the concept development phase at the end of 1983, with a Phase I TPFDD conference scheduled for 25 to 29 June 1984.

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U ~~(S)~~ OPLAN 1100 was submitted to JCS in January 1983. It was approved by the JCS as a CONPLAN in March 1983. The plan

(b)1.4(a)

area of responsibility. Extensive coordination with regional embassies and USCENTCOM components continued during 1983.

U ~~(S)~~ CONPLAN 1101 provided options

(b)1.4(a)

(b)1.4(a)

and was submitted to JCS on 16 June. It was approved by the JCS on 15 September.

U ~~(S)~~ CONPLAN 1102 was developed in coordination with

(b)1.4(a)

within the AOR. The plan was submitted to JCS in December 1983 with approval expected in early 1984.

(U) PLAN 1200 was tasked in the fiscal year 1984 JSCP. It was under concept development during the latter portion of 1983. Submission to JCS was expected in March 1984. The plan

(b)1.4(a)

AOR.

(U) PLAN 1220 was developed and submitted to JCS in May.

(b)1.4(a)

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U ~~(S)~~ Contingency Plan 1-83

(b)1.4(a), (b)1.4(c)

combined actions to counter a threat to the Straits of Hormuz. Originally conceived by USCINCPAC, the plan became a USCENTCOM action in June 1983. JCS approved the plan in July with US and (b)1.4(c), (b)1.4(a) final agreement occurring in late August. The Commander, Middle East Force (COMIDEASTFOR) represented USCENTCOM and the United States government during the ceremonies held in August.

U ~~(S)~~ In addition to the many plans tasked by the 1983 and 1984 JSCPs, USCENTCOM, in coordination with the JCS, began preliminary planning to

(b)1.4(a)

(b)1.4(a)

(b)1.4(a) Initial assessment actions began in August with a continued effort through the end of the year. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for fiscal year 1985, Volume I, was expected to task USCENTCOM to develop the plan within the deliberate planning system.

U ~~(S)~~ Six compartmented plans or projects continued to be worked in the Plans Division. Strategy, Command Objectives, Representative Operational and Logistical Concepts (1989) was started as a project in late 1982, and involved the Plans Division during 1983. This document was a first attempt to develop a longer range support planning. Utilizing the

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strategy and force goals of the Defense Guidance for fiscal years 1985 to 1989, concepts of operations and logistical support were developed to assist the command and its components to define what their requirements for force, facilities, and resources would be in 1989. Four representative and geographically diverse scenarios were used to help define different levels of conflict within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. The document was published on 7 September and briefed to the JCS on 28 October. Because of the iterative nature of the document, it was to continue as a project in 1984 while guidance and priorities were being refined. After submission to JCS, work began on a Master Programming List to quantify, prioritize, and integrate component requirements to support the concepts. The Master Programming List was scheduled to be submitted to JCS and the Services early in 1984.

~~U (S/NOFORN)~~ During January, one J-5 planner assisted the Office of the Secretary of Defense in negotiations with the

(b)1.4(a), (b)1.4(c)

Two exchange visits between USCENTCOM and British military planners also occurred during the year. Discussions centered on Southwest Asia issues, threats, and capabilities. Further discussions were planned for 1984.

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(U) Throughout 1983, the Political-Military Division continued to monitor the international relations aspects of command policies and actions. This was especially critical as USCENTCOM began its first year as a unified command, having completed the transition from the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. With expanded command responsibilities within the region, attention to political sensitivities and the importance of a prudent, measured approach to issues in the AOR became even more significant in 1983 than they had been during the transition year of 1982. It was in this area that the division focused its energies during 1983, further refining and integrating the overall goals and objectives of the command. Concomitant with this was the development of a multinational strategy in synchronization with key USCINCCENT documents, strategic assessments, and concepts of operations. Coordination of routine and daily actions with other national agencies, development and coordination of a viable regional travel and visit program, allied cooperation, and command information and education were other areas in which the division concentrated its efforts.

(U) As a step in providing the strategic and operational direction for USCENTCOM, a draft multinational strategy was developed to set forth USCINCCENT's goals and objectives for

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the countries in his area of responsibility. These command goals and objectives, woven into overall national policy, would serve as USCENTCOM's primary guidance in developing initiatives, actions, plans, and programs in its relations with individual countries and with the region as a whole over the mid-and long-term periods.* Annexes were completed for each country in the AOR. These annexes were submitted to JCS as a portion of the USCENTCOM input to National Security Decision Directive 99 and were favorably received by the Washington community, including the DOD, JCS, and State Department.

(U) In its role as the focal point for interaction with the Department of State, the Political-Military Division initiated a formalized program of scheduled quarterly visits to Washington, DC, for each of its regionally-oriented desk officers. This program ensured that each desk or action officer maintained a face-to-face relationship with his or her counterparts at the State Department, as well as within DOD and JCS.

~~U (S)~~ The division functioned as the OPR for five major USCINCENT trips in 1983. Preparing for and executing this travel involved developing itineraries and agendas, tasking

*(U) Mid-term was defined as 1985-1989; long-term as 1990-1995.

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the staff for contributions, building a trip book, and accompanying USCINCCENT as a member of the official party. The first trip, held from 18 to 22 February, was to Cairo, Egypt, where the USCINCCENT and key staff attended meetings of the US-Egyptian Military Coordinating Committee. From 26 to 29 May, a trip was arranged to Italy and to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan from 29 May to 2 June. In Italy, USCINCCENT met with members of the Italian General Staff and the Director of the MFO, while a USCENTCOM political-military officer briefed the Italian General Staff on USCENTCOM's mission and functions. In Jordan, meetings were held with members of the Jordanian Armed Forces General Staff and with His Majesty, King Husayn. In September, as the US government representative to the National Day celebration, General Kingston travelled to the Yemen Arab Republic via Brussels, Belgium. In Brussels from 21 to 23 September, USCINCCENT addressed the NATO Defense Planning Council. In November, in conjunction with Exercise BLACK ROCK 83, a trip was developed to Kenya, where USCINCCENT met with Kenyan officials and visited the exercise sites. From 16 to 21 December, General Kingston travelled to Saudi Arabia. This trip to a key regional state was a major milestone in the development of interpersonal relationships within the AOR. Meetings were held at the ministerial level and with the leadership of the Saudi Arabian armed forces.

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(U) Division officers provided political-military expertise to the USCENTCOM staff for the BRIGHT STAR, GALLANT KNIGHT, and PROUD PROPHET exercises in 1983. Major contributions, both in the development of exercise objectives and during the play of the exercises came from the Civil Affairs Branch of the Political-Military Division.

(U) In the latter part of the year, an effort was begun to explore and document the possibilities of allied cooperation to offset shortfalls within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. Recognizing that some allied countries conduct operations in the USCENTCOM AOR and that Congressional pressure for increased allied burden sharing was not going to diminish, development of a plan to obtain this cooperation seemed a logical step to take. Therefore, it was decided to incorporate country strategies for obtaining allied cooperation into the USCENTCOM planning process. Each country strategy included objectives, capabilities, and a plan for increasing the contributions of each country identified. Military-to-military talks with Great Britain and France were scheduled for early 1984 to provide momentum for this effort.

(U) To provide the USCENTCOM Command Group with a single source document for unclassified data on the countries of the

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AOR, the division produced "Country Books." These books contained an overview of the history, people, military, and various geopolitical aspects of the individual countries. Country Books for all 19 countries were completed in 1983 and would be revised and updated periodically.

(U) Action was initiated in the fall of 1983 to develop a USCENTCOM Expanded Relations Program. This program was designed to nurture military-to-military relations among USCENTCOM, its components, and the military of host nations whose support was needed during wartime. A Political-Military Division team travelled to Hawaii to meet with the staff of the United States Western Command (WESTCOM) to study the techniques and content of the WESTCOM Expanded Relations Program. After assessing the WESTCOM program, it was decided to assess the capabilities and resources of USCENTCOM's components to support an Expanded Relations Program and to develop a concept, concept briefs, and a draft directive for coordination and approval. These actions were to be completed in 1984.

(U) The major problem experienced by the Political-Military division in 1983 was manning. Projected action officer manning for the division was 17; actual manning was 10. Including the loss of the political-military billets from the

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closing of the Washington Liaison Office, the number of total USCENTCOM political-military officers decreased by 52 percent during 1983. Exacerbating the problem was the loss of one of the ten officers assigned to the division to work as the military assistant to the POLAD, and the lack of interservice expertise due to the lack of US Navy foreign area specialists. The division was supposed to function as a reserve of personnel with area experience and expertise. They were available to accomplish long-range analytical studies and to advise command decision-makers of political-military realities. Reductions in manning made the division fall increasingly behind in its long-range work. The division was thus left in the position of reacting instead of anticipating and providing timely, in-depth analytical assessments.

(U) During 1983 the Policy Branch again provided primary staff support for the USCINCCENT commanders' conference conducted at Headquarters USCENTCOM. Conference attendees were: LTG Livsey, Commander of USARCENT; Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Piotrowski, Commander of USCENAF; MajGen Cheatham, Commanding General of I MAF; Commodore Newman, Commander of USNAVCENT; and BG Lutz, Commander of the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force.

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Figure 13. J-5 Speeches

<u>Representative</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Audience/Location</u>
(U) Commodore Gleim	15 April	Naval War College students
(U) Col (b)(6)	12 May	Chief of Moroccan Air Force
(U) LTC (b)(6)	2 June	Foreign Minister of Djibouti
(U) Commodore Gleim	20 July	US Navy League, Ashville, North Carolina
(U) Commodore Gleim	4 October	Conference on Amphibious Force Capabilities; Washington, DC
(U) Lt Col (b)(6)	28 October	JCS brief on USCENTCOM Concept of Operations; Washington, DC
(U) Lt Col (b)(6)	8 November	US Military Academy
(U) Maj Gen Taylor	12 November	Conference on Gulf Security, Charleston, South Carolina
U ~~(S)~~ Commodore Gleim	14 December	GCC States on Iranian threat*

U * ~~(S)~~ On 14 December, a military team led by the J-5 briefed

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(U) The USCINCCENT's participation in the Commander in Chiefs Conference sponsored by the Chairman of the JCS was also supported during the period 15 to 17 March at Headquarters USREDCOM. Primary staff support for USCINCCENT's trip to Hawaii for the USNAVCENT change of command, 18 to 21 January, was provided by the Policy Branch.

(U) During 1983, efforts were intensified in the Strategy Branch to establish relationships and responsibilities between USCENTCOM and the other unified commands by promulgating the following three Command Arrangement Agreements and one Memorandum of Understanding:

- U ~~(S)~~ Command Arrangement Agreement between USCINCEUR and USCINCCENT was signed on 17 January.
- U ~~(S)~~ Command Arrangement Agreement between USCINCPAC and USCINCCENT was signed on 3 May.
- U ~~(S)~~ Command Arrangement Agreement between USCINCPAC and USCINCCENT was signed on 30 December.
- U ~~(S)~~ Memorandum of Understanding between USCINCEUR and USCINCCENT was signed on 3 May.

(U) In addition to providing inputs for the USCINCCENT's speeches, the branch also provided speeches and accompanying slides for command representatives as listed in Figure 13 on the facing page.

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(U) During January and February, the first USCENTCOM POM was presented to the appropriate Air Staff panels and committees. At that time, the Air Force had not yet been identified as administrative agent for the command, so headquarters programs were placed in the unfunded addendum of the Air Force POM. The Programs Division was the OPR for seeking identification and establishment of an administrative agent to be responsible for administrative and logistic support of Headquarters USCENTCOM, whether in garrison, forward, or deployed, and for joint subordinate commands established by USCINCCENT. This task required extensive interface with the Air Staff, the Office of the JCS, and OSD. On 2 October, the Secretary of Defense designated the Air Force as administrative agent, allowing USCENTCOM full participation in the fiscal year 1985 and subsequent POMs. Immediate results were the funding of six of seven USCENTCOM programs in the fiscal year 1985 Presidential budget.

(U) The division was OPR for the visit of Representative Ike Skelton (Democrat, Missouri) on 17 January. Mr. Skelton, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, was given an overview of the command and its mission. In January and February, the division developed and presented a USCENTCOM briefing to allied students attending the Air War College and

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the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Work was started in January on the development of the Joint Strategic Planning Document and Supporting Analysis for fiscal years 1986 to 1993; the final input was sent to JCS on 20 April. In February, work began on the Command's initial Master Objectives List, a summary of all military programs required to support USCENTCOM. The Master Objectives List was published and distributed on 12 October. Also, work was initiated on formulating an input to the JCS Joint Program Assessment Memorandum, an assessment of the Service POMs, with the final reply sent in May. The Programs Division was OPR for the visit of Deputy Secretary of Defense Thayer to USCENTCOM on 25 February. In March, the Programs Division prepared General Kingston for his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Sub-committee on Sea Power and Force Projection. In June, USCENTCOM provided comments on unresolved POM issues in the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Program Issue Books, which were preparatory DRB deliberations on the service POMs for fiscal year 1985. Actions beginning in May culminated with USCINCCENT's 13 July presentation to the DRB, where he advocated programs critical to USCENTCOM. Just prior to the DRB, the Programs Division functioned as trip coordinator for the USCINCCENT's trip to London and Bahrain. During August, the Programs Division participated in exercise BRIGHT STAR 83.

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Also, development of the fiscal year 1986 to 1990 Defense Guidance began, including written comments on the draft document, culminating with USCINCCENT's 2 November presentation to the DRB on substantive issues in the Defense Guidance. After three months of staff action, the first draft of the fiscal year 1986 USCENTCOM POM was published on 2 December. In November, the division took a lead role in developing the USCINCCENT Master Programming List, a comprehensive compilation of the programmatic requirements for USCENTCOM forces through fiscal year 1990.

COMMAND AND CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS (C⁴S)

(U) The J-6 directorate had overall staff responsibility for the development of communications-electronics and ADP policies, plans, budgets, and programs for USCENTCOM. The directorate ensured C³ support for the command; supervised the development, acquisition, and operation of communications and computer facilities and equipment; served as the USCENTCOM focal point for WWMCCS matters; and was responsible for coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense

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
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Communications Agency, and the National Command Authorities for technical matters during peacetime and for supervision and implementation of those agencies' management policies during contingencies or war. In June, the directorate was reorganized into three divisions as shown in Figure 14 on the facing page.

(U) The Joint Manpower Program for fiscal years 1983 and 1984 was approved on 15 March 1983. Under this JMP, the J-6 was authorized a staff of 46 officers and 73 enlisted personnel. In June 1983, the J-6 was reorganized. Under this reorganization, the number of branches within the two communications divisions was reduced and responsibility for functional areas was realigned. This reorganization was briefed to the USCINCCENT, who approved the implementation of the revised organization prior to submission of the JMP for fiscal years 1985 and 1986 to the JCS on 30 September. In addition to the reorganization of the two communications divisions, the JMP contained an additional 21 manpower spaces approved by USCINCCENT to support programmed growth of computer services within the headquarters. The 21 manpower spaces requested in this JMP represented a growth in headquarters manning; that is, no compensatory billets were deleted from other staff activities. Also under this JMP, the

Figure 14. J-6 Organization



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Computer Systems Division was divided into a small group of staff planners and a 76-person separate computer support organization. This separate organization contained all functions which came under the heading of operations and maintenance. The function and organization of each division was as described below.

(U) The Current Plans and Operations Division was responsible for communications planning in support of OPORDs and OPLANS, contingency operations, exercises, disaster relief, relocation, and evacuation plans. The division also managed existing communication systems, both at Headquarters USCENTCOM at MacDill AFB, Florida, and those in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. The Current Plans and Operations Division was the OPR for COMSEC, TEMPEST, telephone directories, requests for changes to existing communications, and radio frequency matters. The division was also responsible for developing procedures and organizing a Joint Communications Control Center to manage theater communications systems in exercises and operations. The division also monitored the unit readiness of signal units assigned to USCENTCOM for planning to assess their ability to implement the command's OPLANS. The Current Plans and Operations Division was divided into four branches: the Plans and Operations Branch, the Mission Support Branch, the COMSEC Management Branch, and the Administrative Support Branch.

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(U) The Future Plans and Programs Division provided policy guidance and direction regarding communications requirements definition, planning, programming, and funding; coordinated the headquarters C³ participation in the PPBS; monitored PPBS actions; and was the OPR for the USCINCCENT's C² Initiative Fund. The division also identified theater-unique requirements for integration into the worldwide command and control architecture, reviewed and coordinated command and control program studies and analyses of the headquarters and Service components, participated in telecommunications system configuration management during the planning cycle to ensure interoperability with existing systems, and served as USCENTCOM focal point for all future communications enhancements. Based on recognized limitations, and in conjunction with users, the division developed statements of requirements for new communications systems and developed communications systems concept plans for the enhancement of theater telecommunications systems (fixed and tactical), networks, and facilities. It also identified communications shortfalls and limitations in existing plans and defined the communications capabilities needed to support future concepts of operation. The division was the OPR for all C⁴S programming matters, coordinated with component commands on C⁴S programming, planning, and requirements, coordinated supporting signal unit planning and programming, and developed and managed the J-6

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budget. The Future Plans and Programs Division consisted of three branches. These were the Requirements and PPBS Branch, Programs Management and System Integration Branch, and the Administrative Support Branch.

(U) The Computer Systems Division directed, monitored, and controlled the USCENTCOM ADP program; formulated and directed implementation of policies, concepts, and procedures to ensure effective and efficient use of command ADP resources, and was responsible for the planning, programming, budgeting, acquisition, systems engineering, cost effectiveness, interoperability, tactical architecture, security, and integration of USCENTCOM fixed and tactical command, control, and special purpose ADP systems. The division furnished technical assistance to J-2 for the planning, programming, budgeting, acquisition, and systems integration of USCENTCOM intelligence ADP systems. The division also established, implemented, and managed the development and implementation of approved ADP programs and projects; directed the installation, testing, evaluation, operation, and maintenance of USCENTCOM ADP systems; developed, reviewed, and justified command ADP budget estimates; and advised USCINCCENT and staff elements to ensure effective planning, implementation, and operation of USCENTCOM ADP systems. The chief of the Computer Systems Division served as the official "Designated Approving

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Authority" as directed by DOD Directive 5100.40 to approve USCENTCOM ADP systems for the processing, use, storage, and production of classified material; was responsible for career progression counseling of all assigned ADP personnel; managed and initiated necessary changes to joint manning documents relative to data automation; and managed ADP training for USCENTCOM. The division consisted of four branches. These were the ADP Plans and Programs Branch, Software Design, Development, and Maintenance Branch; Computer Operations Branch, and the Administrative Support Branch.

~~U (S)~~ The J-6 directorate participated in one contingency during the year. (b)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a)(b)(c)

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(b)1.4(a)

U ~~(C)~~ Significant findings which resulted from

(b)1.4(a)

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developed an internal supplement to the Crisis Action Team standing operating procedure that provided guidance for those communications and data processing personnel who remained behind

(b)1.4(a)

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(b)1.4(a)

were incorporated into two exercises held during the year, GALLANT KNIGHT 83 and BRIGHT STAR 83, and in two other contingencies, ARID FARMER and RUBBER WALL.

~~U (C)~~ Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 83 was a major command post exercise held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in March. This exercise provided the J-6 staff with the opportunity to exercise theater communications management by the Joint Communications Control Center. It provided an opportunity for newer members of the staff to get acquainted with frequency management, telecommunications circuit requests, and joint systems management. The exercise included a demonstration of meteor burst communications equipment which had been borrowed from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The USCENCOM terminal operated as a station in a FEMA test. The Computer Systems Division deployed and provided operational, maintenance, and software support for the WWMCCS Level 6 system and the Deployable Intelligence Data Handling System. Also during exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 83, a Joint Analysis Cell was set up by J-6. This cell served as the collection point information gained from the conventional monitoring efforts of USCENCOM's components. This information was "pooled" together into one joint overall product, in addition to the normal reporting flow of the information to the respective supported headquarters. The

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was the third and most complex in the BRIGHT STAR series. The communications systems employed during exercise BRIGHT STAR 83 paralleled those found in USCENTCOM contingency plans. A mixture of transmission media, including UHF and super high frequency (SHF) satellite, high frequency (HF), and terrestrial systems, was used to maximize reliability and survivability. USCENTCOM controlled the joint communications systems to higher and component headquarters, while each component was responsible for internal communication with its deployed forces. The forward headquarters elements of USCENTCOM, SOCCENT, and USNAVCENT at Cairo West were supported by the JCSE. USARCENT at Cairo West was supported by units of the 11th and 35th Signal Brigades, while USCENAF, also at Cairo West, was supported by the 5th Combat Communications Group. At Berbera, Somalia, portions of the 8th and 9th Communications Battalions constituted the primary forward communications support elements of the First Marine Amphibious Force, with JCSE providing UHF and SHF satellite assets. JCSE also deployed UHF satellite teams to the American embassies at Mogadishu, Somalia; Khartoum, Sudan; Muscat, Oman; and Cairo, Egypt. Organic UHF satellite and HF communications supporting naval forces afloat were also used throughout the exercise.

U (S) Lift constraints for exercise BRIGHT STAR 83 required that some communications systems and services be reduced or

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eliminated altogether. For example, the planned USCENTAF communications support package for operations at Thumrait, Oman, was reduced to a UHF satellite single-channel secure voice capability. In other cases, communications resources were shared by several collocated headquarters. At Cairo West, the USARCENT telephone switchboard was used by both the Army and Air Force, and the USCENTAF SHF satellite was shared by Army and Air Force subscribers. The resulting lack of depth and flexibility created an increased risk to command and control communications. Fortunately, the risk was substantially reduced by the high operational rates experienced on most of the communications systems.

(U) Automatic data processing equipment deployed in support of exercise BRIGHT STAR 83 included the WWMCCS Level 6 system, the DIDHS, and one Cromemco System II microcomputer workstation. Operational, maintenance, and software support was also provided. Circuits over two different satellites facilitated dual host entry of the Level 6 to USREDCOM and USEUCOM. The USAREUR Force and Supply Tracking (FAST) program was installed on the Level 6 system and evaluated during the exercise. This program was used to track forces and supplies from the point of debarkation to individual areas of responsibility. Both J-3 and J-5 evaluated the system and found that it did not perform as desired. Evaluation of the system was to continue in 1984.

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(U) Extensive work was done during BRIGHT STAR 83 to interface US telephone systems with Egyptian cable and dial central office systems. This permitted the US to access the host nation military and commercial telephone systems, while allowing the Egyptians to enter the US tactical telephone network.

~~U (S/NOFORN)~~ There were several significant findings from exercise BRIGHT STAR 83. In general, they reiterated the need for an in-place communications capability in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. As an example, USARCENT switches and subscribers were in place several days before the arrival of the USCENAF satellite terminal that would ultimately provide USARCENT's connectivity to the DCS. An in-place satellite capability would assure out-of-country connectivity to each component as it arrived. Further, once communications terminals arrived, there were delays in getting the systems on the air. These delays could have been avoided by an in-place system, which would have been operationally ready to support the user as soon as he arrived. In actual contingencies, this initial period was the critical time when positive, responsive communications were most required. A second finding was that the initial exercise communications capability between the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) Cairo and Cairo West (UHF satellite secure

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voice) was inadequate to support the USCENCOM liaison team operating at the OMC complex. Because of extensive interference, the satellite was ineffectual for an extended period. Compounding this problem was the availability of only one AUTOVON line into the OMC and the establishment of a real-world planning cell at that location. Thirdly, the deployment timing of mutually supporting communications systems needed to be more closely managed. As mentioned earlier, some sharing of communications resources was necessary during exercise BRIGHT STAR 83. There were problems with the arrival and activation times of certain shared communications assets which affected the availability and timeliness of associated services.

U ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ At the conclusion of exercise BRIGHT STAR 83, a small USCENCOM cell was formed to assist in the coordination of logistics for

(b)(1)1.4(a)(b)(c)

(b)(1)1.4(a)(b)(c)

Army. USCENCOM's J-4 formed the nucleus of the USCENCOM cell, and two J-6 representatives coordinated communications and ADP support for the cell. This support consisted of SHF and UHF satellite terminals, telephones, and a visual information processor/multiple interface unit (VIP/MIU) for WWMCCS information net connectivity. A successful WWMCCS teleconference was maintained between the deployed operation location and the

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USCENTCOM operations center for the duration of the operation. Conveniently, all of the equipment was already in place from exercise BRIGHT STAR 83.

(U) USCENTCOM Headquarters C3 capabilities were enhanced during the year. Reuters and Associated Press News terminals were relocated from Building 1105 (the "Mole Hole") to the new headquarters in Building 540 at MacDill AFB. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service was activated on 7 February. Electrospace Systems, Inc., was awarded a five-year contract on 11 January to install a secure digital switch for USCENTCOM. The switch would be useable as a secure intercom by February 1984, with interface into the AUTOSEVOCOM network to be established in March. The Emergency Action Center console system was activated to support key USCENTCOM command and control functions, and an intrabase radio system was established in April. The intrabase radio system included the new privacy features of the digital encrypted (non-secure) system. The system consisted of a base station, 15 hand-held portable transceivers, and a repeater installed in eastern Tampa.

(U) The following six USCENTCOM ROC documents were validated by JCS during the year: (1) ROC 2-82, "Anti-Jam UHF Satellite Communications Capability," was partially validated on

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12 April. This capability would provide for a limited anti-jam capability in the Indian Ocean UHF Satellite Footprint. (2) ROC 3-82, "Southwest Asia Communications Infrastructure" was validated as a concept on 1 July. This ROC detailed the requirement for an in-place Southwest Asia communications infrastructure to support USCENTCOM. (3) ROC 4-82, "A WWMCCS ADP Required Operational Capability," was validated on 16 May. This ROC identified a command and control information processing capability to effectively command and control designated USCENTCOM forces and be able to respond to the NCA and JCS. (4) ROC 5-82, "Interim Theater Communications Node," was validated on 14 January. This node provided an interim communications capability pending establishment of a Southwest Asia communications infrastructure. (5) ROC 6-82, "USCENTCOM's Forward Headquarters Element Communications Capability," was validated on 6 September. This ROC validated the communications capability requirements for a requirement for a USCENTCOM Forward Headquarters Element to be located in Southwest Asia. (6) ROC 9-82, "Integration of TRI-TAC and Improved High Frequency Communications Equipment," was validated on 12 October. This ROC established the requirement and timetable for the Services and JCSE to procure selected communications equipment to ensure interoperability among the Services' equipment.

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(U) The following four new ROCs were submitted to JCS in response to validated ROC 3-82.³² (1) ROC 1-83, "Initial Communications Node," was submitted on 23 May. This ROC established requirements for the first major communications node of the Southwest Asia communications infrastructure. (2) ROC 2-83, "Second Communications Node," was submitted on 9 June. This ROC established requirements for the second major communications node of the Southwest Asia communications infrastructure. (3) ROC 3-83, "Third Communications Node," was submitted on 14 June. As its name implied, this ROC established requirements for the third major communications node of the Southwest Asia communications infrastructure. (4) ROC 4-83, "Minor Communications Node," was submitted on 31 October. This ROC established requirements for all nine minor communications nodes of the Southwest Asia communications infrastructure.

(U) The JCS assigned responsibility for the production of the technical analysis and cost estimate for ROCs 1-83, 2-83, and 3-83 to the Department of the Army. This was needed to support the ROC validation process. In December 1983, the technical analysis and cost estimate for ROC 1-83 was delivered

32. (U) JCS SM-459-83.

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to the JCS. Headquarters DCA, in a parallel and coordinated effort that complemented the technical analysis and cost estimates, began work on a systems-level design of the Southwest Asia communications project. The preliminary draft of this effort was available for USCENTCOM comments in December. In addition, a task order was issued in June by the JCS (C³S) and OSD (C³I) which contracted the Institute for Defense Analysis to conduct a communications study for USCENTCOM. The objective of the study was to identify host nation communications capabilities that could augment the planned USCENTCOM theater communications capability. On 22 August, the Defense Resources Board directed that the Army and Air Force add \$244 million in the POM for fiscal years 1985 through 1989 to procure tactical transportable communications equipment to support USCENTCOM's mission in its area of responsibility. A USCENTCOM-State Department working group was established in June to initiate host nation access agreements for sites in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. Three major nodes and nine minor nodes would be installed at these sites. The working group met twice during the second half of the year and developed a positive dialogue regarding the establishment of communications sites in the AOR.

(U) Proposed upgrades to command ADP hardware and software were submitted in data automation requirements and system

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development notifications through the Air Force Data Systems Design Center to the Air Force Director of Systems Management at HQ USAF. The system development notifications were forwarded from HQ USAF to the JCS for validation.

(U) The only data automation requirement submitted in 1983, CEN-A83-01, dated 13 January, was for a microcomputer-based local area network to support the essential command and control information processing needs of USCINCENT and his staff. The data automation requirement was approved and the equipment began arriving in June.

(U) The objective of system development notification CEN-002, dated 14 March, was to ensure USCENTCOM WWMCCS ADP connectivity at deployed locations during contingencies and exercises. The notification requested that USEUCOM be designated as a WWMCCS host, and was validated by JCS on 19 August.

(U) The objective of system development notification CEN-003, dated 27 October, was to ensure an alternate WWMCCS host at the Alternate National Military Command Center during contingencies and exercises, in case one of the primary hosts was unable to provide support. This system development notification was at HQ USAF for review at the end of 1983.

(U) The objective of system development notification CEN-004, dated 21 June, was to expand Level 6 memory capabilities and provide the ability to transfer information between word processing equipment, command and control computer network microcomputer workstations, and the Level 6. The JCS were evaluating this notification at the end of 1983.

(U) The objective of system development notification CEN-005, dated 14 September, was to acquire an Ada compiler to provide Ada software development capabilities. Ada was a new computer language designed for systems in which the computer was an integral component performing on-line monitoring. The primary concerns of Ada were readability, maintainability, and security. It had been adopted as the DOD software standard for new computer applications.³³ At the end of 1983, this system development notification was at JCS being evaluated at the end of 1983.

(U) The objective of system development notification CEN-006, dated 19 October 1983, was to have the WWMCCS computer contract modified to permit USCENTCOM military repairers to perform maintenance and repair of USCENTCOM Honeywell automatic

33. Stephen J. Young, An Introduction to Ada, Ellis Horwood Limited, Chichester, 1983, p 13.

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data processing equipment while in garrison. This system development notification was at JCS for evaluation at the end of 1983.

(U) A new intelligence software section was formed in the Computer Systems Division in January. The primary responsibility of this section was to support J-2 intelligence requirements. The principal systems that were supported were the USCENCOM DIDHS and the USREDCOM H6000 and IDHS.

(U) In February, the second Deployable Intelligence Data Handling System software delivery was made by the Planning Research Corporation. A DIDHS disk upgrade from RM03s to RA60s was initiated. Software and procedures that converted DIA Automated Intelligence Information File tapes to DIDHS readable input tapes were developed. The DIDHS Software Development Facility was installed at USCENCOM for use by programmers from the Planning Research Corporation. A contract was made with this corporation to develop enhanced DIDHS software (Version CC002) which was scheduled to be completed in June 1984. Design of the DIDHS communications shelter was completed and it was due for delivery in the fall of 1984.

(U) The USCENCOM Major Command ADP Plan for fiscal years 1985-1989 was published on 31 May. This was USCENCOM's first

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ADP plan submission which was separate from that of USREDCOM. This plan described the scope of USCENCOM's mission environment, organizational structure, and objectives to provide an understanding of current and future ADP requirements. An executive summary of USCENCOM's program ADP requirements was also provided in this document.

~~U (S)~~ During the second half of 1983, USCINCENT made major progress in obtaining a dedicated C3 aircraft. Such an aircraft would permit USCINCENT when deployed to maintain continuous contact with the JCS, USCINCENT Headquarters at MacDill, and USCENCOM component commanders. Until the provision of a permanent airborne command post, the Air Force identified two aircraft to serve in the interim and stated that the Mission Essential Need Statement had been forwarded to JCS for inclusion in the Worldwide Airborne Command Post replacement program.³⁴ Subsequently, an NKC-135 was identified by HQ USAF as the first of the two interim aircraft. It was flown in June to Greenville, Texas, for initial modification by E-Systems. This aircraft was to be modified to meet USCINCENT's needs in two phases: Phase I, to be completed by January 1984, would bring the aircraft up to SAC's standards for EC-135Y aircraft. This would be

34. Msg(S), HQ USAF/CV, 242205Z Feb 84.

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accomplished by adding seats and modifying the engines, airframe, and avionics. Phase II, to be performed in 1987, would add backend full C² communications for USCINCCENT and his battlestaff, as well as other aircraft enhancements.

U ~~(C)~~ Because there were no backend aircraft communications planned until Phase II initial operational capability in fiscal year 1987, a separate USCENTCOM C² Initiative Fund procurement action was initiated for a secure voice satellite communications terminal. This terminal would be placed in the Phase I aircraft, whose estimated initial operational capability was 1 April 1984.

(U) The first USCENTCOM command and control communications map exercise was held at MacDill AFB from 6 to 8 June. The purpose of this exercise was to examine C³ support of USCENTCOM and its component headquarters in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. Using the OPLAN 1004 scenario, USCENTCOM and component C³ planners examined the communications systems overlaid on each other on a map of the AOR, so that areas requiring further refinement in the plans could be identified. The management of theater communications systems was discussed so that a written concept could be included in USCENTCOM's communications-electronics standing instructions. It provided insights into the magnitude of the communications installation effort necessary to support USCENTCOM's OPLANS.

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(U) When the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force became USCENTCOM on 1 January 1983, responsibility for the command's COMSEC Equipment Program was transferred from USREDCOM to USCENTCOM J-6. A representative from USCENTCOM attended the annual COMSEC Equipment Program conference for the first time in June. USCENTCOM made its first annual submission under the program in September. This submission contained COMSEC requirements for seven new communications systems.

U ~~(C)~~ In July, USCINCCENT was asked by US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Richard N. Murphy for assistance in obtaining equipment to establish a secure voice net in his country of assignment. Through a lengthy coordination process with JCS, USEUCOM, and the State Department, four Goldwyne KY-70s were obtained and shipped to the United States Military Training Missions in Riyadh and Dhahran, to Elf One, and to the American Consulate at Dhahran in December.

(U) The Easywork system was installed on the Level 6 computer on 20 July. Easywork provided the user a simple and quick method to create, format, update, copy and compare data files, and to generate data output reports.

(U) In July, the directorate also prepared and published USCENTCOM Regulation 105-4, "Address Indicating Groups (AIGs),"

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and 105-6, "Administrative Control of Electrically Transmitted Messages During Minimize."

(U) In support of the command and control communications network, two development machines were installed in the Computer Systems Division in July. From August to December, nine workstations were installed throughout the headquarters. The receiving staffs were J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4/7, J-5, J-6, the Comptroller, and the Secretary of the Joint Staff. Two more workstations were to be installed in 1984 when Computer Sciences Corporation would have completed its software development efforts and returned its government-furnished equipment. The command and control workstations were also deployable. Additional requests for workstations were received for 1984.

(U) In order to free critical disk drive space on the USREDCOM H6000 system, space-saving functions were performed. In addition, Headquarters USCENTCOM requested additional resources for processing requirements. In July, USCENTCOM requested two removable 450 disk drives which gave the command 240,000 little links of file space. One 450 disk pack was used up with two J-3 systems and one J-5 system. USCENTCOM reorganized disk space in October and received two dedicated 450 spindles from USREDCOM.

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(U) System software release WRNP2.0 was received from the Command and Control Technical Center in Washington, DC, and installed on the Level 6 computer on 7 July. Major software enhancements in WRNP2.0 included Level 6 to H6000 host computer capabilities for transferring files and console-to-console communications as well as various ADP security features.

~~U (C)~~ On 26 August, USCENTCOM submitted eight projects to JCS for funding under the USCINCCENT's C² Initiative Fund for 1984. The projects totaled \$1,899,500. These projects were:

(U) Phase I Aircraft Satellite Communications: A secure voice UHF satellite terminal to be installed in Phase I of USCINCCENT's C³ aircraft. The estimated cost was \$110,000 in procurement and \$2,000 in operations and maintenance funds.

(U) Deployable Command Radio Net: A deployable set of 15 voice privacy "brick" radios, one repeater, and one secure voice UHF Satellite communications terminal to connect key members of the staff to the C³ focal point during deployments. The estimated cost was \$109,000 in procurement and \$1,500 in operations and maintenance.

~~U (C)~~ SOCCENT radio net: A deployable set of 24 voice privacy "brick" radios and six base stations to support SOCCENT.

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The estimated cost was \$150,000 in procurement and \$2,000 in operations and maintenance.

(U) Defense Representative SATCOM: Six secure voice UHF satellite terminals for key defense representatives in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. The estimated cost was \$360,000 in procurement and \$90,000 in operations and maintenance.

~~U (S)~~ Fleet Imagery Support Terminal (FIST): One FIST terminal at HQ USCENTCOM and one for deployment purposes to support J-2 with high quality secure photographic transmission. Estimated cost of this system was \$438,000 in procurement and \$50,000 in operations and maintenance.

~~U (C)~~ Light Reaction Communications System: Five suitcase-portable UHF satellite communications systems with secure voice, data, and facsimile to support USCENTCOM J-2 during contingency operations. The estimated cost was \$278,000 in procurement and \$8,000 in operations and maintenance.

~~U (C)~~ En route Automated Intelligence Support: A portable computer system and software to deploy with USCINCCENT to provide intelligence and order of battle information. The estimated cost was \$30,000 in procurement and \$171,000 in operations and maintenance.

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U ~~(C)~~ Project Sideview Support: This project would provide USCENTCOM with video side views of overhead photography for mission planning by J-3 and J-2. This would cost an estimated \$100,000 in procurement with no operations and maintenance expenditures.

(U) The J-6 staff made progress during the year in the area of frequency management. Two Systematics General Corporation remote terminals were received which provided the first major step in automation of the frequency management function. The remote terminals were connected to the WWMCCS Honeywell H6000 at USREDCOM. The Frequency Resource Record System which was maintained at the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center at Annapolis, Maryland, was modified to include USCENTCOM's files. Frequency assignments which had been made by USCENTCOM since 1 January were entered into the data base. A first during exercise BRIGHT STAR 83 was the use of the Level 6 WWMCCS terminal to connect with the USREDCOM Honeywell H6000 computer to perform frequency management functions.

U ~~(C)~~ In September, J-6 submitted the command's biennial report on the status of COMSEC to the JCS as prescribed by JCSM C3S-M-665-83. The report identified COMSEC equipment shortfalls in both the USCENTCOM headquarters and components and planned improvements. The command's goal was eventually to have

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sufficient COMSEC equipment to secure all radio and telephone transmissions.

(U) In October, a booklet on garrison communications capabilities was developed and distributed to the staff. This booklet was designed to assist USCENTCOM staff officers in identifying available communications for mission accomplishment.

(U) Also in October, Xerox equipment was delivered and the Xerox microcomputer which supported the Adjutant General was evaluated. This evaluation was to continue in 1984. Specific applications for this microcomputer were word processor and local area network functions within the headquarters.

~~U (S)~~ Because of the lack of an in-place theater communications capability in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility, as well as the diversity of terrain and the long distances involved, USCENTCOM and its components had to rely heavily on satellite communications. In particular, USCENTCOM's identified requirements for space on the Indian Ocean SHF satellite far outstripped its capacity. In an effort to consolidate and prioritize USCENTCOM and component command SHF requirements for the near and long term, USCENTCOM hosted a Space Segment/Channelization Conference on 25 and 26 October. The

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Defense Communications Agency presented an overview of the Defense Satellite Communications System program and the preliminary results of an analysis of the system's capability to support USCINCCENT requirements. The formal results of the DCA analysis were expected to show a large shortfall in the ability of the Defense Satellite Communications System to support USCINCCENT's mission in Southwest Asia. Efforts to develop a joint prioritization of requirements and an allocation scheme were continuing.

(U) The deregulation and divestiture of American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) created several problems for exercise planners. During GALLANT KNIGHT 83, the J-6 staff experienced some of these problems and began to look for resolutions. Without help from AT&T Long Lines, the USCENTCOM J-6 staff had to put an inordinate amount of technical detail into requesting each circuit which supported the exercise. This would have required additional personnel and a large technical library, not only at USCENTCOM, but at each major command. J-6 requested that an Air Force activity be established to serve as the technical expert for all commands, and the Air Force Communications Command agreed. The facility was to be operational in mid-1984. J-6 also invited members of industry to brief the staff on the impact of divestiture and prepared a briefing on the direct effect on

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USCENTCOM. The bottom line was that requests had to be made earlier (at least 120 days before activation), that requests had to be accurate, since the customer had to pay for changes, and that services would cost more.

~~U (S/NOFORN)~~ Volume I of the USCENTCOM Command and Control System Master Plan was submitted to the JCS for approval in October. It supported USCENTCOM's strategy and command objectives, as well as the operational and logistic concepts document forwarded to the JCS in September. The Master Plan focused on an in-place, theater communications system augmented by tactical assets when and where required. The Master Plan contained the six sections shown below:

<u>Section</u>	<u>Subject</u>
1	Summary and Prioritized Requirements
2	Overview of USCENTCOM Command and Control
3	USCENTCOM Theater Communications Architecture
4	Composition, Capabilities, and Limitations of Current C4 Systems
5	C4 Improvements Plan
6	Required C4 Capabilities

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(U) In November, the USCENTCOM POM cycle for fiscal year 1986 began. Four program decision packages were submitted: Secure Switch Operator Manning, Theater Communications Capability-II, Theater Communications Capability-III, and Tactical Communications Capability. Of the new USCENTCOM initiatives, the four J-6 program decision packages were ranked in the top five. In addition, the theater communications package submitted and funded in fiscal year 1985 was carried forward to fiscal year 1986 as a baseline program.

(U) A USCENTCOM C³ overview briefing was prepared in November. It was designed to accomplish several objectives. First, it was to bring all players up-to-date on the actions that took place from January 1983 through the end of the fiscal year that affected USCENTCOM communications support. Secondly, it identified significant issues and problems that needed to be highlighted and reconciled. Thirdly, it established a firm baseline for approved fiscal year 1985 and out-year funding and developed a realistic fiscal year 1986 POM input. This briefing was given to JCS C3S, DCA, and the Service communications chiefs during November and December.

(U) Headquarters USCENTCOM Regulation 335-1, "Computer Systems, Policies, Responsibilities and Support Procedures," was

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revised and published in November 1983. Also published and disseminated in October 1983 were the "WWMCCS Terminal Users Reference Handbooks" and the "WWMCCS Terminal Users Quick Reference Guide."

U (C) During December, the J-6 opened a cryptographic equipment account to provide for the crypto equipment to be used in support of Headquarters USCENTCOM programs such as USCINCCENT's C² systems and deployable, quick-reaction communications packages. The cryptographic equipment was to begin arriving in early 1984. A total of 72 individual items was programmed.

(U) A WWMCCS ADP security test and evaluation of the USCENTCOM Level 6 facility and remote terminal areas within Building 540 was completed on 15 December. This evaluation was conducted as part of the accreditation process for continued operation in the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network in accordance with JCS Publication 22, "WWMCCS ADP System Security Manual." The completed report was forwarded to the Director, Joint Staff via HQ USAF.

U (C) The J-6 staff conducted a study during the months of June through September to evaluate the vulnerabilities of

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communications services provided to HQ USCENTCOM at MacDill AFB, Florida. The 1928th Communications Group and the local telephone company provided information on circuitry and the base security office provided expertise on physical security. The report supported the need for bulk encryption of the telephone company microwave link supporting the base. The J-6 orchestrated the effort with NSA, DCA, USREDCOM, Air Force activities, and the telephone company to initiate action to accomplish this task. The encryption should be realized in 1984.

(U) A memorandum of understanding between USEUCOM and USCENTCOM concerning WWMCCS computer systems support for USCENTCOM was finalized and signed by the J-6 Director and the Chief, USEUCOM Data Service Center in November. An MOU between USREDCOM and USCENTCOM concerning WWMCCS computer systems support for USCENTCOM was in final coordination at USREDCOM at the end of the year. Another MOU between the Alternate National Military Command Center and United States Central Command concerning WWMCCS computer system support for USCENTCOM was in final draft at the end of 1983.

~~U (C)~~ Other computer system developments included installation of six support programs on the USREDCOM WWMCCS H6000 system for use by USCENTCOM staff activities. These programs were the J-1 personnel system used to conduct orderly room

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functions (completed in June), the Allied Cooperative Support Sharing System which contained existing agreements with host nations (July), the Special Security Office support program used to maintain information on billets authorized access to special compartmentalized information (November), the Security Access Roster System for the J-2 Special Security Office (November), the Nuclear Contingency Planning System for J-3 (December), and the Nuclear Weapons Accounting System for J-3 (December).

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CHAPTER III

SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

(U) Although a great deal of the work of the United States Central Command was accomplished in its six directorates, there were also several staff agencies which supported USCENTCOM headquarters. These agencies included the traditional professions of the ministry, law, history, and medicine, as well as the more specifically military occupations of headquarters commandant, adjutant general, comptroller, and provost marshal. In addition, there were specialists in public affairs, facilities, and combat capabilities analysis among the special staff, as well as liaison officers from two specified commands, SAC and MAC, from two other unified commands, USEUCOM and USPACOM, and from a number of other organizations.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) The Office of the Inspector General was formed on 1 January when the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force became the United States Central Command. The formation of the office was in accordance with JCS SM-254-82, dated 22 April 1982. The mission specified in that document was for the IG to assist the commander in maintaining effective command and control, high standards of joint operational readiness, and an effective operational security program. Seven USCENCOM regulations were written and published outlining in detail the specific duties of the office in carrying out its mission.


(U) The office was authorized a total of eight personnel under the USCENCOM Joint Table of Distribution, Part II, dated 16 August 1983. This document authorized an Inspector General (O-7) who was "dual-hatted" as the Commander, Forward Headquarters Element; three Deputy IGs (O-6); an Assistant IG (O-4); an administrative supervisor (E-8); a stenographer (E-6) and administrative NCO (E-5). The Inspector General at year's end was BGen Ray "M" Franklin, USMC. Captain [REDACTED] (B)(3)(B)(6), US Navy; Col [REDACTED] (B)(3)(B)(6), USAF; and Col [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(3), US Army, were the USCENCOM Deputy Inspectors General.

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(U) The Inspector General's major activities during the year included the evaluation of two major exercises and the inspection of five Security Assistance Offices in USCENCOM's area of responsibility. In March, the USCENCOM IG conducted an inspection of the Military Assistance Program in Jordan at the request of USEUCOM. Also in March, the IG conducted an evaluation of command and control, joint operational readiness, and operational security during GALLANT KNIGHT 83, a joint command post exercise. GALLANT KNIGHT 83 was conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In June, the OMC in Sudan was inspected, again at USEUCOM's request. In August, the IG evaluated airlift and sealift utilization in support of BRIGHT STAR 83, a major joint field training exercise held in Egypt. On 1 October, USCENCOM assumed responsibility for the security assistance program in its area of responsibility. Command inspections of the security assistance offices in Somalia and Yemen were conducted in October. The final major activity of the year was an inspection of the US Military Training Mission, Saudi Arabia in December. All inspections of USCENCOM's security assistance offices were considered satisfactory.

Figure 15. Adjutant General Organization



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ADJUTANT GENERAL

(U) During 1983, the total number of authorizations for the Adjutant General's office was reduced from 32 to 31. An Army E-3 and an Air Force E-4 authorization were deleted on 1 July as a result of a JCS-directed manpower reduction, but, at the same time, the position of Deputy Adjutant General, an Air Force O-4, was established. On 1 November, one E-8 administrative superintendent position was temporarily transferred from the Adjutant General's administrative support staff to the Resources Division as the Administrative Systems Project Manager.

(U) During 1983, the Adjutant General's staff participated in two major exercises. One of these was GALLANT KNIGHT held in March, while the other was BRIGHT STAR, conducted during August and September.

(U) In the Publications/Graphics Division, 1983 began with one authorized O-3 division chief, four enlisted personnel in the Publications Branch and five enlisted personnel in the Graphics Branch. The Publications Branch expanded its Master Reference Library by ordering a set of Marine Corps publications to

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complement the JCS, OSD, Army, Navy, and Air Force publications already maintained. During the year, the Publications Branch provided editing service and published 128 USCENTCOM publications and 29 Command Policy Letters. By the end of 1983, a total of 60 command forms had been developed and printed. The Graphics Branch continued to provide a full range of graphics support to the command; it processed 1,190 workorders for viewgraphs, 35-millimeter slides, posters, and similar products during 1983. To increase its capability, a Xerox 6500 color copier was added to its equipment. In September, both the Publications and Graphics Branches were relocated from Building 1105 to Building 540.

(U) The Resources Division was authorized two enlisted personnel in 1983. In October 1983, the Adjutant General added an ad hoc position to the Resources Division (an E-8 administrative superintendent) for the specific task of evaluating guidelines on the procurement and management of administrative systems equipment. The newly organized division established and gained approval for procurement and management policy for administrative systems equipment based on Air Force Regulation 4-2. In addition, the division obtained an agreement with the Xerox Corporation for a three-month test of the Xerox Ethernet local area network at no cost to the government. The agreement was going to save approximately \$250,000 over the test period. If the test proved successful, the local area net could

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be implemented throughout the headquarters during fiscal year 1984. The net would link the 46 word processing units in the headquarters into a common network providing electronic mail, upgraded graphics capabilities, electronic file storage and retrieval, highspeed letter-quality printing, and other features. It would be Tempest-certified up to Secret.

(U) The Resources Division and the Administrative Systems Project Manager also developed a program to control 32 copying machines in the headquarters. The copier control program evaluated copier usage, including copier supplies versus total number of copies per machine per division. The program allowed the copier manager to realign equipment to provide the most efficient equipment to areas where demand was greatest. This program was designed to provide the headquarters with a more realistic approach to the fiscal year 1985 budget for procurement of copiers and copier supplies. Total copy count for 1983 was in excess of 11,200,000 impressions. This total included the reproduction of all incoming messages to the headquarters.

(U) At the beginning of the year, the Services Division was authorized one O-3 division chief, eight enlisted personnel in the Message Distribution Branch, four enlisted personnel in the Document Control Branch and two enlisted personnel in the Reproduction Branch. A JCS-imposed manpower reduction removed one position from the Message Distribution Branch on 1 July.

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From December 1982 to September 1983, the division had to operate in a split configuration to support elements of the headquarters in both Buildings 1105 (the "Molehole") and 540, the new headquarters facility. The division operated a shuttle run between Buildings 1105, 540, and the base communications center to transport messages, mail, and reproduction. The division was reconsolidated in September 1983 in Building 540 when the second and final phase of its construction was completed. In April, the Message Distribution Branch upgraded its equipment by replacing its Xerox 8200 copier with a Xerox 9500. This machine averaged over 500,000 copies per month as daily incoming message traffic increased from 400 to 600 per day and the larger staff required more copies of messages. The Xerox 9500 assigned to the Reproduction Branch averaged 300,000 impressions per month. To reduce the workload on the Reproduction Branch, the division sent a number of larger printing projects to the USAF field printing plant at Eglin AFB, Florida. Over 1,750,000 impressions were produced for the headquarters at the Eglin facility. In November, a new Security Engineered Machine Company Classified Document Disintegrator was installed in Building 540 as part of the Document Control Branch. Although the machine had excellent specifications, it had operational problems. Large scraps of classified material were left in the machine after shredding. This problem was being worked on at the end of the year by the contractor and the facility engineer.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

(U) Nineteen eighty-three was a significant year for the USCENTCOM Public Affairs Office. The command evolved from the RDJTF into a unified command, there was a major overseas exercise, and USCENTCOM had the first operational deployment of forces assigned it. The Public Affairs Office had an intimate role in each of these important activities.

(U) In contrast to previous press coverage of the highly visible RDJTF, public interest in USCENTCOM appeared to stabilize during 1983, even though media interest intensified during several of the more noteworthy events. Generally, the media presented fair and accurate accounts of USCENTCOM activities.

(U) The Public Affairs Office realized its full complement of personnel during the year, and successfully utilized reservists in unique roles. Commander Milt Baker, US Navy, who had served as the only public affairs officer for both the RDJTF and USCENTCOM, retired on 1 September and was replaced by Captain

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US Navy, who had arrived on 5 August.

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(U) The year began with a formal ceremony in honor of the activation of the United States Central Command, the nation's sixth unified command. This ceremony was held on 5 January and every division and section of the Public Affairs Office took part in it. General (GEN) John W. Vessey, US Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the keynote speaker. The Public Affairs Office designed and produced the ceremony brochure,¹ issued a press advisory to local media,² established a media center for the event, and distributed a press release.³ Transcripts of remarks for GEN Vessey⁴ and for LTG Kingston⁵ were prepared. Escorts were provided for media representatives who covered the activation ceremony.

(U) Public affairs themes were developed for USCENTCOM in early 1983⁶ and they became the central factor influencing

1. Brochure (U), "United States Central Command Establishment Ceremony," 5 Jan 83.

2. Fact Sheet (U), "U.S. Central Command Ceremony," Public Affairs Office, 5 Jan 83.

3. News Release (U), "Headquarters, United States Central Command," 5 Jan 83.

4. Remarks (U), GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., US Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 Jan 83.

5. Introductory Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston, US Army, Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, 5 Jan 83.

6. Ltr (U), USCENTCOM Chief of Staff to Distribution, subj: "Unclassified Public Affairs Themes for USCENTCOM," 1 Apr 83.

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relations between the new command and the news media. Their thrust was that USCENTCOM would maintain a low profile with the media by avoiding taking actions that would generate media interest, but that the command would respond to questions from the media. The basic rationale for this approach was to help defuse host nation sensitivities in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility regarding their involvement with US military organizations.

(B) (1)Section 1.4 (a), (b), (d)

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(B)(1)1.4, (a), (b), (c), (d)

7. Memorandum for Correspondents (U), 7 Jul 83.

8. Fact Sheet (U), Headquarters, USCENTCOM Public Affairs Office, "Bright Star," Aug 83.

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(b)(1) 1.4 (a), (b), (d)

(U) A public announcement⁹ and a media advisory¹⁰ were also made available to the media for Exercise EASTERN WIND in Somalia. The only event open to the press was the USMC amphibious landing near Berbera. All media queries were referred to the US Embassy in Mogudishu.

(U) Exercise NATURAL BOND, held in Sudan, was also the subject of a public announcement¹¹ and a media advisory.¹² Media were not invited to cover the exercise, but some interviews were granted in Khartoum. Major (Maj) (b)(6) USAF, of the USCENCOM public affairs staff deployed as the on-scene public affairs officer for this exercise.

9. Memorandum for Correspondents (U), 7 Jul 83.

10. Fact Sheet (U), HQ USCENCOM Public Affairs Office, "Eastern Wind," Aug 83.

11. Memorandum for Correspondents (U), 8 Jul 83.

12. Fact Sheet (U), "National Bond," Aug 83.

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(b)(1)1.4 (a), (b), (d)

(U) The Operations Division of the USCENTCOM public affairs office focused on activities in media relations, community relations, internal information, audiovisual documentation and exercises during 1983. Media relations were limited and low-key, but responsive when required. The central factor affecting media relations was the publication of public affairs themes by the Department of State.

(U) The Media Relations Branch was heavily involved in the ceremony recognizing the activation of USCENTCOM, operation EARLY CALL, developing public affairs themes, and exercise BRIGHT STAR 83. But in addition to these events, the Media Relations Branch had other significant challenges in 1983.

(U) During the year, the USCINCCENT was the author of two articles. The first, "The U.S. Central Command: Securing the First and Final Battles," was published in The Military

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Engineer¹³ and the second, "C³I and the U.S. Central Command," appeared in Signal magazine.¹⁴ The Media Relations Branch assisted LTG Kingston in preparing both articles.

(U) There were also many articles written about the command published in various journals during the year. Subjects included deployment capability,¹⁵ support structure,¹⁶ the Jordanian rapid deployment force,¹⁷ the movement of forces to protect Egypt and the Sudan from perceived threats by Libya,¹⁸ the effect of the command on US ability to defend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),¹⁹ Exercise GALLANT

13. LTG Robert C. Kingston, "The U.S. Central Command: Securing the First and Final Battles," The Military Engineer, Nov-Dec 83, pp 490-493, pp 23-25.

14. LTG Robert C. Kingston, "C³I and the U.S. Central Command," Signal, Nov 8.

15. Andrew J. Ambrose, "The US RDF: By Air and Sea - Speed and Quantity," Navy International, Dec 82, pp 1502-1507.

16. Andrew J. Ambrosia, "US Central Command: revised support structure," Jane's Defence Review, Vol 4, No 7, 1983, pp 621-626.

17. Jack Anderson, "Secret U.S. Plan Would Establish RDF in Jordan," The Washington Post, 13 Jan 83, p B-11.

18. Article (U), "U.S. forces said to move near Libya," Baltimore Sun, 17 Feb 83, p 1.

19. George C. Wilson, "RDF Seen Weakening NATO Defense," Washington Post, 19 Feb 83, p A-13.

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KNIGHT,²⁰ the command's sealift programs,²¹ local conflicts surrounding the bidding²² and building²³ of the new headquarters, and propaganda by the Soviets.²⁴

(U) Because of the low-key public affairs posture, there were very few visits to the headquarters by journalists. Most notable, perhaps, was the visit in July by Bob Dudley of U.S. News & World Report. His visit gave him useful background information that was used in conjunction with the articles he wrote on Exercise BRIGHT STAR.

(U) An issue that received some media attention in November was the announcement that USCENTCOM would establish a Forward Headquarters Element.²⁵ Although the release was made from

20. Steve Huettle, "Fort Bragg Hosting CENTCOM Exercise," Fayetteville Observer, 9 Mar 83, p 1-B.

21. R.J.L. Dicker, "RDF Sealift Programs: the long-term maritime pre-positioning force takes place," International Defense Review, Jul 83, pp 956-958.

22. Nash Stublen, "Builders Critical of Building on Base Projects," The Tampa Tribune, 24 May 84, p 1-B.

23. Nash Stublen, "MacDill Buildings go \$900,000 over Budget," The Tampa Tribune, 2 Dec 82, p 14-B.

24. A. Vasilyeu, "The New American Military Command," Soviet Military Review, pp 51-53.

25. News Release (U), HQ USCENTCOM, "Forward Headquarters Element Established," 29 Nov 83.

Tampa, all of the articles carried a Washington dateline, since queries regarding the subject were directed to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.²⁶

(U) As 1983 came to a close, the public affairs office was studying the feasibility of having the low-key public affairs themes altered to allow a more aggressive approach to the dissemination of information. Such a change in the command's public affairs posture would require revision of the themes produced in Washington, however, and it appeared unlikely that they would change soon.

(U) In the area of community relations, the United States Central Command enjoyed a banner year, both locally and nationally. Locally, the Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce recognized USCENTCOM's new status as a unified command by including its enlisted members in their Military Recognition Program. Under this program each Service Member of the Quarter received a package of gifts donated by local businesses. The Chamber agreed that the Service Member of the Year would also be covered under this program with recognition and donations

26. News Clip, "Floating Headquarters Planned in Mid-East," Associated Press, 30 Nov 83.

coming early in 1984. Members of the command briefed key local civic groups on the mission and roles played by USCENTCOM in the defense of the nation. The Deputy USCINCCENT, Maj Gen Taylor, led this effort, delivering key speeches to the Tampa Rotary Club and the Downtown Tampa Kiwanis Club during the year, in addition to talking to similar groups throughout the region. Nationally, an aggressive public speaking program resulted in addresses by LTG Kingston to carefully selected, influential opinion-leading groups across the country, including the San Antonio World Affairs Council, the Harvard Club of New York City, the Kansas City International Affairs Council, and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. In addition, Maj Gen Taylor spoke to a breakfast meeting of the Mid-America Arab-American Chamber of Commerce in Chicago, which proved helpful in opening doors to the command in the business community. Concurrent with USCINCENT's public speaking engagements, LTG Kingston met with the editorial boards of two leading national newspapers, the Kansas City Star and the Chicago Tribune.

(U) Internal information activities were highlighted by the first-ever deployment of the Navy Broadcast Service's mobile FM radio van for use in BRIGHT STAR 83. Unfortunately, host nation sensitivities precluded final authorization for on-air broadcasting during the exercise. Nevertheless, personnel at all

levels recognized the potential for internal information dissemination inherent in this new capability. In addition, the internal section published a command brochure which became a mainstay in efforts to inform various audiences about USCENTCOM. Capt Mark Hughes, USMC, was reassigned from Executive Officer to the Internal Information Officer billet in early December. Master Gunnery Sergeant (b)(6) USMC, was reassigned as the Assistant Internal Information Officer at that time, having served in the principal billet for the greater part of the year.

(U) Audiovisual documentation played a major role in the public affairs mission in 1983. The establishment ceremony on 5 January, with GEN Vessey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as guest speaker, was the first event documented. Providing coverage was a motion picture team and still photographer from Charleston AFB, South Carolina. This material was placed in the Defense Audiovisual Depository.

(U) Photographic documentation of operations, visitors, and exercises was the major audiovisual effort during the year. In February, the command assembled a video and still photo team to document operation EARLY CALL. These photographers arrived at the forward operating location in the first echelon of mission aircraft. Stills and videotape of this operation taken by the team were used to brief the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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(U) Many important visitors to the command were documented by command photographers, including Sudanese President Nimeiri. Also, a major portion of the command's photographic effort involved the use of the base audiovisual lab for awards photos and of a commercial contract for development of color photography.

(U) An extensive planning effort began in April for BRIGHT STAR 83. Photographers and equipment were assembled from ten audiovisual units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to document this exercise. Coverage included operations in all participating countries. A JCS slide briefing and videotape were produced with Headquarters, Aerospace Audiovisual Service acting as executive agent. Videotapes were distributed to more than 60 units and organizations, while 81 sets of 35-millimeter slides were shipped worldwide.

(U) With the arrival of the Abodia slide retrieval unit, the command developed a computerized slide retrieval system with 4,000 original slides and more than 8,000 duplicates. This system was believed to be a "first" within the Department of Defense.

(U) In March 1983, the Operations Division participated in exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 83, a USREDCOM-sponsored CPX held at

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Fort Bragg, North Carolina. One officer, one enlisted person, and an Aerospace Audiovisual Service photographer deployed to Fort Bragg for the exercise. Public affairs for the exercise was low key, respond to query only. Whenever possible, queries were passed to the USREDCOM public affairs officer for action. The public affairs staff provided service and support to the command group, conducted photodocumentation, handled photography, and delivered USCINCCENT's "real-world" daily press brief.

U ~~(S)~~ In late July, Operations Division personnel began deploying for operations connected with BRIGHT STAR 83. BRIGHT STAR 83 was held in Egypt during August and September. As part of this exercise, public affairs officers were deployed with audiovisual personnel from various services to exercises NATURAL BOND in Sudan, EASTERN WIND in Somalia and

(b)(1)1.4(c)

(b)(1)1.4(c) Operations Division personnel served in various capacities for these exercises. While deployed, Operations Division personnel provided real-world public affairs support to the command group, delivered the USCINCCENT real-world daily press brief, handled photography, supervised audiovisual documentation of the exercises, and supervised the Navy Broadcasting Service's mobile broadcast facility.

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(U) All exercises received extensive audiovisual documentation. A master slide set was developed and offered to exercise participants for briefing purposes. A master after action videotape was nearing completion at the end of 1983. Release of the videotape to exercise participants was anticipated by the end of January 1984. The original tape and file of EARLY CALL operations was also in the Operations Division files.

(U) The Policy and Plans Division's main focus remained on the preparation and refinement of several OPLANS and CONPLANS throughout the year. Following the arrival of the division chief in December 1982, the two-man division was responsible for substantial improvements and innovations that affected USCENTCOM public affairs. Much of the planning effort at the beginning of the year was dedicated to the USCENTCOM establishment ceremony. The Plans Division aided the overall effort by assisting in the media center and providing press escorts for local and national media.

U ~~(S)~~ Exercises in 1983 involved major planning efforts. The Plans Division was primarily involved in two exercises: GALLANT KNIGHT 83 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and BRIGHT STAR 83 in Egypt with collateral exercises being conducted in Somalia,

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Sudan, and Oman. The division provided the public affairs annexes to the exercise directives and the exercise OPORDs for both exercises. Both division personnel deployed to Egypt to augment the Operations Division at the Cairo West military airfield.

(U) The USCENTCOM public affairs themes mentioned earlier served as the basic document for the development of the command's public affairs briefing. This briefing proved a valuable tool in informing influential visitors, such as ambassadors, diplomatic consuls, and personnel newly assigned to the AOR, on how public affairs related issues were to be handled throughout USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. The orientation was also presented by the deputy public affairs officer at the USCENTCOM Commanders Conference in July.

(U) With the elevation to unified command status, additional emphasis was given to the role of Inspector General. The public affairs plans shop worked closely and extensively with the IG to formulate a comprehensive checklist on public affairs related items that would be utilized by missions as well as by USCENTCOM inspectors when visiting and inspecting various units. This management tool proved effective in assisting missions and inspectors alike.

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(U) With the arrival of the Chief of Operations, Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) (b)(6) USMC, in February 1983, the US Central Command public affairs office attained total manning in accordance with the joint manpower program. The most significant personnel action to occur in RDJTF and USCENCOM public affairs history was the retirement of Commander (b)(6) (b)(6) on 1 September 1983. Commander (b)(6) a "plank-owner," arrived shortly after the inception of the RDJTF in April 1980. Replacing Commander (b)(6) in August 1983 was Captain (b)(6) (b)(6) US Navy, former Chief of the News Division, Director of Defense Information, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

(U) In the area of reserve utilization, at mid-year a naval reserve officer requested a special tour of active duty in the public affairs office. His tour was approved and he was assigned several projects, the most important of which was how to incorporate reservists into public affairs activities. Three other reservists (two Army, one Air Force) were utilized to augment the public affairs staff during the BRIGHT STAR 83 deployment in August and September 1983. Their primary tasking was preparation of the daily press brief for the USCINCENT update. This reserve augmentation was a valuable personnel resource and a request for permanently assigned reservists was submitted to J-1 in September 1983.

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LEGAL ADVISOR

(U) One of the many offices to relocate from the Molehole to the new headquarters building was the Office of the Legal Advisor which moved from the RDJTF trailer complex to Building 540 in September. The new office layout provided six private offices, a law library, and an administrative area.

(U) The USCENTCOM legal advisor, LTC (b)(6) was promoted to Colonel (O-6) in February 1983. He retired effective 1 April 1983 and was presented the Legion of Merit. COL (b)(6) (b)(6) US Army, succeeded COL Murray as legal advisor on 1 April. Lieutenant Commander (b)(6), US Navy, arrived for duty in May 1983. He assumed responsibility for legislative liaison and civil law.

(U) Major (MAJ) (b)(6), US Army, travelled to Jordan in June in connection with a foreign claim and a problem in foreign criminal jurisdiction arising out of the injury and subsequent death of a local male youth who was struck by an automobile driven by an American soldier. He investigated the

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claims and foreign criminal jurisdiction aspects of this case. The soldier was returned to CONUS without being subjected to the criminal justice system of Jordan.

(U) The USCENTCOM legal office held a three-day legal conference in November. Representatives from component and supporting legal offices participated in the conference. Legal personnel stationed in the AOR also were able to attend. The conference provided a forum for discussing problem areas, meeting counterparts from other service branches, learning about USCENTCOM's organization and mission and reviewing command directives. The conference was so successful in achieving its goals that it was decided to make it an annual event.

(U) In the financial area, two representatives worked closely in negotiations toward a cost sharing agreement with Oman. Also, three USCENTCOM lawyers took part in BRIGHT STAR 83. Their principal task was to assist in negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding concerning the procurement of exercise-related supplies and services.

(U) The legal office participated in continuing discussions and research concerning future "offshore procurement." Very strict procedures had been established for procurement by

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government agencies, and many of these rules and prohibitions applied to purchases made OCONUS. What was needed, however, was a streamlined, legitimate method of obtaining necessary goods and services outside the US in compliance with applicable law. Progress was being made in this area and efforts continued at full throttle. Finally, the legal office assumed responsibility for legislative liaison and coordinated efforts to identify issues likely to arise during Congressional hearings.

PROVOST MARSHAL

(U) When the RDJTF became USCENTCOM on 1 January, many new challenges and responsibilities came to the USCENTCOM Provost Marshal's Office. Areas which were previously the responsibility of the US European Command and its components became the responsibility of USCENTCOM. The Provost Marshal's mission statement was adjusted to reflect this shift of functions as well as to add industrial security matters to its mission. The mission statement was revised to read as follows:

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(U) Responsible for staff supervision of all aspects of Military/Security Police missions assigned to USCINCCENT. Serves as the focal point for plans, policies and Coordination of Lines of Communication (LOC) Security, Personal Protection, Physical Security, Industrial Security, Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD), Port Security, Enemy Prisoners of War/Civilian Internees (EPWs/CIs) and Antiterrorism. Assist in development of Plans and Policies for Counterterrorism, Rear Area Protection (RAP) and Rear Area Combat Operations (RACO). Prepares plans and policies for law enforcement support in theater. Coordinates with Host Nation, US local and Federal Police Security Agencies for support. Provost Marshal is Executive Agent for Military Customs in USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

(U) The austere manning within the Provost Marshal Office continued throughout 1983 and was improved only for a brief period when Lt Col (b)(6) a USAF security police officer, was assigned temporarily from J-4. He was later returned to the duties of J-4 executive officer. The authorized manning at the close of 1983 remained the same as in 1982.

(U) During 16-17 February, the Provost Marshal hosted the first USCENTCOM provost marshal conference in the trailer area near Building 1103. All USCENTCOM component representatives attended, as well as representatives from HQ Marine Corps, HQ Naval Investigative Service, HQ US Army Criminal Investigative Command, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.

(U) During the year, members from the Provost Marshal Office participated in both GALLANT KNIGHT 83 and BRIGHT STAR 83.

Additionally, to better prepare the Provost Marshal's staff for their ever-growing responsibilities in the area of antiterrorism, all officers attended either the USAF Dynamics of International Terrorism Course at Hurlburt Field, Florida, or the US Army Countering Terrorism Course at Fort McClellan, Alabama. One officer attended the international police very important person (VIP) protection course in Washington, DC, and the industrial security course at Richmond, Virginia. Two officers were trained at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in US customs procedures.

(U) Throughout the year the Provost Marshal's staff attended many conferences on subjects such as the unified command transition plan, US customs, military police force structuring, rear area protection, and air base ground defense. In addition, the Provost Marshal was asked to address the USAF Security Police Worldwide Symposium held at Eglin AFB, Florida. USCENTCOM's host nation liaison officer also briefed the HQ USAF Office for Terrorism on USCENTCOM antiterrorism initiatives.

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

(U) The Headquarters Commandant provided base support to the USCENTCOM headquarters during deployments, redeployments, and in

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garrison. This support included administration, internal security, food service, transportation, engineering, and supply. The commandant functioned as the camp commander and coordinated with the host nation base commander.

(U) In the area of training, the Headquarters Commandant Training Division expanded professional military education opportunities for members of the command by increasing the allocations to various schools offered by the Services such as the NCO Academy and Noncommissioned Officers Schools. Technical schools such as the Army Air Assault School, US Special Operations School, and the Air Ground Operations School, were also added to increase opportunities for individuals to develop occupational skills.

(U) In the area of equipment, the Headquarters Commandant validated table of allowance TA-140 with the Air Staff. This table of allowance provided the equipment authorization list for a deployed field headquarters and its accompanying equipment to be stationed at MacDill AFB. A Southwest Asia pre-positioned equipment package was developed and presented to the Air Staff.

(U) The Headquarters Commandant's staff participated in CONUS Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 83 and OCONUS Exercise BRIGHT STAR

83 by supporting the 508-man deployed headquarters. BRIGHT STAR 83 involved the deployment of men and materials utilizing airlift and sealift in support of a base operation.

FACILITY ENGINEER

(U) On 2 February, ground was broken for Phase II of the headquarters building at MacDill AFB. Enterprise Corporation of Dunedin, Florida, won the contract for this accelerated construction project. Joint occupancy was permitted on 1 September, which allowed specialists from the 1928th Communications Squadron to install essential communications to meet operational requirements. By 22 September 1983, the staff, which had been previously separated by the five miles between Buildings 540 and 1104, was consolidated for the first time under one roof. This entire precedent-setting construction project was completed in only 18 months, largely because of the efforts of a small group of soldiers and airman with no previous construction experience led by LTC (b)(6) US Army, the USCENTCOM facility engineer.

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Figure 16. USCENTCOM Exercise Obligations By Quarter 1983
(thousands of dollars)

	FY83 (Cumulative)				FY84
<u>EXERCISE</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>
PROUD SABER 83	\$.6	\$ 3.7	\$ 3.7	\$ 3.8	\$ 0
JADE TIGER 83	188.7	134.1	173.7	188.3	0
GALLANT KNIGHT 83	15.8	259.3	238.6	201.8	0
BRIGHT STAR 83	.4	8.5	91.6	485.9	0
WINTEX 83	5.3	5.4	6.0	6.0	0
GALLANT KNIGHT 84	0	0	0	0	18.9
ACCURATE TEST 84	0	0	0	0	33.6
BLACK ROCK 84	0	0	0	0	19.1
Other Exercises	<u>0</u>	<u>44.6</u>	<u>48.2</u>	<u>85.5</u>	<u>29.7</u>
TOTAL	\$ 210.8	\$ 455.6	\$ 561.8	\$ 971.3	\$ 101.3

NOTE: Decreases in cumulative obligations are due to actual expenses being less than estimates.

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COMPTROLLER

(U) No significant changes were made to the Comptroller staff organization during the year. The Comptroller assumed responsibility for financial management of the Military Assistance Program and, at mid-year, Military Advisory and Assistance Group administrative and overhead support budgeting for the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

(U) The Comptroller administered a Joint Readiness Exercise program within the USCENTCOM budget. In fiscal year 1983, USCENTCOM participated in three major exercises (JADE TIGER, GALLANT KNIGHT, and BRIGHT STAR) and had observers or conducted site surveys for several others. Listed in Figure 16 on the facing page are the obligations by quarter from 1 October 1982 through 31 December 1983 for each exercise.

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Figure 17. Administrative Program By Directorate/Office
(thousands of dollars)

<u>DIRECTORATE</u>	<u>FY83 (Cumulative)</u>				<u>FY84</u>
	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>
Personnel, J-1	\$ 21.0	\$ 35.5	\$ 59.2	\$ 88.1	\$ 22.6
Intelligence, J-2	129.4	200.0	326.8	433.6	136.3
Operations, J-3	124.5	236.7	345.4	531.7	102.5
Log & SA, J-4	161.6	469.9	952.8	1249.4	480.3
Plan, Pol & Prog, J-5	58.8	102.2	144.2	214.3	91.2
C ³ & Compu Sys, J-6	196.0	280.0	395.6	444.5	121.6
HQ Commandant, HC	254.9	432.4	578.6	1041.2	106.4
Adjutant General, AG	206.5	316.2	398.3	483.2	257.6
Command Group, CS	30.9	70.4	108.5	135.2	95.8
Comptroller, CO	8.8	17.3	23.5	34.2	4.5
Legal Advisor, LA	16.2	26.4	33.5	41.5	5.9
Wash Liaison, WL	27.2	31.1	32.0	36.4	0
Public Affairs, PA	12.7	27.4	37.1	79.7	10.2
Cbt Cap Anal Gp, CA	7.4	26.0	24.9	30.9	7.8
Surgeon, SG	15.1	24.7	40.4	48.0	13.1
Provost Marshal, PM	1.1	5.4	13.2	20.1	5.8
Inspector Gen, IG	3.4	14.1	16.3	23.1	3.5
Facilities, FO*	0	0	0	0	121.0
Det 1, SACOS	<u>3.1</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>5.8</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>0.9</u>
TOTAL	\$1278.6	\$2320.2	\$3536.1	\$4942.5	\$1587.0

* Included with HC for FY83.

(U) GALLANT KNIGHT 83 marked the first time that the office of the Comptroller participated in an exercise as a player. The Comptroller determined there was a need to exercise finance and fiscal procedures to determine the adequacy of provisions to financially support deployed operations in the areas of military pay, currency supply, control of financial institutions, and contracting support. Participation by USARCENT and USCENAF components was excellent. The exercise achieved its primary objective of making components aware of financial management responsibilities during a contingency. Funds had to be obtained and accounted for, service personnel, especially in rear areas, required pay support; and local goods and services had to be paid for. Feedback indicated experience obtained during this exercise served component Comptroller elements well during real operations in support of non-USCENTCOM missions.²⁷

(U) Depicted in Figure 17 on the facing page and in Figures 18 and 19 below are cumulative quarterly obligations of the HQ USCENTCOM Operating Budget for 1983, showing all four quarters of Fiscal Year 1983 and the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1984 (October through December 1983).

27. GALLANT KNIGHT 83 After Action Report.

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Figure 18. Administrative Program by Element of Expense
(thousands of dollars)

<u>ELEMENT OF EXPENSE</u>	<u>—————FY83 (Cumulative)—————</u>				<u>FY84</u>
	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>
TDY	\$ 423.1	\$ 744.1	\$1174.2	\$1569.7	\$ 591.8
Airlift	0	220.0	592.1	796.2	343.6
Rental Vehicles	0	0.2	6.6	11.0	0
Trans of Things	12.8	14.7	14.5	22.4	0
Facilities Rental	55.1	53.9	57.0	54.3	6.3
Equipment Rental	104.8	147.4	203.7	170.3	133.8
Communications	53.0	89.7	127.2	156.7	46.0
Printing & Repro	2.4	5.8	8.2	13.4	0.8
Facilities Projects	16.4	35.0	44.7	120.1	0
Custodial Services	80.7	93.8	135.1	136.6	107.2
Purch Maintenance	68.8	93.2	97.2	113.0	165.4
Other Purch Svcs	92.5	102.4	110.7	158.2	17.7
Supplies	322.5	602.0	795.1	1342.6	155.4
Equipment	<u>46.5</u>	<u>118.0</u>	<u>169.8</u>	<u>278.0</u>	<u>19.0</u>
 TOTAL	 \$1278.6	 \$2320.2	 \$3536.1	 \$4942.5	 \$1587.0

Figure 19. Summary by Major Program
(thousands of dollars)

	FY83 (Cumulative)				FY84
<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>
MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM II					
Administration	\$1278.6	\$2320.2	\$3536.1	\$4942.5	\$1587.0
Exercises	<u>210.8</u>	<u>455.6</u>	<u>561.8</u>	<u>971.3</u>	<u>101.3</u>
TOTAL MFP II	\$1489.4	\$2775.8	\$4097.9	\$5913.8	\$1688.3
MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM III					
WWMCCS/ADP	\$ 31.9	\$ 62.0	\$ 378.5	\$ 573.8	\$ 160.6
MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM IX					
Official Rep	<u>3.6</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>
TOTAL OPERATIONS &					
MAINTENANCE FUNDS	\$1524.9	\$2841.9	\$4484.2	\$6498.6	\$1850.9
Military Assistance					
Program	<u>\$ 22.3</u>	<u>\$ 73.6</u>	<u>\$ 98.2</u>	<u>\$ 163.4</u>	<u>\$ 139.5</u>
GRAND TOTAL	\$1547.2	\$2915.5	\$4582.4	\$6662.0	\$1990.4

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(U) The USCENTCOM fiscal year 1983 operating program showed an increase of 93 percent over the previous year's program. This was attributable to the assumption of unified command status on 1 January 1983. Temporary duty (TDY) costs (an 87 percent increase) and the additional \$800,000 for special airlift reflected the price that had to be paid for assuming responsibility for an area several thousand miles from USCENTCOM's home base at MacDill AFB, Florida. In fiscal year 1983, USCENTCOM was able to obligate 99.9 percent of its funds. Large operations and maintenance items actually scheduled to hit late in the year, such as a Special Assignment Airlift Mission, the moving costs and partitions for Building 540 Phase II, and BRIGHT STAR 83, were fully funded. A total of \$232,000 in supply and equipment items ordered as fiscal year 1983 requirements but not delivered before 30 September 1983 were "pre-obligated," avoiding the need to use fiscal year 1984 dollars when the items were delivered. When fiscal year 1983 was over, all but \$5,000 of USCENTCOM's operations and maintenance funds was obligated, with all but \$1,000 of that left committed, as required by Air Force regulation. Due to travel fallout, i.e. actual travel expenditures being less than the funds initially obligated, \$2,600 went unspent in the Military Assistance Program after all requirements were satisfied.

(U) The Fiscal Year 1985 Operating Budget presented requirements totaling \$7.976 million. Per instructions, funds to support as-yet-unresolved POM issues, such as the USCENTCOM Forward Headquarters Element, were excluded. Also excluded were amounts for JCS-directed and coordinated exercises, a significant amount for the new command. The fiscal year 1985 force and financial plan figure of \$4.653 million, \$3.323 million less than stated requirements, would have to be increased to allow USCENTCOM to perform the mission for which it was created.²⁸

(U) The fiscal year 1984 financial plan presented requirements totaling \$7.881 million. It excluded funds to support the FHE, the deployed headquarters, and activities in the USCENTCOM AOR that were funded by USEUCOM in fiscal year 1983. These activities, which included a port liaison office in Nairobi, Kenya, a DOD position in the American Embassy in Djibouti, and a contingency planning group, were expected to require an additional \$200,000 based on USEUCOM estimates. The funded figure in the financial plan of \$5.752 million (considering the withholding of JCS-directed exercise funding)

28. HQ USCENTCOM OAC51, FY1985 Operating Budget, RCS: DD-COM(AR)1092, 7 Jan 1983, pp i-ii, FOUO.

would support minimum financial requirements of the command in garrison, but unfunded amounts were necessary for USCENTCOM to accomplish all of its assigned mission.²⁹

(U) Submission of the Military Assistance Program budget for USCENTCOM marked one of the last milestones in USCENTCOM's transition to full unified command status. Keyed to the assumption of the security assistance mission in fiscal year 1984, the budget requirements included operating costs of eleven Security Assistance Organizations, as well as for the headquarters Military Assistance Command support costs. Estimates reflected expenses chargeable to Military Assistance Executive funds for the USCENTCOM Headquarters, the Foreign Military Sales administrative account, embassy support, and host country "assistance-in-kind" support. Accelerated FMS charges were also included for US personnel and flying hour costs.³⁰

(U) The estimated dollar resources required to perform the security assistance mission for USCENTCOM were as follows:

29. HQ USCENTCOM OAC51, FY 1984 Financial Plan RCS DD-COMP(AR)1092, 9 May 1983, FOUO.

30. HQ USCENTCOM, Military Assistance Program (MAP) and MAAG Administrative and Overhead Budget FY 1985, 1 Jul 83, FOUO.

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
MAAGs	\$15,088.9	\$16,133.7
Headquarters	<u>2,209.8</u>	<u>2,313.3</u>
TOTAL	\$17,298.7	\$18,447.0

(U) The fiscal year 1984 Military Assistance Advisory Group dollar resources shown were \$2,488.9 (20 percent) higher than the fiscal year 1983 budget figures prepared by USEUCOM. Already high operational support costs were compounded by projected increases for nearly all of the countries in the region. Leased housing, utilities, transportation, and rapid wear-out of vehicles represented a high proportion of the support costs.³¹

SURGEON

(U) Within the Surgeon's Office, the transition of RDJTF to a unified command was made smoothly. During this period, several personnel changes were made. Sergeant Major (SGM)

31. Ibid.

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(b)(3),(b)(6) was selected for the Command Sergeant Major program and was subsequently transferred to the European Command and replaced by SGM (b)(3),(b)(6). The Deputy Surgeon, COL (b)(3),(b)(6), retired and was replaced by COL (b)(3),(b)(6). Also, LTC (b)(3),(b)(6), preventive medicine officer, was added to the surgeon's staff.

(U) Because of the ever-increasing workload and internal "growing pains" associated with the new commands and the emphasis placed on planning procedures, the approved Joint Manning Document did not provide sufficient administrative support to the surgeon's staff. Action was being taken to resolve this problem by requesting additional administrative personnel.

~~U (S/NOFORN)~~ From a medical point of view, exercise BRIGHT STAR 83 was the most successful of all USCENTCOM field training exercises. It was the first FTX in which medical support was provided by all component commands. In comparison to BRIGHT STAR 82, the 1983 exercise was several days longer, involved a larger medical support package, and provided the opportunity to medically support concurrent exercises in (b)(1)1.4(a). Emergency medical and routine support was provided by accompanying medical units in support of forces that deployed to the exercise area. The hospitalization capability established

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was austere and consisted of elements of the 5th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) at (b)(1)1.4(a) backed up by host nation hospitals. Treatment was limited to that essential for preparing patients for further evacuation. Those patients requiring treatment beyond the capabilities of deployed medical units were evacuated to fixed US military hospitals outside the exercise area. All suitable means of available transportation were used to evacuate patients. Patients requiring evacuation from (b)(1)1.4(a) were evacuated to the USS TARAWA, which was off that country's coast. Patients requiring evacuation from (b)(1)1.4(a) were evacuated to (b)(1)1.4(a). The medical support structure that was developed was designed to provide support for forces engaged in infantry, mechanized, and airborne training in (b)(1)1.4(a), in air operations in (b)(1)1.4(a), in amphibious operations in

(b)(1)1.4(a)

~~U (S/NOFORN)~~ The medical objectives of BRIGHT STAR 83 were to provide coordinating medical staff support to USCINCCENT, exercise staff supervision on medical matters, coordinate continuous medical support for care from the onset of illness or injury for expeditious return to duty or evacuation from the area. In addition, the Surgeon established preventive medicine programs and environmental health procedures commensurate with

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the environment, available resources, and existing priorities. He also insured appropriate medical regulating, whole blood procurement and distribution, and joint utilization of available and acceptable medical facilities, equipment and services, coordinated with J-6 to ensure adequate medical communications, monitored medical supply and medical maintenance to insure maximum efficiency and economy, and exercised technical control over US hospital assets.

U ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Efforts had to be made to improve coordination with higher and subordinate headquarters. Coordination also had to be improved among component commanders, as well as from components to their parent commands. Detailed planning was of little value unless coordinated with all concerned. In developing a "medical support force list," there had to be assurance that the selected units were designed and organized to perform the desired mission, were properly staffed with trained and qualified personnel, and were deployed with appropriate functional equipment. After meeting the above criteria, the unit and staff had to have a clear understanding of its mission and responsibilities. In addition, they had to have a well-defined chain of command. These criteria were not met in all instances, especially with preventive medicine units at Cairo West. Initially, some of the medical staffs were overly zealous and attempted to get involved in subordinate units' "business."

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U ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In addition to the weaknesses identified above, there were many positive aspects demonstrated during the planning and conduct of the exercise. In all, BRIGHT STAR 83 was a successful exercise from a medical point of view. It provided training and experience to numerous medical units and staffs in an environment which many had never experienced before. It proved that the medical community could adjust to changing needs, was technically qualified to perform the mission, and provided a valuable service during the exercise.

(U) In Somalia, a tri-service logistics medical training team reviewed Somalia's military medical posture and developed a five-year training program designed to enable the Somalis to become self-sufficient. The training plan was to begin at the basic aidman level and move up to medical and surgical specialties, as well as to gain experience in the supply, personnel, and patient affairs specialties. A USCENTCOM Navy Chief Corpsman remained in Somalia to assist in the design of a one-year Somalia-US medical civil affairs program and to coordinate the Somali effort during the BRIGHT STAR 83 medical civil affairs program.

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CHAPLAIN

(U) During 1983, the USCENTCOM Chaplain, Navy Captain (b)(3),(b)(6), initiated several programs. In October, he established a weekly noontime Bible study for the headquarters staff. Within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility, he arranged for the purchase and distribution of basic religious supplies for people assigned to the security assistance offices in Sudan, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia, and produced and delivered three video cassettes which presented an orientation to Islam for headquarters and component staffs. The Chaplain sponsored the first USCENTCOM component chaplains' conference on 2 and 3 November and, in coordination with the chief chaplains of the three Services, prepared a regulation for the USCENTCOM religious program.³²

(U) In personnel actions, the command chaplain billet was raised from O-5 to O-6 in the JMP, augmentation requirements were successfully revalidated, and the USCENTCOM's chaplain's initiatives were successful in establishing and filling a billet for a chaplain at Headquarters USNAVCENT. The chaplain also performed six weddings and six baptisms for the USCENTCOM staff.

32. USCENTCOM Regulation 161-1, "Command Religious Program," 1 Jan 83.

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(U) The Chaplain and his religious program specialist deployed to exercises GALLANT KNIGHT 83 and BRIGHT STAR 83, marking the first time USCINCCENT had coordinated program supervision for ministries during exercises. In November and December, the Chaplain made visits to Saudi Arabia and Sudan to assess religious needs and to minister to US military personnel assigned there.

COMBAT CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS GROUP

(U) On 1 July 1983, the Combat Capabilities Analysis Group observed its third full year of activity as a special staff agency of the RDJTF and later USCENTCOM. Throughout 1983, it remained subordinate to the Chief of Staff. During the year, the group continued its coordination and liaison with academic and defense research analysis centers and with private contractors involved in studies relevant to USCENTCOM's area of operations. During 1983, group officers performed numerous temporary duty (TDY) trips to various DOD agencies and senior service schools for conferences, wargaming research, and briefings to acquire and share information and study efforts.

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(U) The Combat Capabilities Analysis Group continued to produce finished printed studies, internal studies, and oral briefings to assist the command element of USCENTCOM. These products were in the areas of strategic studies, wargaming, planning, logistical analysis, and issues raised by subordinate headquarters, USCENTCOM directorates, and USCINCCENT. These studies normally involved a wide range of areas encompassing more than one headquarters staff section.

(U) ~~(C)~~ In August and September, the group was heavily committed in supporting Operation BRIGHT STAR with three officers deployed to the AOR. One was assigned as liaison officer with the embassy in Oman prior to the exercise, another was assigned as liaison officer to the Sudanese embassy, and the third served as an evaluator on the IG team.

(U) ~~(C)~~ In March, three officers from the group participated in Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 83 held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Two members served as the director and a member of the battle management cell, while a third served as an evaluator on the IG team.

(U) ~~(S)~~ In June, two officers from the group represented the command at the National Defense University War Game, exercise PROUD PROPHET 83. This exercise involved three weeks of

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preparation and two weeks of play. Its scenario concerned a Soviet invasion of Pakistan.

(U) ~~(C)~~ LTC (b)(6) was requested as a temporary replacement to the Coordination Planning Group in Saudi Arabia from January to March. He served as an advisor on AWACS support and acted as advisor to the Royal Saudi Air Force, Saudi Land Forces, Signal Corps, and Air Defense Command.

(U) ~~(C)~~ During 1983, the Combat Capabilities Analysis Group represented USCENTCOM in the developing area of Modern Aids to Planning (MAP). In June, two officers went to a symposium at Lawrence-Livermore Laboratories, California, to share views and ideas with other commands involved in MAP. An additional trip was made to Washington, DC, in September, to bring representatives of the unified and specified commands together to discuss the level of MAP participation by each command. The group informally presented the command's requirements at a meeting hosted by the JCS and the Studies and Gaming Agency (SAGA). In October, four officers visited Martin-Marietta in Orlando, Florida, for MAP briefings by that organization. The group remained the focal point for identifying USCENTCOM's MAP requirements. Further study in this area continued into 1984.

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(U) Two officers were selected to attend the Foreign Area International Seminar conducted by the State Department in January and June 1983.

(b)1.4(a)

(U) Other major activities in which the group participated included the XVIII Airborne Corps Exercise WAREX II held at Fort Bragg during February and the Defense Science Board Summer Study held in Washington, DC, during August.

(U) During 1983, the group produced, encouraged, reviewed and coordinated defense research and analysis in direct support of USCINCCENT and component commanders' missions plans and operations. That research produced the following published studies:

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- (U) The Potential for Boundary Conflict in Southwest Asia (3 January 1983).
- (U) Persian Gulf Oil as a Vital Interest (15 April 1983).
- (U) Environmental Impact Report (26 May 1983).

(b)(1)1.4a

- (U) Research and Analysis Topics in Support of the US Central Command: A Guide to Research Topics (26 October 1983).

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LIAISON

(U) At USCENTCOM headquarters, there were a number of liaison officers assigned to facilitate mission accomplishment. These included liaison offices from two specified commands, SAC and MAC, from agencies as diverse as the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the United States Coast Guard, from specialized DOD agencies such as the Defense Fuels Supply Center, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Military Transportation Management Command, the Military Sealift Command, and the Defense Communications Agency Field Office.

(U) While most of these liaison offices consisted of one person who was often "dual-hatted" as an advisor to USREDCOM as well as to USCENTCOM, the Strategic Air Command had a liaison cell of five persons specifically assigned to provide advice and assistance to USCINCCENT.

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(U) Detachment 1, Strategic Air Combat Operations Staff, as this liaison cell was officially known, consisted of a commander/bomber planner, an intelligence officer, a reconnaissance planning officer, a tanker planning officer, and an administrative supervisor. The commander was also responsible for a geographically separated unit at Shaw AFB, South Carolina, collocated with USCENTAF. This operating location consisted of a director/logistics planner, a bomber planning officer, and a tanker planning officer. The USCENTCOM liaison officer reported to the HQ SAC deputy chief of staff for operations plans, Maj Gen Harley A. Hughes.

(U) The mission of the USCENTCOM liaison office was to provide support to USCENTCOM and USCENTAF for the inclusion of SAC capabilities into the concept of operations for HQ USCENTCOM. Also, the office provided liaison and continuity among SAC, USCENTCOM, and USCENTAF through its MacDill and Shaw liaison offices.

(U) In November, the SAC liaison office was involved in the inception and development of the USCENTCOM Master Priority List. The SAC liaison office served as a focal point between USCENTCOM and HQ SAC in determining the ranking of SAC contingency wartime programs in the overall unified command's program priorities.

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(U) The SAC liaison office spearheaded efforts to acquire an EC-135Y C³ aircraft for USCENTCOM. Robins AFB, Georgia was selected as the beddown location for the aircraft. In November, a NKC-135A previously assigned to the Air Force Systems Command, was delivered to E-Systems, Greenville, Texas, to be reconfigured to an EC-135Y. This aircraft was scheduled to be delivered to SAC early in 1984, but most of the work had been completed by the end of 1983. The Memorandum of Agreement between HQ SAC and USCENTCOM concerning the operation of the EC-135Y was being developed and coordinated by both commands at the end of the year.

~~U (C)~~ During 1983, the SAC liaison office was instrumental in developing a program to interface the collection capabilities of the RC-135 with the battlefield management mission of the E-3A AWACS. This resulted in the theater commander being able to utilize the real-time collection capability of a strategic reconnaissance asset in tactical operations.

(U) SAC forces were extensively involved in BRIGHT STAR 83. Major forces included three B-52Hs from the 28th Bombardment Wing at Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota, which deployed to Cairo West, from where they flew exercise employment sorties. Four SAC KC-10s also deployed to Cairo West and provided air refueling support for F-111, E-3A, and AC-130 aircraft. The KC-10s

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refueled US Navy aircraft and Egyptian Air Force F-4s. In the

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(U) Throughout 1983, the SAC liaison office worked closely with USCENTAF in the QUICK FORCE and QUICK THRUST exercises. Low-altitude, minimum-communication air refueling tactics were refined in these exercises, which were designed to allow TAC and SAC forces to train together. Both commands employed the same operational concepts which they were planning to use in actual contingencies in Southwest Asia.

(U) Similar tasks were performed by the other specified command which had a liaison office assigned to USCENTCOM. The Military Airlift Command liaison officer deployed on both GALLANT KNIGHT 83 and BRIGHT STAR 83. In the latter exercise, Lt Col C. (b)(6) the MAC liaison officer, played a key role in the development of the redeployment airflow from the AOR back to the CONUS. Colonel (b)(6) also worked as a member of the Crisis Action Team during the EARLY CALL deployment of forces to Sudan, the ARID FARMER deployment of F-15s and tankers to Sudan in August, and the RUBBER WALL resupply of Lebanese armed forces via Cairo West in September.

U ~~(S)~~ Both Colonel (b)(6) and his successor as MAC liaison officer, Col (b)(6) worked on special projects during the year. The most notable of these was in providing MAC expertise and knowledge in the development of the USCENTCOM Master Priority List, the Chemical Ammunition Logistics Workshop,

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the development of a command plan for recovery of nuclear weapons in the AOR, and the preparation of the three volumes of the PORT GRAND plan, which was designed to keep open the Straits of Hormuz. In its ongoing efforts, the MAC liaison office continued to furnish information, rationale, and statistics to the Command Group and staff regarding MAC operations. In particular, in support of USCINCCENT's presentations to Congress, the office provided data and rationale for the development and production of the C-17 as the long-range solution to eliminate the projected shortfall in airlift after the 1990s.

(U) In June 1983, the Defense Fuel Supply Center established a liaison officer with the US Central Command. Responsibilities of the liaison office were to serve as the single point of contact for deliberate planning and crisis action for the Defense Fuel Supply Center. The liaison officer was also to plan, coordinate, and execute the center's involvement in field training and command post exercises, and to maintain close liaison with the US Central Command Joint Petroleum Office and petroleum staffs of the command's components.

(U) The Defense Fuel Supply Center liaison officer was instrumental in coordinating fuel requirements for BRIGHT STAR 83, ARID FARMER, and RUBBER WALL. Of significance during the BRIGHT STAR 83 field training exercise was the successful

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negotiation of a memorandum of understanding with the Egyptian government for resupply of petroleum products to all exercise locations. Real-world contingency force deployments during ARID FARMER and RUBBER WALL further established the effectiveness of the liaison office. Real-world petroleum support requirements were coordinated with the Defense Fuel Supply Center to permit it to deploy a team to Sudan in sufficient time to orchestrate resupply for ARID FARMER and to extend the memorandum of understanding with Egypt to permit support of RUBBER WALL.

(U) The Defense Intelligence Agency Representative, a US Army Lieutenant Colonel, served USCINCENT as the personal representative of the Director, DIA. Working closely with members of the USCENTCOM Intelligence Directorate, J-2, the DIA Representative coordinated defense intelligence support and provided advice to the USCINCENT and his staff. During 1983, that support included DIA participation in major exercises, coordination of visitor activities, establishing working relationships between DIA and USCENTCOM elements, and assisting in the resolution of intelligence-related issues.

(U) The office of the DIA Representative, newly established in August 1982, had many administrative tasks to complete in 1983 in order to institutionalize the position: statements of organization, mission, and functions were written and

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promulgated; office space, furniture, supplies, and equipment were obtained; and efforts were taken to apprise US Central Command staff elements regarding the functions of the new office.

(U) During 1983, the participation of the DIA Representative in three major USCENTCOM exercises established a precedent for continued DIA support. New ground was broken in all of these exercises since DIA had never before sent a representative to a unified command exercise. During GALLANT KNIGHT 83 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, held from 15 to 22 March 1983, the DIA Representative to the USREDCOM Joint Exercise Control Group served at the same time as a central point of contact to assist USCENTCOM with its defense intelligence requirements. For BRIGHT STAR 83, the DIA Representative went to Washington, DC, from 9 to 12 August to coordinate current intelligence support requirements for USCENTCOM's deployed headquarters. In BOLD EAGLE 84, held from 16 to 20 October 1983 at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, the DIA Representative served in an advisory and liaison capacity for both the Joint Exercise Control Group and the Joint Task Force Headquarters. Throughout all these exercises, the DIA Representative studied concepts for improving national-level intelligence support to a deployed headquarters of a joint task force, working closely with both the supported command and his parent agency. The result was a strong DIA commitment to provide increased support in the future and the

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development of a deployable communications system to go with a supported command or to join it later in the field. This concept, termed "National Military Intelligence Support Terminal," was being staffed within the Defense Intelligence Agency at the end of the year.

(U) Other activities involving the DIA Representative in 1983 included liaison support to operation EARLY CALL, arranging visitor itineraries, participation in a DIA command representatives' conference in Washington, DC, and coordinating staff interaction on a proposal for a Joint Intelligence Production Facility. During USCENTCOM's EARLY CALL operation in February 1983, the DIA Representative assisted the J-2 in coordinating requirements for intelligence support to the USCENTCOM staff element which deployed to the theater. Throughout 1983, there were many visitors from DIA who came to USCENTCOM. The DIA Representative arranged itineraries for distinguished visitors from DIA and assisted USCENTCOM staff members in arranging visits to DIA. In May, all five of the DIA representatives worldwide gathered for the first time in Washington, DC, to receive current briefings at DIA and to discuss issues of common concern. The other commands with DIA Representatives were SAC, PACOM, EUCOM, and SHAPE. A DIA Liaison Officer from the Joint Electronic Warfare Center also attended the conference.

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(U) A major initiative was advanced in 1983 in the form of USCENTCOM's concept for a Joint Intelligence Production Facility at MacDill Air Force Base. The DIA Representative spent many weeks coordinating the efforts of DIA, USCENTCOM J-2, and USREDCOM J-2 in addressing the issue of enhanced intelligence production support at MacDill.

(U) Another liaison function was the Defense Communications Agency Field Office at MacDill AFB. This office, working with DCA headquarters, provided technical assistance to J-6 during exercises, whether held within or outside of the CONUS. This technical assistance focused on entering and using the Defense Communications System and on activating the leased circuits required to support these exercises, which included GALLANT KNIGHT 83, BOLD EAGLE 83, and BRIGHT STAR 83. The DCA Field Office also provided technical assistance for EARLY CALL.

(U) The DCA completed installation of the noncommunications positions of the first phase of the USCENTCOM command center during the year. The major equipment which was installed included an information display system and an audiovisual system which linked various conference rooms in the headquarters building: the main conference room, the USCINCCENT's conference room, the J-2 and J-3 conference rooms, and the Crisis Action Team command post, as well as projection equipment in the various

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conference rooms, map boards, and wall displays. In addition, DCA completed an engineering study for the second phase of the command center which was planned to be installed in 1984.

U ~~(S)~~ During 1983, DCA published four technical reports which were relevant to USCENTCOM. The only one of these reports which was not unclassified concerned the entire Southwest Asia communications program. This report provided both engineering and financial information about extending the defense communications system into Southwest Asia through communications nodes at selected locations in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. It addressed not only facilities located on the landmass of Southwest Asia, but also all USEUCOM and USPACOM facilities which could provide C³ support to operations in the USCENTCOM theater. This report was an important contribution in the development of USCENTCOM communications infrastructure.

(U) Another technical report concerned defense satellite communications support for USCENTCOM. Because the command was so dependent on satellite communications, the DCA Field Office asked DCA headquarters to do a study of satellite communications support to Southwest Asia. In this study, near- and mid-term defense satellite communications capacity was evaluated against operational requirements. The study revealed that approximately one-third of USCENTCOM's stated requirements could be satisfied

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by a combination of existing and planned space segments. This information became a major factor in planning for exercises and contingencies, in Southwest Asia communications infrastructure plans, and in future satellite requirements planning.

(U) A third technical report concerned the joint multi-channel trunking and switching system. This report was produced by DCA in response to a USREDCOM ROC, utilizing one of USCENTCOM's Southwest Asian scenarios. It addressed communications requirements for an extended deployment in the AOR and influenced the development of USCENTCOM's ROCs 1-83, 2-83, and 3-83.

(U) The last DCA technical report for 1983 was for an overall communications program plan. In response to a tasking from the Secretary of Defense, DCA carried out a technical analysis of the communications equipment requirements of USCENTCOM and its components. Pointing out the shortfalls made a significant contribution to the Defense Resource Board's identification of the \$277,000,000 required over a five-year period for USCENTCOM to acquire the communications equipment it needed to carry out its assigned mission.

(U) In early August 1983, the United States Information Agency videotape on USCENTCOM was completed. The twenty-minute

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tape was a straightforward explanation of USCENTCOM's role in the AOR. In addition to action footage of all of USCENTCOM's elements during exercises and interviews with Generals Kingston, Taylor, and Van Den Elzen, the tape showed Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Undersecretary of State Eagleburger on camera explaining USCENTCOM's broad military and diplomatic role in its area of responsibility. Immediately after the tape was completed by USIA in Washington, the command's Foreign Public Affairs Advisor, Mr Brian Bell, a USIA senior foreign service officer, and Col (b)(6) USMC, Chief of the J-5 Policy Branch, went to the field and showed the videotape to country teams at seven selected US embassies in the AOR. Most ambassadors or charges instructed their staffs to make maximum use of the tape. Later, USIA prepared a voice-over copy of the tape in Arabic, as well as in several other languages, to permit wide use throughout the AOR.

(U) In August 1982, the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard and the Commander in Chief, United States Readiness Command agreed to establish a Coast Guard liaison officer billet at MacDill AFB. The officer assigned to this billet would be retained on the Coast Guard rolls and would be assigned primarily to the Joint Deployment Agency with collateral duties as liaison officer to USREDCOM and the RDJTF (soon to become USCENTCOM). The O-5 billet was initially filled on 1 October 1982. The Coast

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Guard liaison officer divided his time between JDA, USREDCOM, and USCENTCOM.

(U) During calendar year 1983, Commander (b)(6) USCG, the incumbent, worked actions for J-3, J-4, J-5, and the Provost Marshal. The USCG liaison officer deployed to Fort Bragg for GALLANT KNIGHT 83 and assisted in the planning and execution of Coast Guard personnel deployment and employment during that exercise. The USCG liaison officer presented a Coast Guard briefing to J-4 and J-5 personnel, including MG David E. Watts. The Coast Guard's primary areas of involvement with USCENTCOM were port security, harbor defense, and rear area protection. In this regard, the Coast Guard liaison officer attended meetings and briefings and regularly maintained personal contact with USCENTCOM action officers to keep abreast of pertinent matters.

~~U (C)~~ The National Security Agency representative to USCENTCOM provided USCINCCENT and each of his directorates and special staffs with SIGINT and COMSEC advice and assistance. This service was accomplished through liaison and exchange with appropriate NSA elements, from both the headquarters at MacDill AFB and from deployed locations during exercises. The NSA representative was also dual-hatted to USREDCOM. To assist him in providing support to both commands, he was supported by the

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chiefs of the respective cryptologic support groups at USCENTCOM and USREDCOM, who also served as the deputy NSA representatives, to their commands.

(U) The Political Advisor was a US senior Foreign Service officer who provided advice and assistance on political matters to USCINCCENT and the USCENTCOM staff. The POLAD, Mr. (b)(6)

(b)(6) maintained a close working relationship with senior State and Defense Department officials, as well as with US Ambassadors in USCENTCOM's AOR. He assured that USCINCCENT received all available sensitive and relevant political information. The POLAD travelled to Washington to coordinate key issues for USCINCCENT and accompanied him on all his OCONUS trips. These trips and the ambassadorial visits arranged by the POLAD to HQ USCENTCOM helped to establish rapport between the command and the State Department. The POLAD also established and chaired the Central Liaison Group which took over responsibilities from the American Consul General, Stuttgart, for noncombatant evacuation operations for USCENTCOM's AOR.

(U) On 15 and 16 February, Mr. (b)(6) visited NATO headquarters in Belgium to develop an understanding in NATO of USCENTCOM's role. The resultant bilateral briefings to other NATO countries by the US Mission assisted in developing avenues for future bilateral cooperation with USCENTCOM in its AOR.

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(U) An Air Force officer, Maj [REDACTED] (b)(6) was assigned to be the Military Assistant to the Political Advisor. He coordinated among the military elements of USCENTCOM's staff and assisted Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6) in developing the State Department-USCENTCOM relationship. As a result of the POLAD's many travels, Major [REDACTED] (b)(6) assumed the duties of the POLAD in his absence and his position title was changed to "Deputy Political Advisor." Establishment of this position gave the Political Advisor's office the flexibility of both military and political experience in developing advice to USCINCCENT.

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DISTINGUISHED VISITORS
TO
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

1983

JANUARY

4	Mr. (b)(6) Assistant Associate Director for Mobilization Preparedness, Federal Emergency Management Agency
5	Lieutenant General Lincoln D. Faurer (USAF) Director, National Security Agency
6	Colonel (b)(6) (USAF) Vice Commander, 56 TTW
10-11	Dr. (b)(6) Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical Matters
10-12	1983 Air War College Field Trip
13	Brigadier General Thomas A. Baker Deputy Director of Operations, HQ USAF
13	Major General Elvin R. Heiberg III (USA) Deputy Commander, Corps of Engineers
14	The Honorable Edward V. Hickey, Jr. Assistant to the President and Director, White House Military Office
16-17	The Honorable Lelio Lagorio Minister of Defense of the Italian Republic
16-17	Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO) House Armed Services Committee
18	Admiral James Gracey Commandant of the Coast Guard
18	Vice Admiral Kenneth M. Carr Vice Director of Strategic Target Planning, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff and Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic/Atlantic Fleet (designate)

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- 18 Lieutenant General Harry Griffith (USA)
Director, Defense Nuclear Agency
- 18-19 The Honorable Nicholas A. Veliotis
Assistant Secretary of State for Near East
and South Asian Affairs
- 19 Lieutenant General George Fricaud-Chagnaud
Chief, French Military Mission to AFCENT
- 21 The Honorable Francis J. West, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Affairs
- 21 Lieutenant General Mario Gariboldi
Vice Chief of Staff, Logistics and Services
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
- 24 Colonel (b)(6)
Commander of the Army, Luxembourg
- 24 Chief Master Sergeant (b)(6)
Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force

FEBRUARY

- 1 Major General Vito J. Castellano
Adjutant General, State of New York
- 1 Major General Bruce M. Davidson (USAF Reserve)
Mobilization Assistant to the Secretary of the
Air Force
- 2-3 Vice Admiral Thomas J. Bigley
Director of Plans and Policy, J-5, OJCS
- 2-3 Rear Admiral Robert P. Hilton
Vice Director for Operations, J-3, OJCS
- 3-5 Admiral Karamat Rahman Niazi
Chief of the Naval Staff, Pakistan
- 4 Dr. (b)(6)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Information Systems

- 8 Commodore Oakley E. Osborn
Command Duty Officer (CDO) at the National
Military Command Center
- 9 General Jack Catton (USAF, Ret)
Corporate Vice President, Lockhewed Corporation and
Former Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command
- 10 Major General Thomas G. Darling (USAF)
Commandant, Armed Forces Staff College
- 10 Mr. (b)(6)
Staff Director for Senator Stevens (D-AK),
Senate Appropriations Committee
- Colonel (b)(6)
Chief of Congressional Liaison, Office of the
Comptroller of the Army
- Colonel (b)(6)
Chief of Legislative Liaison, Office of the
Comptroller of the Air Force
- 10 Mr. (b)(6)
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Regional Director, Region IV (Atlanta)
- Mr. (b)(6)
FEMA Regional Director, Region VI (Denton, TX)
- 10-11 The Honorable Chester A. Crocker
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
- 11 RADM William J. Ryan
Commander, Defense Fuel Supply Center
- 11 Brigadier General James D. Smith
Assistant Division Commander for Support,
82d Airborne Division
- 11 The Reverend (b)(6)
Ecclesiastical Endorsing Agent for the
Lutheran Church - Missouri, Synod
- 14 Brigadier General David W. Forgan (USAF)
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations,
Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT)

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- 15 Brigadier General Donald C. Hilbert
Assistant Vice Director for Estimates, DIA
- 15 Lieutenant General Robert T. Herres (USAF)
Director, Command, Control, Communications
Systems, OJCS
- 15 Major General Ames S. Albro, Jr.
Director, Military Programs,
Office of the Civil Engineer, HQ DA
- 16 Mr. (b)(6)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Programs and Integration, Manpower, Reserve
Affairs and Logistics
Office of the Civil Engineer, HQ DA
- 16-17 Brigadier John Foley
Director, Special Air Service, United Kingdom
- 18 Lieutenant General Jerome F. O'Malley
Vice Chief of Staff, HQ USAF
- 22-23 Lieutenant General Bernard T. Mitemeyer (USA)
The Surgeon General, U.S. Army
- 24 Lieutenant General W. F. Ulmer, Jr.
Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood
- 25 10th Air Force Plans Officers' Conference
- 25 National Defence College (Canada)
- 25 The Honorable Paul Thayer
Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Rear Admiral Donald F. Jones
Military Assistant to Mr. Thayer
- 28 Defense Orientation Conference Association
- 28Feb- Commodore James M.G. Seely
2 Mar Chief JCS Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency
(SAGA)

MARCH

- 2 Tampa Leadership Conference
- 3 The Honorable John O. Marsh
Secretary of the Army
- 4-7 Mr. (b)(6)
House Appropriations Committee (HAC) Staff Member
- Mr. (b)(6)
HAC Defense Subcommittee
- 8-9 Major General Clifton Kapp
Commander, 416th Engineer Command, USA Reserve
- Brigadier General Max Baratz
Deputy Commander, 416th Engineer Command,
USA Reserve
- 9-10 Ambassador David Schneider
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Near East and South Asia
- Mr. (b)(6)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Near East
Bureau
- Mr. (b)(6)
Director, South Asian Affairs, Near East Bureau,
Department of State
- Mr. (b)(6)
Director, Egyptian Affairs, Near East Bureau,
Department of State
- 9-11 Major General Clarence E. Mcknight, Jr.
Commander, US Army Communications Command
- Brigadier General John T. Myers
Deputy Commander, US Army Communications Command
- 9-11 Major General Neil L. Eddins
Chief, US Military Training Mission (USMTM),
Saudi Arabia
- 10-11 Major General Earl G. Peck
Director, Intelligence and Space Policy
Office of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy (ODUSD-P)

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- 11 Major General Edward C. O'Connor
Director, Operations, Readiness, and
Mobilization, ODCS, OPS, HQ DA
- 16 Air Force ROTC Tour (Southern Illinois University)
- 23 General Glenn K. Otis
Commander in Chief, US Army Europe (Designee)
- 24 MAC Civic Leaders Tour
- 24-25 Major General Edward L. Tixier
Chief OMC Cairo
- 29 Mr. (b)(6)
Professional Staff Member, Senate
Appropriations Committee
- Mr. (b)(6)
General Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee
- 30 Major General Duane H. Cassidy
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
Headquarters Military Airlift Command
- 30 Representative Jamie L. Whitten (D-MS)
Chairman, House Appropriations Committee

APRIL

- 3-4 Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Massachusetts)
Senate Armed Services Committee
- 4 Mr. David A. Trippier
Member of Parliament, United Kingdom
- 4 Brigadier General Stuard E. Barstad
Deputy Chief of Air Force Chaplains
- 5 Altus AFB Civic Leaders Tour
- 5 National Security Agency Military Operations Panel

11 Minister Yoon Sung Min
Minister of National Defense,
Republic of Korea

11 Mr. (b)(6)
Chairman, Scientific Advisory Committee,
Defense Intelligence Agency

11 Rear Admiral Charles E. Gurney III
COMIDEASTFOR

11-12 Rear Admiral Robert E. Kirksey
Director, Strategy Plans and Policy Division, OP-60
CINCPAC J5 Designee

12-15 Members of the Capstone Orientation Course

13-14 Mr. (b)(6)
Deputy Director, Office of Security Assistance
and Sales,
Department of State

15 Lieutenant General Jack N. Merritt
Director, Joint Staff, Office of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (Designate)

18 General Kim Yoon Ho
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Republic of Korea

20 Major General William E. Odom
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

20-21 Pakistan National Defense College Tour

22 Brigadier General Robert O. Petty
Director, Defense Communications System
Organization, DCA

22 Mr. (b)(6)
Acting Deputy Director, Directorate of Energy and
Transportation Policy, OSD

28 Major General Evan L. Hultman
Commander, 103rd Corps Support Command

29 Senator Lawton M. Chiles (D-Fl)
Member of the Senate Appropriations and
Budget Committees

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MAY

1-2 Brigadier General Harry E. Soyster
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Intelligence Systems Automation, HQ DA

3-4 Major General C. D. Smith
Deputy Director, Strategic Mobility, J4, JCS

5 Lieutenant General George M. Browning, Jr.
Comptroller of the Air Force

5 Members of the British Defence Staff

5 Mr. (b)(6)
National Security Agency Representative for
Defense

9-10 Colonel (b)(6)
Deputy Commander, Royal Brunei Malay Regiment

9 Brigadier General George R. Robertson
Division Engineer, US Army Engineer Division,
Middle East
Office of the Civil Engineer, HQ DA

12-13 Mr. (b)(6)
Director, Africa Region, OSD/ISA

Mr. (b)(6)
National Security Council

13 Major General George B. Crist (USMC)
Vice Director Joint Staff/Inspector General, OJCS

16 General Wolfgang Altenburg
Inspector General, Armed Forces of the
Federal Republic of Germany

17-18 Mr. (b)(6)
Deputy Chief of Mission Designate, United Arab
Emirates

Mr. (b)(6)
Deputy Chief of Mission Designate,
Ethiopia

Mrs. (b)(6)
Public Affairs Officer Designate, US Embassy,
United Arab Emirates

17-18 Rear Admiral John F. Addams
COMIDEASTFOR Designate

Rear Admiral Stanley R. Arthur
COMUSNAVCENT

Commodore Alvin S. Newman
COMUSNAVCENT Designate

Commodore Paul D. Butcher
CTF 73/75 Designate

18-19 Mr. (b)(6)
Director of East African Affairs (AF/E),
Department of State

Mr. (b)(6)
Director of Pol Mil/Policy Analysis,
Department of State

23-25 Major General Ahn Chul Ho
Deputy Chief of Staff, ROK-US CFC

24 Italian Air Force, 51st Class, Air War College

25 Mr. (b)(6)
National Security Agency

25 Commander (b)(6)
Naval Commander, Australian Joint Warfare
Establishment

26 Tampa Chamber of Commerce

31 Major General Richard A. Burpee
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and
Operations, Headquarters, US Air Force

30-31 Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee

Mr. (b)(6)
Seapower and Strategic Force Projection Subcommittee

Mr. (b)(6)
Preparedness Subcommittee

Mr. (b)(6)
Personnel Subcommittee

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JUNE

1 Dr. (b)(6)
Assistant Director, National Security and Space
Directorate, Office of Science and Technology

5-7 Major General Spence M. Armstrong
Chief of United States Training Mission (USMTM),
Saudi Arabia

8 The Honorable William C. Harrop
United States Ambassador to Kenya

8-9 Sir (b)(6)
United Kingdom Ambassador to the United States

9-10 Mr. (b)(6)
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

10 Brigadier General (P) Kenneth C. Leuer
Assistant Commandant, US Army Infantry School;
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (Designee)
8th Army and CFC, Korea

12-13 The Honorable Alvin Adams
US Ambassador to Djibouti

The Honorable Frank H. Perez
Deputy Chief Mission (Designate) Ankara, Turkey

13-17 Egyptian Contingency Support Delegation

15 Sudan Orientation Training Tour

15-17 Brigadier General Claude T. Ivey
Chief, Office of Defense Representative,
Pakistan (Designate)

17 Lieutenant General Mohamed Ali Samantar
First Vice President and Minister of Defense,
Somali Democratic Republic

26-28 Brigadier General Stanton R. Musser
Chief, Office of Military Cooperation, Cairo
(Designate)

27 Major General Richard M. Wells
Director, Defense Mapping Agency

- 27-28 General Ferdinand (Von Senger) und Etterlin
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe
- 30 Brigadier General James B. Davis
Director Personnel Program, Office of Deputy Chief
of Staff, Manpower and Personnel, USAF
- 30 General Wallace H. Nutting
Commander in Chief, United States Readiness
Command

JULY

- 1 The Honorable Hume A. Horan
US Ambassador to Sudan (designate)
- 5 Lieutenant General John J. Murphy
Commander, 15th Air Force
- Brigadier General Samuel H. Swart, Jr.
Commander, 57th Air Division
- 10-11 Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Mr. [REDACTED]
Defense Analysts, House Budget Committee
- 14-15 Rear Admiral William J. Ryan
Commander, Defense Fuel Supply Center
- 15 Dr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Director of Installation Planning, OSD (MRA&1)
- 18-20 Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Deputy Chief, Operations Office, National
Security Agency
- 19 Mr. Bob Dudney
US News and World Report
- 23-25 Air Chief Marshal Sir [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Chief, Australian Defence Force Staff
- Air Vice-Marshal [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Head, Australian Defence Staff and Defence
Attache to Washington, D.C.
- 26 Major General Richard A. Scholtes
Commander, Joint Special Operations

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- 27-28 Sudan Orientation Training Tour
- 28 Brigadier General William M. MacInnes
Deputy Commander, New Jersey Air National Guard
- 28-29 Major General El Sir Mohamed Ahmed
Director of Military Intelligence
Sudanese People's Armed Forces

AUGUST

- 1-2 Ambassador Frances Cook
Consul General, Alexandria (Designate)
- 4-5 Brigadier O. P. Sabharwal
Defence, Military and Naval Attache
Embassy of India
- 11-13 Brigadier General Abdal Hafiz Marei Falah Khannan
Director of Military Intelligence,
Jordanian Armed Forces
- 12 Major General Jack W. Waters
Commander, International Logistics Center (AFLC)
- 15 Brigadier General Bernard L. Weiss
Director of Contracting and Manufacturing
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Research, Development, Ande Acquisitio,
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- 17-18 Mr. (b)(6)
Deputy Chief of Mission, Djibouti
- 18 Brigadier General Bernard H. Thorn
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- 19 Major General John D. Kelly
General Officer Commanding, Field Force Command
and
Brigadier General R. A. Sunderland
Army Attache to Washington, DC
Australian Army

SEPTEMBER

6-7 Lieutenant General William J. Livsey
Commanding General
Third US Army

8-9 Lieutenant General Richard H. Thompson
Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics
Department of the Army

11-12 Ambassador David E. Zweifel
US Ambassador to Yemen
and
Ambassador Donald Leidel
US Ambassador to Bahrain (Designate)
and
Ambassador Charles Dunbar
US Ambassador to Qatar (Designate)
Department of State

19 Brigadier General Robert G. Lynn
Deputy Director for Tactical Theater,
Command and Control Communications Systems
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

23 Honorable Vicent Puritano
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

23 Rear Admiral Paul D. Tomb
Deputy Director
Strategic C3 Systems
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

23 Mr. (b)(6) (+ 8)
The Defense Committee
Federal Republic of Germany Parliament

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Assistant Deputy Director of Operations
NSA (plus members NSA/DIA support team)

27-30 Lieutenant Colonel (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Commander, Bahrain Coast Guard

28 Colonel (b)(6)
Chief of Intelligence
Kenyan Armed Forces

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29 Brigadier General Stanton R. Musser
Chief, OMC Cairo

30 Sep- His Excellency [REDACTED] (b)(6)
1 Oct Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Sultanate of Oman

OCTOBER

3 Major General William E. Klein
Vice Director of Plans and Policy, J5
Joint Chiefs of Staff

3 Major General Edward Furdson
(Retired, British Army)
Defense Correspondent
London Daily Telegraph

3-4 Lieutenant General Sir Edward Burgess
Commander, United Kingdom Field Army and
Inspector General, Territorial Army
and
Major General John G. Chapple
Director Military Operations (DMO)
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6 Royal College of Defence Studies
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12-13 Ms. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
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Army Corps of Engineers

13 Ambassador Gerald E. Thomas
Ambassador to Kenya (Designate)

13 Vice Admiral William H. Rowden
Commander
Military Sealift Command

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17-18 European Attaches

18 NATO Senior Political Committee

20 Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
President

and

Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Vice President
AVCO Corporation

27 Dr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
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and

Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Assistant Deputy Director
Plans and Policy DIA

and

Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Director of Intelligence Resources, OSD

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31 NSA Class (CY 600)

31 Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Director, Special Advisory Staff
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

NOVEMBER

1-3 Admiral Harry D. Train, USN (Retired)
General/Flag Officer Capstone Course

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and
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- 8-9 Mr. (b)(6)
Deputy Chief, Near East
and
Mr. (b)(6)
Branch Chief, Horn of Africa
and
Mr. (b)(6)
Branch Chief, Iran
- 9 General Lawrence A. Skantze
Vice Chief of Staff USAF
and
Brigadier General Vittoriano Giachini
Defense and Air Attache from Italy
- 15-16 Field Marshal Sir (b)(6)
British Chief of Defence Staff
and
Major General Thomas A. Boam
United Kingdom Defence Attache
- 15-17 Brigadier General Claude T. Ivey
Chief, Office of the Defense Representative
Pakistan
- 17 Mrs. (b)(6)
Director of the Program Evaluation & Methodology
Division
- 22 Strategic Studies Group
- 28 His Excellency Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri
President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan
and
Mr. (b)(6)
Sudan Ambassador to the US
and
Lieutenant General Abdelsalam Saleh Eissa
Commander of the Medical Corp
and
Brigadier General Ahmed Mohamed Osman Hussein
Military Defense Air and Naval Attache
- 29 Tampa Area Retired General/Flag Officer Briefings

29-30

(b)(6) and (b)(6)
House Appropriations Committee, Surveys and
Investigations

30

Atlantic Civic Leaders
Mr. (b)(6) US Congressman
and
Brigadier General Bassnett

DECEMBER

6

Mr. (b)(6)
Executive Director American Legion, Washington D.C.

7

Brigadier General Cook
USMC, Deputy J-3, EUCOM

8-9

Brigadier General Bobby Brashears
Dep Dir for Plans and Policy, HQ USPACOM

12

Lieutenant General Sharif Zeid Bin Shaker
Commander in Chief, Jordan Armed Forces
and
Major General Muhammad Taysir Abd Ar Rahman Za'rour
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and
Major General Hilmi Muhammad Lozi
Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and
Planning, Jordan Arab Army
and
Brigadier General Ahmed Jweiber-Jabir
Defense and Armed Forces Attache to the Embassy
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
and
Major General Edward L. Tixier
USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for SWA Affairs
and
Ambassador Richard N. Viets,
US Ambassador to Jordan

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Lieutenant General Herman O. Thomson
Director of Plans and Policy, OJCS

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Mr. (b)(6)
National Indications Officer (NIO) for Warning

14

Lieutenant General James S. Murphy (Ret)

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- 20 Mr. (b)(6) MP
The Minister of State for Armed Forces, UK
and
Colonel (b)(6)
British Marine, Chief of Staff
- 22 Air Comodore (b)(6)
Assistant Chief of Staff (Training), Pakistan
Air Force
- 23 Mr. (b)(6)
Admin Officer, AM Embassy at Doha Quatar
- 29 Major General Edward C. O'Connor
Commander, US Army Security Assistance Center

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GLOSSARY

ADP	automatic data processing
AFB	Air Force Base
AIG	Address Indicating Group
AIRES	advanced imagery requirements and exploitation system
AOR	area of responsibility
AT&T	American Telephone and Telegraph
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network
AWACS	Airborne Control and Warning System
BG	brigadier general (US Army)
BGen	brigadier general (USMC)
Brig Gen	brigadier general (USAF)
C ²	command and control
C ³	command, control, and communications
C ³ CM	command, control, and communications countermeasures
C ⁴ S	command and control, communications and computer systems
Capt	captain (USAF and USMC)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	Criminal Investigative Division
CINC	commander in chief
CITS	USCENTCOM Imagery Transmission System

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Col	colonel (USAF and USMC)
COL	colonel (US Army)
COMIDEASTFOR	Commander, Middle East Force
COMINT	communications intelligence
COMSEC	communications security
CONPLAN	concept plan
CONUS	continental United States
CPX	command post exercise
CSG	Cryptologic Support Group
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCS	defense communications system
DCS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIDHS	deployable intelligence data handling system
DITS	Digital Imagery Transmission System
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DRB	Defense Resources Board
ELINT	electronic intelligence
FAST	Force and Supply Tracking
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHE	Forward Headquarters Element
FICEURLANT	Fleet Intelligence Center Europe and Atlantic
FIST	Fleet Imagery Support Terminal

FM	frequency modulation
FMS	foreign military sales
FTX	field training exercise
GDIP	General Defense Intelligence Program
GEN	general (US Army)
HF	high frequency
HQ	headquarters
HUMINT	human intelligence
IDHS	intelligence data handling system
IG	Inspector General
IMINT	imagery intelligence
IOC	initial operating capability
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSE	Joint Communications Support Element
JDA	Joint Deployment Agency
JMP	Joint Manpower Program
JOPS	Joint Operations Planning System
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPDSA	Joint Strategic Planning Document and Supporting Analysis
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JUWTF	Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force
LANTCOM	Atlantic Command
Lt Col	lieutenant colonel (USAF)
LTC	lieutenant colonel (US Army)
LtCol	lieutenant colonel (USMC)

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LTG	lieutenant general (US Army)
LtGen	lieutenant general (USMC)
Lt Gen	lieutenant general (USAF)
MAB	Marine Amphibious Brigade
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
Maj	major (USAF and USMC)
MAJ	major (US Army)
Maj Gen	major general (USAF)
MajGen	major general (USMC)
MAP	modern aids to planning
MASH	Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
MAU	Marine Amphibious Unit
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
MEDNTPS	Mediterranean Near-Term Pre-positioned Ship
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MG	major general (US Army)
MIDEASTFOR	Middle East Force
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MWR	morale, welfare, and recreation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NEACP	National Emergency Airborne Command Post
NCO	noncommissioned officers

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NIS	Naval Investigative Service
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NSA	National Security Agency
NTPF	near-term pre-positioning fleet
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OMC	Office of Military Cooperation
OPLAN	operations plan
OPORD	operations order
OPR	office of primary responsibility
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACOM	Pacific Command
PDRY	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
POL	petroleum, oil, and lubricants
POLAD	Political Advisor
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
POMCUS	Pre-positioned Materiel Configured in Unit Sets
PPBS	planning, programming, and budgeting system
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
RDMF	Rapidly Deployable Medical Facility
ROC	required operational capability
RO/RO	roll-on/roll-off
ROWPU	reverse osmosis water production unit
SAC	Strategic Air Command

SAGA	Studies and Gaming Agency
SDIS	surveillance and display interface system
SEAL	Sea, Air, and Land
SGM	Sergeant Major (US Army)
SHF	super high frequency
SIGINT	signal intelligence
SOCENT	Special Operations Command Central
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SPECAT	Special Category
TA	Table of Allowance
TACSIM	tactical simulation system
TADIL-A	Tactical Digital Information Link-A
TDY	temporary duty
TOPCAT	tactical operations planner collection and tasking system
TPFDD	time phased force deployment data
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UHF	ultra high frequency
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USARCENT	United States Army Forces Central Command
USAREUR	United States Army Europe
USCENTAF	United States Central Command Air Forces
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCG	United States Coast Guard

USCINCCENT	Commander in Chief, United States Central Command
USCINCREC	Commander in Chief, United States Readiness Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USIA	United States Information Agency
USJUWTFCENT	United States Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Central Command
USLANTCOM	United States Atlantic Command
USMARCENT	United States Marine Forces, Central Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USNAVCENT	United States Naval Forces Control Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USREDCOM	United States Readiness Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VIP	very important person
VIP/MIU	visual information processor/multiple interface unit
WESTCOM	Western Command
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System
YAR	Yemen Arab Republic



1984 COMMAND HISTORY

Document approved for release by U.S.
Central Command. See FOIA Case #
2004-031



USCINCCENT
ROBERT C. KINGSTON
GENERAL, USA

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
DEPUTY USCINCCENT
ROBERT C. TAYLOR
MAJOR GENERAL, USAF
(1 January 1983-31 July 1984)



DEPUTY USCINCCENT
DAVIS C. ROHR
MAJOR GENERAL, USAF
(1 August 1984-)



CHIEF OF STAFF
JACOB W. MOORE
MAJOR GENERAL, USMC



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CHAPTER I

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

(U) During its second full year of existence, the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) continued to carry out its mission as the nation's newest unified command. Upon its activation on 1 January 1983, USCENTCOM acquired responsibility for one of the most volatile regions of the world. Occasionally deploying from its headquarters (HQ) at MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), Florida, USCENTCOM was involved in a number of exercises and contingencies during 1984 which tested its ability to respond quickly and effectively to crises within its area of responsibility (AOR). On a more mundane, day-to-day level, the command continued to refine its plans, oversee its components, and monitor developments in northeast Africa and southwest Asia. In addition, USCENTCOM continued to conduct security assistance programs within its AOR, a responsibility which it assumed on 1 October 1983.¹

1. Msg (U), JCS to Commander Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, subj: "Activation of US Central Command," 301614Z Dec 82; remarks (U), prepared for delivery by LTG Robert C. Kingston, USCINCCENT, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Status of USCENTCOM, 23 Feb 84.

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(U) During 1984, the United States Central Command was one of six unified commands.² By definition, a unified command had a broad, continuing mission under a single commander, was composed of significant assigned components of two or more services, and had been established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The primary purpose of a unified command was to provide for the optimum effectiveness of United States (US) military forces in combat operations for the projection of US military power, as required to support and advance national policies. The Commander in Chief, United States Central Command (USCINCCENT) was responsible to the National Command Authorities (NCA), through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for such military missions as might be assigned to him.³

(U) At the time of Central Command's activation in 1983, there were already five unified commands

2. A seventh, the United States Space Command, was activated on 1 October 1985.

3. JCS Pub 1, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," 1 Jun 79, p 362; JCS Memo SM-729-83, "Unified Command Plan," 28 Oct 83.

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in existence. Four of these had originally been conceived in the first Unified Command Plan, which was approved by President Harry S. Truman on 14 December 1946.⁴ Activated in 1947, each of these commands was responsible for a specific geographical area of the world. The oldest, Pacific Command (PACOM), had been established on 1 January 1947, and, from its headquarters at Camp H. M. Smith, Oahu, Hawaii, was responsible for United States military activities in East Asia and the Pacific basin. Dating from 15 March 1947, the United States European Command (USEUCOM) managed US military affairs in Europe from its headquarters at Patch Barracks, in Stuttgart, West Germany. The next oldest unified command was the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), headquartered at Quarry Heights, Panama. This command had been established as Caribbean Command on 1 November 1947, but its name was changed to USSOUTHCOM on 6 June 1963. Finally, the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), with its headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia, had been established on 1 December 1947. Its name remained unchanged until 11 October 1983, when it became the United

4. JCS Special Historical Study (C/REVW 27 Jun 95), "History of the Unified Command Plan," 20 Dec 77. Information used is (U).

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States Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM). At the same time, PACOM was redesignated the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM).⁵

(U) Each of these four unified commands was responsible for a specific portion of the earth's surface. To establish USCENTCOM, portions of territory were taken away from existing unified commands and amalgamated to create a new unified command. In particular, Afghanistan and Pakistan were reassigned from PACOM to USCENTCOM, while the other countries in the new command's area of responsibility were either reassigned from USEUCOM's jurisdiction or had not previously been assigned to any unified command. Although "unassigned" before transferring to USCENTCOM on 1 January 1983, these countries had become the responsibility of USCENTCOM's predecessor, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), between 1980 and 1982.

(U) There was one other unified command in existence at the time of the activation of USCENTCOM. The United

5. Msg (U), JCS to CSA, CNO, CSAF, USCINCCENT, et. al., subj: "Redesignation of CINCPAC, PACOM, CINCLANT, and LANTCOM," 112122Z Oct 83.


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States Readiness Command (USREDCOM) had been established as the United States Strike Command at MacDill AFB on 1 January 1962 and was redesignated as USREDCOM exactly ten years later. It had no overseas geographical responsibilities, but was charged with providing forces to the other unified commands as necessary and was responsible for the land defense of the continental United States (CONUS). When the RDJTF was activated at MacDill AFB on 1 March 1980, it was originally a subordinate unit of USREDCOM and its first Commander, Lieutenant General (LtGen) Paul X. Kelley, United States Marine Corps (USMC), reported directly to the Commander in Chief, United States Readiness Command (USCINCRED). At the time, the USCINCRED was General (GEN) Volney F. Warner, US Army. On 1 October 1981, the RDJTF became a separate joint task force and ceased to be subordinate to USREDCOM. This was the first step in the evolution of the RDJTF into USCENCOM.⁶

With the activation of USCENCOM on 1 January 1983 and the revision of the Unified Command Plan in October 1983, the six unified commands divided up the world as shown in Figure 1 on the following page. Except for USREDCOM, all of these commands had specific geographical areas of responsibility outside of the continental United States.

6. History, RDJTF, 1982, p 1.

Figure 1. United States Unified Commands




(U) The area of responsibility assigned to USCENTCOM consisted of 19 countries. Before the establishment of Central Command, two of these, Afghanistan and Pakistan, had belonged to PACOM, while 12 had belonged to USEUCOM and five had not been assigned to any unified command. In the latter category were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and the Sudan. Countries previously assigned to USEUCOM were Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). In addition, USEUCOM had been responsible for security assistance in Kenya

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Figure 2. USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility



and Somalia, countries which were not formally part of its area of responsibility. Despite the petroleum resources in the Persian Gulf, all 19 countries in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility were considered by the United Nations to be "developing countries," with six of them (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and both Yemens) in the especially impoverished category of "least developed."⁸

(U) The 19 countries assigned to USCENTCOM were as shown in Figure 2 on the facing page. Not coincidentally, these same 19 countries had also been the responsibility of the RDJTF at the time of its inactivation. Three years earlier, when the RDJTF was activated on 1 March 1980, it had been charged with pre-deployment planning for "Southwest Asia," a term which was then defined to mean "all states on the Arabian Peninsula south of the northern borders of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; the countries of Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan on the Middle East land mass; Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya on the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and adjacent waters."⁹ On 1 October 1981, the African nations of Egypt and the Sudan were included within this somewhat unusual

8. Atlas of US Foreign Relations, Development Assistance, US Department of State Bulletin, June 1983.

9. Hist RDJTF 1980, p III-1.

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definition of "Southwest Asia," while the "adjacent waters" of the Persian Gulf were deleted. Of these two new countries, Egypt had previously been assigned to USEUCOM while the Sudan had not been assigned to any unified command. Another USEUCOM-assigned country, Jordan, had been added to the RDJTF's area of responsibility on 7 December 1982, and was incorporated into USCENTCOM's area of responsibility on 1 January 1983. The addition of Jordan brought the total number of countries in the command's AOR to the 19 shown in Figure 2 on page 8. Larger in total area than the continental United States, these 19 countries continued to comprise USCENTCOM's area of responsibility during 1984.

(U) In 1983, when USCENTCOM became the first new unified command to be activated in 21 years, its establishment indicated a more active US policy toward the Middle East, expressing the fact that the United States military community no longer looked upon this "central" area of the world merely as an extension of either Europe or the Pacific basin. Instead of being divided between two different unified commands oriented either toward the potential central European battlefield or toward East Asia, the central area was now the focus of a single United States military command. Focusing the efforts of a new

unified command on Southwest Asia and Northeast Africa emphasized the importance of this area to American interests and underscored the fact that the United States was ready to take military action to defend those interests, if necessary.

MISSION

(U) The mission of the United States Central Command was to achieve US policy objectives in its area of responsibility. These national policy objectives included the following basic goals: assuring Western access to adequate supplies of oil, deterring Soviet aggression, preserving regional stability, and halting the spread of Soviet influence, reversing it wherever possible.¹⁰

10. USCINCENT Policy and Strategy Book (U), Vol I, 1984, p 31.

(U) There were three primary threats to the key resources located in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility and to the sea lines of communication needed for US forces to get there: internal unrest, intraregional conflict, and external Soviet aggression. Except for invading and occupying Afghanistan, the USSR had not become militarily involved in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility since World War II, but additional involvement could never be ruled out. Instead of using direct military intervention, the Soviets preferred to exploit local conflicts and instability. They were often involved in coups, revolutions, civil wars, insurgencies, rebellions, and external attacks by other countries. Within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility, the Soviet military presence, its ability to

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exercise overt military options, and its general influence had increased during recent years.¹³

(U) Foremost among the United States' peacetime strategic objectives was to prevent wars, primarily by reducing the causes of local conflict. What was required to meet this objective were specific political-military and military-economic initiatives to strengthen the countries in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. By making them stronger militarily, economically, and politically, they would become more stable and less likely to become involved in local conflicts. In addition, USCENTCOM sought to lend its cooperation and assistance to other US government agencies responsible for American diplomatic and economic initiatives throughout the region. Such assistance offered opportunities for the United States to counter Soviet military involvement in the region by taking advantage of US economic, technological, and managerial strengths. Further, political and economic relationships between the US and other nations often led to military cooperation.¹⁴

13. Briefing (U) ~~(S/NOFORN/OADR)~~, "Plans, Policy & Programming," undated, in J5-OP files.

14. USCINCENT Policy and Strategy Book (U), Vol I, 1984, p 31.

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(U) Deterrence was another peacetime objective which involved the same issues as preventing wars. To aid in achieving this strategic goal, the United States needed to be able to exercise military options, such as making a show of force, providing protection, and interposition. In some cases, the local forces of the countries in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility were strong enough to exercise their own deterrent effect, inhibiting Soviet intervention or coercion. In addition, a coalition of strong local forces, capable and confident of operating jointly with USCENTCOM forces, could act as a force multiplier. Such US-local coalitions could assist in the successful prosecution of both peacetime and wartime strategies. Successful deterrence would stop not only overt Soviet military action in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility, but would also prevent Soviet fostering of internal instability by adjacent states and radical groups.¹⁵

(U) Wartime strategies considered by USCENTCOM derived from two basic scenarios. The first scenario envisioned a local conflict without Soviet involvement, ranging from a low-intensity insurgency to a mid-intensity confrontation involving an indigenous force. The second scenario assumed a medium-to-

15. Ibid.

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high-intensity direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. Strong, stable local countries could help the United States fight a war of this type against Soviet forces. This help could be critical, regardless of the location of the war on the conflict spectrum, whether involving counter-insurgency or coalition partnership. In the former case, they could constitute a stabilizing force; in the latter, they could be a useful force multiplier.¹⁶

(U) The revised 1983 version of the Unified Command Plan listed seven specific responsibilities common to all unified commands. As commander of a unified command, USCINCCENT was to (1) maintain the security of the command and protect the United States, its possessions, and bases against attack or hostile incursion and to (2) carry out assigned missions, tasks, and responsibilities. More specifically, he was to (3) assign tasks to, and direct coordination among, USCENTCOM's subordinate commands to insure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his assigned mission. To accomplish this, USCINCCENT was authorized to (4) communicate with three categories of people: The chiefs of the military services on uni-service

16. Ibid.

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matters as he deemed appropriate; the Joint Chiefs of Staff on other matters, including the preparation of strategic and logistic plans, strategic and operational direction of USCENTCOM's assigned forces, conduct of combat operations, and other necessary functions of command required to accomplish the missions; and the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with applicable directives. In addition, USCINCCENT was required to (5) carry out planning and implementing responsibilities for the evacuation of US noncombatant and certain non-US persons abroad in accordance with the provisions of "State-Defense Policies and Procedures for the Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens Abroad in Time of Emergency."¹⁷

17. DOD Directive 5100.51, 11 Oct 66.

(U) When USCENTCOM was activated on 1 January 1983, it was assigned components from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Headquarters for these three components had already existed for the RDJTF, and it was not difficult to redesignate these forces for the new US Central Command. In the case of the Army, a special unit, Third United States Army, had already been reactivated at Fort McPherson, Georgia, on 1 December 1982 to take over from the XVIII Airborne Corps as the Army component of the RDJTF, so that when the transition to unified status was made a month later on 1 January, Third Army acquired the role of United States Army Forces Central Command (USARCENT).²⁰ The Navy component, United States Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT), was headquartered at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, as its RDJTF predecessor had been. Likewise, Ninth Air Force, at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, which had doubled as the Air Force component of the RDJTF, became the United States Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF).²¹

20. Activation Plan (U), Third United States Army (TUSA), 17 Sep 81.

21. The acronym USCENTAF was chosen in preference to the more consistent USAFCENT because of the possibility of confusion with AFCENT, the abbreviation for Allied Forces Central Europe.

ORGANIZATION

(U) To carry out its mission as a unified command, USCENTCOM was organized into six directorates and a number of special staff agencies. The directorates were organized along traditional functional lines and numbered J-1 through J-6, the "J" referring to the joint nature of the unified command. Each directorate will be discussed in more detail below.

(U) The Personnel Directorate, or J-1, was primarily responsible for the adequacy of USCENTCOM staff manning. It also insured the deployability and sustainability of the USCENTCOM headquarters staff, carried out personnel planning for contingency and operations plans (OPLANS) and orders, and developed personnel policy.

(U) The Director of Personnel was responsible for formulating policies and supervising the execution of command arrangements pertaining to the individual members of the command, giving full consideration to the established policies of the military departments to which USCENTCOM personnel belonged, i.e., the Departments of the Army, Navy (including the Marine Corps), or Air Force. He also exercised staff responsibility for morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR)

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programs within the command and conducted the USCENTCOM safety program.

(U) The J-1 also insured accomplishment of records management, personnel requisitioning and actions, processing of effectiveness reports, awards management, Congressional correspondence, and Red Cross liaison. In general, the directorate provided manpower control and organization management.²³

(U) USCINCCENT received intelligence information from his J-2, or Intelligence Directorate. The USCENTCOM Director of Intelligence had staff responsibility for all intelligence and counterintelligence matters pertinent to the command's mission and had overall responsibility for the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence necessary to support the various tasks assigned to USCENTCOM. The J-2 was also responsible for the management of all intelligence resources assigned to the command.²⁴

23. Manual (U), USCENTCOM Organization and Functions, R 10-2, 1 Feb 85, p M-3.

24. Ibid., p N-3.

(U) Operational matters were the province of the J-3, or Operations Directorate. The Director of Operations planned, organized, coordinated, directed, and controlled USCENTCOM operational and exercise activities. The J-3 advised the USCINCCENT on all matters pertaining to the strategic and operational direction of assigned forces, the conduct of combat operations, the planning and conduct of exercises involving USCENTCOM forces, and other command functions required to accomplish the assigned mission. He monitored the operational status of subordinate elements and identified requirements for the host nation support needed to conduct operations and exercises in USCENTCOM's assigned area of responsibility. When deployed, the J-3 coordinated joint force combat operations involving air, ground, and naval forces. In addition, the Operations Directorate provided staff supervision over all aspects of operations security; command, control, and communications countermeasures (C³CM); and nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and planning.²⁵

(U) Logistical affairs were the responsibility of the J-4, or Logistics Directorate. The Director of Logistics was charged with ensuring the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of operations by providing materiel and facilities when needed. The J-4 was also expected to eliminate unnecessary

25. Ibid., p O-3.

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duplication of facilities and to prevent overlapping of functions among the service components of the command. Finally, he provided staff support to the command in all aspects of logistics, security assistance, military construction, weapons planning, and operations, while coordinating among the components, military services, host nations, and other commands.²⁶

(U) On 1 October 1983, USCENTCOM assumed responsibility for security assistance matters in the countries with security assistance programs within its area of responsibility. A security assistance directorate in a joint staff would ordinarily be designated J-7, but in USCENTCOM (as in USEUCOM and USPACOM) security assistance was a division within the Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate, which had been redesignated J-4/7 on 1 October 1983 to reflect its dual responsibilities.

(U) The Plans, Policy, and Programs Directorate (J-5) was assigned a wide-ranging variety of tasks. It was responsible for the preparation and maintenance of operations orders (OPORDs) and plans, including concept

26. Ibid., p P-3.

plans (CONPLANS). To support a variety of war plans, it prepared, reviewed, and coordinated time phased force deployment data (TPFDD). The J-5 also advised USCINCCENT on matters relating to command policy, missions, and functions which concerned the joint deployment, employment, and redeployment of forces. The directorate provided a staff focal point for reviewing, analyzing, and recommending courses of action concerning deployments and evaluating tasking documents pertaining to policy, command relationships, and long-range planning. Additionally, the directorate prepared USCENTCOM's input to the DOD planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS). J-5 had primary staff responsibility for the coordination and implementation of civil affairs policy and supervised the implementation of civil-military cooperation functions within the command. It also advised the JCS and other unified and specified commands on matters relating to USCENTCOM policy, mission, functions, requirements, and the development of doctrine and techniques for the joint deployment and employment of forces.²⁷

(U) Communications were provided by the Command and Control, Communications and Computer System (C⁴S) Directorate,

27. Ibid., p Q-3.

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known as "J-6" for short. It was responsible for the development of communications-electronics and automatic data processing (ADP) policies, plans, budgets, and programs for USCENTCOM. The J-6 ensured command, control, and communications (C³) support for the command. He also supervised the development, acquisition, and operation of communications and ADP facilities and equipment. The C⁴S Directorate was the USCENTCOM focal point for the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) and was responsible for coordination with the JCS, the Defense Communications Agency (DCA), and the NCA on technical matters during peacetime and for implementing these agencies' management policies during contingencies or war.²⁸

(U) In addition to these six directorates, USCENTCOM headquarters had a number of other staff agencies to assist the USCINCENT in carrying out his assigned functions. The Adjutant General provided administrative service and support to the USCENTCOM staff in a number of important areas, including correspondence management, forms and records management, and graphics. He also developed and

28. Ibid., P R-3.

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instituted plans, policies, and precedence systems, while maintaining a budget to support the USCINCCENT and headquarters staff. The Legal Advisor was responsible for providing legal advice to the USCINCCENT. He also interacted with US and foreign government agencies, reviewing country law studies and advising USCINCCENT on the need for country-to-country agreements, drafting such agreements, and assisting in their negotiation and conclusion. He provided support in legislative liaison and coordinated the Congressional testimony of USCINCCENT and the USCENTCOM staff. The Legal Advisor also provided legal assistance to members of the command and their dependents. In addition, he developed exercise and real-world plans in support of all operations, negotiating fly-over rights, staging rights, basing rights, status of forces agreements, and procurement of local goods and labor, while taking into account host country laws and procedures.

(U) The Public Affairs Officer advised USCINCCENT and his staff on public information matters. He generated public affairs policy recommendations and directives, drafted public affairs annexes to operations plans and orders, provided public affairs policy guidance to component commands and assigned forces, arranged media briefings and interviews, and provided public affairs services during combat operations. His wartime responsibilities included providing cleared daily

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summaries, security reviews, and audiovisual coverage of combat operations. He served as the cognizant staff officer for community relations and command information and handled public affairs audiovisual matters. In general, he oversaw public affairs activities within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

(U) In the field of law enforcement and security, the Provost Marshal maintained law and order within the command. To this end, he provided analysis of police statistical data, made recommendations about the confinement of US personnel, and coordinated with local national police forces. He also coordinated all matters concerning traffic control, entry procedures, and weapons systems security and developed plans and policies concerning enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees. Finally, he maintained liaison with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), with the Naval Investigative Service (NIS), and with the Army Criminal Investigative Division (CID).

(U) The Comptroller was responsible for advising USCINCENT and his staff on resources management, fiscal and budgetary matters, resource structure, and the creation and maintenance of a financial management system. He

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executed the approved operating budget, joint readiness exercise budget, and foreign military sales (FMS) programs. He also developed Comptroller annexes for war plans and for operational, emergency, contingency, and evacuation plans. He ensured, through the component commanders, that appropriate provisions were made for the pay of US military and civilian personnel, local national civilian personnel, and prisoners of war, as well as arranging for banking, savings, and remittance services for US personnel. In garrison, the Comptroller provided military pay and related finance service support to people assigned to USCENTCOM headquarters.

(U) Within USCENTCOM's garrison at MacDill, as well as when deployed, one of the more important staff members was the Headquarters Commandant. He provided base support to USCENTCOM headquarters during deployment, redeployments, and while at home station. This support included internal physical security, food service, transportation, maintenance, engineering, and supply. The Headquarters Commandant also functioned as troop commander and provided an orderly room to support the headquarters. The commandant's office monitored the Services' required training programs and maintained necessary records, while managing Service school requirements, including allocating quotas for schools.

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(U) Other staff members included the surgeon and the chaplain. The Command Surgeon exercised staff supervision on all medical matters, developed and coordinated medical plans, and advised USCINCCENT on the overall health of the command. The Command Chaplain assisted and advised USCINCCENT and staff on all religious activities within the command. The chaplain was also the staff expert on the religious beliefs, policies, procedures, and laws of the countries within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. This knowledge was particularly useful in view of the widely varying religious practices found in the Middle East, which ranged from Christianity to several mutually antipathetical varieties of Islam.

(U) Finally, the Combat Capabilities Analysis Group researched and analyzed questions which affected the combat capabilities of USCENTCOM and those of potentially hostile military forces. It made an effort to test the validity of assumptions contained in command plans, and tried to analyze USCENTCOM's strategies, logistics, and operations. Generally, it performed as an in-house "think-tank."

(U) In addition to the six directorate and several special staff agencies discussed above, there were a number of liaison offices attached to USCENTCOM. Two specified


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commands, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Military Airlift Command (MAC), were represented by liaison officers at MacDill, as was another unified command, USEUCOM. There was also a Defense Communications Agency field office, as well as National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and US Army Intelligence Security Command representatives assigned to the staff. In addition to MAC, two other transportation operating agencies were represented by liaison offices: the Navy's Military Sealift Command and the Army's Military Traffic Management Command. Liaison officers to USCENCOM were also provided by the Air Force Logistics Command, the Defense Fuels Supply Center, and the United States Coast Guard (USCG). The organization of USCENCOM headquarters as of 31 December 1984 was as shown in Figure 3 on the following page.

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Figure 3. USCENTCOM Organization (As of 31 December 1984)



KEY PERSONNEL

(U) Throughout 1984, the USCINCCENT was GEN Robert C. Kingston, US Army. Born on (b)(6) in Brookline, Massachusetts, General Kingston enlisted in the Army in November 1948. On 20 December 1949, he received a commission as a second lieutenant of infantry following Officer Candidate School at Fort Riley, Kansas. During two tours in Korea between 1950 and 1954, General Kingston served with the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry as platoon leader, executive officer, company commander, and, during his second tour, as the commanding officer of the Far East Command Special Mission Group. From 22 to 29 November 1950, Second Lieutenant (2LT) Kingston led a platoon which reached the Yalu River just before the Chinese intervened in Korea.²⁹ Task Force Kingston was one of only two US Units to reach the Yalu before having to withdraw from North Korea.³⁰

(U) In 1954 and 1955, Captain (CPT) Kingston served as the executive officer of the Ranger Mountain Camp at Dahlonga,

29. (U) Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, United States Army in the Korean War, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961, pp 737-738.

30. (U) Martin Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury, "Kingston," Masters of the Art of Command, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1975, pp 83-99.

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Georgia. Afterwards, he served with the 82d Airborne Division from 1956 to 1959, as an airborne infantry company commander and as assistant division G-2. In 1960, he completed the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1960 and 1961, Major (MAJ) Kingston sojourned in England as the exchange airborne officer with the 16th Independent Parachute Group, including a nine-month tour as commander of C Company, 3d Battalion. Continuing to serve in Europe, General Kingston moved to the Special Planning Staff Branch of the Operations Division at HQ, United States Army Europe (USAREUR) in August 1961. He returned to the United States in June 1963 to the Army Airmobile Test Unit at Fort Benning, Georgia. From August 1964 to July 1965, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Kingston attended the University of Omaha, receiving a bachelor's degree in general education. College graduation was followed by attendance at the Armed Forces Staff College, from which he graduated in January 1966.

(U) During his first tour in Vietnam, from February 1966 through September 1967, Colonel (COL) Kingston served as the Senior US advisor to the Vietnamese Ranger High Command, as commander of the 1st Battalion 35th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, as a member of the Studies and

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Observation Group, HQ Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Returning to the United States in October 1967, he served as the chief of the General Planning Branch, Plans and Programs Directorate, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, HQ Department of the Army, until August 1968, when he began a one-year class at the National War College in Washington, DC. After graduating from the National War College and receiving a master's degree in foreign relations from George Washington University, Colonel Kingston moved to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and assumed command of the 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces. He returned to Vietnam in November 1969 as Commanding Officer, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). After commanding this brigade for six months, he assumed command of the division's 1st Brigade for an additional three months.

(U) Returning to the United States, Colonel Kingston became Deputy Secretary of the General Staff in the Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army. Following attendance at the University of Pittsburgh's Advanced Management Program for Executives, Colonel Kingston returned to Vietnam in June of 1972, where he served as Deputy Commanding General, Second Regional Assistance Command and as Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps and Military Region 2. He was promoted to brigadier general (BG) on 29 December 1972 and assumed command of the

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Joint Casualty Resolution Center at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, on 23 January 1973.

(U) Returning to Fort Riley, General Kingston became assistant division commander of the 1st Infantry Division on 4 February 1974. On 1 September 1975, he was promoted to major general (MG), backdated to 1 June 1973. General Kingston assumed command of the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance and the US Army Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg on 1 October 1975. Beginning his third tour in Korea on 20 June 1977, General Kingston assumed duties as assistant chief of staff, J-3, United States Command, United States Forces Korea, Eighth US Army, in Seoul. On 28 July 1977, General Kingston became the chief of staff of the Tri-Headquarters, and on 1 June 1979, he assumed command of the 2d Infantry Division at Camp Casey, Korea. General Kingston was promoted to lieutenant general (LTG) on his 53rd birthday, 16 July 1981, and assumed command of the RDJTF the following day, succeeding LtGen Paul X. Kelley, USMC, who had commanded the RDJTF since its activation on 1 March 1980. On 6 November 1984, LTG Kingston was promoted to full general.³¹

31. (U) Congressional Record, 99th Congress, 23 Feb 85, pp S2009-S20H.

(U) The deputy USCINCCENT at the beginning of 1984 was Major General (Maj Gen) Robert C. Taylor, United States Air Force (USAF). General Taylor was an RDJTF "plankholder" (or "plankowner"), a term which meant that he had been assigned to the command since its activation in March of 1980. Born in 1932 in Danforth, Illinois, General Taylor was a command pilot who had flown more than 4,300 hours in fighters, including the F-86, F-89, F-102, and F-4. Following 17 years of assignments to fighter squadrons around the world, General Taylor graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1970. While assigned to the Directorate of Plans, HQ USAF, from 1970 to 1972, he was selected for duty as Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Melvin E. Laird. He later served in the same capacity for the next two Secretaries of Defense, Mr. Elliot L. Richardson and Dr. James R. Schlesinger. In 1974, General Taylor became Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) for Plans, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), becoming DCS for Plans in 1975. He became the commander of the 314th Air Division in Korea in 1977, then Director of Operations and Readiness, HQ USAF, in August 1978. General Taylor became RDJTF deputy commander in March 1980. He retired as deputy USCINCCENT on 31 July 1984.

(U) General Taylor was succeeded by Maj Gen Davis C. Rohr, USAF, who became deputy USCINCCENT on 1 August 1984.

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Born on [REDACTED] (b)(6), in Burlington, Wisconsin, General Rohr graduated from the US Military Academy at West Point in 1952 and earned his pilot wings in August 1953. He went to South Korea in January 1954, flying the F-86F. Later, General Rohr served in Japan and Ohio before moving to the US Air Force Academy in June 1960, where he taught military history and was in charge of the academy's Russian history course. In January 1965, he moved to Ramstein Air Base, Germany, then to Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, in August 1968. General Rohr joined the 31st Tactical Fighter Wing at Tuy Hoa Air Base, Vietnam, in August 1969. In October 1969, he took command of the 306th Tactical Fighter Squadron and flew 245 combat missions as an F-100 pilot while in Southeast Asia.

(U) From August 1970 to September 1973, General Rohr was assigned to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, as country director for South America. He then moved to Headquarters Tactical Air Command (TAC), Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, serving first as executive officer to the deputy chief of staff, logistics, and later as deputy director of maintenance engineering. He became vice commander of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) at Bergstrom Air

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Force Base, Texas, in July 1975 and took command in May 1976. In August 1977, he left Bergstrom to command the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, and was its commander during the initial introduction of the F-16 air combat fighter into the USAF inventory. In October 1979, General Rohr was named chief of the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) in Cairo, Egypt. As OMC Chief, he was responsible for the US security assistance program in Egypt and also served as adviser to the ambassador on military matters as the US defense representative. In August 1981, he became the director, plans and policy, J-5, for USEUCOM, with Headquarters in Vaihingen, Germany. General Rohr moved to USCENTCOM in August 1984.

(U) Chief of Staff throughout 1984 was Major General (MajGen) Jacob W. Moore, USMC. A native of Catawba, North Carolina, General Moore was commissioned in 1954 after completing naval aviation training. Since then, he had flown over 7,000 hours in many different aircraft, including the F-8 Crusader, the F-4 Phantom II, the AV-8 Harrier, and the F-18 Hornet. Following a career in Marine aviation which included three tours at Headquarters Marine Corps, General Moore was assigned as Commanding General, 1st Brigade, Fleet Marine force Pacific, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, on 11 June 1982. He was promoted

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to major general on 29 July 1983 and joined USCENTCOM a month later, becoming Chief of Staff on 29 August.

(U) In addition to the Commander in Chief, Deputy Commander in Chief, and Chief of Staff, there were six other flag officers assigned to USCENTCOM. These were the J-2, J-3, J-4/7, J-5, J-6, and the Inspector General. Senior among these directors was MG David E. Watts, US Army, who had been director of J-4 since 15 June 1983 and of J-4/7 since USCENTCOM's assumption of security assistance responsibilities on 1 October 1983. Born in Newton, Massachusetts, in (b)(6), General Watts enlisted in the Army during World War II and served with the 82d Airborne Division. He left the Army in 1947 to attend the University of Connecticut and graduated and was commissioned in 1952. General Watts served as a platoon leader during the Korean War, then served in the United States and Europe before attending the USMC Command and Staff College in Quantico, Virginia, in 1960. Following a tour at Third US Army headquarters, he served in Okinawa, Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, then attended the Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He then obtained a master's degree through the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.

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General Watts returned to Vietnam to command the 1st Supply and Support Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, until the fall of 1968. Following a tour in the Pentagon, General Watts attended the Army War College and returned to Fort Leavenworth to serve on the faculty. After serving as chief of staff for the US Army, Japan and deputy commander of the US Army Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, General Watts returned to Germany in 1977, becoming DCS Logistics for USAREUR in 1980. He served as USCENTCOM J-4/7 throughout 1984.

(U) At the beginning of 1984, the director of J-3 was Brigadier General (Brig Gen) Michael P. C. Carns, USAF, who had also served as Director of Operations for the RDJTF from 25 June 1982 until its inactivation on 31 December 1982. When USCENTCOM was activated on 1 January 1983, General Carns became its J-3. A member of the Air Force Academy's first graduating class of 1959, General Carns also graduated with distinction from Harvard University in 1967 with a master's degree in business administration. Before moving to the RDJTF, General Carns had been commander of the 57th Fighter Weapons Wing at Nellis AFB, Nevada, since 14 October 1980. Prior to that assignment, General Carns had been commander of the 354th TFW at Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina.

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(U) General Carns was succeeded on 1 July 1984 by Brig Gen Robert C. Beyer, Jr. Born on [REDACTED] (b)(6), General Beyer graduated from West Point in 1956 and received his USAF pilot wings in 1957. General Beyer flew F-102s at George AFB, California and at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, until 1963 when he became an air officer commanding a cadet squadron at the US Air Force Academy. After two years in Colorado, he was appointed as the first exchange officer to the US Military Academy at West Point and became a tactical officer in the Office of the Commandant of Cadets. General Beyer returned to operational flying in August 1967 at MacDill AFB, taking the F-4D and F-4E pilot checkout course. In May 1968, he went to Da Nang Air Base, Vietnam, serving as flight commander and completing 207 combat missions. Returning to the US in May 1969, he went back to MacDill as an F-4E flight commander and instructor pilot. Following graduation from the Armed forces Staff college, General Beyer was assigned to the headquarters of the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) in January 1971 as an action officer in the Directorate of Operations. In July 1974, he moved over to JCS J-3 and then went to the Air War College. Moving to Luke AFB, Arizona, in June 1976, General Beyer worked through several operations positions before becoming vice commander of the 58th

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Tactical Training Wing. He took command of the 8th TFW at Kunsan Air Base, South Korea, in March 1980, followed by assignments as PACAF inspector general and vice commander of 5th Air Force at Yokota Air Base, Japan. General Beyer returned to MacDill in June 1984 to become USCENTCOM Director of Operations.

(U) Another director of flag rank since 1982 was BG Dudley J. Gordon, US Army, who had been in charge of J-2 since 7 September of that year. Following graduation from Infantry Officer Candidate School in March 1956, General Gordon was assigned to the Army Security Field Station in Warrenton, Virginia. He then served with the Army Security Agency in Shemya and Fort Richardson, Alaska; at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia; Korea; Fort Devons, Massachusetts; and Fort Hood, Texas. During 1969, General Gordon served a tour in Vietnam as Special Security Officer, IV Corps Detachment, followed by attendance at the Armed Forces College in Norfolk, Virginia. Later, General Gordon graduated from the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and was then assigned as Chief of the Collection Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Security, which was his position prior to becoming RDJTF and then USCENTCOM J-2.

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(U) On 23 July 1984, General Gordon was succeeded by BG Charles B. Eichelberger, US Army. Born in La Grange, Georgia, on [REDACTED] (b)(6), General Eichelberger enlisted in the Army in September 1955 and graduated from Infantry Officers' Candidate School in 1957. Assigned to the Army Security Agency in Hawaii and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, General Eichelberger went to Vietnam in 1962 as the S-2/S-3 of the 3d Radio Research Unit. He returned to Fort Bragg and served in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Following assignments to USAREUR and Korea, General Eichelberger graduated from the Command and General Staff College in 1969 and from the Army War College in 1976. He then served as Deputy Director for Intelligence at the Intelligence Center, Pacific, until January 1977, when he joined J-3 of PACOM. In June 1978, he assumed command of the Intelligence and Security Command's field station in Berlin, then, in August 1980, became the Division Chief for the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Electronic Warfare Division of the Requirements Directorate of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the Department of Army. In October 1982, General Eichelberger was assigned as Deputy Commander of the US Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He was promoted to brigadier general on 1 February 1984, a few months before coming to USCENTCOM.

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(U) The only Navy flag officer assigned to USCENTCOM was Commodore James Mac Gleim, who had been RDJTF Director of Plans, Policy, and Programs (J-5) since 8 July 1982. Raised in a farming community in central Nebraska, Commodore Gleim entered the Navy as an aviation cadet and was commissioned as an ensign in 1955. He deployed to Lebanon in 1958 with an A-4 squadron aboard the USS SARATOGA. During the Vietnam war, he served as flight deck officer and later as executive officer of the USS CORAL SEA. Before coming to the RDJTF and later USCENTCOM at MacDill, Commodore Gleim had been Commander of Naval Air Station (NAS) Lemoore, California.

(U) In addition to the Chief of Staff, there was another USMC general officer on the USCENTCOM staff, brigadier general (BGen) Ray "M" Franklin, who had been at MacDill since June of 1982. As a member of the RDJTF staff, General Franklin had had three titles: Inspector General (IG), Commander of the Forward Headquarters Element (FHE), which was established aboard the USS LA SALLE in the Persian Gulf on 31 December 1983, and Director of Transition from RDJTF to USCENTCOM. When this transition was completed on 1 January 1983, General Franklin concentrated his effort on establishing an FHE in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

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(U) BGen John H. Gary III, USMC, replaced General Franklin on 11 June 1984. Born on [redacted] (b)(6) in Richmond, Virginia, General Gary graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 1955 and then attended the Basic School, Quantico, Virginia. He served in the 3d and 2d Marine divisions before going to the Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico in July 1965. Following graduation in January 1966, General Gary went to Vietnam, serving as a company commander and later on the G-3 staff. Attendance at the Naval War College preceded a second tour in Vietnam, this time in the J-2 of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. From 1972 to 1975, General Gary served as the assistant naval attache in the US Embassy in Canberra, Australia. Returning to the US in May 1975, General Gary went to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and then to the National War College in Washington, DC. Following completion in June 1978, he became professor of naval science at the Virginia Military Institute, his alma mater. While serving in this capacity, he was selected in February 1981 for promotion to brigadier general and was advanced to that grade on 9 April 1981. After assignments at the National Military Command Center, as the Commanding General of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, and as the Assistant Division Commander of the 3d Marine Division on Okinawa, General Gary became both IG and FHE Commander at USCENTCOM.

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(U) USCENTCOM acquired a ninth flag-grade officer in February 1983, when Brig Gen Samuel J. Greene, USAF, became Director of the Command and Control, Communications and Computer Systems Directorate (J-6). Born on [REDACTED] (b)(6) in New York City, General Greene graduated from Manhattan College in 1958 with a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering and had served in the USAF since graduation. Before coming to USCENTCOM, General Greene had been Commander of the Pacific Communications Division from 1979 to 1981 and Vice Director to the Joint Tactical Communications Officer at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, from 1981 to February 1983. General Greene served as J-6 throughout 1984.

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CHAPTER II

JOINT PLANNING, OPERATIONS, AND TRAINING

(U) The joint staff of the United States Central Command headquarters numbered 893 people on 1 January. Headquarters strength decreased by 33 personnel during 1984 to equal 860 people at the end of the year. This was the first personnel decrease in the history of the RDJTF and USCENTCOM. The former grew from a small initial cadre to 263 at the end of 1980, to 328 at the end of 1981, and to 843 at the close of 1982. During its first year of existence, USCENTCOM had grown by 50 people at the end of 1983, so the 1984 reduction of 33 actually represented relative stability in personnel strength. Divided among six directorates and a number of special staff agencies, these people worked during 1984 to plan, conduct operations, and train the forces needed to fight in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

PERSONNEL

(U) Colonel (Col) [REDACTED] (b)(6), USAF, had been the RDJTF Director of Personnel since 25 April 1980 and continued

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in that capacity throughout 1984. As the "plankholder" J-1, Col (b)(6) had been responsible for personnel matters since the beginning of the RDJTF, and thus had the twin distinctions of being the only RDJTF J-1 and the first Director of USCENTCOM's Personnel Directorate.

(U) COL (b)(6) US Army, continuing to serve as the Deputy Director, represented USCENTCOM on the Advisory Council on Dependent's Education. The Council met three times during the year, including once in Wiesbaden, Germany. In connection with this meeting, Colonel (b)(6) made a staff visit to DOD Schools, Mediterranean Region, at Torrejon Air Base, Spain, and to the Bahrain School.


(U) In August 1984, the Personnel Directorate reorganized by adding a fourth division to the three divisions as shown in Figure 4 on the following page: Plans/Manpower, Personnel Services, and Policy/Personnel Support. The new division was the Civilian Personnel Division and included an additional civilian authorization which was filled on 2 September.

(U) On 1 October, civilian employees assigned to USCENTCOM security assistance organizations were transferred from the Army and Navy to the Air Force. Further, civilian personnel servicing for all US citizen civilian employees in

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Figure 4. J-1 Organization



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the AOR was transferred to the civilian personnel office, Hellenikon Air Base, Greece.

(U) With the assistance of the US Army, the annual wage survey for Saudi Arabia was conducted during September and October. The USEUCOM Civilian Personnel Coordinating Committee convened in London in December and approved the results of the Saudi Arabia wage survey. The J-1 civilian personnel division chief represented USCENCOM at this meeting.

(U) In 1984, the Personnel Directorate, especially its Plans/Manpower Division, took part in several contingencies, field training exercises, and command post exercises. Some of these occurred within the CONUS, while some took place outside the continental United States (OCONUS). With its involvement ranging from plans to participation, the personnel directorate took part in the contingencies EAGLE LOOK and INTENSE LOOK; the CONUS exercises GALLANT KNIGHT 84, GALLANT EAGLE 84, NIGHT TRAIN 84, ELLIPSE FOXTROT 85, and POWDER RIVER 85; and the OCONUS exercises ACCURATE TEST 84, SHADOW HAWK 84, and IRON COBRA 84.

(U) Manpower reviews were one of the Personnel Directorate's most important accomplishments during the year.

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Figure 5. USCENTCOM Internal manpower review results

	Fiscal Year 1985 JMP	Required	Net Change
USCINCCENT	7	7	0
Deputy USCINCCENT	4	4	0
Chief of Staff	3	3	0
Forward HQ Element	1	1	0
Inspector General	7	7	0
Secretary of the Joint Staff	9	9	0
Command Historian	2	2	0
Protocol Officer	5	6	+1
USEUCOM Liaison	1	1	0
Executive Advisors to USCINCCENT	3	3	0
J-1	50	52	+2
J-2	155	151	-4
J-3	148	153	+5
J-4	120	110	-10
J-5	58	63	+5
J-6	143*	140	-3
HQ Commandant	62	55	-7
Adjutant General	31	31	0
Legal Advisor	9	9	0
Public Affairs Office	13	14	+1
Provost Marshal	5	6	+1
Comptroller	16	16	0
Command Surgeon	7	11	+4
Command Chaplain	2	2	0
Combat Capabilities Analysis Group	6	9	+3
Total	867	865	-2

* Includes 11 new billets. Services may not approve; reclama pending.

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At the direction of USCINCCENT, the Manpower Management Branch conducted an internal manpower survey of the headquarters between 1 November 1983 and 8 June 1984 using a work sampling measurement technique and the proposed fiscal year 1985 Joint Manpower Program (JMP). The survey's results were as shown in Figure 5 on the facing page.

(U) After completing the internal survey, the Manpower Management Branch next provided a team on 12 September to conduct a survey of the Office of Military Cooperation in Egypt. The survey concluded with the team validating OMC's manpower level at 64 billets.

(U) Two months later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manpower Survey Team came to MacDill and conducted their own study of the headquarters from 9 October to 2 November. The study examined USCENTCOM headquarters manpower authorizations and validated a requirement of 777 billets.

(U) On 8 November, JCS identified 18 of USCENTCOM's billets to be realigned to meet higher priority joint requirements. These billets were taken from the approved fiscal year 1984 JMP as part of the three percent JCS Enhanced Manpower Program.

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(U) On 30 November, JCS and the Services approved the fiscal year 1985 JMP for USCENTCOM headquarters, as well as the JMPs for the Intelligence Production Element and Computer Systems Support Element. In addition to the approved JMP for the headquarters totalling 772 billets, the JMP for the Intelligence Production Element contained 16 authorized billets and the JMP for the Computer Systems Support Element had another 67 authorizations.

(U) On 13 December, USCENTCOM submitted its proposed fiscal year 1986 JMP for the headquarters with its 749 previously approved billets. In a second document, 23 previously approved headquarters billets were transferred to a newly created Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT). Also submitted was a three percent JCS Enhanced Manpower Program which identified 25 manpower spaces from the approved fiscal year 1985 JMP in priority order, together with impact statements.

(U) The fiscal year 1986 JMP for the Intelligence Production Element contained the fiscal year 1985 base of 16 plus 38 programmed billets, for an overall total of 54. However, the JCS and the Services had not yet decided whether to approve the 38 programmed billets or accept them

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for programming, pending a decision on the establishment of the proposed Intelligence Center, Florida. As a result, it appeared appropriate to include them in the submission for fiscal year 1986. In comparison, the fiscal year 1986 JMP for the Computer Systems Support Element contained the fiscal year 1985 base of 67 plus an increase of three billets previously approved for fiscal year 1986, bringing its total to 70.

(U) The fiscal year 1986 Joint Mobilization Augmentation, Part III of the JMP, was also submitted on 13 December 1984. It included a request for a net increase of 41 which raised the fiscal year 1986 total to 470. As for SOCCENT, its 32 Joint Mobilization Augmentation requirements remained unchanged, although SOCCENT's billets were moved from USCENCOM headquarters to form a separate subunified command. The Computer Systems Support Element, on the other hand, increased by one Joint Mobilization Augmentation billet. Also submitted was the USCENCOM special activities JMP for fiscal years 1986-1990. It contained a total of 31 billets.

(U) During the year, the Reserve Affairs Branch of the Plans/Manpower Division integrated the Cromemco computer system into its office equipment to automate record keeping and compute statistics. This effort focused on recruiting

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for vacancies, with the computer being used to locate specific specialties, grades, and service.

(U) Temporary duty (TDY) trips were taken to Washington, DC, St. Louis, and Denver by Branch personnel to broaden the base of knowledge required to coordinate actions with the Reserves. Concurrently, the Denver trip included attendance at an Individual Mobilization Augmentee Unified Command Conference held in the Air Force Reserve Personnel Center.

(U) The Reserve Affairs Officer took part in exercises GALLANT KNIGHT 84 and IRON COBRA 84 to increase his technical expertise so that he could inform newly assigned augmentees of what was expected on exercises and operations. Another significant event in the branch was J-2's generosity in providing an augmentee to assist with the workload.

(U) While the US Marine Corps continued its effort to formally establish USCENCOM's Reserve Augmentation Unit effective 1 January 1985, negotiations continued with the other Services on how their portions of the Individual Mobilization Augmentee Program would be organized and

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funded. Because no programmed funds were available until the out years, the Services agreed to use their current funding until completion of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process.

(U) Over 60 reservists representing all the Services were utilized by the USCENTCOM headquarters during the year, and all were funded by agencies outside the headquarters. On 26 June, 469 augmentation billets were approved by JCS, including 280 designated as Individual Mobilization Augmentee billets. (See Figure 6 on the following page.) A total of 511 augmentation billets were requested in the Joint Mobilization Augmentation program for fiscal year 1986.

(U) Responsible for USCENTCOM's Environmental and Morale Leave Program, the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Branch of the Personnel Directorate's Policy and Personnel Support Division conducted an extensive study during 1984 on the policy of permitting only military members to have an authorized environmental and morale leave destination in the CONUS. Since all MAC space available flights into USCENTCOM's AOR transited Europe, any change to policy had to be carefully studied and coordinated with USEUCOM. After a thorough review of the facts and political considerations, the MWR Branch determined that valid requirements existed to open CONUS up to dependents,

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Figure 6. USCENTCOM Approved Fiscal Year 1984 Joint Mobilization Augmentation Program

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Total</u>	
O-6	4 (1)		(1)		4 (2)	
O-5	18 (1)	10 (1)	4 (3)	3 (2)	35 (7)	
O-4	44 (0)	30 (3)	10 (4)	5 (2)	89 (9)	
O-3	7 (3)	21 (6)	5 (1)	3 (2)	36 (12)	
W-0	9 (0)			1 (0)	10 (0)	
Total	82 (5)	61 (10)	19 (9)	12 (6)	174 (30)	
E-8	4 (1)	6 (2)	1 (0)	2 (0)	13 (3)	
E-7	10 (2)	10 (1)	(4)	3 (0)	23 (7)	
E-6	10 (1)	22 (6)	4 (2)	(2)	36 (11)	
E-5	14 (23)	7 (25)	5 (4)	2 (6)	28 (58)	
E-4	6 (16)	(19)	(2)	(3)	6 (40)	
E-3	(20)	(20)			(40)	
Total	44 (63)	45 (73)	10 (12)	7 (11)	106 (159)	
Total	126 (68)	106 (83)	29 (21)	19 (17)	280 (189)	
Grand Total	194 (41%)	189 (40%)	50	19%	36	469

() = Active Augmentees

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and USCINCCENT approved a policy change that allowed dependents to travel to CONUS under the environmental and morale leave program.

(U) This significant policy change allowed military members, civilians, and dependents traveling with their sponsors (military and civilian) to travel to CONUS on leave once per a 24-month tour. The change dramatically enhanced environmental conditions and morale in USCENTCOM.

(U) The Personnel Services Division of the Personnel Directorate processed 1,006 requests for travel to the AOR. Of these requests, 222 were from O-6s and above; the remaining 784 were from personnel in the grade of O-5 and below. From 9 to 16 November, the Army Personnel Section of the Personnel Services Division received a Personnel Management Assistance Team inspection. No major discrepancies were noted.

(U) Overall strength for USCENTCOM headquarters and its support elements were as shown in Figure 7 on the following page. A total of 777 personnel were assigned to HQ USCENTCOM while 83 people were assigned to support elements, making a grand total of 860 personnel at the end of the year.

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Figure 7. USCENTCOM Headquarters Personnel (as of 31 December 1984)**HEADQUARTERS USCENTCOM****(749 Authorized)**

ARMY		NAVY		USAF		USMC		TOTAL MILITARY		US CIVILIAN		TOTAL	
Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn
253	268	118	118	247	255	112	120	730	761	19	16	749	777

SUPPORT ELEMENTS, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND**(106 Authorized)**

	ARMY		NAVY		USAF		USMC		TOTAL MILITARY		US CIVILIAN		TOTAL	
	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn
CSSE	24	21	11	11	24	21	8	8	67	61	0	0	67	61
IPE	3	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	16	0	0	0	16	0
SOCENT	13	11	5	5	5	6	0	0	23	22	0	0	23	22
TOTAL	40	32	16	16	42	27	8	8	106	83	0	0	106	83

**RECAPITULATION, HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS,
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND****(855 Authorized)**

ARMY		NAVY		USAF		USMC		TOTAL MILITARY		US CIVILIAN		TOTAL	
Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn	Auth	Asgn
293	300	134	134	289	282	120	128	836	844	19	16	855	860

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INTELLIGENCE

(U) The Directorate of Intelligence (J-2) was responsible for all intelligence and counterintelligence matters in support of USCENTCOM, including overall responsibility for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence necessary to support the command's mission. The Director of Intelligence was also responsible for the management of all assigned intelligence resources. As shown in Figure 8 on the following page, the Directorate of Intelligence consisted of four divisions: Intelligence Operations, Resources Management, Targets, and Collections. The Special Security Office and Cryptographic Support Group were special staff offices which supported the command and were organized within the Directorate of Intelligence. At the beginning of the year, the Director of Intelligence was BG Dudley J. Gordon. He was succeeded by BG Charles B. Eichelberger, who arrived on 19 July.


(U) The Intelligence Operations Division was responsible for indications and warning, analysis, exercise planning, analysis of signals intelligence (SIGINT), and the preparation and presentation of briefings. It provided near-real-time, all-source intelligence information and ensured that intelligence support was provided to the National Command Authorities, as well as to USCINCENT, USCENTCOM component

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Figure 8. J-2 Organization



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commands, and the USCENTCOM staff. This division was responsible for the operation of the USCENTCOM Indications and Warning Center, provided mission support to the USCENTCOM Joint Reconnaissance Center, and prepared special intelligence products in support of the command mission. It also managed the formal schools training program for the Intelligence Directorate. The dissemination management of originator controlled material was also performed by the Intelligence Operations Division.

(U) The Analysis Branch performed analysis of political, social, economic, and military activities and events in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. It provided input to intelligence annexes for OPLANs and OPORDs and conducted liaison with component and national level intelligence agencies.

(U) The Special Support Branch managed the operation of the Exercises, Presentations and Production Management Sections of the Intelligence Directorate. It provided the primary intelligence interface with the Operations Directorate (J-3) and with other USCENTCOM directorates concerning concepts of intelligence support during the execution of OPLANs, contingency operations, and exercises.

(U) The Signals Intelligence Branch provided

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communications intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) support to the Intelligence Operations Division. The branch maintained a tailored ELINT order-of-battle file on countries within USCENTCOM's AOR. SIGINT branch personnel were responsible for reviewing and integrating COMINT and ELINT information into the overall intelligence plan. The branch also maintained a capability to access national data bases in support of the USCENTCOM intelligence mission. In addition, SIGINT branch personnel assisted in the development of intelligence handling and data base systems. The branch provided input for the SIGINT annex to OPLANs and intelligence estimates.

(U) The Indications and Warning Branch operated the USCENTCOM Indications and Warning Center to support and direct the command mission in accordance with DOD directives. It also provided mission support to the USCENTCOM Joint Reconnaissance Center.

The Resource Management Division managed directorate input to the planning, programming and budgeting system, and other policy guidance. It monitored intelligence planning to support USCENTCOM contingency operations, developed intelligence support systems and the Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) for the command,

and provided counterintelligence support for USCINCCENT.

(U) The Systems Development Branch evaluated present and future intelligence system proposals. It tracked service and component intelligence capabilities and planned enhancements, conducted concept demonstrations, and exercised prototype systems. It also identified, articulated, and defended USCENTCOM requests for enhanced intelligence system support to

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include preparation of required operational capabilities (ROCs), data automation requests, and inputs to the POM and GDIP. This branch also managed contractor studies of USCENTCOM intelligence system support, developed intelligence system architecture, and served as USCENTCOM system coordinator for the Intelligence Data Handling System.

(U) The Counterintelligence and Security Branch provided counterintelligence support to USCINCENT, prepared counterintelligence annexes to OPLANS and OPORDs, coordinated with national intelligence and local law enforcement agencies, and monitored component counterintelligence assets to ensure full counterintelligence coverage of USCENTCOM's geographic area of responsibility. The branch also coordinated physical security matters, document control and accountability. Moreover, it created headquarters security procedures and ensured compliance with them. It also monitored component command procedures.

(U) Responsibility for the development, promulgation, and management of the command targets program was assigned

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to the Targets Division. Additional responsibilities of this division included target materials management, the mapping, charting, and geodesy program, and target development.

(U) The Targets Development Branch provided overall management of USCENTCOM targeting programs to ensure that coordinated target analysis programs and attack methodologies were employed by components and supporting forces. This included command coordination for target nomination, analysis, and validation of target production requirements.

(U) The Target Support Branch was responsible for the compilation of production requirements for command-wide aeronautical, topographic, and hydrographic products. It was also responsible for tactical target materials and terrain analysis products, including the validation of special purpose requirements.

(U) The Collection Management Division provided a centralized collection management authority in support of the headquarters, components, and supporting forces to ensure that optimum use was made of intelligence collection resources and that all collection requirements were satisfied in a timely manner.

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(U) The Special Security Office provided local management of national-level compartmented security programs. It provided protection and control of access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, and operated a secure communications facility to support the headquarters and provide privacy communications for USCINCENT and key personnel.

(U) The Cryptologic Support Group was an extension of the National SIGINT Operations Center of the National Security Agency at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. During exercises, contingencies, and deployments, the Cryptologic Support Group provided USCINCENT, his J-2, and component commanders with time-sensitive, threat warning, SIGINT-derived information and access to SIGINT data exchange with the NSA through the Mobile Cryptologic Support Facility or through the ultra high frequency (UHF) satellite communication tributary package. In garrison, the Cryptologic Support Group supplemented existing information systems with advice and assistance as required.

(U) The J-2 Directorate had three liaison offices. A Defense Intelligence Agency representative was assigned to ensure effective and responsive defense intelligence

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support to the command group and staff of USCENTCOM, and to serve as the principal defense intelligence advisor to USCINCCENT through the Director of Intelligence.

(U) Secondly, the National Security Agency Central Security Service representative to USCENTCOM provided the Commander and each of his directorates and special staffs with signals intelligence and communications security (COMSEC) advice and assistance and provided effective liaison with all NSA organizations. The NSA representative served as the personal representative of the NSA Director to USCINCCENT.

(U) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative acted as the focal point for central intelligence support to the command. As the personal representative of the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA representative provided USCENTCOM with an interface into the entire intelligence community.

(U) All sections of the Special Support Branch contributed toward the accomplishment of the Intelligence Directorate's mission during 1984. The Presentations Section presented the Daily Intelligence Briefing to USCINCCENT's principal deputies and special staff officers. In addition, the J-2 Intelligence Threat Assessment Brief for USCENTCOM's Area of Responsibility was presented to a

number of high-level dignitaries visiting the headquarters, including heads of state in USCENTCOM's AOR, Congressional staffers, flag officers, and community leaders.


The Production Management Section saw requirements for intelligence production increased over 1983 by 11 percent in the area of ad hoc requirements. This increase continued to fuel the drive for the establishment of an Intelligence Production Facility to be located at MacDill AFB. The section also assumed the editorial and publication duties associated with USCINCCENT's Daily Intelligence Briefing Cable and took administrative responsibility for the Intelligence Library from the Special Security Office.

(U) The Exercise Section directed and coordinated the preparation of the intelligence portion of command exercise plans. It developed and coordinated the identification and deployment of personnel, equipment, and support necessary to execute J-2's concept of intelligence operations during the execution of one CONUS field training exercise (FTX), six OCONUS FTXs, and five CONUS command post exercises (CPXs). These exercises and two contingency deployments were described in the following paragraphs.

IRON COBRA 84 was a joint and combined logistical FTX conducted in Egypt from 25 September to 5 October. The J-2 mission was to provide the deployed exercise headquarters with real-world current intelligence and threat warning.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsored two worldwide procedural CPXs during 1984: NIGHT TRAIN 84, held from 5 to 14 April, and POWDER RIVER 84, conducted from 15 to 26 October. The J-2 participated as part of a USCENTCOM crisis action team (CAT) located at MacDill AFB, Florida. The J-2 mission was to provide the CAT with exercise indications and warning and threat intelligence.

GALLANT EAGLE 84 was an FTX conducted at multiple locations throughout the southwestern part of the United States from 5 to 11 September. The J-2 established a Joint Intelligence Center at HQ USCENTCOM (Deployed) at Vandenberg AFB, California. A notional scenario developed by J-2 provided the background against which the component FTXs were set. The J-2 mission was to provide USCINCCENT with current real-world intelligence and to be a higher headquarters response cell for the exercising component elements.



(U) During the year, the SIGINT Analysis Branch guided J-2 systems development and the contractor in writing computer programs to process formatted ELINT reports. Where possible, incoming ELINT reports were correlated to the enemy order of battle file or to an intercept history file. Uncorrelated reports were flagged for analyst resolution. The National Security Agency's ELINT parameter file was available on-line to assist analysts in resolving the function of an emitter. This program answered a long-standing deficiency and allowed USCENTCOM J-2 to use the large volume of formatted ELINT, especially during contingency operations.

In conjunction with DIA, the Plans and Policy Branch developed a proposal for a Joint Intelligence Production Facility to satisfy USCENTCOM intelligence production requirements. This proposal was subsequently refined from a 350-man "full-up" organization to a 115-man DIA field activity called the "Intelligence Center," capable of satisfying most of the command's urgent production requirements. This initiative met with strenuous Service objections regarding military manning and was transformed into a largely civilian organization operated by DIA in direct support of USCENTCOM. At the end of the year, this initiative was awaiting approval by the JCS.

All branches of the Resource Management Division contributed to the accomplishments of the Directorate of

Intelligence during the year. The plans section submitted two major Joint Manpower Programs, the fiscal year 1986 JMP and the fiscal year 1986 USCENTCOM Joint Special Activities Element, with the purpose of upgrading systems support, counterintelligence support, and Indications and Warning support.¹ The J-2, with the participation of USCENTCOM's components, updated its portion of the USCENTCOM Master Programming List for the first time since its conception in 1983.²

The Policy and Programming Section submitted initiatives for the fiscal year 1986-1990 GDIP, the fiscal year 1987-1991 GDIP, and the fiscal year 1987-1991 POM.³ The GDIP submissions became due in December instead of in January. Requirements for both in-garrison and deployed systems and supporting manpower were included. The fiscal year 1987-1991 GDIP included two baseline programs, and IDHS Mitre manpower. It also contained

1. Joint Manpower Program (U), fiscal year 1986-1990, 13 Dec 84; Fiscal Year 1986-1990 Intelligence Production Element, 13 Dec 84.

2. Master Programming List (U), fiscal year 1987-1991, undated.

3. USCENTCOM Program Objective Memorandum (U), fiscal year 1987-1991, Jan 85; J-2 Input to fiscal year 87 GDIP (U), 21 Dec 84; J-2 Input to fiscal year 1986 GDIP (U), 14 Jan 84.

other programs: Defense Dissemination System-Receive Location, Selected Imagery Dissemination System, IDHS Mitre support, ad hoc Imagery, Production Element, and J-2 program support. Four new initiatives submitted in this GDIP package included Intelligence Collection Management, Collection Requirements Management Architecture, and Production Elements I and II. The fiscal year 1987-1991 POM submission included one base line program Deployable Intelligence Data Handling System, one disconnect DIDHS I, and one new initiative Quick Reaction Special Security Office. Projects submitted for funding within the CINC's Command and Control (C²) Initiative Fund included the Decision Support and Information System for Terrorism (DESIST) and

(U) The System Development Branch made strides in en route automated intelligence support during the year. Fiscal year 1984 CINC C² initiative funds were obtained to procure and develop a portable carry-on microcomputer capable of extracting tailored order-of-battle and installation data from the garrison-based Intelligence Data Handling System and processing it to support USCINCCENT and his battle staff during deployment to the AOR or while deployed on limited contingency operations. A microcomputer system was procured and software developed to

4. Fiscal Year 1985 CINC C² Initiative Fund Project (U).

download selected data from either the garrison or deployable IDHS systems. User application software and a user's handbook were being written by the USCENCOM J-6 for achievement of an initial operational capability in early 1985. When fielded, this system would allow the Intelligence Directorate to provide more comprehensive and timely intelligence support to the CINC and Battle Staff.⁵

5. Information paper (U), En route/Limited Deployment IDHS Support (U), 12 Oct 84.

6. Background paper, "THREADWAY," 11 Aug 84.

(U) A contract with the Planning Research Corporation for USCENTCOM's command-wide in-garrison Intelligence Data Handling System was successfully concluded in August. The ADP Concept of Operations for the USCENTCOM IDHS was published in May to document a methodology for facilitating the establishment and exchange of common command-wide intelligence data. The USCENTCOM command-wide in-garrison IDHS Mission Element Need Statement was published in May and validated by the Defense Intelligence Agency in August.⁷ The need statement identified capabilities essential to providing USCENTCOM headquarters and its components with intelligence to support war planning and crisis management in garrison and to support the rapid transfer of intelligence information from in-garrison ADP systems to deployable systems during transition and deployment.⁸ DIA officials were provided a briefing describing command-wide IDHS, which resulted in a DIA commitment to support fiscal year 1986 GDIP funding for the full system. A transition and implementation plan was published in July which detailed the type and sequence of actions required for implementation of the

7. ADP Concept of Operations for US Central Command Intelligence Data Handling System, 1 May 84.

8. Transition and Implementation Plan for the US Central Command IDHS, Jul 84.

USCENTCOM-wide IDHS and to make the transition to an automated environment.⁹

The USCENTCOM Imagery Transmission System (CITS) continued development during the year. CITS would link HQ USCENTCOM, DIA, MAC, USARCENT, USCENAF, USNAVCENT, I Marine Amphibious Force (I MAF), and XVIII Airborne Corps

9. Mission Element Need Statement, USCENTCOM Command-Wide In-Garrison IDHS, 3 May 84.

10. Talk Sheet for USCENTCOM Staff Update, Dec 84.

with Litton-Amecon-produced Fastfax 2000s. These were prototype commercial facsimile devices that would transmit magazine-quality imagery among the headquarters. USCENTCOM experienced many delays during 1983 and 1984 because of either production delays at Tobyhanna Army Depot or terminals being redistributed. As a result, the CITS initial operating capability (IOC) date slipped to the second quarter of fiscal year 1985.¹¹

11. Issue Paper, USCENTCOM Imagery Transmission System (CITS), Aug 84.

(U) The USCENTCOM Intelligence concept of operations was published in July 1984. It described USCENTCOM's concept for intelligence operations in garrison, during transition prior to deployment, while en route, in support of limited deployed contingencies, and for full-scale deployment.¹⁴ The USCENTCOM Imagery Architecture was also published in July as an Appendix to the USCENTCOM Intelligence Concept of Operations. It described USCENTCOM's architecture for the exchange of imagery

12. Point Paper, Digital Imagery Transmission System (DITS), 27 Nov 84.

13. General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) Program Decision Package, USCENTCOM Defense.

14. USCENTCOM Intelligence Concept of Operations, Jul 84.

products for both the in-garrison and deployed environments. It identified imagery and imagery transmission requirements, current capabilities, and USCENTCOM's concept for imagery support. It also described interfaces among imagery processing dissemination locations, HQ USCENTCOM, component headquarters, and selected subcomponent or lateral headquarters.¹⁵

15. Appendix C, USCENTCOM Imagery Architecture to the USCENTCOM Intelligence Concept of Operations, Jul 84.

PAGES 89-90 NOT RELEASABLE

(U) During the year, USCENTCOM and USREDCOM signed a Memorandum of Understanding for a Joint Technical Management Staff to direct, design, and develop common Intelligence Data Handling Systems, including the USCENTCOM DIDHS and that of the host in garrison. The Joint Technical Management Staff formed in July. A definition and design contract was directed by this staff following the award of a contract to the Planning Research Corporation in October. Functional description and hardware acquisition documents were prepared to buy computers and develop software that would provide the same timely

automated support to the USCENTCOM intelligence analyst both in garrison and while deployed. The Joint Technical Management Staff effort was expected to result in economies of scale and minimization of development risks for subsequent implementation while dramatically increasing the likelihood of satisfying total system functional requirements.²³

The J-2 Counterintelligence Branch wrote USCENTCOM Policy Letter Number 10, "Open Storage of Classified Material," during the year. It also conducted a preliminary information security inspection prior to an inspection conducted by the General Services Administration in September. No discrepancies were noted. Several technical surveillance countermeasures inspections were coordinated by the Counterintelligence Branch during the year. The annual USCENTCOM Counterintelligence Conference was hosted by USARCENT in Atlanta, Georgia. The USCENTCOM Foreign Counterintelligence Concept was developed and briefed to the Service Counterintelligence chiefs. Four

23. Msg, CCJ2-RS (JTMS), subj: "USCENTCOM/USREDCOM Joint Technical Management Staff (JTMS)," 313224Z Jul 84; Budget Estimate Agreement (BEA) between USCENTCOM and RADC, Mar 84.

Counterintelligence battlebooks were completed and distributed during the year. The Counterintelligence Branch staffed and coordinated an operational security survey inspection for exercise NARROW PASSAGE 85 for units deploying OCONUS, and updated 18 counterintelligence threat assessments. Also, 200 background and special background personnel investigations were initiated.

(U) The Target Division's continued emphasis on special operations force weaponeering resulted in the establishment of a permanent special operations working group as a part of the structure surrounding the Joint Technical Coordinating Group and the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual. Target Division's efforts were also instrumental in the publication of the first Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual, "Special Operations Target Vulnerability and Weaponeering." This was part of a family of documents on the effectiveness of joint munitions.

(U) Members of the Targets Division participated in exercises and in real-world deployments during the year. The Targets Development Branch participated in the EAGLE LOOK deployment OCONUS, and division personnel participated in the CONUS exercises BOLD EAGLE and POWDER RIVER.

(U) Responsibility for operation and utilization of the Digital Imagery Transmission System was passed to the Targets Division during 1984. As the USCENTCOM Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for the system, the division would be responsible for DITS operations and integration of DITS products into USCENTCOM planning efforts.

(U) Targets Division, in conjunction with the USREDCOM J-2, co-hosted the DIA annual conference on target intelligence and target materials. Also during the year, the Targets Development Branch finalized selection criteria for the contents of the new Contingency Planning Facilities List for USCENTCOM's AOR. This had been an ongoing coordination effort with DIA since 1982. the document went to the printer in December and was expected to be published in early 1985.

(U) The Targets Development Branch also worked closely with the Planning Research Corporation to develop installations data base requirements for the enroute IDHS microcomputer. Initial operational testing and evaluation of this system was tentatively scheduled for early February 1985.


(U) The Target Support Branch, in coordination with USREDCOM J-2, obtained an agreement with the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) to establish a DMA branch office in Tampa to support command mapping distribution requirements.

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Figure 9. J-3 Organization



OPERATIONS

(U) The Operations Directorate (J-3) was divided into six subordinate divisions. Each division was further subdivided into branches and sections. The overall organizational structure of J-3 was as shown in Figure 9 on the facing page.

(U) The Director of Operations at the beginning of 1984 was Brig Gen Michael P. C. Carns, USAF. His deputy was COL (b)(6) US Army. The key directorate staff officers as of 31 December were: The Chief of Current Operations, Col (b)(6) Jr., USMC; the Chief of Special Operations, COL (b)(6) US Army; the Chief of Exercises, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) (b)(6) USAF; the Chief of Command and Control, Col (b)(6) USAF; the Chief of NBC Defense, Captain (b)(6) US Navy; and the Chief of Weather, Col (b)(6) USAF.

(U) USCINCCENT's operational commitments required a flexible, responsive command and control system. Efforts to maintain such a system continued throughout the year. One noteworthy improvement was the completed installation of the command Red Switch which ensured a secure conferencing

capability and interface with the Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) system.

(U) The second major event concerning EC-135Y operations took place in July, when USCINCCENT and his support staff traveled around the world. UHF and HF

communications connectivity was maintained with the rear headquarters during all phases of the mission.

(U) All communications requirements aboard the EC-135Y were supported by the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). In October 1984, USCENCOM received and installed its own AN/URC-110 satellite communication radio. While communications were somewhat limited, this system ensured aircraft connectivity worldwide, whether airborne or on the ground. Planned modifications included a major interior upgrade program, a communications suite, and a reengining program to include fan jet engines for greater range. It also included the acquisition of a second aircraft programmed for USCENCOM in August 1985.


(U) Exercising USCENTCOM headquarters, staffs, and assigned forces was one of the most important means of improving combat readiness. Vital areas such as command and control procedures, communications techniques, and the interoperability of the equipment of the four Services was examined, evaluated, and modified as necessary.

(U) During this year, USCENTCOM continued to participate fully in the JCS-directed and JCS-coordinated exercise programming process. A fully coordinated program was in place for fiscal years 1986 through 1990. From 11 to 13 December 1984, USCENTCOM and USREDCOM jointly hosted the USREDCOM/USCENTCOM/USLANTCOM/USSOUTHCOM exercise scheduling conference at MacDill AFB, Florida.

(U) The Exercise Division planned and participated in the following seven exercises for 1984:

- . ACCURATE TEST 84
- . NIGHT TRAIN 84
- . GALLANT KNIGHT 84
- . GALLANT EAGLE 84
- . SHADOW HAWK 84
- . IRON COBRA 84
- . POWDER RIVER 85

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Figure 10. ACCURATE TEST 84 Forces and Locations

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
HQ USCENTCOM(-)	Thumrait	35 (1 Muscat)
HQ USCENAF(-)	Thumrait	24
Air National Guard	Thumrait	313
184th Tactical Fighter Group McConnell AFB, Kansas (6 F-4D)		
186th Tactical Reconnaissance Group Key Field, Mississippi (4 F-4C)		
Combat Support Element		
Communications Support	Thumrait	
Joint Communications Support Element		15 (3 Muscat)
Detachment Air Force Communications Command		30
Detachment 509th Signal Battalion		10
MAC Airlift Control Element (21st Air Force)	Thumrait	2
USARCENT Liaison	Thumrait	2
MIDWAY carrier battle group	Indian Ocean	—
	Total	431

(Personnel figures represent those personnel present during employment phase.)

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(U) GALLANT KNIGHT 84 was an employment command post exercise conducted from 8 to 12 May at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and at the Navy War College, Newport, Rhode Island, using the Naval Wargaming System. This was the fourth GALLANT KNIGHT exercise, and the fifth in a series that exercised simulated contingency operations in the USCENTCOM AOR. It was the first GALLANT KNIGHT that USCENTCOM scheduled itself, the previous four having been scheduled by USREDCOM.

(U) There were many objectives for exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 84. As specified in the JCS five-year plan, GALLANT KNIGHT 84 was designed to exercise USCENTCOM in an employment CPX of a USCENTCOM contingency. Participants exercised Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK) tactics, techniques, and procedures, exercised intelligence collection and dissemination, developed and refined joint intelligence procedures for use in contingency operations, examined procedures in joint force sustainment, and resolved weaknesses in the joint support structure which hindered sustainment of

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Figure 11. USCENTCOM Participants in GALLANT KNIGHT 84

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Provided by</u>
HQ USCENTCOM	USCENTCOM
JCSE (-)	
USCENTCOM	
United States Army Forces Central Command	
USARCENT	
Third United States Army	
XVIII Airborne Corps	
24th Infantry Division (Mech)	
82d Airborne Division Headquarters (-)	
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)	
HHC, 1st COSCOM	
HQ, 1st SOCOM (-)	
6th Cavalry Brigade (AC) (-)	
11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade (-)	
HHC, 16th Military Police Brigade	
18th Field Artillery Brigade (-)	
20th Engineer Brigade (-)	
HHC, 35th Signal Brigade	
75th Field Artillery Brigade	
525th Military Intelligence Group Headquarters	
1-12th Field Artillery Battalion (Lance)	

18th Aviation Group (Provisional) (-)

3/68 Air Defense Artillery

HHD 58th ATC Platoon

United States Central Command Air Forces

USCENTAF

USCENTAF HQ Ninth Air Force

1st Tactical Fighter Wing

27th Tactical Fighter Wing

33d Tactical Fighter Wing

37th Tactical Fighter Wing

117th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (Air National Guard)

121st Tactical Fighter Wing (Air National Guard)

150th Tactical Fighter Group (Air National Guard)

186th Tactical Reconnaissance Group (Air National Guard)

347th Tactical Fighter Wing

354th Tactical Fighter Wing

388th Tactical Fighter Wing

5th Bombardment Wing (Heavy)

28th Bombardment Wing (Heavy)

41st Aerial Refueling Squadron

55th Aerial Refueling Squadron

193d Tactical Electronic Warfare Group (Reserve)

388th Electronic Combat Squadron

507th Tactical Air Control Wing

552d Airborne Warning and Control Squadron

682d Air Support Operations Center Squadron

Military Air Command

Strategic Air Command

United States Naval Forces Central Command

USNAVCENT

Supporting Naval Forces

SUPNAVFOR

1 Surface Action Group

3 Carrier Battle Groups

5 Patrol Squadrons

1 Airborne Mine Countermeasures Squadron

1 Marine Amphibious Force

Special Operations Command Central

SOCCENT

1st Special Operations Wing

5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)

Navy Special Warfare Task Group

1/75 Ranger Battalion

2/75 Ranger Battalion

the force in combat operations. Other objectives of GALLANT KNIGHT 84 were to examine joint integrated air defense in the USCENTCOM AOR with emphasis on adequacy and sufficiency of point defense weapons to defend isolated critical facilities and key bridges, tunnels, etc., and the resupply of surface-to-air missiles and to examine Joint Targeting Board effectiveness to include SOF targeting.

(U) From the point of view of joint operations, there were 23 specific objectives of GALLANT KNIGHT 84:

1. (U) Exercise and examine intelligence support to combat operations with special emphasis on second echelon targeting, command, control, and communications countermeasures, unconventional warfare, and battle damage assessment.

3. (U) Exercise common air tasking procedures.

5. (U) Exercise and examine the integrated joint and combined airspace management and air defense system.

8. (U) Examine and refine procedures for deconfliction of air assets and joint targeting.

10. (U) Exercise follow-on utilization of the NTPF and MEDNTPS.

13. (U) Exercise procedures to protect and maintain the security of operations.

15. (U) Exercise command and control procedures for echelons above corps functions in conducting the air/land battle.

16. (U) Examine the adequacy of the organization and staffing of USARCENT to accomplish its wartime mission.

17. (U) Exercise air tasking guidance procedures.

18. (U) Examine component reporting requirements.

19. (U) Exercise employment of carrier-based air in support of the land battle.

20. (U) Exercise and examine the integration of C³CM

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in joint operations.

21. (U) Exercise and examine component frequency deconfliction procedures.

22. (U) Exercise and examine cross-Service preplanned and immediate electronic countermeasures tasking procedures.

23. (U) Exercise and examine C³CM targeting methodology.

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(U) There were four objectives of the exercise in the area of operations security (OPSEC): (1) evaluate OPSEC effectiveness and provide OPSEC assistance and guidance to exercise participants, (2) preserve the secrecy of

friendly intentions and military capabilities during the exercise, (3) identify OPSEC vulnerabilities and recommend protective measures which would permit participating commanders to enhance the security of future exercises or operations without adversely impacting on operational effectiveness, and (4) evaluate the ability of planners to identify and execute OPSEC measures to protect logistics movement.

(U) GALLANT KNIGHT 84 extensively exercised communications support. Some exercise objectives were to emphasize communications realism, including war plan capabilities and simulated communications outages, such as

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battle damage, electronic warfare, and compromise of keying material. The exercise was designed to evaluate capabilities of supporting communications units to provide secure connectivity, to evaluate communications management procedures established by the Joint Communications Electronics Standing Instructions and internal Crisis Action Team Operating Instructions, and to exercise processes of frequency deconfliction among J-2, J-3, and J-6 for COMPASS CALL employment. GALLANT KNIGHT 84 also examined the utility of automated frequency management using the USREDCOM Honeywell H-6000 while deployed, evaluated USCENTCOM internal meaoning, interference, jamming, and intrusion handling procedures, evaluated the USCENTCOM staff's ability to accomplish its mission, given the type, quantity, and quality of communications reflected in contingency plans, and determined the command's COMSEC posture. In addition, the CPX exercised procedures for establishing and maintaining WWMCCS automated data processing connectivity between HQ USCENTCOM and all USCENTCOM component headquarters. Finally, GALLANT KNIGHT 84 exercised procedures for deploying the DIDHS, exercised the procedures for establishing and maintaining connectivity between DIDHS and the Mobile Cryptologic Support Facility and between DIDHS and the Tactical Special

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Security Office, and exercised procedures for deploying command and control computer network work stations.

(U) Special operations also played a significant role during GALLANT KNIGHT 84. There were eight specific special operations objectives to be accomplished in this exercise.

2. (U) Exercise and review force employment concepts.

7. (U) Test and evaluate special operations procedures contained in draft standing operating procedures.

(U) In the intelligence area, GALLANT KNIGHT 84 was designed to evaluate intelligence collection support to USCINCCENT and components, including the development and refinement of procedures to be used in contingency operations.

(U) GALLANT KNIGHT 84 evaluated J-2's support to J-SAK and beyond to include threat and target analysis. It evaluated J-2's message distribution system effectiveness and evaluated deployed intelligence information systems

effectiveness and player ability to use alternate means of acquiring data, as required. Finally, the exercise evaluated the intelligence information interface between USCENTCOM and its components. It evaluated the flow of intelligence information from J-2 to other directorates, evaluated the flow of intelligence information from J-2 to other directorates, and evaluated the J-2's field standing operating procedures. In the area of nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare, five specific objectives were exercised "on-line" during GALLANT KNIGHT 84. It exercised chemical operations and logistics emergency action procedures and exercised stockpile-to-target chemical munitions deployment and employment procedures, but this was limited to administrative procedures only. GALLANT KNIGHT 84 also exercised coordination with JCS, NBC reporting, and initiation of chemical warfare retaliatory requests by components.

(U) Medical objectives of GALLANT KNIGHT 84 included examining medical policies and procedures on evacuation and treatment of biological and chemical casualties. They also included looking at preventive medicine procedures and examining the procedures and reporting requirements of the USCINCCENT Joint Medical Regulating Office and Joint Military Blood Program Office. Other medical objectives involved examining Class VIII support, examining the effects of the evacuation policy upon medical units, evacuation requirements, medical resupply, and replacement of lost personnel, and examining intertheater and intratheater medical evacuation.

(U) The provost marshal took advantage of GALLANT

KNIGHT 84 to exercise and examine enemy prisoner of war deployment and employment procedures, but this was limited to administrative procedures only. GALLANT KNIGHT 84 also exercised coordination with JCS, NBC reporting, and initiation of chemical warfare retaliatory requests by components.

(U) In the comptroller area, there was a total of six objectives to be accomplished during GALLANT KNIGHT 84:

(1) Test the ability of USCENCOM's components to utilize existing currency and to effect resupply of currency, including use of foreign money for off-shore procurement.

(2) Test ability of the components to restrict payments to personnel, both in frequency and dollar amount.

(3) Test the ability of components to implement a military payment certificate system.

(4) Test ability of components to pay civilian personnel (both US and local nationals) in-country.

(5) Test ability of components to provide banking, savings, and other remittance programs for US personnel.

(6) Test ability of components to pay limited per diem or danger pay, if directed.

(U) The Combat Capabilities Analysis Group had the following objectives for GALLANT KNIGHT 84:

- (U) Examine USCENTCOM's capability to deal with the indigenous civilian populace.

for the naval forces during execution of the applicable OPLAN.

(U) In the legal area, GALLANT KNIGHT 84 exercised the Department of Defense law of war program and the military justice system. In the area of personnel, GALLANT KNIGHT 84 simply exercised the strength accounting of components.

(U) In summary, CPX GALLANT KNIGHT 84 successfully exercised USCENCOM, its components, and supporting commands in simulated employment operations in the AOR. The stated objectives were exercised and generated many insights into improving the command's C³ posture.

(U) GALLANT EAGLE 84 was the second exercise in the GALLANT EAGLE series. It was a joint and combined FTX

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conducted at several exercise locations in the southwestern United States from early August to early October 1984. Major ground maneuver forces were located at Fort Hunter Liggett, California; Fort Irwin, California; and Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California. The employment phase of GALLANT EAGLE 84 was conducted from 5 to 11 September. The exercise concept of operations was developed based on a threat scenario that caused the deployment of USCENTCOM forces to counter aggression against a friendly nation identified as the country of Purple. The exercise evolved in three phases:

- Phase I - Deployment, 10 August-4 September.
- Phase II - Employment, 5-11 September.
- Phase III - Redeployment, 12 September-3 October.

(U) According to the intelligence scenario for GALLANT EAGLE 84, the death in April of the charismatic leader of Purple's revolutionary regime threw the country into chaos, as religious, military, tribal and secular factions vied for power with no one element able to marshal widespread popular support. Interfactional fighting and riots flared in Purple's cities and countryside. Purple's neighbor Orange attempted to capitalize on the situation by

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supporting the small but highly organized separatist movement in the northern provinces. Orange demanded oil transit rights across southern Purple and threatened military action if they were not granted.

(U) The situation in Purple continued to deteriorate through June. Separatists in the northern provinces proclaimed their independence from the Purple government in Sacramento and were immediately recognized by Orange. The separatists armed with Orange weapons seized much of the countryside in the north, isolating Purple army brigades located in Redding, Gerlach, and Winnemucca. They then asked for Orange assistance in solidifying their gains.

(U) The stunning insurgent successes galvanized the Purple army, which united under a new leader to depose the current Purple regime and proclaim a state of martial law. Noting Orange complicity in the separatist movement, the new government ordered the expulsion of all Orange diplomats, suspended diplomatic relations between the two countries, and appealed to the United States for military and economic aid. Tensions flared rapidly between the two governments, with claims and counterclaims of political aggression.

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(U) The US pledged political and economic support to the Purple military government and sponsored a resolution in the United Nations Security Council censuring Orange's support for the insurgents. In retaliation, Orange charged that the Purple military was a tool of the Central Intelligence Agency and was an instrument of US imperialistic repression. Simultaneously, Orange demanded that the US reduce the size of its embassy staff in Orange and close all consulates outside of the capital.

(U) In early July, Orange initiated a series of large-scale military exercises along Purple's northern border. Orange claimed the exercises represented normal summer training; however, US intelligence sources reported that reservists in the border provinces had been called up to bring units of the 12th Combined Arms Army (CAA), 24th CAA, and 4th CAA to full strength; and the Purple government provided evidence that stockpiles of vehicles and petroleum products were being assembled at border crossing points. Additionally, all Orange air forces were standing down except the five fighter and four fighter-bomber regiments which were deployed to airfields within 150 nautical miles of Purple's border. Three Purple divisions were deployed to the northern portion of the

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country and placed on alert, with some elements deployed closer to the border. However, further reinforcement was impossible because of the insurgent threat and the possibility of escalating hostilities. Based on this evidence and renewed Purple pleas for military assistance, the US National Command Authorities ordered selected USCENTCOM air and ground units to prepare for deployment to bases in Purple to deter Orange aggression.

(U) On 31 July, Orange, citing intolerable provocations and pledging to free the Purple people from the imperialist yoke, ordered its forces across the border into Purple. An independent air offensive by Orange bombers, fighter-bombers and fighters was initiated. Three Orange CAAs, heavily supported by air, invaded Purple by crossing the northern border. Forward deployed elements of the Purple 54th, 60th, and 77th Divisions were quickly overrun, and an extensive program of sabotage, presumably orchestrated by the separatists, prevented their reinforcement by main force elements.

(U) The Purple military government quickly perceived the futility of attempting to defend the northern provinces and the capital at Sacramento and directed the evacuation of key

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officials to Los Angeles. The Purple government formally requested that the US initiate military operations to preserve Purple's integrity. The NCA responded by ordering USCENTCOM forces to deploy to Purple and to prepare to initiate combat operations.

(U) The remnants of the 54th, 60th, and 77th Divisions were ordered to withdraw and establish defensive positions in the vicinity of Los Angeles, San Bernadino, and San Diego. The 34th and 44th Divisions were ordered to establish a defensive line north of Los Angeles in the vicinity of Tulare and China Lake. Those Purple aircraft still operational after heavy Orange bombing were also withdrawn to southern Purple. Purple resistance was able to delay the Orange advance on Sacramento until 15 August when the provincial governor was forced to surrender the city. He and his staff were quickly executed as lackeys of the CIA and a puppet "liberation government" dominated by separatist cadres was installed.

(U) Orange objectives included the seizure of cities and ports along the Gulf of Santa Catalina as well as the adjacent oil fields and production facilities and the establishment of a friendly puppet government in Purple.

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(U) The Orange invasion was going to overcome formidable logistics and terrain constraints. Initially, the Orange offensive will be conducted by five combined arms armies attacking along three axes of advance, with the purpose being to secure the cities of Sacramento, Tahoe, and Eastgate and to acquire terrain for forward deployment of supporting fighter-bomber units and air defense elements, and to enhance the throughput capability of the main supply routes by forward deploying logistical bases.

(U) The attack continued on 22 August with a breakout of Orange forces on four axes. The 12th CAA attacked from Sacramento towards Hunter Liggett, the 24th CAA from Tahoe towards Tulare and China Lake, and the 4th CAA from Eastgate towards Fort Irwin. The 8th Guards Tank Army and the 10th CAA remained in the Orange front's second echelon. Additionally, the 18th CAA, garrisoned in the Lake Meade area, was committed to the attack. The 18th CAA attacked to the southwest through Las Vegas so that its lead elements posed a threat to the Twentynine Palms area.

(U) At the start of the exercise, Orange forces were arrayed in the vicinity of Hunter Liggett, Tulare, China Lake, Bartow, and Twentynine Palms, with Orange tactical combat air

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units deployed into captured air bases to extend their combat radii to cover the entire country of Purple.²⁷

(U) Both headquarters and maneuver unit locations were spread over a vast area in California and Nevada. Major headquarters locations were:

- o USCENTCOM - Vandenberg AFB, California
- o USARCENT - Camp San Luis Obispo, California
- o USMARCENT - Big Bear, California
- o USCENTAF - Vandenberg AFB, California
- o USNAVCENT - Vandenberg AFB, California
- o SOCCENT - Nellis AFB, Nevada

27. Fact Book ^(U) ~~(S/OADR)~~, GALLANT EAGLE 84, Tab 4, "Intelligence Scenario GALLANT EAGLE 84," 5-11 Sep 84. Information used is (U).

(U) Component commands exercised toward a wide variety of objectives based on specific requirements. USARCENT conducted air and ground operations against armor, mechanized, and light infantry forces in areas characterized by desert and mountainous terrain. The USCENTAF forces which took part in GALLANT EAGLE 84 closely paralleled those tasked in command contingency plans. USMARCENT's live fire exercise allowed Marines to exercise in the kind of environment in which they could be expected to fight if employed in a USCENTCOM contingency. SOCCENT conducted joint and combined special operations in the southwestern desert area of CONUS and in the Pacific Ocean near the California coast. USNAVCENT conducted operations and training at Los Angeles and Port Hueneme, while Carrier Air Wing Fourteen conducted close air support and strike exercise flight operations from Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada.²⁸

(U)

28. After Action Report ~~(S/OADR)~~, GALLANT EAGLE 84, 21 Jan 85, pp 2-2 through 2-9.

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(U) The forces and exercise area used for GALLANT EAGLE 84 were the largest ever used in a USCENTCOM CONUS field training exercise. Approximately 45,000 participants operated in a five-state area from 21 key locations. The employment phase of the exercise was conducted from 5 to 11 September.

(U) In air operations, 621 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft flew more than 3,300 sorties, covering the full spectrum of air-land combat missions. Approximately 400 tactical air sorties were flown daily by USAF, US Navy, and USMC aircraft. USCENTAF flew 10 to 12 composite force packages daily to conduct deep interdiction operations. B-52 night offensive interdiction, A-10 and A-7 close air support, AWACS, refueling, and electronic warfare missions were also flown. Carrier Air Wing 14, shorebased off the USS CONSTELLATION, conducted simulated carrier operations out of NAS Fallon, Nevada. These maritime missions included strike packages and close air support at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California. The Marines provided two air strike packages daily plus extensive live fire close air support at Twentynine Palms. In a one-hour period while I MAF demonstrated final protective fire, USMC air delivered 187

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Mark 81 or 82 bombs plus supporting ordnance of various types. F/A-18 participation by US Navy and USMC air was the largest ever by this aircraft in a joint exercise. Its performance was indicated by a near 100 percent sortie completion rate. Extensive airspace management planning and coordination was accomplished with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to clear more than 35,000 square miles of airspace for sustained 24-hour operations. Military and civilian air operations in and around the GALLANT EAGLE 84 area of operations were deconflicted to ensure safety by integrating standard FAA and military air control procedures.

(U) Meanwhile, on the ground, US Army forces included three division task forces which each consisted of a division Tactical Operations Center, a brigade HQ(-), and reinforced battalion-sized maneuver elements. Army forces operated at Camp Roberts, California; the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California; and Fort Hunter Liggett, California. Elements of the 1st and 7th Infantry Divisions supported GALLANT EAGLE 84 by conducting both linkup and opposing force operations. While extensive multi-faceted offensive and defensive training was accomplished, the Army operational highlight was a strategic airborne assault conducted from Pope AFB, North Carolina, to Camp Roberts, California, by the 2-505

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Infantry (Airborne). Five hundred and twenty-five paratroopers and 106.8 short tons of cargo were dropped to initiate Army field operations. Seventeen MAC C-141B aircraft and a complete USAF escort package directly supported the assault. USMC ground forces consisted of a division (-) with two regiments. During 5 to 9 September, Marine ground operations were 100 percent live fire, culminating in an extensive final protective fire exercise which employed the division's organic direct and indirect fire weapons. Preceded and followed by a joint USAF/USMC air attack, the final protective fire exercise was the largest ever conducted in CONUS by US Marines.

(U) Exercise GALLANT EAGLE 84 provided USCENTCOM with an excellent opportunity to provide joint logistic support over significant distances in a desert environment. GALLANT EAGLE 84 forces deployed to the exercise area of operations by sea, rail, and air from 55 locations in 20 states. The MV AMERICAN EAGLE and USNS CAPELLA combined to lift 1,942 vehicles and 57 containers totaling over 13,000 short tons of equipment and material. Sealift operations began on 28 July and ended on 28 August. Nine hundred and twenty-three rail cars moved 2,247 pieces of US Army combat equipment including tanks, wheeled vehicles, and containerized vans. Rail movements began on 1 August and terminated on 3 September. Four hundred and eighty-four MAC- and MTMC-contracted wide-body aircraft moved

19,196 passengers and 6,325 short tons of critical equipment from 42 CONUS on-load stations to 15 off-load locations in the southwestern United States. Thirty-five percent of the total sea, rail, and air flow was scheduled in the JDS. Eighty-two percent of that scheduled force flow was tracked through the JDS.

(U) Responsible components arranged for or coordinated logistic support at each exercise location for the participating units. While many units were able to utilize existing CONUS military installations, airfields, highways and ports, the major ground forces often conducted training and were logistically supported in an austere environment. Performances by the 143d Transportation Command (US Army Reserve) and the 318th Movement Control Agency, a reserve component, were noteworthy in the management of overall transportation and inland transportation, respectively.

(U) GALLANT EAGLE 84 was not without its environmental considerations. USCENTCOM, responsible for maneuver damage control for the first time in an FTX, worked with the components to ensure that training was conducted in accordance with environmental regulations at all exercise sites. Consequently, the exercise resulted in minimal impact on the environment at all of the exercise locations.

(U) In the area of communications, GALLANT EAGLE 84 provided USCENTCOM communicators with their greatest challenge yet in planning and coordinating the installation, operation, and maintenance of command, control, and communications and ADP systems. To support the exercise, approximately five thousand communications personnel were deployed.

(U) GALLANT EAGLE 84 marked the largest joint employment of new TRI-TAC communications message switches (six AN/TYC-39s) and voice switches (five AN/TTC-3s). Through intensive management and cooperation by all supporting communication units, the exercise had no significant equipment problems.

(U) USCENTCOM and its components requested the activation of 96 leased circuits, the largest number since the breakup of American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T). Intensive management actions and extensive coordination between USCENTCOM, DCA, commercial carriers (AT&T, Western Union, and local telephone companies), and components helped ensure that most of the circuits were activated.

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(U) The MacDill-based JCSE was to provide communications equipment and personnel as required, while USARCENT was to provide a two-man liaison team to USCENTCOM Forward.

(U) USNAVCENT was to provide a two-man naval liaison cell to USCINCCENT Forward and to be prepared to exchange liaison officers with USCINCEUR and USNAVEUR naval forces. The Director of the National Security Agency was to provide SIGINT support to USCINCCENT.

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
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Figure 12. Air Operations in Support of EAGLE LOOK

<u>Sorties</u>	274
E-3A	13
KC-10	24
RC-135	7
F-4	117
F-16	113
<u>Refuelings</u>	251
E-3A	7
RC-135	7
F-4	128
F-16	109
<u>Fuel Off-Load (Pounds)</u>	2,667,600
F-4	1,496,900
F-16	506,200
E-3A	305,600
RC-135	358,900
<u>Egyptian Air Force Refueling Qualification</u>	27
Initial Qualification	9
Requalification	15
Instructor Pilot Qualification	3

PAGES 175 - 176 NOT RELEASABLE



(U) Record traffic was especially heavy during the operation. Of particular note was the deployment of mini-WWMCCS capability to Cairo West by USCENTCOM and the establishment of a WWMCCS Intercomputer Net (WIN) Conference. Traffic figures were as follows: (1) AUTODIN sent 380, AUTODIN received 822; (2) Special Security Office sent 144, received 4914, (3) WIN Conference sent 116, WIN Conference received 751.

(U) Within one hour after landing at Cairo West on 20 March, voice communication with the National Security Agency Headquarters was established, so that timely information on both the Libyan threat and order of battle were available. In addition, a special intelligence net

provided tailored intelligence traffic from national agencies.

(U) On 9 April, the redeployment phase began. Redeployment of the main body was accomplished in four days, using the three KC-10s at Cairo West and 12 C-5A aircraft. The final aircraft arrived in CONUS on 15 April.

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PAGES 181 - 192 NOT RELEASABLE

(U) The NBC Division of the Operations Directorate was busy planning, coordinating, exercising and diversifying operations during 1984.

(U) A joint effort between USCENTCOM and the 9th Infantry Division (High Test Bed) developed an operational and organizational plan which established a requirement for a decontamination system to do decontamination in a low water environment. This document resulted in the US Army Chemical School beginning a development program to procure equipment that can decontaminate in a low-water, extreme-climate environment.

(U) JCS commissioned a study for USCENTCOM to be conducted by the Institute of Defense Analysis. The study objectives were:

~~SECRET~~

(U) Division administrative personnel participated in the real-world mission EAGLE LOOK in support of the Operations Directorate both in a deployed status and in the Crisis Action Team.

(U) . An action officer for the NBC Defense Division attended an XVIII Corps chemical-biological warfare intelligence conference which emphasized USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

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(U) Action officer representatives attended meetings at the US Army Armament and Munitions Command and HQ Military Airlift Command concerning movement of chemical munitions. Problems arising from exercise POWDER RIVER 85 were discussed in detail with the outcome incorporated into USCENTCOM Regulation 50-2, "Chemical Operational and Logistical Procedures."

(U) An action officer attended a briefing presented by the British at the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, Arlington Hall Station, Virginia. The subject was protective mask penetrants.

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(U) A USCENTCOM action officer attended a symposium presented by the American Defense Preparedness Association at San Antonio, Texas. The technical sessions focused on new technology as it applied to the individual and collective protection, detection, decontamination, and munition development.

(U) Final staffing of USCENTCOM Regulation 50-2, "Chemical Operational and Logistical Procedures," was effected with USCENTCOM components and the JCS.

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LOGISTICS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE

(U) During 1984, the directorate of Logistics and Security Assistance evolved through a series of reorganizations related to the rapid growth of the command. MG David E. Watts was the J-4/7 throughout 1984, during which he reorganized the staff. General Watts had two deputies, one for logistics (J-4) and one for security assistance (J-7). At the beginning of 1984, the deputy director for logistics was Col (b)(6) (b)(6) USMC. He was replaced on 30 April by Col (b)(6) (b)(6) USMC, who served as deputy J-4 through the end of 1984. Col (b)(6) (b)(6) USAF, had been deputy for security assistance since USCENTCOM had acquired the security assistance mission on 1 October 1983.

(U) The year was marked by extensive travel for the directorate, with expenditures for temporary duty approaching \$350,000. At the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the USCENTCOM Comptroller, the Director of Logistics and Security Assistance conducted a series of internal management control reviews, segmenting all directorate functions and evaluating each for possibility of waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement.

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(U) MG Watts developed, and reviewed with division chiefs, his top eight goals for the directorate. These eight goals were:

- (U) To make everyone in this Directorate understand that we are in the support business first and foremost. That our mission is to be responsive, quick, accurate, and positive to needs of USCINCENT, his entire staff, our component commands, and other agencies with whom we interact.

- (U) To ensure that US Forces deployed in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility including our Security Assistance Offices, are provided with the best logistical support possible.

- (U) To participate effectively in development, implementation, and support of State/Defense Security Assistance Programs throughout USCENTCOM's AOR.

- (U) To develop a logistics infrastructure in USCENTCOM's AOR that will support military operations through balanced integration of host nation support, military construction, pre-positioning, and security assistance.

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- (U) To make sure USCENTCOM war and contingency plans are logistically supportable. Where they are not, to pursue and obtain logistical resources that will make such plans supportable.

- (U) To develop and maintain a capability for effective participation in the DOD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System; additionally, to be able to analyze and evaluate logistics programs of Defense Agencies and Military Services as they affect USCENTCOM.

- (U) To assist USCENTCOM's component headquarters in developing logistics staffs capable of managing the full range of logistics responsibilities assigned to those components.

- (U) To provide a climate of leadership in this directorate that will enable everyone to reach full potential, develop professionally, and obtain the highest level of job satisfaction and tangible reward.

(U) Each division in J-4/7 was staffed with an organic administrative support shop. A system of directorate office instructions was implemented delineating the manner in which

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basic administrative services and functions were to be achieved. Correspondence control, filing, publications, and related functions continued to be provided to the director and staff.

(U) MG Watts established a semiannual Logistics Conference in 1984. Attendees included key logistics personnel from component commands, Services and logistics agencies. The first conference was held at the Air Force Logistics Center, Warner Robins AFB, Georgia, and the second conference was hosted by I MAF at Coronado, California. This forum was to continue to be used to identify and resolve the ten most challenging logistics problems facing the command. Those ten problems were:

- (1) Five year facilities program
- (2) Pre-positioning master storage plan
- (3) Ammunition pre-positioning ashore
- (4) Airlift en route support
- (5) Sealift en route support
- (6) Simplified method to obtain host nation support
- (7) Requirement for intra-theater airlift
- (8) Shallow draft transportation/port and terminal operations

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(9) Use of intra-theater sealift to reduce intra-theater airlift requirements

(10) Logistics support of unconventional warfare forces indigenous auxiliaries


(U) The J-4/7 Directorate underwent a significant organizational change during the year. Effective 15 June, the original four divisions were reorganized into six. Four new divisions were activated: International Logistics; Mobility; Plans, Programs and Exercises; and War Reserve Materiel Divisions. The Logistics Operations and the Logistics Plans and Policy Divisions were dissolved to make up the new structure. The Security Assistance and Engineer Divisions remained relatively intact. The new War Reserve Materiel Division brought together the Joint Petroleum Office and the Supply and Services Branch from the deactivated Logistics Operation Division and incorporated the new War Reserve Materiel and the Munitions Branches. The new Mobility Division integrated personnel from the old Transportation Branch with additional personnel to provide the necessary expertise to manage strategic and tactical mobility planning responsibilities. The Plans, Programs, and Exercises Division incorporated branches from the previous Plans Division and the old Logistics Operations Division into a Long Range Plans and Policies Branch, a Current Plans and Exercises Branch and a

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Figure 13. J-4/7 Organization



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Programs, Analysis and Evaluation Branch. The Host Nation Support and Acquisition Branches from the old Plans Division were consolidated into the new International Logistics Division. The new organization was as shown in Figure 13 on the facing page.

(U) The new organization focused on command and directorate goals, aligned resources with major functions, and minimized the fragmentation of responsibilities and crossing of division lines. It required no added personnel resources and accommodated the required changes with only billet realignments.

(U) In the area of engineering and military construction, there were several changes in current programs. In November, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command shifted the responsibility for their portion of military construction in Somalia and Kenya from the Atlantic Division in Norfolk to the Pacific Division in Pearl Harbor. This was for management and administrative reasons. No personnel changes on-site were experienced.

(U) Because of political considerations and irreconcilable differences between US and Egyptian contract law, a joint US-Egyptian military construction program at Ras Banas became no longer feasible. International Security Affairs of OSD sent the various concerned Congressional committees a letter which officially notified them that this military construction program would not be executed. Efforts began to identify alternative locations

for those missions which were to be performed from Ras Banas.

(U) Construction continued under the contract management of the Navy's Resident Officer in Charge of Construction - Somalia. Construction at the Berbera Airfield and harbor complex was over 50 percent complete at the end of 1984 with a projected total project completion of August 1985. Construction at the Mogadishu airport complex was over 20 percent complete with a projected completion in December 1985. Items completed at Berbera included airfield lighting, control tower, power plant, and general purpose warehouse.

(U) Under the contract management of the Resident Officer in Charge of Construction-Kenya, the fiscal year 1983 harbor improvements progressed to the 90 percent completion stage with project completion expected in April 1985. A contract for a new communications facility was awarded with completion scheduled for June 1985. Items completed include a pyrotechnic magazine, maintenance facility, helicopter pad, aircraft maintenance building, a warehouse, and supporting utilities.

(U) Projects completed during 1984 included the Masirah fiscal year 81/82/83, Seeb fiscal year 82/83, and portions of the Thumrait fiscal year 82 programs.

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(U) In Masirah, the following projects were completed: runways, taxiways, aircraft parking aprons with refueling hydrants, munitions storage and maintenance facilities, petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) storage tanks, air cargo terminal, general purpose and war readiness materiel (WRM) warehouses, power plant, desalination water plant, aircraft shelters, dormitories, dining hall, and administration building.

(U) Projects completed in Seeb included: a crosswind runway, POL storage of 4,800,000 gallons, ammunition storage and maintenance facilities, aircraft parking ramp with hydrant refueling system, power plant, water supply and distribution, general purpose and WRM warehouse, and four portomods. In Thumrait, four portomods and a security fence were completed.

(U) In the area of maneuver damage control and environmental protection, the first major USCENCOM environmental document, the GALLANT EAGLE 84 Environmental Assessment, was completed as part of the environmental protection process for that exercise. It became a guide for control of troops during the exercise to avoid unnecessary maneuver damage. The system of maneuver damage control centers set up for GALLANT EAGLE, EAGLE LOOK, SHADOW HAWK, IRON COBRA,

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and INTENSE LOOK enhanced the commander's capability to stay informed on environmental protection and maneuver damage items of interest.

(U) Many advances were made in accumulating data on water resource availability in the AOR, particularly for underground water. Over 240 groundwater overlays were obtained from Fort Belvoir with approximately 50 more to be produced. The Army solicited contractors for requests for proposals for the procurement of new well drilling equipment designed to support operations in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

(U) The International Logistics Division actively participated in USCENTCOM'S operation INTENSE LOOK. Of

significance during this exercise was that USCENTCOM was able to exercise host nation capabilities and benefit from the willingness of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to support deployed US forces.

(U) The Acquisition Branch hosted Joint Acquisition Coordinating Board meetings in February, June, and October. Attendance at these meetings was expanded to include the Military Sealift Command, Army Corps of Engineers, and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command. These board meetings produced general agreement on a USCENTCOM "Coordinated Acquisition Program" designed to increase the effectiveness of components' scarce contracting resources. The branch held meetings with the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Installations, and Logistics and for Research and Engineering to process, on behalf of the components, a request for class deviation from all non-statutory clauses and provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation when contracting with the sovereign governments of nations in the area of responsibility.

Several strategic mobility enhancement programs significantly improved USCENTCOM's ability to project its

force. The TAKR³⁴ conversion program delivered four of the total of eight vessels in the procurement package. Exercise GALLANT EAGLE 84 marked the first use of the TAKR in a JCS-directed exercise. Capable of sustained speeds of up to 33 knots, the TAKR provided significant improvement for rapid deployment to the AOR. Continued purchase of the KC-10 cargo/tanker aircraft towards a total package of 60 provided significant strategic airlift capability. By the end of the year, the total buy was 29 aircraft. The C-5A wing modification program had completed 33 modifications by the end of 1984 and, coupled with the planned purchase of 50 C-5Bs, would enhance strategic mobility. Continued refinement of the Joint Movement Center during exercises GALLANT KNIGHT 84 and GALLANT EAGLE 84 provided USCENTCOM the opportunity to test and evaluate joint procedures with its components.

34. (U) A TAKR was a vehicle cargo ship (AKR) belonging to the Military Sealift Command (T).

(U) Water distribution responsibilities were being transferred from the Army Engineers to the Quartermaster Corps. This transition progressed smoothly during 1984 with units and new generation water equipment being fielded. Quartermaster units sent their troops both to the National Training Center and Fort Lee for training.

(U) Sufficient funding through fiscal year 1984 ensured that adequate new generation water equipment would be on hand to support current OPLANS. With procurement underway the Army placed added emphasis on training soldiers to operate and repair new water equipment. GALLANT EAGLE 85 was an overall success in this regard, with the introduction of new generation water equipment used by all Services. The emphasis remained on training both regular and reserve components.

(U) In December, the first cut of the Water Inland Distribution Plan was briefed to the Water Resources Management Action Group and components were asked for input, with a revision to follow.

On 30 August, the American Embassy at Nairobi requested standby assistance for water support because of drought conditions in Kenya. In short order, Third Army identified support units and equipment to meet this request. Some rain had fallen since then, obviating the need for water support, but the request remained on standby.

(U) During 1984, J-4/7 assisted two security assistance organizations, OMC Khartoum and OMC Mogadishu, in establishing monthly MAC deliveries of commissary items. The delivery for Khartoum originated at Torrejon Air Base, Spain. Support for Mogadishu came from Diego Garcia. Prior to the delivery program, both security assistance organizations were dependent upon more expensive embassy cooperatives and local markets. This new support program enabled DOD members and their dependents at both locations to purchase a wide variety of foodstuffs at commissary prices.

(U) The first USCENTCOM pre-positioning conference was held at Fort McPherson, Georgia from 9 to 10 August. The meeting provided an excellent forum for the frank exchange of information between military services. The USCENTCOM Master Storage Plan was completed in November and briefed at the semiannual USCENTCOM Logistics Conference. This was

a planning vehicle for managing USCENTCOM's pre-positioning requirements and identified them with their appropriate beddown or staging location. The plan identified total requirements by Service, country, location, and projected storage facility costs which were based on current military construction programs in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

(U) Effective January, the forward operating location of the Joint Petroleum Office was absorbed by the USCENTCOM Forward Headquarters Element. In April, the Defense Fuel Region Mideast was created. The Joint Petroleum Office was responsible for the successful resolution of several significant issues during the year, including pre-positioning of fuel additives and obtaining war reserve materiel program stockage within the AOR.

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Updated wartime requirements for ammunition and materiel to be used in Southwest Asia, fiscal year 1987 (R87M), were developed by the Army. They resulted in more valid ammunition data for upgrading USCINCENT theater reserve stocks stored in CONUS depots.³⁵

The first full year of security assistance activity for USCENTCOM was accompanied by an intense amount of activity and progress. The staff worked on USCINCENT's stated objective of becoming actively involved in the security

35. US Army Study (U) ~~S/OADR~~, Wartime Requirements for Ammunition and Materiel, Southwest Asia, R87M; charts (~~C/DECL~~) (U) ~~31 Mar 94~~, TR-2 and TR-3 Southwest Asia pre-positioned War Reserves (RCS: CSGLD-1724), 30 May 84.

assistance program for the AOR and integrating it into USCENTCOM's overall strategy. The year began with the publication of a comprehensive regulation governing the administration of security assistance organizations which was well received in the field. It provided guidance covering virtually every aspect of security assistance operations.

(U) USCINCCENT hosted the first annual Security Assistance Conference from 30 January through 3 February. Attended by virtually every major player and agency in the security assistance business, the conference primarily addressed issues involving the transition to a new unified command, their impact on the security assistance organizations, and the direction which the command was taking in the region. From 23 February through 2 March, USCENTCOM hosted the first annual Security Assistance Training Workshop, with representatives from all posts and CONUS training agencies. They programed \$100,000,000 worth of training for over 3,300 foreign students on a line-by-line basis.

(U) As was done prior to assuming full responsibilities for security assistance, USCENTCOM

provided a full staff input and comment to the embassy Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance to the JCS and the Secretaries of Defense and State. This product constituted a key input to the process of developing the Congressional Presentation Document. As an adjunct to this effort, two USCENTCOM security assistance staff officers again participated as working members of the Security Assistance Program Review Working Group to develop detailed presentations for selected countries.

The year also saw greater involvement in exercise and crisis action programs, as witnessed by GALLANT KNIGHT 84 and POWDER RIVER 85 and real-world developments such as the sale of Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia and Red Sea mine clearing operations. These actions resulted in the development of several USCENTCOM recommendations for improvements in the security assistance system in order to enhance responsiveness, improve planning, and incorporate unified command participation in the decision process at the Washington inter-agency level. Additionally, USCINCCENT submitted seven direct proposals for legislative initiatives to JCS which, if considered and acted upon, would enhance the conduct of security assistance in the United States' best interests. The year saw several trips to the Security Assistance Offices by various country desk

officers, division chiefs, and participation in USCENTCOM IG visits by plans and policy staff officers.

The routine update of USCINCCENT plan 1200 for disaster relief in the AOR was begun during 1984. The result was a total rewrite which was thoroughly coordinated with the Department of State. The directorate conducted the logistics portion of the 1002 Phase I refinement conference. It was responsible for the logistics portions of the 1002 and 1004 Phase II refinement conferences. Requirements were derived from 1003 and 1004 and would be extended to 1008. The directorate was involved with extensive work in August to develop and refine concepts of operations for 1008 and 1009. Work was begun on OPLAN 1011 which was tasked as a small force plan for the case of global war starting outside the USCENTCOM AOR. This TPFDD refinement was unique because it was done over two weeks by using teleconferencing. CONPLAN 1005 was updated. Plan 1100, "Non-combatant Evacuation Operations," was updated and annexes on goods, services, and mortuary affairs were included. Trips to the AOR involved planning for the PORT GRAND scenario. Work was begun on CONPLAN 1012 which resulted from tasking on the PORT GRAND plan. Progress was made on OPLAN 1012 throughout the year. Additionally,

the Directorate rewrote the logistics section of USCINCCENT's Concept of Operations, 1990.

(U) Directorate personnel attended many conferences, increasing the influence of USCENCOM in the policies of many different agencies worldwide. Officers attended a conference on the joint operation planning and execution system in Norfolk, Virginia. Extensive preparation was made for the logistics conference in Coronado, California. The directorate participated in the Joint Surface Movements Board conference and the Logistics Capability Planning Conference. An important trip was made to USEUCOM headquarters to participate in a conference attended by USCENAF, USAFE, SOCCENT, USAREUR, and USNAVEUR representatives. This was the first major progress in developing close coordination for mutual use of facilities and to start defining support requirements to USEUCOM. Officers attended a planners' conference in New Orleans. An officer attended the joint logistics-over-the-shore demonstration in Norfolk, Virginia. One officer attended JCS-sponsored war games at Newport, Rhode Island.

The directorate increased USCENCOM's influence in DOD policies through input to revisions of documents and by visiting with a variety of government officials. The

Directorate participated in an extensive rewrite of the Logistics Infrastructure Brief. As office of primary responsibility for the Logistics Intelligence Data Base, the directorate began receiving production packages from DIA for locations in Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Branch hosted a visit by Dr. [REDACTED] (b)(6) from OSD. The result was a reassessment of total force requirements up to and including the Minimum Risk Force. Directorate officers hosted high ranking diplomats from AOR countries' embassies in Washington, DC. Officers took part in discussions with visitors from the Congressional Budget Office. Extensive work was done on the Service POMs. The source document, "Logistics Planning and Policy Guidance," was published during 1984, superseding the "RDJTF Logistics Concept" first published in 1982.

(U) During the year, the Programs, Analysis, and Evaluation Branch of the Plans Division developed a method of extracting and summarizing all cargo categories from force (unit) records within a time phased force and deployment list. This model assisted planners in more accurately defining airlift and sealift requirements and capabilities and in analyzing shortfalls. The procedure received approval by the JOPS community and was destined to become a WWMCCS standard.

To assist programmers and planners, a procedure was developed and instituted to apportion sealift assets based on Service requirements and sealift capabilities. The apportionment procedure was recognized as a valuable planning tool and was heartily approved by the Military Sealift Command. The sealift apportionment procedure was successfully implemented in OPLAN 1008.

The J-4/7 directorate, and more specifically the Programs, Analysis, and Evaluation Branch, spearheaded all logistics issues of USCENTCOM in the PPBS, including the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), Defense Guidance, Service Program Objective Memoranda, and Program Decision Memoranda. Many of the programs advocated by this branch were successfully orchestrated and subsequently received funding or additional programming efforts. Significant strides were made in military construction, sustainability, and pre-positioning.

Phase I and II TPFDD conferences were held during the year. The culmination of the conferences permitted the Programs, Analysis, and Evaluation Branch to develop a transportation feasibility estimator for OPLANS 1002 and 1004.

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PLANS, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS

(U) During 1984, the primary focus of J-5 was to provide the plans, policies, and programs required of a unified command. Directorate manning, as well as division functions and significant accomplishments, were addressed below.

(U) In the area of manpower, the approved Joint Table of Distribution for fiscal year 1984 authorized J-5 58 manpower spaces. A JCS manpower survey, conducted in the fall of 1984, had the primary objective of identifying minimum manpower requirements needed to accomplish the missions assigned by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The team conducted desk audits of assigned personnel and identified a requirement for 65 J-5 billets. This represented an increase of seven manpower spaces from the fiscal year 1984 Joint Manpower Program.

(U) On 1 December, the JCS approved the fiscal year 1985 JMP and acted on the Manpower Enhancement Program to reduce fiscal year 1985 authorizations by 3 percent. This resulted in a loss of one officer billet in the Political/Military Division and one enlisted space in the

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Plans Division. Fiscal year 1985 approved authorizations for J-5 were accordingly reduced from 58 to 56 spaces.

(U) The Director of Plans, Policy and Programs throughout 1984 was Commodore James M. Gleim, US Navy. The Deputy Director was Col (b)(6) USAF. Chief of Plans was COL (b)(6) US Army. The Politico-Military Division changed hands during 1984. COL (b)(6) who was chief of the division at the beginning of the year, was succeeded by COL (b)(6) US Army, in July. Chief of the Policy/Strategy Division throughout 1984 was Col (b)(6) USMC. The Programs Division changed hands during 1984, with Col (b)(6) (b)(6) USAF, taking over from Col (b)(6) USAF, in July. The overall organization of J-5 was as shown in Figure 14 on the following page.


(U) In accordance with JCS instructions, redistribution of billets was accomplished when the fiscal year 1986 JMP was submitted to JCS for approval. While the J-1 had recommended that J-5 be held to 61 billets, 65 spaces were approved and submitted. Additionally, redistribution of compatible headquarters personnel was to be accomplished in 1985 to accommodate existing and projected workloads. Personnel breakdown for each division was as shown in Figure 15.

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Figure 14. J-5 Organization



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Figure 15. J-5 Manning

	<u>1984</u>	<u>Proposed Changes</u> <u>Fiscal Year 86</u>
Plans, Policy and Program Directorate	(3 Off/3-Enl)	(3 Off/1 Enl)
- Administrative Office	(3-Enl)	(4 Enl)
Plans Division	(1-Off)	
- Administrative Office	(2-Enl)	(4 Enl)
- Operations Plans Branch		(5 Off)
- Concept Plans Branch	(5-Off)	
- Long Range Plans Branch	(5-Off)	(4 Off)
- Time Phased Force		
- Deployment Data		
- Development Branch	(3-Off/2-Enl)	(4 Off/2 Enl)
Political-Military Division	(1-Off)	
- Administrative Office	(2-Enl)	(3 Enl)
- Near East Branch	(3-Off)	
- Africa Branch	(3-Off)	
- South Asia Branch	(3-Off)	
- Civil Affairs Branch	(1-Off)	
Policy/Strategy Division	(1-Off)	
- Administrative Office	(2-Enl)	
- Policy Branch	(4-Off)	
- Strategy Branch	(3-Off)	
Programs Division	(1-Off)	
- Administrative Office	(2-Enl)	
Programs Branch	(5-Off)	
 Total:	 58 (42 Off, 16 Enl)	 65 (47 Off, 18 Enl)

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(U) The Plans, Policy and Programs Directorate was comprised of four divisions: Plans, Policy/Strategy, Political-Military, and Programs. The Plans Division was responsible for preparing, coordinating, and maintaining operations plans to include Time Phased Force Deployment Data and concept plans in accordance with the Joint Operations Planning System. It also developed strategies and concepts of operations to support future operational planning and provided liaison to components and in-support-of headquarters when deployed.

(U) In June, the Plans Division was reorganized into four branches. The Operations Plans Branch prepared OPLANS and other plans. It assisted in the preparation of operations orders as required, reviewed supporting plans written by the component commands, supporting commands, and agencies, and prepared noncombatant protection and evacuation plans. It also reviewed emergency actions plans for foreign service posts, including on-site visits.

(U) The Concept Plans Branch prepared CONPLANS, compartmented plans, and other plans. It reviewed supporting plans and assisted in the development of concepts and wargames. It monitored the JCS Joint Exercise Program

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to insure that exercises were consistent with OPLANs, provided plans expertise for joint exercises, and participated in crisis action operations.

(U) The Long Range Plans/Analysis Branch developed objectives and concepts to support planning and programming for USCENTCOM. It analyzed and provided impact of all political and military planning factors for USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. This branch also developed and provided plans input to all national policy directives, the Defense Guidance, the Joint Strategic Planning Document, and the Defense Resources Board (DRB). It provided plans inputs for planning and programming actions which impacted a future joint service force of over 500,000 persons. It developed and presented US military positions and objectives for sensitive negotiations with regional nations and provided planning assistance on a military-to-military basis with allies and nations in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

(U) The Time Phased Force and Deployment Data Development Branch prepared, reviewed, and coordinated TPFDD data to support OPLANs. It also reviewed component deployment data, developed force flow projections, and structured forces for deployment, support, and redeployment. The branch coordinated

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with the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) on TPFDD development and refinement.

(U) The J-5 Political-Military Division was the focal point for interaction with friendly foreign countries through the Departments of State and Defense. In its role of monitoring the international relations aspects of USCENTCOM policies and actions, the division continuously worked to insure that all command plans, policies, and programs, including security assistance and exercises, were conducted within acceptable political parameters and national policy. The division provided USCINCENT with trip preparation, international security policy reviews, and other matters pertaining to the development of strategy, plans, and programs which affected US international relations. In order to provide USCINCENT with timely and sound political-military assessments, the division was organized into functional branches in which officers with area expertise closely monitored developments within a defined geographical area. The division also assumed responsibility for civil affairs planning. This was accomplished with periodic augmentation by US Army reservists from the 352d Civil Affairs Command, Riverdale, Maryland. This division was divided into four branches.

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(U) The Near East Branch conducted plans, programs, and policy reviews and prepared political-military assessments of Near-East countries in the USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

(U) The Africa Branch conducted plans, programs, and policy reviews and prepared political-military assessments of African countries in the AOR.

(U) The South Asia Branch conducted plans, programs, and policy reviews and prepared political-military assessments of South Asian countries in the AOR.

(U) The Civil Affairs Branch was responsible for plans and policy relating to the conduct of civil affairs in support of USCENTCOM operational plans.

(U) The Policy/Strategy Division of J-5 was responsible for the development of both USCINCENT's nation-building infrastructure strategies and his warfighting strategies that were designed to achieve national objectives. It established milestones to enable assessment of all nation-building and warfighting strategies, coordinated continuously with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department and Department of Defense and other government agencies to ensure consistency of effort

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in strategy development, and assessed equipment, personnel, training and warfighting capabilities within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. The division monitored current regional issues and developed strategies in accordance with JCS Publication 2, "Crisis Management." It developed Command Arrangement Agreements (CAAs), Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) and Memoranda of Understanding with other unified and specified commands and developed terms of reference (TOR) and the rules of engagement for the USCENTCOM AOR as needed. The division was the command OPR for the following documents: OSD Military Posture Statement, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (Volumes I and II), the Unified Command Plan, and USCINCCENT's Quarterly Report to the Secretary of Defense. It developed USCENTCOM inputs to all policy and strategy documents or issues, provided support background material for USCINCCENT's annual presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee, and developed trip books, speeches, and slides for use by the Command Group and the J-5 directorate.

(U) The Strategy Branch developed both the nation-building infrastructure strategies and the warfighting strategies to achieve national objectives. It established milestones to enable assessment of all nation-building and warfighting strategies and coordinated continuously with the JCS, State Department, and DOD to ensure consistency of effort in strategy development. The branch also prepared recommendations, comments, or inputs to JCS and other US

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Government agencies on incoming reports and studies pertaining to strategy. It developed and proposed command positions related to other US agency strategy papers as they affected national and international negotiations, including other papers, studies, and reports of the JCS, National Security Council, and US government. It assessed equipment, personnel, training, and warfighting capabilities within USCENTCOM's AOR, monitored current regional issues and developed strategies in accordance with JCS Publication 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces." It developed MOAs and MOUs with other unified and specified commands, established USCENTCOM command relationships for OPLANs, CONPLANs, and exercise plans. It also developed TORs and was the OPR for command visits as assigned. The branch compiled and wrote USCINCCENT's Quarterly Report to the Secretary of Defense, compiled and wrote the annual USCINCCENT presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee, and developed speeches and slides for presentation by the Command Group, J-5 directorate, and other ranking USCENTCOM personnel.

(U) The Programs Division monitored and coordinated all aspects of the DOD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System for USCINCCENT and was integrally involved with the

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unified command PPBS system and all programmatic requirements of USCENTCOM. Major actions included: (1) preparing USCINCCENT for presentations to the Defense Resources Board, (2) coordinating USCENTCOM interaction in the POM cycle by providing guidance to components for program development and prioritization, (3) submitting USCENTCOM's POM to the Air Staff and advocating USCENTCOM programs in the Air Staff Board Structure (4) providing command inputs to the Joint Strategic Planning Document and Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA), Defense Guidance, Joint Program Assessment Memorandum, and OSD Program Issue Books, and (5) developing a USCENTCOM Master Priority List (MPL).

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(U) PLAN 1220-83 "Normal Deployability Reaction Force" was approved by USCINCCENT on 5 May 1983. It provided for the deployment of a battalion size force with or without a supporting tactical air squadron.

USCINCCENT's Concept of Operations (1990) was further refined and updated in 1984. Following the briefing to the JCS on 28 October 1983, JCS provided staff and service comments in January 1984. On 16 January, JCS provided a prioritization of current JSCP tasks to use for infrastructure development. With the new 86-90 Defense Guidance, J-5 led a staff effort to refine the Concept of Operations updated to 1990. USCENCOM components provided comments and revised factors for the update. The document was published on 31 August. In late December, JCS directed a review of the concept of operations as an off-shoot of USCENCOM's developing strategy. Both concept and strategy would be developed concurrently during 1985.

conducted military-to-military talks with Oman, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain in an effort to improve the collective defense of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

A series of conferences was held during the year to support planning efforts. USCENTCOM planners' conferences were held from 5 to 7 June at New Orleans, Louisiana and from 12 to 14 December at Camp Pendleton, near Oceanside, California. A USEUCOM-USCENTCOM planners' conference was held at Vaihingen, Germany from 16 to 18 August.

(U) In October, the first biennial USCENTCOM plans directory was published.

(U) Throughout 1984, the Political-Military Division continued to monitor the international relations aspects of command strategy, plans, policies, and actions. This was especially critical through USCENTCOM's second year as a unified command. This second year was characterized by maturation. The command developed and refined strategies, plans, and programs for the AOR and, equally important, established its credibility both at home and abroad. It was in this area that the Political-Military Division focused

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its energies in 1984, further refining and integrating the overall goals and objectives of the command. Key to this effort was the development of the Multinational Strategy in coordination with other key USCINCCENT documents, the Strategic Assessment, and the Concept of Operations. Coordination of routine and daily actions with other national agencies, development and coordination of a viable regional travel and visit program, allied cooperation, and command information and education were other areas in which the division concentrated its efforts.

(U) As an integral step in providing the strategic and operational direction for USCENCOM, a draft Multinational Strategy was further developed to set forth USCINCCENT's goals and objectives for all 19 countries in the area of responsibility. These command goals and objectives, woven into overall national policy, would serve as primary guidance for USCENCOM in developing consistency in all initiatives, actions, plans, and programs in its relations with individual countries and the region over the mid-term (1986-1990) and the long term (1991-1996). Country-specific annexes were completed for each country of the AOR. Parts of these annexes were submitted to JCS as a portion of the USCENCOM JSPDSA fiscal year 1985-1992 input and received favorable acceptance and comment.

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(U) In its role as the focal point for interaction with the Department of State, the division was involved in a continuous formalized program of scheduled quarterly visits to Washington, DC for each of the regionally-oriented action officers. This program ensured that each action officer maintained a face-to-face relationship with his or her counterparts at the State Department as well as within DOD and JCS. The division also hosted a USCENTCOM visit by Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) John T. Chain, USAF, Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State that led to on-going discussions with the State Department and other Washington agencies about problems specific to USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

(U) The division functioned as the OPR for three major OCONUS USCINCCENT trips during the year. Preparation for and execution of the travel involved development of itineraries and agendas, tasking of all staff elements for contributing actions, building of trip books, and accompanying USCINCCENT as a member of the official party. In July, LTG Kingston circumnavigated the globe. He travelled to Hawaii for policy and strategy discussions with the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command (USCINCPAC) and to pick up the Commander, US Naval Forces

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Pacific who was to accompany him during a visit to Pakistan. From Hawaii, USCINCCENT travelled to the Philippines and Diego Garcia to hold discussions with commanders and personnel responsible for maintaining the Near-Term Pre-positioning Force. The CINC's next stop was the first USCINCCENT visit to Pakistan, which constituted a significant concession on the part of that country. While in Pakistan, the CINC held discussions with senior military and civil officials, including President Zia-ul-Haq. The CINC then visited Jordan and Morocco on his way home.

(U) As a result of both US and Oman initiatives, the first of what was envisioned to be a series of political and political-military discussions between the two countries was held on 8 and 9 October. The Political-Military Division prepared for USCINCCENT's participation as the senior USCENTCOM representative.

(U) Division officers provided political-military expertise to the USCENCOM staff for exercises GALLANT KNIGHT and POWDER RIVER in 1984. Major contributions, both in exercise objective development and during the actual exercise play came from the Civil Affairs Branch of the Political-Military Division. One major innovation of the division was in developing effective command and control of multinational operations in countries with which the US had no formal treaties or alliances. The concept of the Military Coordinating Committee was first tried in exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 84 and was injected into a major joint exercise for the first time during POWDER RIVER 85, which was conducted in calendar year 1984. The GALLANT KNIGHT exercise provided the opportunity to exercise a large share of the reserve component civil affairs units that supported USCENCOM. The civil affairs branch, supported by

augmentation from the 352d Civil Affairs Command, was heavily involved in the planning, execution, and control of the exercises.

(U) To provide the USCENTCOM Command Group with a

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single source document for unclassified data on the countries of the AOR, the division produced country books. These books contained an overview of the history, people, military, and various geopolitical aspects of the individual countries. Country books for all nineteen countries had been completed in 1983 and were revised and updated on a periodic basis. Egypt, Djibouti, Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were updated in 1984.

(U) Efforts continued during the year to explore and document the possibilities of allied cooperation to offset shortfalls within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. Recognizing that some allied countries conducted operations in the USCENTCOM AOR and that Congressional pressure for increased allied country burden sharing was not going to diminish, it was logical to incorporate efforts to obtain this cooperation in the USCENTCOM planning process. Therefore, it was decided to incorporate country strategies for obtaining allied cooperation into the command strategies. Each country strategy would include objectives, capabilities, and a plan for increasing the contributions of each country identified.

(U) The major problem experienced by the division was manning. Planned and projected action officer manning for the Division was eleven, but the actual level was nine.

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Exacerbating the problem were two factors: the lack of naval interservice expertise caused by the Navy's policy not to formally train foreign area specialists and the shortage of administrative and clerical support. The division normally should function as a reserve of personnel with area experience and expertise who were available to accomplish long range analytical studies; devise workable strategies and tactics to implement plans, policies and programs; and to advise USCENTCOM decision makers about the political-military realities of the world. The continued manpower shortages made the division fall increasingly behind in its long-range work. The division was basically reacting instead of anticipating and providing timely, in-depth analytical assessments.

(U) The Policy/Strategy Division was the OPR for ten official visits, prepared eleven speeches, and developed numerous papers which stated USCENTCOM's position on varying issues. Examples included: a study which delineated USCENTCOM accomplishments in the region over the last three years, strategic considerations of the AOR for the near and long term and a series of papers on US-Gulf fighter policy and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

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(U) The Policy Branch functioned as the OPR for USCINCCENT's OCONUS trip from 9 to 22 November to London, Lisbon, Somalia, Kenya, Oman, and Bahrain. The primary purpose of the trip was for USCINCCENT to attend Omani National Day celebrations as a personal guest of Sultan Qaboos. Additionally, USCINCCENT held discussions with US and host-nation officials in the United Kingdom, Portugal, Somalia, Kenya, and Bahrain.

(U) From 5 August to 21 September, one policy branch officer served as part of the USCENTCOM forward staff element in Egypt during operation INTENSE LOOK. Also, a branch officer served as part of the USCENTCOM Inspector General Evaluation Team during exercise GALLANT KNIGHT. A policy branch officer served as CAT watch chief during Exercise POWDER RIVER.

(U) During 1984, the Policy Branch provided primary staff support for the two USCINCCENT commanders conferences conducted in conjunction with exercises GALLANT KNIGHT and GALLANT EAGLE.

(U) The policy branch was OPR for a number of official visits to USCENTCOM headquarters:

- . Ambassadors from AOR countries, 6 and 7 February 1984.

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. Commodore Newman, COMUSNAVCENT, 27 February to 1 March 1984.

. General Leopold Chalupa, CINC, Allied Forces Central Europe, 30 March 1984.

. General Officer CAPSTONE Course, 2 May 1984.

. General Sennewald, Commanding General, Forces Command, -10 July 1984.

. Air Marshal Donald Hall, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, United Kingdom, 19 July 1984.

. Brigadier General Phillip M. Drew, Assistant Deputy Director, Political-Military Affairs, JCS/J-5 22 to 24 October 1984.

. General (Retired) Richard Stilwell, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 22 October 1984.

. Admiral Sir William Staveley, CINC/Chairman British Commanders in Chief, Overseas Committee, 5 November 1984.

. Dr Fred C. Iklé, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy,
6 December 1984.

(U) In the Strategy Branch, several USCENTCOM agreements with other unified commands were reviewed and rewritten during 1984, the Memorandum of Understanding between USCINCPAC and USCINCCENT was rewritten and promulgated on 25 January and a Memorandum of Understanding between USCINCEUR and USCINCCENT was rewritten and promulgated on 29 January.

(U) In addition to providing speech inputs for USCINCCENT, the branch also provided speeches with accompanying slides for Command representatives as listed in Figure 16 on the following page.

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Figure 16. J-5 Speeches

<u>Representative</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Audience/Location</u>
(U) Col (b)(6)	4 January	Allied Students, Air War College, Maxwell, Alabama
(U) Col (b)(6)	21 January	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Tampa, Florida
(U) LTG Kingston	23 February	Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC
(U) Commodore Gleim	21 April	US-Pakistan Military Policy Group Meeting in Pakistan
(U) LTG Kingston	10 May	Commanders Conference, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
(U) Col (b)(6)	4 June	Armed Forces Planners Conference, Washington, DC
(U) Col (b)(6)	12 September	Ambassador Lewis, US Ambassador to Israel, Washington, DC
(U) Maj Gen Rohr	3 October	Air Force Doctrine Conference, Langley AFB, Virginia
(U) Brig Gen Beyer	5 November	US Students, Air War College, Maxwell AFB Alabama
(U) MajGen Moore	29 November	Royal College for Defense Studies, London, England
(U) Maj Gen Rohr	13 December	United Kingdom Commander in Chief Committee's Joint Warfare Staff, Senior Officers Joint Warfare Course, Poole, England

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(U) The J-5 Programs Division led command efforts throughout the Department of Defense Planning, Programming and Budgeting System process. In the planning phase, the commander's comments on the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis were developed based upon inputs from the components and a review by the staff. The review began in January with final comments provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April. Defense Guidance review began in September and concluded in November with the commander's recommendations for change being forwarded to the Secretary of Defense and USCINCCENT's appearance before the Defense Resources Board to discuss them. The division also prepared the commander for the CINCs' conference which preceded the DRB meetings.

(U) In the programming phase, the HQ USCENTCOM fiscal year 1986-1990 POM was presented to the panel and committee structure of the Air Staff Board in January and February for funding consideration. Program development, review, and prioritization for the HQ USCENTCOM fiscal year 1987-1991 POM occurred from August to December. Thirteen programs were developed and the POM was published in late December. Command involvement in identifying component programming requirements began in January in response to JCS tasking to develop an infrastructure in the AOR in a fiscally realistic manner. The

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first Master Programming List resulted from this component-USCENTCOM staff effort and was published in February. The document began its first review in June, after Service POM publication, and the second edition was published in October. During program review in May, the command evaluated the adequacy of Service POMs to fulfill the mid-term objectives of the Defense Guidance and provided comments to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their use in developing the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum. Preparation for the OSD Issue Book cycle began with completion of the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum. The division participated, at OSD invitation, with the drafting of issue outlines for Southwest Asia programs. USCINCCENT's comments on issues of importance to USCENTCOM were dispatched in July on each of the eight OSD Issue Books. Simultaneously, the division led the preparation effort for USCINCCENT's appearance before the DRB in July, which concluded command involvement in the programming phase. In the budgeting phase, the command reviewed all OSD Program Budget Decisions, drafted impact statements for USCENTCOM programs which were reduced in scope, and monitored programs affecting USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

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(U) During August, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the JCS initiated parallel efforts to enhance the CINCs' participation in the PPBS. The USCENTCOM Programs Division responded to both efforts by developing the command position and response, and, later, by implementing subsequent guidance. As a result of the initiative, Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Tactical Air Command became component spokesmen before the Departments of Army and Air Force, respectively, for matters relating to USCENTCOM's Army and Air Force components' PPBS requirements. During the ensuing months, numerous meetings and briefings occurred which led to the development of a list of higher priority needs for the fiscal years 1987-1991 POM for the Secretary of Defense, JCS, FORSCOM, and TAC.

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**COMMAND AND CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER
SYSTEMS (C⁴S)**

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(U) During GALLANT KNIGHT 84, the Computer Operations Division successfully deployed the Honeywell Level 6 minicomputer to provide WWMCCS connectivity among the forward field elements, rear garrison operations, and the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network. The J-4 deployed the Personnel Manpower System, using the Cromemco microcomputer, to the exercise area, supporting over 300 USCENTCOM personnel. J-6 deployed a communications status monitoring system which proved extremely useful.

PAGES 269 - 270 NOT RELEASABLE

(U) For the first time in the play of a USCENTCOM exercise, the augmentation program was exercised in support of the computer operations staff. During GALLANT EAGLE 84, six active duty personnel augmented the Computer Operations Division: two crypto repairmen, a computer repairman, and three computer operators. The program proved successful, providing a wealth of knowledge and experience shared by both the USCENTCOM organic staff and the assigned personnel.

(U) During the year, HQ USCENTCOM C3 capabilities were enhanced with the completion of four programs. The most significant was the installation of a secure digital switch by Electrospace Systems Incorporated. The red switch, operational in February, functioned as a secure intercom within the headquarters and was interfaced in April into the AUTOSEVOCOM network to provide worldwide secure voice connectivity for 260 subscribers within the headquarters. Selected instruments were cleared for Top Secret and Special Compartmented Information. The system

was fully modular to allow for future expansion and increased interface capabilities. J-6 published off-duty security procedures for the new "Red Switch" telephones.

(U) In May, an Air Force Communications Command Engineering and Installation team installed three communications-electronics schemes. An optical character reader was installed in the message center, interfacing directly with the MacDill AFB standard Air Force Automated Message Processing Equipment. The team also installed cables in support of the Local Area Network and the Information Distribution System.

(U) A KY-3 secure voice device was installed in the CINC's residence during the year. J-6 published the security requirements for protection of COMSEC equipment in the CINC's residence.

(U) AT&T divestiture caused abrupt changes to the methods of satisfying commercial circuit requirements. Lead times went from an average of 120 days to 180 days. A special task force of executives from AT&T and its divested Bell operating companies was established to assure that national security communications requirements were satisfied.

(U) The initial field instructions on "pair-wise unique" material were drafted for AN/TYC-39 to AN/TYC-39 tactical automated message switch and AN/TYC-39 AUTODIN to switching center connectivity. The utilization of "pair-wise unique" material was successfully implemented during GALLANT EAGLE 84. Input was also provided to the National Security Agency for an instruction governing utilization of "pair-wise unique" material.

(U) In February, HQ USAF and the Strategic Air Command provided USCINCCENT with a C3 aircraft. After being modified by E-Systems it was redesignated as an EC-135Y. These modifications did not include the installation of communications to support USCINCCENT and his battlestaff.

(U) Through the use of CINC C2 initiative funds and operations and maintenance funds, a portable secure UHF satellite communications terminal was procured from Motorola Inc. The terminal was installed aboard the aircraft in early November. It provided interim communications capabilities until a second aircraft was obtained and retrofitted with a full communications suite. To increase the capability of the interim terminal, AN/GXC-7B facsimile transceivers were ordered. This equipment would add record communications capability to the terminal. Through a memorandum of agreement with SAC, USCINCCENT's C3 aircraft was homebased at Robins AFB, Georgia and supported by the 19th Air Refueling Wing.

(U) Many of the lessons learned from the USCINCCENT's trips to the AOR and around the world were used in planning the upgrade of the Emergency Action Center satellite communications terminal. Flexibility was made a top priority to meet varying communications requirements of the command. The 485th Electronic Installations Group conducted an engineering study for the upgrade of the Emergency Action Center and prepared a report in late November. The report was reviewed with recommended changes based on experience gained since the initial study.

(U) In the area of mission support, KY-70s (secure voice) were installed and operational at the Chief of the US Military Training Mission, ELF ONE, and the American Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; at the US Military Training Mission and the American Consulate in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; and at the American Consulate in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. These KY-70s were upgraded to KY-71s by the Department of State.

(U) Prepositioned telecommunications service requests to support OPLAN 1004 were submitted through DCA channels beginning in February 1984. The project was completed in July 1984. By having these requests prepared and on file with common carriers ahead of time, UCENTCOM's response

time to a major contingency would be reduced.

(U) The directorate also set up the first J-6 hosted communications/ADP conference. Attendees included representatives from all components, the Air Force Communications Command, TAC, SAC, and HQ USAF.

(U) The Deployable Intelligence Data Handling System underwent a mass storage upgrade from July to October. The single Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) militarized RM03 50-megabyte disk drive was replaced with three DEC RA60 205-megabyte disk drives, providing a total of 615 megabytes of on-line data storage. Additionally, a DEC TU80 1600 bits per

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inch tape drive was installed to update DIDHS magnetic tape capability. A new DEC operating system, the Interactive Applications System 3.2 was installed in October to accommodate and utilize the significantly increased storage capability. The equipment upgrade enhanced overall DIDHS operational capabilities by providing adequate storage for an increasing intelligence data base and redundant flexibility in the hardware configuration.

(U) In March, Planning Research Corporation delivered a new DIDHS software release, CC02, followed by CC03 in October and CC04 in December. These releases greatly enhanced user and system capability in areas of data base management, message handling, and communications support. Data from the DIDHS mainframe was successfully downloaded to the GRID microcomputer for development work on the J-2 En route Intelligence Support System.

(U) The Combat Capabilities Analysis Group began planning to purchase ADP equipment in support of Modern Aids to Planning for USCENCOM. The system would be located in the J-6 computer room and would be used to conduct feasibility analyses of USCENCOM OPLANS, test force on force OPLANS, analyze planning assumptions, and

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support the USCENTCOM staff with computer assisted analyses. This requirement evolved out of the JCS Chairman's guidance on wargaming and his support of the Secretary of Defense principle that each unified command have the authority and means to conduct war games. The equipment was expected to be procured in fiscal year 1985.

(U) System Development Notice CEN-007 was validated and approved by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 July. It was developed to justify the purchase of additional WWMCCS unbundled software to support USCENTCOM's second Honeywell Level 6 minicomputer. The requirement for a second Level 6 and supporting software was outlined in System Development Notice RED-076.

(U) The second Honeywell Level 6 minicomputer was ~~delivered and installed~~ in the Computer Operations Facility during March. The second Level 6 was designated and utilized as a developmental and back-up system to the original Level 6 system during garrison operations. During deployed operations, the original Level 6 could be deployed to the field with the second Level 6 maintaining normal ADP functions in garrison.

(U) USCENTCOM was identified as a test site for WWMCCS

software release WRNP 3.0 for use on the Honeywell Level 6 minicomputer. Testing began in November and was to continue through March 1985.

(U) System Development Notice CEN-008 was approved on 2 October. It was developed to justify the purchase of dual asynchronous boards for the Level 6 minicomputer and three teletype devices to support the USCENTCOM Crisis Action Team. The boards were necessary to support component WWMCCS connectivity to the USCENTCOM level 6 while in a deployed mode.

(U) System Development Notice CEN-010 was submitted on 5 October. It was developed for justification to connect stand-alone microcomputer workstations into the WWMCCS ADP system. This capability would allow the staff to operate in stand-alone mode when deployed and be able to interface into the WWMCCS system once the main body arrived.

(U) The first USCENTCOM Justification, Acquisition and Approval Document was developed and submitted by J-6 and approved by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the year. This document outlined requirements for WWMCCS ADP support of USCENTCOM and specifically designated the acquisition of a transportable Honeywell Information System Distributed Processing System 8 as USCENTCOM primary computer host support. It also established a reliable access to the Joint Deployment System and other WWMCCS data bases for the command. The system was scheduled to arrive in fiscal year 1985.

(U) The Software Branch received 112 requests for computer support during the year. Twenty-five of these requests were for 34 TEMPEST Z-150 microcomputers and 14 were for WWMCCS Information System Common User Subsystem workstations. The remaining requests involved software development, maintenance, modification, and staff assistance.

(U) In support of J-4/7, a system was developed for contract acquisition planning using a data base acquired from the US Department of Commerce. Additionally, a micro system to track the planning of munition consumption rates for air and ground weapon systems was designed and a major program to identify containerized cargo in a TPFDL for evaluation of movement capabilities was developed.

(U) The software branch of J-6 developed and deployed a communications status monitoring system during GALLANT

KNIGHT 84 and GALLANT EAGLE 84, developed an OPLAN deployment flow reports system for J-5, and developed and installed a command group suspense control system to track suspenses within the command.

(U) ROC 1-84 was submitted in July for an Improved Communications Capability for Unconventional Warfare/Special Operations.

(U) Two ROCs were validated during the year. ROC 7-82, for a USCENTCOM Tactical Communications Capability, was validated by Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 526-84 dated 15 August. ROC 1-83, for the First Major Communications Node in Southwest Asia, was validated by JCS Memorandum 798-84 dated 28 December.

(U) The validation process was still in progress at the end of the year for ROC 2-83 (Second Major Communications Node), ROC 3-83 (Third Major Communications Node) and ROC 4-83 (Nine Minor Communications Nodes).

(U) The JCS assigned the Department of the Army the responsibility for production of the technical analysis and cost estimates for ROCs 1-83, 2-83, 3-83, and 4-83 to support

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the ROC validation process. The technical analyses and cost estimates for all four ROCs were delivered in final form early in the year. Headquarters Defense Communications Agency, in a parallel and coordinated effort complementing the technical analysis and cost estimate process, began work on a systems level design of the Southwest Asia Theater Communications Capability. DCA published the system level design in Defense Communications System Five Year Program 87 in September.

(U) On 14 September, USCENTCOM submitted 16 projects to JCS for funding under the CINC Command and Control 1984 program:

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. (1) Joint Reconnaissance Center Communications Network, which provided connectivity from the joint reconnaissance center forward to reconnaissance platforms and rearward to USCENTCOM Rear.

. (2) Decision Support and Information System for Terrorism (DESIST), which provided the capability to process and display terrorism data.

. (3) Security Assistance Organization Communications, which provided an interbase radio system prepositioned in the AOR for contingencies involving security assistance organizations.

. (4) Institute for Defense Analyses Communications Study, which identified in detail the types and capabilities of host nation communications equipment in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

. (5) WWMCCS Graphics Terminal, which would expedite the time consuming, daily analysis of data during plans development and facilitate decision making.

. (6) which would display a large volume of

SIGINT to support threat analysis and timely decision making during contingencies or crises.

. (7) Deployable UHF Satellite Communications, which would provide UHF satellite terminals for MARCENT's FHE.

. (8) UHF Tactical Satellite Package to provide UHF satellite communication to link MARCENT's forward deployed forces to the tactical command post.

. (9) Secure Teletype Message Terminal, which will provide a commercial secure teletype system for the Commander, Middle East Force (COMIDEASTFOR) to units of the Sultan of Oman Navy.

. (10) Automatic Message Handling through WWMCCS, which would provide an automatic message handling capability off the host WWMCCS computer.

. (11) Integration of Simulation Models on Command and Control ADP, which would develop a software package to be used over WWMCCS, for training personnel in staff procedures, and development of plans.

. (12) Repeater Station that would extend the range of the USARCENT hand-held portable radio ("brick") system.

. (13) Base Station to be used with USARCENT's "brick" radio system.

. (14) Vehicle Converter to be used with USARCENT's brick radio system.

. (15) Brick radios that provided deployable command net radio to connect the commander, chief of staff, operations officer, and battle watch officer while deployed.

. (16) Executive Presentation System, which would provide a graphics terminal for USARCENT.

(U) A program was established during the year to handle the communications requirements for security assistance officers in USCENTCOM's AOR. Minimum communication services for security assistance officers in the USCENTCOM countries were defined in USCENTCOM Regulation 12-2, "Security Assistance Policy, Administrating and Management," published on 1 April. A single action officer was established within the J-6 directorate as a focal point for security assistance communications matters.

(U) At OMC Cairo, J-6 representatives made several liaison visits to the OMC to discuss communications

activities. A site survey was conducted under USCENTAF sponsorship to recommend communications for a newly established TAFT. A second AUTOVON trunk was activated to the OMC to handle the increase in Department of Defense telephone traffic.

(U) Equipment was received and partially installed for the OMC's UHF non-tactical brick radio system, a system recommended and sponsored by the OSI.

(U) A staff visit was made by J-6 to the offices of the Military Assistance Program Jordan to assist in defining requirements to enhance the range of the interbase radio system connecting residences to the embassy. Roof mount antennas were recommended and arrangements were made through the comptroller to provide the OMC with funds to procure and install these antennas.

(U) At the request of the US Military Training Mission Saudi Arabia, a survey was conducted by the FHE (afloat) J-6 staff officer to recommend upgrade to its existing computer and word processing systems.

(U) For OMC Somalia, follow-up actions to a staff visit conducted in December 1983 continued throughout the year. Arrangements were made to transfer excess VHF non-tactical "brick" radio assets from Beirut to the OMC. At year's end, these assets were in use at the OMC but required rechannelization to be compatible with existing embassy assets. The J-6 staff provided guidance in the establishment of the Foreign Military Sales case to provide the Somalia government with a command and control

capability. USNAVCENT sponsored a program to provide a commercial satellite terminal at the OMC to allow OMC personnel to coordinate with Navy personnel at Berbera.

(U) The J-6 Current Plans and Operations Division was responsible for communications planning in support of OPORDs and OPLANs, contingency operations, exercises, disaster relief, relocation, and evacuation plans. The division also managed existing communications systems, both at USCENTCOM's headquarters and in its area of responsibility. The Current Plans and Operations Division was the office of primary responsibility for communications security, TEMPEST, telephone directories, requests for changes to existing communications, radio frequency matters, and for the preparation, coordination, and publication of the theater Joint Communications Electronics Standing Instructions. The division also

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monitored unit readiness of those signal units assigned for planning to USCENTCOM to assess their abilities to implement the OPLANS. The Current Plans and Operations Division consisted of four branches until July 1984: Plans and Operations, Mission Support, COMSEC Management, and Administrative Support. In July the Plans and Operations Branch was divided to form the OPLANS and Operations Branch and the Exercise and Contingency Branch. In December, the division was restructured to become the Communications Operations Division with four branches: Exercises and Contingencies, Mission Support, COMSEC, and Administrative Support. The OPLANS and Operations Branch was eliminated and branch personnel relocated in the formation of the Plans and Requirements Division. The operations functions were assumed by the remaining branches.

(U) On 1 December, the Future Plans and Programs Division was disbanded and two new divisions were formed: the Program Management and PPBS Division and the Plans and Requirements Division.

(U) The Programs Management and PPBS Division managed USCENTCOM C3 programs, including headquarters enhancements, Southwest Asia infrastructure, meteor burst communications,

base, camp, and station communications, and USCENTCOM components' communications-electronics modernization. This division was also OPR for other JCS programs, such as military satellite communication, TRI-TAC, the Joint Multichannel Tactical Switching System, JCSE Modernization, and Defense Communications System/Defense Security Communications System/Secure Voice Improvement Program. Additionally, this division was the OPR for User Requirements Data Base, the DCA Five Year Program, and the J-6 Internal Management Control Program, and managed each program from the validation of the requirement until an operational capability come into being. The division developed C3 systems of the future based on command requirements and developmental programs, provided periodic updates to staff on the status of programs and provided membership to working groups or standing committees as required to properly manage programs.

(U) The Plans and Requirements Division provided policy guidance and direction regarding telecommunications requirements, definition, planning, and programming. This division developed the communications portion of USCENTCOM's war, disaster, and evacuation plans and orders. It provided technical assistance in the area of communications-electronic development programs, reviewed and coordinated command and

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control program studies of Headquarters USCENTCOM and its Service components, and served as the theater focal point for all future telecommunications enhancements. It developed statements of requirements based on recognized limitations, and in conjunction with the user, for new telecommunications systems. The division also developed communications system concept plans (Command and Control System Master Plan) for the enhancement, of theater telecommunications (fixed and tactical) networks and facilities and defined the communications capabilities needed to support future concepts of operation. It coordinated the long-term development of plans and procedures for the survivability of theater telecommunications systems, including physical security, alternate routing of critical circuits, mix-of-media, and use of host nation military and commercial systems. Finally, the division coordinated supporting signal unit planning and programming and managed security assistance organizations' communications improvements.


(U) In November, the computer systems security function was removed from the Computer Operations Branch and organized as the Computer Systems Security Branch. The Software Design, Development and Maintenance Division

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reorganized, functionally, two of four branches to become the Software Development Branch and the Operational Software Branch.

(U) In December, the Computer Systems Division was reorganized to properly reflect the deployable nature of specific billets as outlined in the command joint manning plan. The division's deployable mission was tasked to the newly formed Computer Systems Support Element. The Chief, Computer Systems Division additionally served as Chief, Computer Systems Support Element (CSSE). The Computer Operations Branch, Computer Systems Security Branch and the Software Design, Development and Maintenance Branch were assigned to the CSSE as the Computer Operations Division, Computer Systems Security Division and the Software Design, Development and Maintenance Division, respectively. The ADP Plans and Programs Branch remained subordinate to the Computer Systems Division. The new organization of the J-6 at the end of the year was as shown in Figure 17 on the following page.

Figure 17. J-6 Organization



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CHAPTER III

SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

(U) While a great deal of the work of the United States Central Command was accomplished in its six directorates, known collectively as the "J-staff," there were also a number of special staff agencies within USCENTCOM headquarters. These agencies included the traditional professions of the ministry, law, history, and medicine, as well as the more specifically military occupations of headquarters commandant, adjutant general, comptroller, and provost marshal. In addition, there were specialists in public affairs and combat capabilities analysis among the special staff, as well as liaison officers from two specified commands, SAC and MAC, from another unified command, USEUCOM, and from a number of other organizations.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) On 9 April, the Inspector General, BGen Ray "M" Franklin, USMC, was relieved by Captain (b)(6), US Navy, who was the Inspector General until the arrival of BGen John H. Gary III, USMC, on 15 June 1984. Col (b)(6) (b)(6) USAF, retired on 1 August and was relieved by Col (b)(6), USAF. BGen Gary, Colonel (b)(6), Captain (b)(6), and COL (b)(6), USA, were the key incumbents at year's end.

(U) USCENTCOM Regulation 20-2, dealing with command inspections and the Security Assistance Organization Command Inspection Checklist, was rewritten. Other major activities during the year included the evaluation of two major exercises and the inspection of ten security assistance offices in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. In January, inspections of the US Liaison Office in Kenya and the OMC in Egypt were conducted. The inspection of the office in Kenya was changed to an assistance visit with a reinspection scheduled for a later date. In February, the Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan was inspected. In March, command inspections of the Military Assistance Program in Jordan and the US Liaison Office in

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the UAE were conducted. In April, the OMCs in Sudan and Oman were inspected and the Liaison Office in Kenya was reinspected. This completed the fiscal year 1984 inspection cycle and all inspections of security assistance organizations were considered satisfactory.

(U) In May, the IG conducted an evaluation of command and control, joint operational readiness, and OPSEC was performed during GALLANT KNIGHT 84, a joint command post exercise conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In August, BGen Gary accompanied USCINCCENT on a four-day visit to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In July and August, the IG participated in a USCENTCOM Manpower Survey in preparation for a JCS manpower survey to be conducted in October. At the conclusion of the survey, it was decided to reduce the size of the office by one O-6 billet. This would be reflected in the fiscal year 1986 joint manpower document. In September, an evaluation of GALLANT EAGLE 84, a joint and combined field training exercise involving strategic movement of forces into a simulated overseas area of responsibility using the Joint Deployment System, was conducted at multiple locations in the southwestern area of the United States.

(U) On 1 October, a new fiscal year began, and the IG

began a new command inspection cycle. It began with inspections of the Liaison Office in Kenya and the OMC in Somalia. The final major activity of calendar year 1984 was the command inspection of the US Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia in December. All inspections of security assistance organizations were rated satisfactory.

(U) The Inspector General was also the Commander of the FHE. BGen Ray "M" Franklin, USMC, was relieved as Commander, Forward Headquarters Element, on 9 April. BGen John H. Gary III, USMC, assumed command on 15 June. On 1 June, Col [REDACTED] (b)(6) USAF, was assigned as Special Assistant to the Commander, FHE, replacing Col [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) USAF, who retired on 31 August. USCENTCOM Regulation 525-17, "Administration for the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Forward Headquarters Element (FHE) Afloat," was published on 19 April.

ADJUTANT GENERAL

(U) Total authorizations for the Adjutant General's office remained unchanged during 1984. The Adjutant General was authorized 31 positions as of 31 December. On 6 February, LTC [redacted] (b)(6) assumed the position of the Adjutant General, vice LTC [redacted] (b)(6). Throughout the year, one E-8 administrative superintendant from the Adjutant General's administrative support staff performed

(U) The USCENTCOM FHE afloat was formally established on 31 December 1983 with Col (b)(6) USAF, the first designated Deputy Commander, FHE. The deputy commander position was a rotating 120-day TDY filled by an O-6 or an O-6 selectee from USCENTCOM. Following Colonel (b)(6) was Col (b)(6) (b)(6) USMC, from the J-5, who was deputy commander from April through August. COL (b)(6) USA, from J-4, was deputy commander from August to November, and Captain (b)(6) US Navy, from J-3, held the position at the end of the year.

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duties in the Resources Division as the Administrative Systems Project Manager.

(U) The Adjutant General's organization was as shown in Figure 18 on the following page.

(U) In June, the Adjutant General was designated USCENTCOM's focal point for the Freedom of Information Act. During the year, the Adjutant General's staff participated in two CONUS and one OCONUS exercises. These were: GALLANT KNIGHT in March, SHADOW HAWK in July, and GALLANT EAGLE in September. The Adjutant General also deployed two individuals to support operation EAGLE LOOK, one person to support operation INTENSE LOOK, and another to support the Forward Headquarters Element from September through December.


(U) In January, under the Department of Defense Internal Management Controls Program, the Publications/Graphics Division developed a cost reduction program for commercial publication subscriptions. Input provided by the command's directorates and special staff offices accounted for a reduction in publication subscriptions at a saving of well over \$5,000.

(U) Commercial publication subscription data was

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Figure 18. Adjutant General Organization



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automated on the Xerox 820 computer system. This process enabled updating and listing on a more economical and timely basis. It also provided a consolidated list of active and inactive subscriptions along with providing the command's directorates and special staff offices with individual listings of their subscriptions. Fast accounting of total expenditures and savings were other benefits of this automation.

(U) During the year, the filing system within the publications branch was upgraded with the introduction of the Kardex Rotary Filing System which provided ample storage capacity for forms, publications, and miscellaneous materials. The office was renovated with new office furnishings, such as new desks and library storage cabinets. Forms management procedures were also automated into the Xerox Star System which provided an efficient process for the Graphics and Forms Management Sections to produce new and revised forms. This reduced processing time to one day compared to one week if done manually.

(U) The Graphics Branch continued to provide a full range of Graphics support to the command. It processed 1,296 work orders for viewgraphs, 35-millimeter slides, posters, and similar products during the year. The branch also received

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approval from the Joint Congressional Committee on Printing for a computer phototypesetter.

(U) The Resources/Administrative System Division's manpower authorization was updated to include a Navy E-7 for fiscal year 1986. The increased manpower would establish an administrative system manager for the headquarters. The division also completed the Local Area Network test on 20 August and submitted the findings to the Joint Working Group on office automation. It recommended that the findings be accepted and given to the Chief of Staff for final approval of the XEROX Ethernet Local Area Network. On 30 August, the Chief of Staff approved the installation of the network into the Headquarters. All 860 word processors, excluding those physically located in the areas restricted to compartmented information, would be linked into a common local area network providing electronic mail and electronic file management. In addition to the the 860 word processors, ten additional multifunctional (Xerox 801X Star) work stations would be included on the net providing additional word processing capabilities, graphics, spreadsheet, and a file management program. Two high-speed laser printers would also be installed, giving letter quality text and graphic

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capabilities at approximately 12 pages per minute. Linking all of the above equipment would be a 300 megabyte file server to provide file space and control the system. Installation of the equipment was expected to be completed by 1 March 1985, with startup of the local area network at that time.

(U) In an effort to provide the Headquarters a deployable word processor, the Resources/Administrative System Division ordered and received ten Xerox 630 Memorywriters to test within the headquarters. Although the Memorywriters had not been tested in a field environment, the staff was confident that the 630 would solve this long-standing problem. The 630 Memorywriters were being used in the staff on a day-to-day basis pending the requirement for deployment. Plans were to include the Memorywriters on the local area network in the near future.

(U) During the year, each directorate and special staff office completed a word processing survey, justifying all word processing equipment on hand. Air Force Regulation 4-2 was used as the controlling directive for each survey. The year-end allowance of word processing equipment for the headquarters was 70 machines.

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(U) As part of the ongoing effort to provide a wide range of services under the office automation concept, the Publications/Graphics and Resources/Administrative System Divisions joined in the development and procurement of a microfiche system. This system would provide the staff with a wide range of microfiche products, including back lighting capabilities for the filming of overhead transparencies and an automatic computer printout paper feed system to speed the filming of any size document on computer size paper. Installation of the microfiche system was expected during the first quarter of 1985.

(U) The Resources/Administrative System Division also developed a computer program to better control the issuance, storage, and requisition of command-wide expendable supplies. These supplies consisted primarily of bond paper, toner, and developer for the copiers. This program worked by having the directorates and special staff offices submit estimates of their usage rates for these supplies, this cutting down not only the amount of funds requested for future fiscal years, but also to cut down waste within the system. With this program, the division realized a tangible cost savings of approximately \$40,000. Additionally, the copier control program developed in

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1983 provided a complete maintenance history of every copier within the command. This added feature helped in replacing three copiers with poor maintenance records with three higher production machines, thereby giving the command a higher return for its investment dollar.

(U) The Services Division made numerous improvements to its capabilities in 1984. New Automated Message Processing Equipment hardware was installed in the Message Distribution Branch. This new piece of hardware printed messages at the rate of approximately 250 lines per minute. A new Message Optical Character Reader was received to process all outgoing messages. This sophisticated piece of electronic gear eliminated the need to handcarry all messages to the Base Telecommunications Center. Incoming message traffic increased from 600 to nearly 1,000 per day, with surges topping 1,700. Total message copies increased to nearly 700,000 copies per month. Outbound messages increased from 20 to approximately 35 per day. The Xerox 9500 high speed copier in the Message Distribution Branch was purchased in July. By purchasing it, the division saved \$29,531.63 in rental charges. The Reproduction Branch workload increased to an average of 350,000 impressions per month. Under the umbrella of the Government Printing Office in Atlanta, a commercial printing contract was

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let, utilizing a local commercial printer. Work that had previously been sent to the Eglin AFB Field Printing Plant was being accomplished locally. By entirely eliminating postage costs and drastically cutting turn-around time, this was a significant step forward in serving the commercial printing needs of the entire command.

(U) An automated filing cabinet was installed to replace ten individual filing cabinets in the Message Distribution Branch. This was a significant improvement in the message filing process and greatly enhanced message retrieval service.

(U) The Distribution and Document Control Branch workload grew significantly during the year. The branch processed as much as 250 pounds of official mail and 25 pieces of registered mail per day. This branch received an outstanding rating during an information security inspection by the General Services Administration Information Security Oversight Office. A completely revised set of procedures for control of Top Secret material was prepared for inclusion in a revised command information security procedures regulation. The Services

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Division also coordinated arrangements to display traveling art from all four Services in the USCENCOM Command Section.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

(U) The Public Affairs Office continued to play an active and important role in the command's activities. Public interest in USCENCOM remained at a stable level, with the more noteworthy events receiving generally fair and accurate accounts of command activities. Several personnel changes took place during the year, but a full staff level was maintained. Changes were made in the plans and policy, audio-visual, and internal areas.

(U) The Policy and Plans Division was involved in the planning process of every command exercise. Shown in Figure 19 on the following page were the major exercises that required a unique public affairs annex or significant military exercise briefing during the year. The division was also responsible for writing public affairs plans for

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**Figure 19. Exercises Requiring Public Affairs Involvement
During 1984.**

ACCURATE TEST

SHADOW HAWK

GALLANT EAGLE

BLACK ROCK

GALLANT KNIGHT

SLY FOX

IRON COBRA

VALIANT USHER

ELLIPSE FOXTROT

SEA WIND

MIRROR IMAGE

NIGHT TRAIN

POWDER RIVER

PRESSURE POINT

Figure 20. Plans Involving Public Affairs Involvement During 1984.

Port Grand

OPLAN 1002

CONPLAN 1007

0300

Command Post Standing Operating Procedure

OPLAN 1004

Casualty Standing Operating Procedure

Multinational Strategy

ELF ONE

OPLAN 1008

OPLAN 1009

CONPLAN 1011

CONPLAN 1100

CONPLAN 1010

JCS Contingency Plan

Hurricane Relocation Plan

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command plans for future contingencies. Those were as shown in Figure 20 on the previous page.

(U) Plans and policy personnel were involved in developing public affairs guidance for the USCENTCOM Inspector General. Extensive inspections were conducted for the military missions in Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. New checklists were developed for Sudan, Oman, the UAE, Kenya, and Somalia.

(U) The chief of the division was sent to Washington, DC to rewrite Volume I of the Joint Operation Planning System. His expertise was used to develop a concise and organized document for use throughout the military Services.

(U) The division was also effective in writing and developing a number of projects that reflected credit on the office. Among those were the development of a briefing for the Defense Information School, a foreign affairs seminar, a plans overview brief, and a memorandum of understanding between Egypt and the United States on public affairs matters. The division was also responsible for developing eight public affairs regulations and guidance for the office.

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(U) The division was responsible for implementing and working manning problems. During exercises and other long periods of time, the office required the additional help of reservists. The division worked closely with the J-1 to develop a program that would meet the needs of the office. The division also assisted in gathering manpower data and justification for the office.

(U) The focus of the Policy and Plans Division remained on the preparation and refinement of operations plans and concept plans throughout the year. Much of the planning effort was dedicated to working with the Joint Chiefs of Staff public affairs office, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, United States Embassy personnel in the AOR, and the Services.

(U) The division dedicated the early part of the year to planning public affairs guidance for GALLANT EAGLE 84, the largest exercise ever conducted in the continental United States. With participation of all the military Services and heavy media interest, the operations plan for public affairs was one of the most concise documents researched and written.

(U) The division provided the public affairs annexes to

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the exercise directives and exercise operations orders for other command exercises such as SHADOW HAWK and real-world contingencies such as operation INTENSE LOOK.

(U) The division had the additional responsibility of updating and writing public affairs checklists for the use of missions in the AOR and for the USCENTCOM Inspector General. The checklists resulted in increased public affairs awareness and understanding among the people involved.

(U) The Operations Division of the public affairs office focused on media relations, audiovisual documentation, community relations, internal information, and exercises during the year.

(U) Two key events were the focal points of division activity in 1984. One of these was INTENSE LOOK, a real-world contingency involving mine countermeasures operations in the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea in support of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The other was a major training exercise in the continental United States named GALLANT EAGLE 84.

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(U) Operation INTENSE LOOK, which was conducted during August and September, had significant public affairs involvement from the start. In response to JCS direction, the Public Affairs Office deployed a three-man public affairs team consisting of the USCENTCOM Public Affairs Officer, Captain (b)(6) US Navy, the Operations Division Chief, Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) (b)(6) USMC, and Master Gunnery Sergeant (MGySgt) (b)(6) USMC, the Assistant Internal Information Officer. The team deployed first to Norfolk, Virginia, and from there to the Naval Base at Rota, Spain, with Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 14. The team then independently travelled onward to Cairo, Egypt, while the squadron sailed for the Gulf of Suez aboard the USS SHREVEPORT. In Cairo, the team joined the staff of USCENTCOM Forward, headed by Commodore A.S. Newman, Commander United States Naval Forces Central Command, located in the American Embassy in Cairo.

(U) The team handled all public affairs aspects of this internationally followed event. Activities included documenting the operation with a seven-man audiovisual documentation team provided by the Atlantic Fleet Audiovisual Command in Norfolk, Virginia; releasing still photographs and videotape to the international media under the direction of the

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Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; organizing a background briefing and a media embark on-board the USS SHREVEPORT for a selected 14-member media pool; and providing public affairs guidance to the on-scene commander and his staff. These efforts resulted in generally favorable coverage of the mine clearing effort by the world's media and enhanced the image of the United States in this key area of the world.

(U) Exercise GALLANT EAGLE 84 was the largest exercise ever conducted in the continental United States by the United States Central Command. The exercise took place in the desert Southwest between August and October and involved participation by all services and the United States Coast Guard. Following months of preliminary planning, public affairs guidance was developed and issued. Several Operations Division personnel deployed to Vandenberg AFB, California to handle the public affairs aspects of the exercise. The deployed public affairs staff organized a joint information bureau staffed by liaison officers from each of the USCENTCOM components. The bureau supplied answers to media queries and facilitated requests from news media representatives for visits to units or observation of specific exercise events. This was the

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first time that USCENTCOM's Public Affairs Office had employed a joint information bureau structured along these lines. The results were favorable and brought about positive coverage of the exercise. GALLANT EAGLE 84 allowed Operations Division personnel to gain first-hand experience in conducting public affairs for a widely dispersed, large-scale, complex exercise.

(U) USCENTCOM's media relations posture was in accordance with the public affairs themes promulgated by the Departments of Defense and State. Command activities were kept low-key and generally disclosed only in response to query. As a result, the media did not express much interest in the command. The continued volatility in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility, the INTENSE LOOK minesweeping operation in support of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and GALLANT EAGLE did heighten media interest in command activities, but media queries were generally directed to and handled by spokesmen at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

(U) Despite the command's low-key posture, several publications solicited articles from the command. Each article required an intensive effort by a combination of public affairs officers to write and revise it. Additionally, each article was reviewed by the staff and then approved by USCINCCENT for release.

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(U) The first major article on the command appeared in the April issue of Defense 84. It had been programmed to be published some months earlier but various delays by the command and the magazine resulted in publication in the spring. This article became the benchmark for other articles and speeches.¹

(U) The second major article appeared in July in Armed Forces Journal.² It was an exclusive interview with LTG Kingston. The majority of the work for this article consisted of assisting the Commander in Chief in preparing for the interview and in reviewing the transcript before publication.

(U) The third major article was written for the October issue of Army magazine.³ It was one of several articles written for that issue by senior Army commanders

1. "The United States Central Command" article by LTG Kingston, Defense 84 magazine, Apr 84.

2. "Lt. Gen. Robert C. Kingston" an Armed Forces Journal interview by Benjamin F. Schemmer, Armed Forces Journal, Jul 84.

3. "Central Command Keeps the Vigil in Turbulent Mideast" article by LTG Robert C. Kingston, Army magazine, Oct 84.

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throughout the world.

(U) The fourth major article appeared in the October issue of the Armed Forces Journal.⁴ Mr Benjamin Schemmer, the magazine's editor, was the driving force behind publication of the article and the earlier interview. This lengthy article featured material provided by the command and included information obtained by the magazine based on their original research. Additional articles regarding rapid deployment and USCENTCOM's area of responsibility were also published, making the issue a strong reference for activities and capabilities in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

(U) The last major article appeared in the November/December issue of Defense 84, which devoted the issue to articles by the commanders of the unified and specified commands.⁵ This was the first major project for USCENTCOM in its upgraded status as a four-star command and was also the

4. "US Rapid Deployment Forces--USCENTCOM--What Is It? Can It Do The Job?" article by Raphael Iungerich, Armed Forces Journal, Oct 84.

5. "US Central Command: Refocusing the Lens of Stability on a Region in Crisis" article by General Robert C. Kingston, Defense 84 magazine, Nov-Dec 84.

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first major effort for newly-promoted General Kingston. The article broke new ground in its approach to the presentation of issues.

(U) The upgrading of the command to a four-star billet and the concurrent promotion of General Kingston was a major milestone for the command. Announcement was made in a low-key fashion by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. The short announcement provided only the basic details and did not deal with the rationale for the decision.⁶

(U) Meanwhile, a brief ceremony on 6 November at the USCENTCOM headquarters to welcome General Kingston was not publicized and was not reported.⁷ General Kingston signed a letter that, as an internal information tool, expressed his appreciation for support rendered by the staff during the past years.⁸ Remarks by Secretary of Defense

6. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense Public Affairs News Release, General Officer Announcement, No. 360-84, 27 Jun 84.

7. CCCC Memorandum, 5 Nov 84, USCENTCOM Formation.

8. CCCC Memorandum, 6 Nov 84, Promotion.

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Weinberger were made to dignitaries at a 6 November promotion ceremony⁹ in Washington, which was attended by members of the Pentagon press corps, while local and national media reported the promotion and upgrade in a routine manner.¹⁰

(U) Media training courses offered by the Army and the Air Force at the Pentagon for general officers continued to be used by the command in 1984. Maj Gen Taylor, the Deputy USCINCCENT, received training from the Air Force in the Pentagon facility in March. Several other general officers were scheduled but had to cancel because of last-minute commitments. Officers who received training before their arrival at the command included General Kingston, Maj Gen Rohr, who succeeded Maj Gen Taylor as Deputy USCINCCENT, and Brig Gen Beyer (successor to Brig Gen Carns as J-3.) At year's end, the Chief of Staff and the IG were scheduled for training in early 1985.

9. Remarks by Secretary of Defense Weinberger at the Promotion Ceremony for LTG Robert C. Kingston, USA, 6 Nov 84.

10. "Central Command Status Upgraded, Kingston Promoted" article by Jim Tice, Army Times, Nov 26, 1984. "Central Command Chief Promoted" article in St. Petersburg Times, Nov 6, 1984; "MacDill Commander to be 4-star general in Army" article in The Tampa Tribune, Nov 7, 1984; "MacDill Commander promoted" article in St. Petersburg Times, Nov 7, 1984.

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(U) Several key media interviews took place during the year. Those interviews were generated by the reporter's initiative and centered on topics of his particular interest. Michael Robinson, correspondent for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), interviewed LTG Kingston at the headquarters on 17 February. Prior to the interview, he viewed the USIA and BRIGHT STAR 83 videotapes and received the command briefing. The interview, which lasted an hour, aired 21 February on the program "File on 4."¹¹

(U) Randy Harrison, foreign correspondent for the Orlando Sentinel, interviewed General Kingston at the headquarters for an hour on 5 March. Before the interview, he received the command briefing, viewed the BRIGHT STAR 83 videotape, and had discussions with most of the USCENTCOM staff principals. At the conclusion of the interview and briefings, Mr Harrison stated that he had done considerable research about the command and did not have a favorable impression before coming to the headquarters. But, as a result of his briefings and open discussions, he had

11. Transcript of "File on Four" broadcast by British Broadcasting Corporation, 21 and 22 Feb 84, Production Number HNV473L510N.

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revised that opinion and felt his basis of information was more balanced and favorable.¹²

(U) The milestone article written about the command during the year was by Richard (Dick) Halloran of the New York Times.¹³ He visited the headquarters on 8 March. He received the command briefing and viewed the BRIGHT STAR 83 videotape. This was followed by a discussion session in the Deputy USCINCCENT's office that was attended by the J-3, J-4/7 and J-5. He interviewed the CINC for an hour and toured the building before departure.

(U) Roy Gutman, a correspondent for Newsday, visited the headquarters on 1 May. Following the command briefing and the BRIGHT STAR 83 videotape, he had a background session with the Deputy USCINCCENT, J-3, J-4, and POLAD. The background session centered on an amplification of items contained in the command briefing.

(U) Bruce Van Voost of Time magazine visited the headquarters on 12 June. He received the command briefing,

12. "Watching the Mideast from Tampa" article by Randolph Harrison, The Orlando Sentinel, 11 Mar 1984.

13. "Poised for the Persian Gulf" article by Richard Halloran, The New York Times Magazine, 1 Apr 1984.

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viewed the BRIGHT STAR videotape and had a 45-minute interview with USCINCCENT. The interview and briefings centered on information about the command and its capabilities. There was no discussion of current activities in the Persian Gulf. Mr Van Voorst indicated that the material was being gathered for his background and information. No article was published.

(U) The command's low-key public posture continued to make it imperative that careful attention be paid to detail in the formulation of public affairs guidance for exercises. The effort expended in that area paid dividends as the public affairs guidance was successfully executed for the year's three key exercises.

(U) ACCURATE TEST was a JCS-directed, USCENTCOM-scheduled joint and combined air defense exercise conducted in a classified location from 12 March to 1 April. Since ACCURATE TEST was classified, there was no media coverage. However, the Air National Guard requested to publish a story about its role in the exercise. Existing public affairs guidance was used to draft a response that refused permission to publish any information. The forethought

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that insured the public affairs guidance supported the classification of the exercise allowed a potentially embarrassing story to be "killed" before it could become a problem.

(U) Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 84 was conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from 20 April to 15 May. Although this was only a command post exercise, the number of forces involved and their visibility dictated that a detailed public affairs package be developed and a section of the public affairs office be deployed. The following personnel deployed to Fort Bragg for approximately the last ten days of the exercise: Captain (b)(6) LTC (b)(6) MGySgt (b)(6) and Sergeant (Sgt) (b)(6)

(b)(6) Unlike in previous years, the media did not request to visit the command. The public affairs section provided real-world press briefings, a clipping service, and photography support. The component Army and Air Force commands each deployed a one-man public affairs office to provide internal support and to assist in case media interest developed.

(U) The largest exercise of the year, and the largest USCENTCOM exercise to date, was GALLANT EAGLE.¹⁴ From the

14. Annex F to Exercise Directive, GALLANT EAGLE 84.

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media perspective, public affairs guidance developed by the USCENTCOM public affairs office allowed a coordinated media effort despite the distances involved.¹⁵ The most salient points were centralized control and decentralized execution and the establishment of a Joint Information Bureau. This was the first time that USCENTCOM had attempted to execute these public affairs concepts. They were successful.

(U) The following personnel deployed from USCENTCOM to the Joint Information Bureau: Captain (b)(6) LTC (b)(6) (Chief of the Joint Information Bureau), Maj (b)(6) (Operations Officer), Capt (b)(6) (Assistant Operations Officer), Capt (b)(6) (Audiovisual Officer), and Sgt (b)(6) (clerk and photographer). The Joint Information bureau was augmented by liaison officers from USARCENT, USCENTAF, and USMARCENT. They were CPT (b)(6) Lieutenant (b)(6) and Maj (b)(6)

(U) The bureau's mission was to act as a central point of contact for all media and all public affairs officers. This approach was successful. More than 115

15. Exercise GALLANT EAGLE 84 Media Contacts/Visits slides dated 10 Sep 84.

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print and 86 radio and television media contacted public affairs officers and more than 72 print and 51 radio and television media representatives visited exercise sites.¹⁶

(U) To assist media and to "kill" any rumors or leaks regarding the exercise, a press advisory was published. USCINCCENT supported the GALLANT EAGLE public affairs effort and sent a message to his subordinate commanders on the subject.¹⁷

(U) To help emphasize the importance of public affairs, a background paper on the subject was prepared by USCENTCOM and included in each reference book at the USCINCCENT Commanders' Conference held in May.¹⁸

(U) Audiovisual Documentation played a major role in public affairs activities by the command. Captain (Capt) (b)(6)

16. USCINCCENT message 231835Z Aug 84 (U), Press Advisory for Exercise GALLANT EAGLE 84.

17. USCINCCENT message 142306Z Aug 84 (U), GALLANT EAGLE Public Affairs.

18. Background Paper, GALLANT EAGLE 84 Public Affairs, undated, prepared by (b)(6) CCPA-P, approved by (b)(6) (b)(6) USN, Public Affairs Officer.

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(b)(6) USAF, replaced Capt (b)(6) USAF, as the command's audiovisual officer. The photographer's billet was eliminated in a manpower reduction and at year's end Master Sergeant (MSgt) (b)(6) USAF, was anticipating reassignment from the command in February 1985. A key to the command's audiovisual success was the ability of the audiovisual officer and photographer to rapidly interface with the appropriate agency within the individual Services that could provide the support required on short notice. Without their special expertise, several missions would have either not been fully accomplished or would have lacked the quality that was obtained.

(U) In March, operation EAGLE LOOK was the focus of a command audiovisual effort. This operation involved the deployment of E-3 AWACS and KC-10 tanker aircraft to assist Egypt in meeting a Libyan threat against the Sudan. Capt (b)(6) deployed with a supporting Aerospace Audiovisual Service (AAVS) crew from Detachment 7, 1361st Audiovisual Squadron to document the operation. The audiovisual mission was to document the events in 35 millimeter slides and videotape to support an after-action briefing and for news release if directed by the Office of the Assistant of Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Four clips were

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produced for various organizations, including an 8-minute overview for USCENTCOM.

(U) In July, the public affairs office coordinated the audiovisual documentation of exercise SHADOW HAWK in Jordan. A two-man AAVS video crew reported to the J-3 at the exercise site and was combined with a Jordanian video team to document all significant phases of SHADOW HAWK. A slide-set for an after-action briefing and for distribution to participants was being coordinated and prepared by J-3 at year's end.

(U) In August, the public affairs office reacted to a tasking from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and deployed a public affairs team with a Navy audiovisual documentation team from the Atlantic Fleet Audiovisual Command in Norfolk, Virginia to document operation INTENSE LOOK. The team photographed all phases of the US mine countermeasures operations that were being conducted in the Gulf of Suez and Red Sea at the request of the Governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This audiovisual effort was especially challenging because of the visible nature of the event and the attendant world attention. During the operation, selected materials produced by the audiovisual documentation team were released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

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for Public Affairs. At year's end, an after action videotape was being developed for use by all participants.

(U) In September, several months of effort culminated with audiovisual documentation of exercise GALLANT EAGLE. Operating through AAVS, which was the audiovisual executive agent for the exercise, audiovisual teams from all Services documented every aspect of GALLANT EAGLE, including deployment and redeployment by land, sea, and air. The audiovisual documentation included a first-time decentralization of the audiovisual effort. Component commands were authorized to obtain their own documentation but were also directed to provide selected items to the AAVS team, which was primarily producing materials for USCINCCENT but also had the long range mission of a post-exercise slide set and videotape. A master slide set was developed and provided to participants. Also, an 11-minute videotape was developed and distributed. The AAVS unit that served as executive agent was Headquarters Aerospace Audiovisual Service.

(U) On 6 November, General Kingston was promoted and spoke to a command formation assembled in front of the USCENTCOM headquarters building. The audience consisted of

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many important visitors and dignitaries. A videotape crew from Charleston AFB, South Carolina, two USCENTCOM photographers, and a photographer from the 56th Combat Support Group at MacDill AFB covered the event. A series of photographs and a tape of the event were produced.

(U) Throughout the year, the public affairs office documented visits to the headquarters. Very important person (VIP) photography was quickly developed through a commercial contract and photographs were mailed to the visitor by USCINCCENT or his representative. Also, public affairs coordinated photography for awards, promotions, and similar ceremonies. The majority of this work was accomplished by the 56th Combat Support Group.

(U) The public affairs office received its portion of the new Information Distribution System and used it to upgrade service to the command. The major network nightly news shows were taped and matters of interest to the command were distributed to the staff via the system. Equipment already on hand was devoted to an editing capability with a back-up function to tape broadcasts off the air.

(U) Command community relations activity continued apace

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during the year. Interest in the command prompted requests from local and area civic organizations for guest speakers. A significant amount of time was spent by the community relations officer in generating quality speaking platforms for the Commander in Chief. This effort involved contacting key organizations throughout the continental United States which do not ordinarily hear from a high-level military speaker, then soliciting invitations to the CINC to speak. The community relations officer's responsibilities for each engagement included preparing correspondence for the CINC's signature in response; maintaining liaison with the organizations whose invitations he accepted; preparing draft remarks and submitting them for his approval through the CINC's special assistant; getting security and policy review of the speech as approved by the CINC from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; making reservations for accommodations and transportation for the CINC's party; travelling to the site of the speech in advance, as required; providing copies of the text after the speech to the sponsor or news media; and preparing letters of appreciation from the CINC to the event's sponsors or others who contributed to the success of the trip. General Kingston spoke before the Cleveland World

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Affairs Council on 6 March and to a combined luncheon meeting of the Houston Downtown Rotary Club and Chamber of Commerce Military Affairs Council on 17 May. During these trips, he also met with the editorial boards of the Cleveland Plain Dealer and the Houston Chronicle in off-the-record sessions. Due to operational and other schedule conflicts, however, the CINC was not able to fulfill several speaking engagements generated by this community relations program and, instead, was represented by other general officers from the command. Specifically, on 9 October, the Director of J-4/7, MG Watts, spoke on behalf of the CINC to the Savannah World Affairs Council. Brig Gen Greene addressed the Florida State Chambers of Commerce in Orlando on 25 October. The Deputy Commander in Chief, Maj Gen Rohr, spoke to the Dayton Chamber of Commerce Military Affairs Council on 9 November in place of the CINC.

(U) The USCENTCOM Joint Service Color Guard, which was made up of enlisted volunteers assigned to the command, continued to be popular. The Tampa Bay Bandits professional football team called upon this unit to present the colors before each of their home games and the United States Football League championship game in July. This was excellent exposure for the command in the local community.

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(U) MGySgt (b)(6) Assistant Internal Information Officer, organized a group of 12 volunteers in uniform from the command to visit Bay Pines Veterans' Administration Hospital in Saint Petersburg, Florida on 14 February. This event was part of the Nationwide Salute to Hospitalized Veterans.

(U) In December, the command submitted names of nine nominees for the Department of Defense-sponsored Joint Civilian Orientation Conference, to be held in 1985. In June, Mr. Robert Blanchard, the new President of the Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce, attended the 1984 conference. He had been nominated by the command in late 1983 and was one of 60 selected to attend this elite program from over 1,000 nominees from DOD organizations.

(U) The Community Relations Branch was responsible for arranging briefings to groups of visiting civilians to the command. During the year, several Air Force Civic Leader tours conducted on MacDill AFB visited the headquarters and received the command briefing from a public affairs officer, then were shown the BRIGHT STAR 83 videotape.

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(U) Continued good relations with the Tampa Chamber of Commerce were evident by the support of the USCENTCOM Service Member of the Quarter and Service Member of the Year program. Area businesses contributed to this program with donations of merchandise, free entertainment, savings bonds, and gift certificates. MajGen Moore attended the 99th Annual Meeting of the Chamber on 28 September as the CINC's representative and was seated at the head table. He was escorted by the Community Relations Officer, who sat at the media table.

(U) Extensive planning for the first USCENTCOM participation in a MacDill AFB Open House was conducted by the Community Relations Officer. However, because of a real-world contingency deployment which removed most of the assets the Headquarters Commandant had set aside for the display, the command did not take part in the 24 March base open house.

(U) The internal information section of the Community Relations branch placed major emphasis during the year on the increasing employment of Armed Forces Radio and Television Service mini-television and radio for USCENTCOM. Major strides were made in mini-television regarding monitoring sites in eight countries: Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Kuwait, and North Yemen. Additionally, the

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Armed Forces Radio and Television Service was broadcasting from Munich into the Middle East via Voice of America transmitters. Broadcasting times were 0800 to 1100 zulu at 15.4 megahertz and from 1100 to 1400 zulu at 15.265 megahertz.

(U) In addition, USCENTCOM fostered a closer relationship between the Navy Broadcasting Service and USCENTCOM concerning operation of mini-television in its area of responsibility. This was facilitated by Capt (b)(6) USMC, the Internal Information Officer, journeying TDY to Washington, DC. While there, he met with Mr (b)(6) Director of the American Forces Information Service and Mr Richard Hiner, Director of the Navy Broadcasting Service. Capt (b)(6) also held discussions with Lt Col (b)(6) of the policy section of the American Forces Information Service. The majority of the TDY was spent with Mr (b)(6) assistant director of the Naval Broadcasting Service and chief of programming. Capt (b)(6) and Mr (b)(6) had extensive discussions on mini-television, policy making within the Air Force Information Service, the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, the Naval Broadcasting Service, future exercises and operations, status of current mini-television sites,

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possible future mini-television sites and the use of satellite nets in USCENTCOM's AOR, among other topics.

(U) The internal information section also assisted in the disestablishment of the mini-television site in North Yemen, which was directed by the American Ambassador there.

(U) During the year, the section also supervised and coordinated submission to the Navy Broadcasting Service of two additional mini-television site applications for Egypt. USCENTCOM's Regulation 360-6, "Mini-television," was also revised to properly align countries within the area of responsibility under their correct geographic area manager for mini-television.

(U) The internal information officer attended the University of Oklahoma's short course in Journalism. Capt (b)(6) took advantage of the 1984 security assistance conference to hold face-to-face discussions with the chiefs of the security assistance units. He provided information and answered questions of the security assistance office chiefs during the conference.

(U) MGySgt (b)(6) the assistant internal information

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officer, was one of three public affairs representatives from the office who deployed for the real-world contingency operation INTENSE LOOK. MGySgt (b)(6) retired from the Marine Corps effective the last day of the year.

(U) Other internal information activities during 1984 included placing coverage in the MacDill base newspaper of the command's Dining-In, which featured General (Gen) P. X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, as the guest of honor and principal speaker. The addition of an Internal Information Plan to OPLAN 1002 and updating USCENTCOM's Quality of Life briefing, which was consolidated by J-1, were other significant internal information activities.

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LEGAL ADVISOR

The USCENTCOM Legal Advisor expanded the annual legal conference into a worldwide one modeled on the PACAF Worldwide Conference. Attendees represented organizations in Korea, Hawaii, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and several locations in the CONUS. Emphasis was on Law of the Sea issues. The legal advisor also participated in the extensive JCS manpower survey, the USCENTCOM manpower survey, and the DOD-directed internal control program. One accomplishment of importance was the successful resolution of a claim which had come out of BRIGHT STAR 83. This was a first-time experience for USCENTCOM and necessitated the identification and utilization of previously unused Air Force-level claims personnel and procedures.

Washington liaison constituted a major undertaking for the USCENTCOM legal advisor during the year. General Kingston testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the fiscal year 1985 DOD Authorization Bill reporting on the status of USCENTCOM and the command's needs, and before the House Appropriations Committee Military Construction Subcommittee regarding military construction projects in USCENTCOM's AOR. Each time

USCINCCENT testified he received many questions and was warmly received. Additionally, the CINC frequently was asked to drop by members' offices for courtesy calls while he was in Washington meeting such people as Senator Paul Laxalt (Republican, Nevada) and Representative Ralph Regula (Republican, Ohio), ranking minority member of the House Appropriations Committee Military Construction Subcommittee. Additionally, he personally briefed Senator Arlen Specter (Republican, Pennsylvania) and his staff prior to their trip to USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. The CINC made numerous speeches to groups, including large numbers of Congressional staffers, such as the Capitol Hill Chapter of the Federal Bar Association and the Reserve Officer's Association Capitol Hill chapter. At the request of Representative Regula and Representative John McCain (Republican, Arizona), he also spoke to a group of high school seniors who were interning on Capitol Hill. Numerous Congressional delegations and staff delegations visited the headquarters during the year, including Representative Regula and staff delegations from House and Senate Committees, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Congressional Research Service. USCENTCOM also hosted a group from the House Appropriations Committee that had been directed to perform a study of military construction

projects in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. The command also monitored numerous trips by members of Congress and their staffs in the 19 countries in its AOR throughout 1984.

Exercises and contingencies accounted for a significant share of USCENTCOM legal manhours during the year. Four attorneys and one legal clerk participated in GALLANT KNIGHT 84, while three attorneys and one legal clerk participated in GALLANT EAGLE 84. A fourth attorney was precluded from participating in this exercise because he was augmenting USCENTCOM Forward during operation INTENSE LOOK. Four attorneys participated in Exercise POWDER RIVER. One served as an exercise controller and two were members of the Crisis Action Team. The fourth served as legal advisor to the commander and staff. The legal advisor also provided legal representation on the Crisis Action Teams for operations EARLY CALL and EAGLE LOOK. The legal advisor was designated as chief of a negotiating team which conducted formal negotiations with Kenya concerning a cost-sharing agreement. An attorney visited Bahrain and Saudi Arabia during the year.

(U) The Legal Advisor also performed standard legal services for USCENTCOM personnel, including legal assistance and the preparation of powers of attorney and wills.

PROVOST MARSHAL

(U) The Provost Marshal Office continued to expand upon its implied tasks and responsibilities, particularly those which were assumed with USCENTCOM's status as a unified command. Antiterrorism surveys, organizing to combat terrorism, and participating in numerous USCENTCOM exercises were the main contributions by the Provost Marshal to the command during 1984.

(U) Two combatting terrorism meetings hosted by JCS

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were attended by representatives of the Provost Marshal. These meetings were a JCS Joint Combatting Terrorism Task Force Working Group held in February and an Antiterrorism Working Group hosted by JCS and DIA held in October. They were instrumental in establishing USCENTCOM's Executive Committee for Combatting Terrorism. The Provost Marshal became a permanent member of USCENTCOM's Executive Committee for Combatting Terrorism and the USCENTCOM Terrorism Steering Committee. He also attended USEUCOM's Joint Antiterrorism Working Group meetings in March and November.

(U) Members from the Provost Marshal's Office participated in GALLANT KNIGHT 84, EAGLE LOOK, SHADOW HAWK 84, GALLANT EAGLE 84, and IRON COBRA 84. Although no representatives from his office were deployed, the Provost Marshal played major roles in other exercises such as ACCURATE TEST 84, ELLIPSE FOXTROT, BOLD EAGLE, and NIGHT TRAIN.

(U) Throughout the year, the Provost Marshal staff attended many conferences, including air base ground defense, US customs, rear area protection, Capstone, the Army Provost Marshal general conference, and the Central Liaison Meeting in Nairobi, Kenya. The Provost Marshal also hosted the Hillsborough County Council on Crime Prevention at USCENTCOM

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Headquarters in December. Master Sergeant (MSG) (b)(6) assumed responsibilities for USCENTCOM Military Customs and attended two weeks training sponsored by the 42nd Military Police Group in Germany.

(U) Austere manning within the Provost Marshal's office continued throughout the year. Both J-1 and JCS manpower surveys recommended an increase of one officer. Although the authorized manning level was increased by one O-4, an antiterrorism officer, no actual increase in personnel was expected until late 1985. MSG (b)(6) was assigned to the Provost Marshal Office as excess in September. He assumed USCENTCOM's responsibilities for customs.

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

(U) The Headquarters Commandant provided base support to USCENTCOM's headquarters during deployment, redeployment, and in garrison. This support included medical, administration, internal security, food service, transportation, engineering, supply, and facilities management. The Commandant functioned as the camp

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commander when deployed and provided coordination with the host nation base commander.

(U) The Headquarters Commandant validated Table of Allowance 158 with the Air Staff. This table of allowance designated the equipment package that would be prepositioned for the headquarters. In 1984, the deployed field headquarters had received 95 percent of the equipment authorized in Table of Allowance 140, which designated the equipment package that would be positioned at MacDill AFB.

(U) The Headquarters Commandant Section participated in two joint readiness exercises during the year: GALLANT KNIGHT 84 and GALLANT EAGLE 84. The latter exercise required the Headquarters Commandant to support a deployed field headquarters of 500 to 600 personnel. GALLANT EAGLE 84 involved the deployment of personnel, material, and equipment utilizing airlift and sealift in support of the bare base operation.

(U) The Facility Division was changed to the Facility Branch and placed under the direct control of the Headquarters Commandant. The Facility Branch was responsible for the operation and maintenance of all USCENTCOM facilities at

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MacDill AFB. These facilities encompassed approximately 235,000 square feet of office, shop, and warehouse space. A civilian facility officer position was established to provide stability and long-range planning.

(U) Facilities work processed during the year included managerial service contracts totalling \$243,000, routine processing and monitoring of 163 repair and maintenance requests, installation of an automatic transfer switch for the emergency generators, upgrade of three offices and the main conference room, installation of a dedicated hot water system to support J-2's photo laboratory, an upgrade of the Honeywell Delta 1000 Security System to provide Top Secret open storage for J-3 and ADP, structural modification of the sensitive compartmented information facility, and conversion of a dark room into usable office space, completion of and move into the USCENCOM trailer park, installation of an air conditioning crossover system for Phase I, and J-2 hallway upgrade. Facility projects totaled \$197,000 for the year.

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COMPTROLLER

(U) The Joint Table of Distribution for 1985 approved on 30 November reduced the Comptroller staff by one military position, recognizing a requirement of fifteen spaces. No significant changes were made to the functional responsibilities of the Comptroller organization.

(U) The JCS exercise budget was \$1,079,000 for fiscal year 1984. The actual expenditures were \$1,156,000, exceeding the budget by seven percent. An additional unprogrammed exercise contributed to the need for additional funds which were reprogrammed internally. The directorates and special staff continued to improve their exercise budgeting procedures through improvements in the cost reporting system and efforts by the Comptroller to improve fiscal awareness among the staff. Figure 21 on the following page outlines the quarterly expenditure of exercise funds by major exercises.

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**Figure 21. USCENTCOM Exercise Obligations by Quarter
(thousands of dollars)**

<u>Exercise</u>	<u>Fiscal Year 1984 (Cumulative)</u>				<u>Fiscal Year 1985</u>
	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>
ACCURATE TEST	\$ 33.6	\$ 77.3	\$ 77.3	\$ 70.1	\$ -
GALLANT EAGLE	4.4	27.4	65.3	330.1	-
GALLANT KNIGHT	18.9	184.5	344.1	326.1	-
BLACK ROCK	19.1	-	-	-	-
SHADOW HAWK	6.6	69.6	72.7	239.3	-
Other Exercises	<u>18.7</u>	<u>107.3</u>	<u>131.2</u>	<u>190.4</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTAL	\$ 101.3	\$ 466.1	\$ 690.6	\$ 1,156.0	\$ 109.5

NOTE: Decreases in cumulative obligations are due to actual expenses being less than estimates.

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(U) The Comptroller participated as a player in CPX GALLANT KNIGHT 84 to refine procedures for financial support to deployed forces in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. The exercise covered military pay, currency supply, control of financial institutions, and contracting support. Participation by USARCENT, USCENAF, and USNAVCENT components reinforced existing procedures and developed new methods to improve financial support in the AOR.¹⁹

(U) Depicted in Figure 21 on the previous page are cumulative quarterly obligations of the USCENTCOM headquarters operating budget for 1984, showing all four quarters of fiscal year 1984 and the first quarter of fiscal year 1985 (1 October - 31 December 1984).

(U) In fiscal year 1984, USCENTCOM was able to obligate 99.8 percent of its funds. Operational and maintenance expenditures in support of operations EAGLE LOOK and INTENSE LOOK totalled \$388,000. These were unprogrammed expenses and were absorbed in the command's current level of funding. Special Assignment Airlift costs were \$673,000, but these costs were showing a declining trend towards the end of fiscal year 1984 with the arrival of the CINC's own aircraft.

19. After-Action report, GALLANT KNIGHT 84.

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Figure 22. Administrative Program by Office
(thousands of dollars)

<u>DIRECTORATE</u>	<u>Fiscal Year 1984 (Cumulative)</u>			<u>Fiscal Year 1985</u>	
	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>
J-1	22.6	28.7	54.0	82.0	23.9
J-2	136.3	229.4	365.6	440.5	135.9
J-3	102.5	257.7	422.6	543.3	180.4
J-4	480.3	717.9	814.4	918.2	105.7
J-5	91.2	114.6	192.7	235.0	74.0
J-6	121.6	178.0	315.7	411.2	58.9
Headquarters	106.4	182.9	284.9	345.4	59.5
Commandant					
Adjutant General	257.6	365.6	454.8	688.7	296.6
Command Group	95.8	110.5	162.7	194.2	106.0
Comptroller	4.5	12.2	16.8	20.3	2.4
Legal Affairs	5.9	13.4	22.4	28.8	3.2
Public Affairs	10.2	21.1	29.8	48.5	9.0
Combat Capabilities	7.8	13.4	28.6	45.8	4.9
Analysis Group					
Surgeon	13.1	35.2	50.8	59.5	43.3
Provost Marshal	5.8	47.5	86.0	96.9	40.9
Inspector General	3.5	57.6	66.7	6.8	3.7
Facilities Office	121.0	212.9	330.7	412.3	244.0
Forward Headquarters	-	70.6	68.9	123.9	77.9
Element					
SAC	.9	2.2	5.4	7.7	1.9
EAGLE/INTENSE LOOK	-	37.8	44.0	387.9	4.9
Suggestions	-	-	.3	.3	-
Emergency Leave	-	.4	-	-	-
TOTAL	1,587.0	2,709.6	3,817.8	5,097.5	1,477.0

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Figure 23. Administrative Program by Element of Expense
(thousands of dollars)

	Fiscal Year 1984 (Cumulative)				Fiscal Year 1985
<u>ELEMENT OF EXPENSE</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>
Civilian Pay	-	-	-	2.5	18.3
TDY	591.8	1,167.6	1,665.7	2,139.6	673.4
Airlift	343.6	483.7	483.2	602.5	-
Rental Vehicles	-	4.3	4.4	12.1	2.7
Trans of Things	-	.2	.3	1.5	.4
Leased Space	6.3	6.3	7.7	8.1	1.5
Equipment Rental	133.8	187.6	176.8	194.8	103.0
Communications	46.0	59.0	71.9	81.8	44.8
Printing & Repro	.8	1.9	2.7	3.3	1.0
Facilities Projects	-	32.4	78.6	139.2	-
Custodial Services	107.2	182.7	207.6	218.0	191.4
Purch Maintenance	165.4	156.3	193.5	210.4	220.9
Other Purch Svcs	17.7	22.3	116.7	261.8	15.7
Supplies	155.4	354.8	653.1	976.9	169.0
Equipment	19.0	50.5	155.5	344.7	34.9
Suggestions	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>.3</u>	<u>.3</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTAL	1,587.0	2,709.6	3,817.8	5,097.5	1,477.0

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Figure 24. Summary by Major Program
(thousands of dollars)

	Fiscal Year 1984 (Cumulative)				Fiscal Year 1985
<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>
MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM II					
Administration	1,587.0	2,709.6	3,817.8	5,097.5	1,477.0
Exercises	<u>101.3</u>	<u>466.1</u>	<u>690.6</u>	<u>1,156.0</u>	<u>109.5</u>
TOTAL MFP II	1,688.3	3,175.7	4,508.4	6,253.5	1,586.5
MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM III					
WWMCCS/ADP	<u>160.6</u>	<u>539.0</u>	<u>570.1</u>	<u>864.8</u>	<u>222.1</u>
TOTAL MFP III	160.6	539.0	570.1	864.8	222.1
MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM IX					
Official Representation	<u>2.0</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>1.7</u>
TOTAL MFP IX	2.0	5.7	9.1	11.0	1.7
TOTAL O&M FUNDS	1,850.9	3,720.4	5,087.6	7,129.3	1,810.1
Security Assistance Program	<u>139.5</u>	<u>235.4</u>	<u>302.7</u>	<u>506.0</u>	<u>104.9</u>
TOTAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM	139.5	235.4	302.7	506.0	104.9
GRAND TOTAL	1,990.4	3,955.8	5,390.3	7,635.3	1,915.0

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TDY remained the largest single line item at 30 percent of the total operating budget.

(U) The fiscal year 1986 operating budget presented requirements totalling \$12.354 million. Funds to support unresolved issues such as the USCENTCOM Forward Headquarters Element were excluded. Also excluded were amounts for JCS directed and coordinated exercises, traditionally a significant amount for the command.²⁰

(U) The fiscal year 1986 financial plan presented requirements totalling \$11.621 million. It included funds to support the FHE afloat and activities in USCENTCOM's AOR. These activities, which included a port liaison office in Nairobi, Kenya, a DOD position in the American Embassy in Djibouti, and a Contingency Planning Group, were estimated to cost \$221,000. The funded figure in the financial plan of \$9.619 million (considering the withholding of JCS-directed exercise funding) would support the minimum financial requirements of the command in garrison but unfunded amounts

20. HQ USCENTCOM OAC51 FY86 Operating Budget RCS DD-COM(AR)1092, 30 Dec 84, pp i-ii.

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were necessary for USCENTCOM to successfully fulfill its total assigned mission.²¹

(U) The security assistance program budget for USCENTCOM provided the Defense Security Assistance Agency and the USAF with the budget requirement for the operating costs of eleven security assistance organizations as well as for the headquarters military assistance program support costs. Estimates reflected expenses chargeable to Military Assistance Executive funds for the USCENTCOM headquarters, the Foreign Military Sales Administrative account, embassy support, and host country assistance-in-kind support. Accelerated FMS charges were also included for US personnel and flying hour costs.²²

(U) The estimated dollar resources required to perform the security assistance mission for USCENTCOM were as follows:

21. HQ USCENTCOM OAC51, FY1985 Financial Plan ~~(S)~~, RCS DD-COMP(AR)1092, 8 May 1984; information used is (U).

22. HQ USCENTCOM, Military Assistance Program (MAP) and MAAG Administrative and Overhead Budget FY 1986, 1 Jul 84, FOUO.

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	<u>Fiscal Year 1985</u>	<u>Fiscal Year 1986</u>
Military Assistance Advisory Groups	\$16,087.9	\$17,088.9
<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>1,897.5</u>	<u>1,910.8</u>
TOTAL	\$17,985.4	\$18,999.7

(U) The fiscal year 1985 military assistance advisory group dollar resources shown were \$2,039.1 (14.5 percent) higher than fiscal year 1984 funding levels. Fiscal year 1986 figures projected an increase of \$1,000 (6.2 percent) above this fiscal year 1985 budget request. Already high operational support costs were compounded by projected increases for nearly all of the countries in the region. Leased housing, utilities, transportation, and rapid wear-out of vehicles represented a high proportion of the support costs. In addition, protection of USCENTCOM's people living and working in its area of responsibility was of the utmost importance.

(U) The Finance Services Branch provided financial support to all headquarters personnel as well as serving as a liaison for approximately 140 Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force military personnel and 36 civilians assigned throughout USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. The command's participation in the direct deposit program increased to 96

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percent of all headquarters personnel, with 100 percent participation for USMC people assigned.

(U) An internal management control program was designed and implemented at HQ USCENTCOM and at the security assistance offices throughout the AOR. The program was aimed at conserving valuable resources through reducing possibilities for fraud, waste and abuse.

SURGEON

(U) Several minor organizational changes took place in the command surgeon's office during the year. Because of an increasing need for medical intelligence within the AOR, it became evident that the surgeon's office should have a preventive medicine officer billet. In addition, plans and operations became separate branches. The organization of the Office of the Command Surgeon was as shown in Figure 25 on the following page. Following a JCS manpower survey, there was a change in the Service of the O-6 Deputy Surgeon from Army to Air Force.

On 27 March, the JCS authorized USCINCCENT to begin direct discussions with Jordanian medical representatives to

preventive medicine procedures. The exercise also examined procedures and reporting requirements of the Joint Medical Regulating Office and of the Joint Military Blood Program Office. It examined Class VIII support and the effects of evacuation policy upon medical units, evacuation requirements, medical resupply, and replacement of lost personnel. GALLANT KNIGHT also incorporated intertheater and intratheater medical evacuation.

The Royal Jordanian Medical Service configured a C-130 aircraft for aeromedical evacuation and conducted a

short training flight. The Jordanians also processed simulated casualties at a field dressing station, transferred patients to Jafer, and conducted a training mission.

As a result of SHADOW HAWK 84, the USCENTCOM surgeon recommended that medical training should continue in future exercises. Specifically, future exercise scenarios should consider additional mass casualty exercises with patients coming from tactical units and aeromedical evacuation flights.

Exercise GALLANT EAGLE 84 was the largest exercise conducted by USCENTCOM to date. It was a JCS-coordinated and USCENTCOM-sponsored, joint readiness exercise involving strategic movement of forces into a simulated area of responsibility using the Joint Deployment System and focusing on deployment and rapid transition to a war fighting capability. The exercise was conducted from 5 to 11 September, at 21 locations in the southwestern United States with approximately 50,000 personnel participating. With this many people and places involved, the complexity of providing medical support to the exercise was apparent. This support was primarily provided by USARCENT, USCENAF, and USMARCENT forces with very limited participation by USNAVCENT. Medical support was rendered by the fixed and deployed medical treatment

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Figure 26. GALLANT EAGLE 84 Fixed Base Medical Treatment Facilities

<u>Hospital</u>	<u>Location</u>
US Army	
Weed Army Hospital	Fort Irwin, California
SB Hays Army Hospital	Fort Ord, California
US Air Force	
Vandenberg AFB Hospital	Vandenberg AFB, California
March AFB Hospital	March AFB, California
George AFB Hospital	George AFB, California
Edwards AFB Hospital	Edwards AFB, California
Nellis AFB Hospital	Nellis AFB, Nevada
McClellan AFB Clinic	McClellan AFB, California
US Navy	
Twentynine Palms Naval Hospital	Twentynine Palms, California
Camp Pendleton Naval Hospital	Camp Pendleton, California
San Diego Naval Hospital	San Diego, California
Long Beach Naval Hospital	Long Beach, California
Falon Naval Air Station Clinic	Reno, Nevada
China Lake Naval Clinic	China Lake, California
Civilian	
Loma Linda University Hospital	Loma Linda, California

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Figure 27. Deployed Field Medical Units

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>USARCENT</u>	
93 Evacuation Hospital	Yermo, California
147 Medical Detachment	San Luis Obispo, California
423 Medical Company (-)	Camp Roberts, California
423 Medical Company (-)	Yermo, California
423 Medical Company (-)	Fort Irwin, California
247 Medical Detachment (HELAMB)	Fort Irwin, California
343 Medical Detachment (HELAMB)	Norton AFB, California
717 Medical Detachment (HELAMB)	Camp Roberts, California
514 Medical Company (GD Amb) (-)	George AFB, California
	Fort Irwin, California
928 Medical Company (GD Amb) (-)	Fort Irwin, California
<u>USMARCENT</u>	
"C" Medical Company (-)	Twentynine Palms, California
	Big Bear, California
<u>USCENTAF</u>	
832 ATH	Vandenberg AFB, California
22 ATH	Biggs AFB, Texas
ATC (Headquarters Commandant)	Vandenberg AFB, California
ATC (TAW)	March AFB, California
ATC (27 TFW)	McClellan AFB, California

facilities shown in Figures 26 and 27 on the two previous pages. Emergency and routine support was provided by accompanying medical units in support of forces deployed to the exercise area. Hospitalization capability was provided by three deployed and twelve fixed facilities. Those patients requiring treatment beyond the capabilities of deployed hospitals were evacuated to the fixed hospitals in the exercise area. There were only three casualties evacuated out of the exercise area back to home stations during the exercise. Army dustoff helicopters were the preferred means of evacuation. The medical support structure was developed to provide care for ground forces engaged in infantry, mechanized, airborne, and air assault training at Camp Roberts, Fort Hunter-Liggett, Fort Irwin and Twentynine Palms. Medical support for the air operations was provided at the aircraft beddown locations. The fact that significant unconventional warfare operations were conducted during the exercise significantly increased the complexity of providing medical support. This was especially true when casualties had to be evacuated from remote locations.

(U) The medical objectives of GALLANT EAGLE 84 were to identify and define the medical responsibilities of

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USCENTCOM's Command Surgeon and USCENTCOM components, to ensure that medical tasks, functions, and responsibilities were clearly delineated and properly assigned to USCENTCOM's components and supporting commands, and to establish uniform medical policies and standing operating procedures applicable to the medical support of operations.

(U) One problem was that responsibility for the provision of aeromedical evacuation support to SOCCENT was not completely coordinated until two weeks before the exercise. The late tasking of USARCENT to provide this support caused major planning problems. Another problem was that only a small percentage of the Army medical units that took part in GALLANT EAGLE 84 were assigned to USARCENT in wartime. It was recommended that in future exercises only units actually assigned to USARCENT be programmed to take part. A third problem was that only a small number of the professional filler personnel assigned to field medical units actually participated in GALLANT EAGLE 84. To solve this problem, it was recommended that people filling positions in the table of organization train with their assigned units. This would produce both better trained individuals and units.²⁶

26. Intvw, Mr. (b)(6) USCENTCOM Historian, with MAJ (b)(6) USARCENT Surgeon's Office, 8 May 86.

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, Medical participation in EAGLE LOOK was provided primarily by the Air Force. USCENTAF provided medical and preventive medicine support to all deployed EAGLE LOOK forces. The USCENTAF surgeon coordinated host nation emergency hospital requirements, aeromedical evacuation, and other medical requirements with USCINCEUR, who was prepared to provide emergency resupply for Class VIII medical supplies and a ready-to-deploy surgical and triage team, to deploy an air transportable hospital, and to regulate aeromedical evacuation requests. The USCENTCOM preventive medicine officer and the command surgeon's operations officer were also prepared and ready to deploy.

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CHAPLAIN

(U) The Command Chaplain, Navy Captain (b)(6)

(b)(6) initiated a number of programs during the year. These included the offer to contract a year's ministry for US personnel in Mogadishu, publication of a USCENTCOM AOR religious profile, the publication of a summary of numbers and locations of US military personnel in each country in USCENTCOM's AOR; the continuation of the weekly headquarters staff Bible study; a revision of USCENTCOM Regulation 165-1; a model input governing religious ministries during USCENTCOM exercises and an arrangement with the Inspector General and J-4/7 to have a chaplain accompany the annual IG Team visit to each country in the AOR.

(U) Personnel actions for 1984 included the incorporation of the Command Chaplain in the USCENTCOM Quality of Life Committee; the attachment of a Reservist to the Chaplain's office; hosting of the second annual Senior Component Chaplains Conference; continuation of pastoral ministry to staff personnel and dependents; addition of a SOCCENT chaplain to the Command Religious Program, and the establishment of a memorial for two members of the RDJTF,

COL [REDACTED] (b)(6), US Army, and Maj [REDACTED] (b)(6), USAF, who died in the crash of an Air Florida airplane while returning to Tampa from TDY in Washington, DC on 13 January 1982.

(U) The chaplain and his religious program specialist deployed to exercises GALLANT KNIGHT 84 and GALLANT EAGLE 84. The latter exercise involved 68 chaplains serving troops in all four Services. In October, November and December, the chaplain deployed to Kenya, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia to minister to security assistance organization personnel and their families. He also made visits to each of his senior component chaplains during the year.

COMBAT CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS GROUP

(U) On 1 July 1984, the Combat Capabilities Analysis Group observed its third full year of activity as a special staff agency of the RDJTF and later of USCENCOM. Throughout 1984, it remained subordinate to the Chief of Staff. During the year, the major trend affecting the Combat Capabilities Analysis Group was that it became USCENCOM's proponent for

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computer-assisted wargaming or "Modern Aids to Planning." With an expected strength of 22 personnel by 1991, the group was reorganized into two divisions, the Operations Analysis Division and the Computer Analysis Division. This reorganization would allow for continued operational analysis in coordination with, but separate from, computer-assisted analysis.

(U) The Combat Capabilities Analysis Group continued its coordination and liaison with academic and defense research analysis centers and with private contractors involved in studies relevant to USCENCOM's area of operations. Group officers took a number of trips to various DOD agencies and senior service schools for conferences, wargaming research, and briefings to acquire and share information and study efforts. The group also continued to produce studies and briefings to assist the command element of USCENCOM. These products were in the areas of strategic studies, wargaming, planning, logistics analysis, and issues raised by subordinate headquarters, USCENCOM directors, and USCINCCENT. These studies normally involved a wide range of topics encompassing more than one staff section.

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In May, three officers participated in Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 84 held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Two officers served in the battle management cell, one as the chief and the other as an analyst. The third officer served as an evaluator on the USCENTCOM IG team.

In June, two officers participated in the Joint Theater-Level Simulation Model User Test held at the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. This test lasted two weeks and was used to evaluate model attrition factors, logistic play, and how the computer maneuvered both air and ground forces.

In October, two officers participated in exercise YELLOW BREECHES, which was a follow-on evaluation of the model. This exercise lasted two weeks and was held at the Army War College.

(U) The Combat Capabilities Analysis Group became the focal point for creation of USCENTCOM's "Modern Aids to Planning," a computer-assisted wargaming capability. The group's activities in identifying hardware and coordinating and fostering contacts between unified commands made USCENTCOM a driving force in the Department of Defense's overall Modern Aids to Planning program. Delivery of the first USCENTCOM computer system was expected in early 1985.

(U) Group personnel made several trips during the year to Washington, DC to represent the command in wargames, wargaming coordination meetings, JCS conferences on total force capability analysis, and discussions with CIA, DIA, and State Department personnel.

(U) Other major activities included participating in and attending the security assistance seminar and low intensity conflict seminars held at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama; two wargames held at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island; and a trip to the Army Corps of Engineers Environmental Station at Vicksburg, Mississippi, to determine its capability to analyze terrain.

(U) During the year, the Combat Capabilities Analysis Group continued to produce analysis in direct support of USCINCCENT and component commanders' missions, plans, and operations. That research produced the following studies and briefings:

- Analysis of US-Soviet Capabilities in Iran Briefing
- Topics for National Defense University (July)
- Iraq and Islamic Fundamentalism (August)
- Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 84 and POWDER RIVER Battle Management Cell Products (October)
- Security Assistance: Comparative Methods, Analysis and Options (November)
- US Options in the Persian Gulf

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LIAISON

(U) At USCENTCOM headquarters, there were a number of liaison officers and special advisors assigned to facilitate mission accomplishment. These included liaison offices from two specified commands, SAC and MAC, from agencies as diverse as the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the United States Coast Guard, from specialized DOD agencies such as the Defense Fuels Supply Center, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Military Transportation Management Command, the Military Sealift Command, and the Defense Communications Agency Field Office. On 18 June, USCINCCENT signed the terms of reference for a liaison officer from USEUCOM to USCENTCOM, formalizing a relationship that went back to the RDJTF.²⁷

(U) As with the USEUCOM liaison officer, most of these liaison offices consisted of one person who was "dual-hatted" as an advisor to USREDCOM as well as to USCENTCOM. The Strategic Air Command, however, had a liaison cell of seven persons specifically assigned to provide advice and assistance to USCINCCENT.

27. Terms of Reference (U), "USEUCOM Liaison Officer at HQ USEUCOM," 18 Jun 84.

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(U) Detachment 1, Strategic Air Combat Operations Staff, as this liaison cell was officially known, consisted of a commander/bomber planner, an intelligence officer, a reconnaissance planning officer, a tanker planning officer, and an administrative supervisor. The commander was also responsible for a geographically separated unit at Shaw AFB, South Carolina, collocated with USCENTAF. This operating location consisted of a director/logistics planner, a bomber planning officer, and a tanker planning officer. The USCENTCOM liaison officer reported to the HQ SAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Plans, Maj Gen Harley A. Hughes.

(U) The mission of the USCENTCOM liaison office was to provide support to USCENTCOM and USCENTAF for the inclusion of SAC capabilities into the concept of operations for HQ USCENTCOM. Also, the office provided liaison and continuity among SAC, USCENTCOM, and USCENTAF through its MacDill and Shaw liaison offices.

(U) In January, USCENTCOM acquired an EC-135Y, tail number 55-3125, to serve as a command, control, and communications aircraft for USCINCCENT. The aircraft was operated and maintained by SAC personnel at Robins AFB,

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Georgia. The SAC liaison officer acted as an interface between HQ SAC, Eighth Air Force, and USCENTCOM concerning aircraft mission tasking information. In addition, the SAC liaison officer also had two flight stewards assigned to support the EC-135Y. The stewards traveled with the aircraft on all missions and were included as a part of the aircraft support package.

(U) Three major personnel transactions occurred during the year. First, in February, Major (Maj) (b)(6) the reconnaissance expert, transferred to USCENTCOM J-3. His replacement, Maj (b)(6) arrived from Offutt AFB, Nebraska in May. Second, Technical Sergeant (TSgt) (b)(6) (b)(6) the Senior Flight Steward, was assigned to the SAC liaison office in June and Staff Sergeant (b)(6) (SSgt) (b)(6) the second flight steward, arrived on station in October. The third action occurred in September when MSgt (b)(6) Administrative Specialist, was notified of his assignment to Offutt AFB. His replacement, SSgt (b)(6), arrived from Korea in December.

(U) During the entire year the SAC liaison office and SAC forces were extensively involved in the exercise program. In May three SAC liaison officers deployed with the USCENTCOM

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staff to Fort Bragg, North Carolina to take part in exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 84. The SAC liaison office manned the J-3 Joint Operations Center and the J-2 Joint Intelligence Center. Primary responsibilities included interfacing between USCENTCOM and the SAC advanced echelon coordinating the requirements and capabilities of SAC forces.

(U) GALLANT KNIGHT 84 marked the first CONUS use of the EC-135Y to deploy a USCENTCOM airborne battlestaff. They flew from MacDill to Pope AFB, North Carolina, maintaining communications connectivity between the forward headquarters at Fort Bragg and garrison (rear) headquarters at MacDill throughout the flight. In addition, the battle staff completed aircraft orientation and communications training during the mission.

(U) In July, the SAC liaison office participated in SAC's exercise GLOBAL SENTINEL. The exercise was designed to determine the impact of conventional operations on the SIOP. Since USCENTCOM did not participate, the SAC liaison officer represented USCENTCOM and simulated USCINCCENT's actions and reactions in response to the changing exercise scenario.

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(U) In September, the SAC liaison office deployed four officers to Vandenberg AFB, California, for FTX GALLANT EAGLE. SAC also deployed one squadron of B-52Hs to Biggs Army Air Field, Texas, to participate in the exercise in an austere environment. This exercise marked a milestone as SAC utilized its HARVEST BEAR equipment for the first time. The SAC liaison office again provided liaison among USCENTCOM, USCENTAF, and the SAC advanced echelon throughout the exercise. The USCENTCOM EC-135Y provided deployment and redeployment support for USCINCCENT and his senior staff from MacDill to Vandenberg and return.

(U) In October, the SAC liaison office actively participated with USCENTCOM personnel in CPX POWDER RIVER. The office operated in the USCENTCOM war room and coordinated SAC force requirements with USCENTCOM, SAC, and USCENTAF.

(U) On its first OCONUS mission, the USCENTCOM EC-135Y also supported EAGLE LOOK. On 19 March, it deployed to Cairo East and offloaded USCENTCOM personnel for EAGLE LOOK. The aircraft then continued to Thumrait, Oman, supporting exercise ACCURATE TEST.

The SAC liaison office was also involved with numerous planning efforts in response to unplanned events in Southwest Asia. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE was an example of a situation where extensive planning was accomplished but assets or forces were not actually deployed. Another example was the introduction of two KC-10s to Elf One. The SAC liaison office worked this delicate issue with both SAC and USCENTCOM staffs to a successful conclusion.

(U) In May, Maj Gen Hughes, the SAC operations officer who was responsible for the SAC liaison office, visited USCENTCOM for orientation briefings. The visit was a success, and General Hughes came away with a better understanding of USCENTCOM and the many problems, ramifications, and sensitivities associated with the its area of responsibility.

(U) Another major project involved the SAC liaison office in the USCENTCOM Master Priority List. The SAC liaison office project officer has been instrumental in working with HQ SAC in developing SAC input for the MPL. In addition, the SAC liaison office accompanied J-4 and J-5 representatives to brief the SAC staff on the aims and objectives of the MPL program.

(U) The USCENTCOM/MAC interrelationship continued in full swing during the year. Because of its unique position as the only unified command to have its headquarters outside of its area of responsibility, USCENTCOM had to rely almost exclusively on the transportation operating agencies for its peacetime and wartime planning, exercises, and administrative operations in the AOR. MAC provided the airlift and special operations (air) assets to support the command.

(U) On a day-to-day basis, MAC flew C-5s, C-141s, C-130s,

and commercial contact flights in and out of the theater to support American interests in most of the 19 countries situated in the AOR. Prime recipients of this channel and special airlift service were the various OMCs and associated security assistance agencies, the US Navy, ELF ONE at Riyadh, prepositioning sites at Port Sudan and Masirah Island, and indirectly, the attachés assigned to the various embassies.

MAC provided a continuous US presence in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. The command had transportation detachments at Cairo, Jiddah, and Dhahran, with two people each at Cairo and Jiddah, and nine at Dhahran. It operated regular organic or contract flights into eight countries in USCENTCOM's AOR: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and the Sudan. Saudi Arabia had the most MAC channel flights, with four per week into Dhahran and one per week into Jiddah and Riyadh. Within Saudi Arabia, a USEUCOM-assigned C-130 operated out of Dhahran flying intra-Saudi mission six days a week as dictated by cargo and passengers. Nairobi, Kenya, averaged three MAC flights per week as part of the Diego Garcia channel. Two flights per week went to Oman's Masirah Island as extensions of the Cubi Point-Diego Garcia

channels in support of the Navy in the Indian Ocean. Bahrain was also visited twice a week, while Amman, Jordan received one MAC channel flight per week.

In the Sudan, Khartoum and Port Sudan each received one MAC channel in Somalia. Both the Mogadishu and Khartoum missions were extensions of the Norfolk to Diego Garcia channel in support of the Navy in the Indian Ocean.²⁸

(U) MAC provided significant support for eight USCENTCOM exercises conducted during the year: BLACK ROCK 84-2, ACCURATE TEST 84, SLY FOX 84, GALLANT KNIGHT 84, SHADOW HAWK 84, GALLANT EAGLE 84 (provided SOF as well as airlift support), IRON COBRA 84, and NARROW PASSAGE 85, for which MAC provided an MC-130 as well as airlift support. Additionally, MAC took part in three CPXs with USCENTCOM: NIGHT TRAIN 84, POWDER RIVER 85, and ELLIPSE FOXTROT 85.

(U) During the year, MAC provided direct logistical support for several "real-world" contingencies, including ELF SENTRY (March and September in Egypt), EAGLE LOOK (March and

^(U)
28. Fact Paper ~~(S)~~, "Military Airlift Command (MAC) Support for USCENTCOM," undated, MAC Liaison Office.

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April in Egypt and the Sudan), and INTENSE LOOK (August and September in Egypt and Saudi Arabia).

(U) Because of heavy commitments, HQ MAC provided innovative airlift initiatives to satisfy user requirements. For example, during the EAGLE LOOK deployment, several C-5s were used. Because of a lack of available C-141s, MAC used C5s almost exclusively during the redeployment. Despite the reluctance of some to use the C-5 because of its reputation for poor schedule reliability, the C-5s performed extremely well in returning all passengers and cargo to CONUS. This was one of the first times that C-5s had been used on a preponderance of such missions for a deployment. During GALLANT EAGLE, airlift requirements for this exercise bumped against, then overlapped, prior requirements for REFORGER 84. C-141s and aircrews became scarce and MAC had to contract heavily with commercial carriers to move USCENTCOM and component troops to and from the western CONUS. This was the first time that such a heavy commercial airlift had to be used for an intra-CONUS move. This commercial movement kept the exercise from having to be stretched out over an unacceptable length of time. On the other hand, it kept MAC crews from participating in the USCENTCOM exercise,

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though they were heavily committed to Europe and REFORGER.

(U) INTENSE LOOK provided USCENTCOM, MAC, USLANTCOM and other planners with unique challenges, some of which were "firsts." Again, C-5s were used extensively for both deployment and redeployment, though in this case it was the nature of the cargo, which drove the aircraft allocation. Outsized Navy RH-53s for aerial mine hunting could not be carried by smaller aircraft. To sustain operations in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a C-130 shuttle was established. This seemed simple enough, but from the standpoint of funding, scheduling, and commitment, the operation became complex because three unified commands were involved. USLANTCOM helicopters operated in the USCENTCOM AOR off one USCENTCOM ship and one USEUCOM ship. Resupply parts for the helicopters were generated by USLANTCOM in Charleston, South Carolina and Norfolk, Virginia and shipped from Norfolk to Sigonella, Italy via a MAC C-141 flying a US Navy channel destined for Diego Garcia. The parts were then flown from Sigonella to Cairo and Jiddah in the USCENTCOM AOR aboard a USEUCOM-assigned C-130 on a mission validated and funded by United States Naval Forces Europe (USNAVEUR) and scheduled by USAFE's 322 Airlift Division belonging to MAC. This was clearly a classic example of interservice joint cooperation and execution.

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The Defense Fuel Supply Center continued to seek additional petroleum storage facilities in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. It secured 287,000 barrels of storage in Mombasa, Kenya and evaluated offers for another 350,000 barrels of storage. In Somalia, it secured 88,000 barrels of storage under contract with the National Petroleum Agency. The condition of the tanks at Berbera, Somalia (64,000 barrels) precluded their immediate use and estimates to repair them exceeded \$2,000,000. If repair costs were as high as the estimate, it was doubtful that the Defense Fuel Supply Center could fund the repair. In Djibouti, contracts were awarded for 223,000 barrels of storage. This was the limit agreed to by the American Embassy in Djibouti and the Defense Fuel Supply Center. In Oman, the Defense Fuels Supply Center had 246,000 barrels of storage at Mina Al Fahal and was negotiating with the Sultan of Oman Air Force for an additional 1,500,000 barrels of storage in the vicinity of Raysuit, Oman. At the end of the year, a second draft of the Oman storage proposal was being staffed and a team from the Defense Fuels Supply Center was planning to return to Oman for discussions in late June and early July 1985. Finally, in Bahrain, a contract for 1,600,000 barrels of storage was being evaluated. Audits of the contractor's proposal were

completed and the Defense Fuel Supply Center expected to receive the results of these audits early in 1985. An additional two months were required in contract negotiations and the Defense Fuel Supply Center anticipated that contract award will be possible in October 1985.

(U) The office of the Defense Intelligence Agency Representative to USREDCOM and the RDJTF was established on 23 August 1982. Authority for assignment of a DIA representative to MacDill AFB was derived from DOD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency," which charged the Director, DIA with ensuring "that adequate, timely and reliable intelligence is available to the Unified and Specified Commands" (paragraph C.3). The DIA Representative position required a US Army lieutenant colonel who had extensive previous experience with the Defense Intelligence Agency and who possessed a thorough knowledge of its organization, mission, and functions. The DIA representative served both USCENCOM and USREDCOM with the mission of ensuring effective and responsive all-source Defense intelligence support to the Command Group and staff, and serving as the principal Defense intelligence advisor to the Commander in Chief through the J-2.

(U) Pursuant to this mission, the DIA representative

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performed the following general functions: conducted frequent liaison with each division in the Intelligence Directorate; stayed abreast of developments within USCENTCOM and its components which might affect Defense intelligence support; through the J-2, kept the CINC and his staff advised of any significant developments in Defense intelligence; performed liaison and coordination functions for the J-2 prior to and during major exercises. During 1984, the DIA representative performed all of these functions in providing intelligence support to USCENTCOM.

(U) The DIA representative participated extensively in the planning and development of a concept for an Intelligence Center at MacDill AFB. He assisted in coordinating numerous meetings, briefings, and conferences among USCENTCOM staff members and their counterparts at USREDCOM and DIA. At year's end, a proposal was being staffed within the JCS. It envisioned a facility with more than 100 intelligence specialists to provide on-site intelligence support to both USCENTCOM and USREDCOM.

(U) The DIA representative participated in two major exercises as the "team chief" for a group of DIA staff officers who were sent from Washington, DC to take part in

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the exercises: GALLANT KNIGHT 84, from 5 to 12 May at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and BOLD VENTURE 85, from 26 October to 4 November at Fort Lewis, Washington. (USCENTCOM was represented in BOLD VENTURE by only a response cell.) These exercises proved instrumental in identifying shortcomings in the strategic intelligence setting and in scenario development which formed the basis for player reactions and national agency intelligence input to the exercise scenario. Closer coordination between J-2 and DIA early in exercise planning would result in significant improvements to the strategic setting and intelligence scenario, improving exercise realism.

(U) Throughout the year, the DIA representative assisted the command in identifying points of contact to obtain timely DIA intelligence support. During operation EAGLE LOOK in March, coordination and liaison activities by the DIA representative led to the satisfaction of a number of critical intelligence requirements. Anticipating personnel turbulence in the J-2 staff, the DIA representative assisted in arranging a series of exchange visits between USCENTCOM J-2 and DIA analysts. These visits aided analysts at both headquarters in achieving mutual respect for their counterparts and in gaining insight into common problem areas. The DIA representative also assisted the J-2 and his staff in accomplishing necessary

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coordination for increased intelligence exchanges with selected nations in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. As a result, significant progress was made toward expanding the role of the command in these important multilateral exchanges of intelligence.

(U) Another liaison function was the Defense Communications Agency Field Office at MacDill AFB. This office, working with DCA headquarters, provided technical assistance to J-6 during exercises, whether held within or outside of the CONUS. Its technical assistance focused on entering and using the Defense Communications system and on activating the leased circuits required to support these exercises, which included GALLANT KNIGHT 84 and GALLANT EAGLE 84.

(U) The DCA field office also provided technical assistance to the J-6 staff in preparing and processing communications-related ROCs. It provided technical and planning assistance to the J-2 staff and provided communications support for intelligence. Finally, the field office provided technical briefings to the staff on the Defense Data Network and the Integrated-Service/Agency Automated Message Processing Exchange.

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(U) The United States Information Agency provided USCENTCOM with a senior representative to serve as the International Public Affairs Advisor to USCINCCENT to monitor foreign public affairs. The Soviet disinformation campaign against the United States and USCENTCOM increased throughout the year as the command became better known throughout the area. A favorite disinformation theme of the Soviets was that the US had secret agreements for military bases in USCENTCOM'S AOR, especially in Pakistan and Egypt. This theme was frequently picked up by the Indian press in the case of Pakistan and by anti-US newspapers in the Persian Gulf which

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were often edited or written by Palestinians.

(U) Despite frequent denials by Pakistan, Egypt, and the US that such bases existed, the Soviets continued to harp on that line and such stories were often printed. President Mubarek even took the extreme step of flying a group of Arab editors to Ras Banas to prove that there were no American troops there.

(U) The extensive US aid to drought-ridden Ethiopia received almost no publicity in the Ethiopian press while the belated Russian airlift assistance was widely hailed by that Marxist government. The height of deceit and ingratitude was reached when a high-ranking Ethiopian charged that his country's suffering was really the fault of the US because it had not come to Ethiopia's aid earlier. The USIA reprinted several stories from the American press, which were placed in some papers in USCENTCOM's AOR, pointing out that the Marxist system of government in Ethiopia had seriously hurt the country's ability to provide food for its people and that lavish sums had been squandered on the celebration of the revolution in Addis Ababa while thousands of people were starving outside the capital.

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(U) The Political Advisor was a US senior Foreign Service officer who provided advice and assistance on political matters to USCINCCENT and the USCENTCOM staff. The POLAD, Mr. (b)(6) (b)(6) maintained a close working relationship with senior State and Defense Department officials, as well as with US Ambassadors in USCENTCOM's AOR. He assured that USCINCCENT received all available sensitive and relevant political information. The POLAD traveled to Washington to coordinate key issues for USCINCCENT and accompanied him on all but one of his OCONUS trips. Countries visited included Britain, Egypt, Djibouti, Bahrain, Oman, Panama, Honduras, the Philippines, Jordan, Pakistan, Diego Garcia, Morocco, Portugal, Kenya, Somalia, the UAE, and Qatar. Mr. (b)(6) also took a short operational visit to Egypt and Saudi Arabia during INTENSE LOOK in August.

(U) In January, the POLAD attended a four-day conference in Tokyo sponsored by USPACOM and the East Asian Liaison group on Embassies' Emergency Action Planning. Following this conference, the POLAD took the initiative in organizing a similar conference for the embassies in USCENTCOM's AOR. Co-hosted by the State Department and USCENTCOM, this conference was held in Nairobi on 7 and 8 June. The USCENTCOM contingent was headed by Maj Gen Robert Taylor, the Deputy USCINCCENT.

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(U) During the year, the POLAD's office was OPR for visits of the US Ambassadors to NATO, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, the UAE, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, and Jordan. Mr. (b)(6) made presentations to the security assistance organization chiefs in January, the Air Force Special Operations Crisis Management Seminar at Hurlburt Field, Florida, in April and August, the CINC's Commanders Conference at Fort Bragg in May, and Allegheny College in July.

(U) In the continuing effort to strengthen USCENTCOM's working relationships with State and the Embassies, the POLAD arranged the second annual State-USCENTCOM Roundtable in Washington, DC on 5 December. It was jointly hosted by the JCS and State and the USCENTCOM attendees were headed by Maj Gen David C. Rohr, Deputy USCINCCENT. The POLAD also sent two USCENTCOM activities cables to all ambassadors and charges during the year. Upon the departure of Lt Col (b)(6) USAF, in August, Lt Col (b)(6) USAF, assumed the duties of the Deputy POLAD.

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DISTINGUISHED VISITORS TO HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

1984

JANUARY

- 5 Dr. (b)(6)
Director of Mobility, Office of Undersecretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering
- 9 Messrs. (b)(6) and (b)(6)
House Appropriations Committee, Surveys and
Investigations
- 10 Brigadier General Roy L. Nelson
Commander, 377th Theater Army Area Command
- 11 Mr. (b)(6)
Political Counselor to US Embassy, Ankara Turkey
- 11 Admiral James Gracey
Commandant of the Coast Guard
- 11 Mr. (b)(6)
Assistant Deputy Director for Research, DIA
- 13 General Thomas M. Ryan, Jr.
Commander in Chief Military Airlift Command
- 13 Mr. (b)(6)
Area Director for Foreign Affairs
Standard Oil of Indiana
- 13 Vice Admiral Thomas J. Hughes
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Logistics
- 13 Mr. (b)(6) (ES-3)
Deputy Director for Resources and Systems
- 14 Major General Leo J. LeBlanc, Jr.
Commanding General, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing
El Toro, California

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- 17 Lieutenant General Phillip D. Shutler, USMC (Ret)
Director for DOD/IDA South Atlantic Lessons Learned
Study
- 17 Major General Edward C. O'Connor
Commander, US Army Security Assistance Center
- 17 Lieutenant General John L. Piotrowski
COMUSCENTAF and Commander, Ninth Air Force
- 17 Brigadier A. W. L. McKinnon
United Kingdom Land Forces
- 19-20 Rear Admiral William J. Ryan
Commander, Defense Fuel Supply Center
- 20 Mr. Ralph Regula (Republican, Ohio)
House of Representatives
- 20-24 General P. X. Kelley
Commandant of the Marine Corps
- 21 General John W. Vessey, Jr.
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
- 26 Colonel [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Commander, Air Weather Service
- 27-28 General P. X. Kelley
Commandant of the Marine Corps
- 29 Jan- Visit of the NATO Nuclear Planning
2 Feb High Level Group
- 30 Jan- Commodore R. G. Heaslip
1 Feb Director, Defence Commitments (Rest of the World)
US/UK Planners Conference
- 30 Jan- Security Assistance Conference
3 Feb
- 30 Jan Brigadier General F. Scanlon
Military Assistant to the Commander in Chief
US Pacific Command

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FEBRUARY

- 1-2 Ambassador David M. Abshire
US Ambassador to NATO
- 2-3 Mr. (b)(6) Jr.
Minister-Counselor, US Interests Section, Baghdad
- 3 Mr. (b)(6)
Director, Tactical Technology Office
Defense Advanced Research for Projects Agency, (DARPA)
- 6-7 AOR Ambassadors' Visit

His Excellency Ejaz Azim
Ambassador of Pakistan
- 8 Honorable Louis L. Giuffrida
Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency
- 9 Major General Joseph Fant
DCG, Second US Army, Ft Gillem, Georgia
- 8-10 Lieutenant General Ibrahim Abdel Ghafour El Orabi
Chief of Staff, Egyptian Armed Forces
- 10 Ms. (b)(6)
Chief, Projection Forces and Analytical Support, OSD
- 15 Major General Grayson D. Tate, Jr. USA
Deputy Director, Defense Nuclear Agency
- 16-17 Lieutenant General William J. Livsey
COMUSARCENT
- 16-17 Ambassador Walter L. Cutler
US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
- 21 Brigadier General Houston P. Houser
Chief of Staff, Third US Army
- 22 Mr. (b)(6)
Director, Energy and Transportation Policy
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics
- 22 Mr. (b)(6) GS-18
Director, CIA Policy and Coordination Staff

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22-23 Kuwait Air Force Officers

22-23 Major General Click D. Smith
Deputy Director for Logistics (Strategic Mobility), J-4
JCS

23 Colonel [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Chief, Morocco-US Liaison Office

24 Canadian National Defense College

Major General Leonard V. Johnson, CD
Commandant of the National Defence College

24-25 Rear Admiral Joseph H. Miller
Deputy Director of Naval Reserve Advisory Council
Quarterly Meeting

27 Vice Admiral Johan Hendrik Balthazar Hulshof
Commander and Chief, Royal Netherlands Navy

28-29 Major General Jacques Guichard
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
Headquarters French Armed Force

27 Feb- Commodore Alvin S. Newman
1 Mar COMNAVCENT

27 Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6) SES-1
Deputy Director for Transportation
Directorate of Transportation, Energy and Troop Support
HQ DCSLOG

MARCH

1 Dr. [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower
Installation and Logistics

2 Colonel [REDACTED] (b)(6) (USAF)
Deputy Commandant of Armed Forces Staff College

2 Vice Admiral Edward A. Burkhalter, Jr.
Director, Intelligence Community Staff

4-5 Colonel [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Chief, Morocco - US Liaison Office

- 5 Mr. (b)(6)
Foreign Correspondent for the Orlando Sentinel
- 5 Brigadier General William B. McGrath
Deputy Director, Planning Resources, J-4, OJCS
- 6 Mr. (b)(6) SES-5
Chairman of the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Committee
- 8 Commodore (b)(6)
Chief, Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency (SAGA), JCS
- 8 Mr. Richard Halloran
New York Times Correspondent
- 9 Mr. (b)(6)
Institute for Defense Analyses
- 11-12 Mr. (b)(6) SCES-5
Chief, G Operations Analysis Group, NSA
- 15 Lieutenant General R. T. Herres
Director, Command, Control, and Communications Systems,
OJCS
- 16 North Atlantic Assembly Subcommittee
(On out of Area Security Challenges to the Alliance)
- 8 Mr. (b)(6)
- 19 Major General Edward C. O'Connor
Commander, US Army Security Assistance Center
- 19 Lieutenant General Bennett L. Lewis
Deputy Assistant, SecDef Mobilization Planning and
Requirements
- 23-25 Major General Walter R. Longanecker, USAF (Retired)
Special Assistance to the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, HQ USAF
- 28 Major General Alastair W. Dennis
Director of Military Assistance Overseas
Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom
- 29-30 Brigadier General Girard Seitter, III
Director of Health Care Operations
Office of the Army
Surgeon General

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30 General Leopold Chalupa
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe

APRIL

5-6 Brigadier General William A. Bloomer
Assistant Wing Commander, Third Marine Aircraft Wing

10-11 Major General Charles W. Brown
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
(Security Assistance) DA, (ADCSLOG)

13 General Goert L. J. Huyser
Chief of Defense Staff, The Netherlands

18-19 Capt (b)(6)
USN, CMEF/Chief of Staff Designate

19 Rear Admiral Edward A. Wilkinson, Jr.
Director, Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)

20 Ambassador Byong Hoin Lew
South Korean Ambassador to the US

22-23 Pakistan National Defence College

Lieutenant General S. M. H. Bukhari
Commandant Pakistan National Defence College

23 Mr. (b)(6)
Dept of State, Director of the Office for India, SRI
Lankas, Maldies and Bhutan

25 Brigadier General Robinson
Deputy Executive Director for Chemical/Nuclear Matters

25-27 Mr. (b)(6) SES-4
Deputy Director, WWMCCS ADP Technical Support

25-27 Dr. (b)(6)
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs

30 Mr. William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence Agency

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MAY

- 1 Mr. Roy Gutman
Correspondent for Newsday
- 2 NDU General/Flag Officer Course
- 2 Major General Harley A. Hughes
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations Plans
Headquarters, Strategic Air Command
- 4 Lieutenant General Theodore G. Jenes, Jr.
Commander, US Army Forces Central Command
- 7 Lieutenant General Geoffrey H. Howlett
General Officer Commanding, Southeast District
of the British Armed Forces
- 10-11 Mr. (b)(6)
Director of System Evaluation
Division, IDA
- 14 Ambassador George M. Lane
USEUCOM Political Advisor
- 15 Mr. (b)(6)
Chief Engineer/Scientist
Defense Communications Agency
- 15 Rear Admiral Avrit, OPNAV-4
Strategic Sealift and USN/USA Cargo Offload Discharge
Systems
- 15-16 Major General Monroe T. Smith
Commander, Air Force Acquisition
Logistics Center
- 15-17 Brigadier General Claude T. Ivey
US Defense Representative to Pakistan
- 16-17 Mr. (b)(6)
Vice Director Management Operations DIA
- 16-19 US/UK USCINCENT Planners Conference
- 18 Mr. (b)(6)
Director, Strategic Concepts Development Center

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- 18 Ms. (b)(6)
Member of House Appropriations Committee,
Surveys and Investigations
- 22 Brigadier General Michael H. Alexander
WWMCCS Information System Joint Program Manager
- 24-25 Mr. (b)(6)
USIA Adisor

JUNE

- 3-5 AVM (b)(6)
Chief of Sultan of Oman's Air Force
and
AVM (b)(6)
Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments)
MOD London
- 4 Spanish Joint Staff College
- 12-13 Major General William E. Klein
Vice Director, Plans and Policy Directorate, OJCS (J-5)
- 12 Colonel (b)(6)
Chief of USAF Medical Service Corps
Office of the Surgeon General
Washington, DC
- 12 Mr. Bruce Van Voorst
Correspondent for Time Magazine
- 12-13 Lieutenant General Gilbert Forray
Commanding General, French Rapid Action Force
and
Brigadier General Michel de Noray
French Military Attache
- 15 Chief Judge Robinson O. Eerett
Court of Military Appeals
- 17-19 Brigadier General Stanton R. Musser
Chief, Office of Military Cooperation, Cairo, Egypt
- 18-20 Brigadier General P. N. Scheidel
Air Force Chief Security Police

22 Brigadier General James L. Crouch
J-6 for USREDCOM

JULY

6-8 Lieutenant General Jack N. Merritt
Director of the Joint Staff

9-10 Brigadier Stephen R. A. Stopford
Military Attache, British Army Staff

10 General Robert W. Sennewald
Commanding General, Forces Command

11 DIA Scientific Advisory Committee

11-12 Major General H. J. Coates, MBE
Australian Defence Attache

16 Major General Spence M. Armstong
Chief, US Military Training Mission, Saudi Arabia

16 Saudi Arabian Land Forces (SALF) Officers

16 General Wallace Nutting
USCINCRD

17 Ambassador John R. Countryman
US Ambassador to Oman

19 Air Marshall Donald Hall
Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, UK

20 Ambassador Paul H. Doeker
US Ambassador to Jordan (Designate)

20 American Trade and Finance Company

24 Mr. (b)(6)
Deputy Assistant Director of National Security
and International Affairs Division (Systems),
Congressional Budget Office

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- 25 Mr. (b)(6) & Dr. (b)(6)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics
and Materiel Management & International Program Analyst
- 30-31 Major General Kenneth D. Burns
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs), OSD/ISA

AUGUST

- 1 Commodore Newman
COMUSANAVCENT
- 3 Mr. (b)(6)
Chief of Station (Designate) to the UAE
- 10 Lieutenant General Theodore G. Jenes, Jr.
COMUSARCEN
- 15 Ambassador Anthony Quainton
US Ambassador to Kuwait
- 17 Brigadier General Wayne O. Jefferson
Deputy Director for C³ Connectivity and Evaluation, JCS
- 20 Lieutenant General Charles J. Cunningham, Jr.
Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs and Evaluation
HQ USAF
- 23-24 Mr. (b)(6)
Director, Arabian Peninsula Affairs
and
Mr. (b)(6)
Director, Office of Regional Affairs, near Eastern and
South Asian Bureau
- 24 Brigadier General Robertson
Commander Middle East Division Corps of Engineers
- 27 Mr. (b)(6)
Deputy Staff Director, Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations

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- 28 Mr. (b)(6)
Designated Political-Military Officer
American Embassy, Djibouti
- 28-30 Mr. (b)(6) GM-15
Deputy Director for International Attiities, OASD(HA)

SEPTEMBER

- 14 Royal College of Defence Studies
- 18-20 Colonel (b)(6)
Commander, Jordanian Special Forces (JSF)
- 20-21 Ambassador William A. Rugh
American Ambassador to Yemen (YAR) (Designate)
and
Mr. (b)(6)
Director, Office of Egyptian Affairs (NEA/EGY)
- 23-24 Mr. (b)(6)
Director of International Logistics, OSD
and
Ms. (b)(6)
Office of International Logistics, OSD
- 24 Mr. (b)(6)
Secretary General, Dutch Ministry of Defense
The Netherlands
- 24 Dr. (b)(6)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Policy Analysis
- 24-25 Ambassador G. Quincy Lumsden
US Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates
- 25-26 The Belgian Parliament Defense Committee

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- 26-27 Major General Nabil Ibrahim Ayub
Chief of South Section and Vice Egyptian Air Force
Training Authority (Plus Four)
- 26-27 Lieutenant General John T. Chain, Jr.
Director of Bureau Politico-Military Affairs
State Department

OCTOBER

- 5 Lieutenant General Julio Alfredo Fernandez Torres
Chief, Argentine Joint Staff
- 9-10 Dr. (b)(6)
Director of the Strategic Concepts Development Center
of the National Defense University
- 10-11 Rear Admiral William J. Ryan
Commander, Defense Fuel Supply Center
- 11 Mr. (b)(6)
Chief Test Pilot for the F-16 Program at General Dynamics
- 11-14 General Sir Edward Burgess
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
- 18 Brigadier General R. Boyd
Commander, International Logistics Center
- 22 General Richard G. Stilwell (Ret)
Deputy Under Secretary Defense for Policy
- 22-24 Brigadier General Philip M. Drew
Assistant Deputy Director, Political-Military Affairs,
JCS/J-5
- 24 Mr. (b)(6)
USIA NEA Area Director
- 26 Brigadier General James W. Ray
Commander Middle East Division Engineer
- 31 Admiral George E. R. Kinnear, II
Grumman Corporation

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NOVEMBER

- 1-2 Major General Wesley H. Rice, USMC
Director, Joint Special Operations Agency
- 5 Dr. (b)(6)
Director of Mobility, Office of the Undersecretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering
- 5 Admiral Sir William Staveley
Commander in Chief, Fleet, UK
- 5-7 Rear Admiral Bruce A. Harlow
Assistant Judge Advocate General for the Navy for
Operations and Management
- 5-9 Annual USCENTCOM Legal Conference
- 6-7 Admiral Theodoros Deyiannis
Chief, Hellenic National Defense Staff
- 6-8 Major General Hardin L. Olson, Jr.
Director, Strategic Plans and Resources Analysis Agency
- 6-8 Major General Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr.
Commanding General, I Marine Amphibious Force
- 13 Colonel (b)(6)
TAC and USCENAF Surgeon
- 13 Brigadier General (P) Claude T. Iey
US Defense Representative to Pakistan
- 14 Major General Norman G. Delbridge
Deputy Chief of Engineers, Corps of Engineers
- 16 Honorable John O. Marsh
Secretary of the Army
- 20-21 Rear Admiral Edward K. Walker, Jr.
Chief of Supply Corps and Commander Naval Supply
Systems Command
- 24-27 Major General Abdullah Al-Tassan
General Director of Central Inspections
Ministry of Defense and Aiatio, Saudi Arabia

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25-26 Lieutenant General Aslam Beg
Chief of the General Staff, Pakistan Army

27-28 (b)(6)
Deputy Director of Budget (Operations), Hq USAF

29 Nov- Brigadier General Stanton R. Musser
3 Dec Chief, Office of Military Cooperation, Cairo Egypt

DECEMBER

3 Ambassador Peter S. Bridges
Ambassador Designate to Somalia
and
Mr. (b)(6)
Charge d'Affairs, Baghdad

4 Financial Working Group Meeting

4 Major General Maurice C. Padden
Vice Director for Operations, JCS

4 Lieutenant General Theodore G. Jenes
COMUSARCENT

6 Dr. Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

12 Major General John M. Brown
USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, FORSCOM

11-14 General Sir Edward Burgess
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

12 Brigadier General Frederick E. Sisley, USMC
Deputy Director J-3, EUCOM

12 Major General Donald J. Fulham, USMC
Director J-5, US Forces Korea

14 Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton, USA, (Ret)
Director, Office for Disaster Assistance, Agency for
International Development, Department of State

14 Mr. (b)(6)
Deputy Director for Plans, Production and Operations
Defense Mapping Agency

- 14 Mr. (b)(6)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Installations
- 17 Brigadier General Wayne O. Jefferson, Jr.
Deputy Director for C³ Connectivity and Evaluation,
JCS, USAF
- 18 Brigadier General John T. Stihl, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Systems, Hq USAF
- 18 Major General Norman E. Archibald, USA
Director, Joint Tactical Command, Control and
Communications Agency
- 27 Mr. (b)(6)
Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations

GLOSSARY

AASE	Army Aviation Support Element
AAVS	Aerospace Audiovisual Service
ADP	automatic data processing
AFB	Air Force base
AOR	area of responsibility
AT&T	American Telephone and Telegraph
AUTODIN	automatic digital network
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications
AUTOVON	automatic voice network
AWACS	Airborne Control and Warning System
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BG	brigadier general (US Army)
BGen	brigadier general (USMC)
Brig Gen	brigadier general (USAF)
C ²	command and control
C ³	command, control, and communications
C ³ CM	command, control, and communications countermeasures
C ⁴ S	command and control, communications, and computer systems
CAA	Combined Arms Army Command Arrangement Agreement
Capt	captain (USAF and USMC)
CAT	crisis action team

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CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	Criminal Investigative Division
CINC	commander in chief
CITS	USCENTCOM Imagery Transmission System
Col	colonel (USAF and USMC)
COL	colonel (US Army)
COMIDEASTFOR	Commander, Middle East Force
COMINT	communications intelligence
COMSEC	communications security
CONPLAN	concept plan
CONUS	continental United States
CPT	captain (US Army)
CPX	command post exercise
CSSE	Computer Systems Support Element
DACT	dissimilar air combat tactics
DART	deployable ADP response team
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DEC	Digital Equipment Corporation
DEFCON	Defense Readiness Condition
DESIST	Decision Support System for Terrorism
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIDHS	deployable intelligence data handling system
DITS	Digital Imagery Transmission System
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency

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DOD	Department of Defense
DRB	Defense Resources Board
ELINT	electronic intelligence
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FHE	Forward Headquarters Element
FMA	foreign military sales
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FTX	field training exercise
GDIP	General Defense Intelligence Program
Gen	general (USAF and USMC)
GEN	general (US Army)
HF	high frequency
HQ	headquarters
HUMINT	human intelligence
IDHS	intelligence data handling system
IG	Inspector General
IMINT	imagery intelligence
IOC	initial operating capability
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSE	Joint Communications Support Element
JDA	Joint Deployment Agency
JDS	Joint Deployment System
JMP	Joint Manpower Program
JOPS	Joint Operations Planning System

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J-SAK	Joint Attack of the Second Echelon
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPD	Joint Strategic Planning Document
JSPDSA	Joint Strategic Planning Document and Supporting Analysis
LANTCOM	Atlantic Command
LASH	lighterage aboard ship
LOC	lines of communications
LTC	lieutenant colonel (US Army)
Lt Col	lieutenant colonel
Lt Col	lieutenant colonel (USAF)
LTG	lieutenant general (US Army)
LtGen	lieutenant general (USMC)
Lt Gen	lieutenant general (USAF)
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
Maj	major (USAF and USMC)
MAJ	major (US Army)
Maj Gen	major general (USMC)
Maj Gen	major general (USAF)
MEDNTPS	Mediterranean Near Term Prepositioned Ship
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MG	major general (US Army)
MGySgt	Master Gunnery Sergeant

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MIDEASTFOR	Middle East Force
MOA	memorandum of agreement
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MPL	Master Priority List
MSG	master sergeant (US Army)
MSgt	master sergeant (USAF and USMC)
MWR	morale, welfare, and recreation
NAS	Naval Air Station
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Order
NIS	Naval Investigative Service
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NTPF	near-term pre-positioning fleet
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OMC	Office of Military Cooperation
OPCOM	operational command
OPLAN	operations plan
OPORD	operations order
OPR	office of primary responsibility
OPSEC	operations security

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OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSI	Office of Special Investigations
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACOM	Pacific Command
PAL	Permissive Action Link
PDRY	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
POL	petroleum, oil, and lubricants
POLAD	Political Advisor
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PPBS	planning, programming, and budgeting system
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
ROC	required operational capability
ROWPU	reverse osmosis water purification unit
SAC	Strategic Air Command
2Lt	second lieutenant (US Army)
Sgt	Sergeant (USAF and USMC)
SHF	super high frequency
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operations Plan
SOAF	Sultan of Oman's Air Force
SOCENT	Special Operations Command Central
SOF	special operations force
SSgt	staff sergeant (USAF and USMC)
TAC	Tactical Air Command

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TACSIM	tactical simulation system
TDY	temporary duty
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TOPCAT	tactical operations planner collection and tasking
TOR	terms of reference
TPFDD	time phased force deployment data
TPFDL	time phased force and deployment list
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TRW	Tactical Reconnaissance Wing
TSgt	technical sergeant
TUSA	Third United States Army
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UHF	ultra high frequency
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
USARCENT	United States Army Central Command
USAREUR	United States Army Europe
USCENTAF	United States Central Command Air Forces
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCINCCENT	Commander in Chief, United States Central Command
USCINCPAC	Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command

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USCINCRD	Commander in Chief, United States Readiness Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USIA	United States Information Agency
USLANTCOM	United States Atlantic Command
USMARCENT	United States Marine Forces, Central Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USNAVCENT	United States Navy Central Command
USNAVEUR	United States Naval Forces Europe
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USREDCOM	United States Readiness Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VIP	very important person
WRM	war readiness material
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System
YAR	Yemen Arab Republic

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